

SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

EXTRAPOLATING SECURITY: WHEN EVERYTHING IS SECURITY, NOTHING IS SECURITY!

Ioana LEUCEA*

Abstract:

The usage of the concepts and words less for their denotative meaning and more for their connotative ones may seem unproblematic at a first glance. Yet the constant usage of language not for the primary significance of words may spread a lot of confusion even within the domain of strategic thinking. While scholars struggle to define and to clarify the concepts they use in order to develop a school of thought to prevent war and conflicts or the emergence of dangerous social phenomena, it seems that at the socio-political level the clarity is lost as the elusive interpretations proliferate.

The conventional wisdom developed after the end of the Cold War envisaged the concept of security in terms of expanding and deepening its meaning. The Copenhagen school advocated for different social domains to be included within the concepts of national, regional or global security, leaving the impression that the security risks are ubiquitous, that no social arena was to be left outside the security compass: be that culture, politics, or education. Every communication act would be monitored for the possibility of containing the seeds of evil, name them propaganda, disinformation, misinformation or fake-news. Film productions or literature are included here as well. Expressions like “cognitive warfare” or “hybrid warfare” have produced more confusion as it is presumed that there are no real peace periods but only war time preparation and that the social reality cannot not be defined in terms of real cooperation. For instance, assuming that specific issues of lesser importance should be included in the category of national security issues, in terms of comprehensive security, the door to intervention opens: the security services are allowed to intervene within the private or social spheres while these are supposed to be free of surveillance or monitoring.

Additionally, the analysis we propose intends to focus on the importance of finding the proper language for organizing the social space when speaking about security matters, as the management of national security depends a lot on the conceptual toolbox.

* Associate professor PhD, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania; email: leucea.ioana@animv.eu. Disclaimer: the material is a reflection of the authors’ opinions and beliefs, and does not represent the opinions, policies or the views of the Romanian Intelligence Service or the National Intelligence Academy “Mihai Viteazul”.

The article upholds the idea that by extrapolating the meaning of security, the words and concepts associated with it generate but confusion, which leads to poor management and organizational errors.

Keywords: *security; concepts; language; culture; cognitive warfare.*

Introduction

The concept of security has gained an almost ubiquitous popularity. It seems that the world has become such a dangerous arena that people must strive every second to survive. The extrapolation of the significance of the term “security”, which initially was used within the domain of military defence and war strategies, has lost its core definition and nowadays it has been transferred to almost all social spheres/ domains. We are now speaking about social security, food security, human security, state security, political security, economic security, financial security, medical security, educational security, communication security, and energetic security and so on. The same thing happens when we speak about threats or hybrid threats. The threat may refer to any type of risks, be they minor or catastrophic. There is no doubt that there are real problems, but the concept has become tautological and redundant as long as any political domain implies a security rationality.

As in the case of the broad definition of human security paradigm, the concept loses its contours and its possibilities to configure a security agenda. In this context, we may assume as well that a culture of fear has become prevalent. If fear becomes part of society’s daily life, this gives birth to a culture of fear (Mölder and Shiraev, 2021).

Extrapolating the connotative meanings of concepts

The usage of the concepts and words less for their denotative meaning and more for their connotative ones may seem unproblematic at a first glance. Yet the constant usage of language not for the primary significance of words may spread a lot of confusion even within the domain of strategic thinking. While scholars struggle to define and to clarify the concepts they use in order to develop a school of thought to prevent war and conflicts or the emergence of dangerous social phenomena, it seems that at the socio-political level the clarity is lost as

the elusive interpretations proliferate. Hannah Arendt (1968) noticed as well that key words selected and used within the socio-political discourse, such as liberty, justice, responsibility, virtue, power, glory lost their original spirit by their usage uprooted from the phenomenological reality. Equally, the same thing happens when speaking about the corrupt meaning of the words security, strategy and (hybrid) threats.

In my opinion, the subject of extrapolating the connotative meanings of the security concept refers to the issue of an abusive and improper way to utilize it, which, as in the case of the concept of strategy, has almost lost its meaning. (Hughes, 2014). The human security paradigm, developed within the post-Cold War period, expanded indefinitely the threats and risks to human life, leading to an almost never-ending list of security problems, be they related to poverty, underdevelopment, medical problems, societal violence, and political problems (Leucea, 2012). There is no doubt that the risks are real, yet the questions and the dilemmas are related to prioritizing and organizing the security agenda. As the security agenda has progressively expanded from the paradigm of securing the state towards human security, concepts like responsibility to protect, human rights, good governance, humanitarian interventions have been brought forefront and the need for rethinking the security concept indicates in fact a crisis of global organization and governance. In terms of ontological security, the dilemma between securing the state and securing the people involves a definition of international society or the answer related to reaching the consent at the global level related to answering the question as to who are the legitimate political actors on the global stage. Should or should not certain actors be recognized as legitimate political actors on the global scene? Who deserves to be protected? People or states?

When discussing the connotative meanings of strategy concept, Strachan (2005, p. 34) noticed the same: "The word 'strategy' has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities." (Strachan, 2005, p. 34) Moreover, Hughes (2014, p. 50) highlight that the term strategy used by governments to describe the diverse politics implemented during peacetime periods and less by armies during war times have gained popularity, yet the conceptual clarity was lost. Carl von Clausewitz (1982) correlated the word strategy with war and Antoine Henri Jomini (1992) considered that "strategy" is

the key in winning the war. Etymologically, the meaning of strategy derives from the Greek word *strategos* having the significance of a military rank, that of a general (Hughes, 2014, p. 50).

Similarly, with the deepening and the widening of the concept of security as the Copenhagen school understands it, the same happened with concept of strategy, the domains that integrated the term have been diversified and amplified. It has almost become a *cliché* within the domain of strategic studies to affirm that we may speak about a paradigmatic change in understanding and conceptualizing strategy and that the progress has been made from a narrow interpretation of the concept to a comprehensive approach of it (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1997). The newly emerged interest for themes like cognitive warfare, manipulation, propaganda, fake-news, and misinformation and so on posits the term strategy within the realm of communication, revealing an entire spectrum of instruments of communication, be they offensive or defensive.

Even the notion of war has been extrapolated to other social domains – weaponization of narratives, for instance – yet the hard meaning of war, *direct aggression executed by the armed forces of a state*, was less perceived as the main threat or risk. The idea of weaponizing discourses for attaining certain goals has also gained importance. The term weaponizing was as well correlated to ideologies or with the culture of uncertainty (Brezinsky, 2007). Similarly, in the whole society approach when speaking about the need of securitization of all domains transforms the entire society into a garrison, a military organization (Mölder and Shiraev, 2021, p. 14). As Raymond Aron (1958, p. 73) once said, the fear of war is often a tyrant's opportunity for preserving a totalitarian (as well as authoritarian) regimes.

Designing the international order: from the anarchic international society towards a cognitive anarchy

The limits of the traditional security paradigms that have structured the world in the past are no longer valid when mapping the international system today and implicitly when making a worldwide threat assessment, but the extrapolation of the security concept in almost any social domain involves the loss of its hard definitions. Therefore, we may assume that when everything is security, nothing is security and

signal that it is necessary to recover the core meaning of the security concept and its use in a proper way when mapping the international security environment.

The theoretical lenses used by the intelligence and political communities in assessing the international security environment have been configured by the traditional theories of international relations, be that classical realism, neorealism or neoclassical realism or by liberal and neoliberal paradigms. The traditional perspectives assumed a positivist ontology of the international society which was composed of a number of states functioning on the basis of certain understandings and rules of behaviour. The evolution of the global society has determined the specialists to reflect upon the traditional analytical frameworks of conceiving security. As the new digital/virtual realities imply even the modification of the human psyche, specialists created the term of "cyber-psychology" in order to highlight the deep influences the digital media has on people's mind and behaviour. Moreover, the fact that the communication environment has become the new battleground, the antechamber of war, brings to the foreground some elements having deep historical roots: a constant evolution of the conflicts and wars translated within the organizational field of the international society and its historical transformational processes. The configuration of the international order becomes a political goal as the construction of international society involves at least a general consensus of the great powers on how the world should look like or be composed of. Throughout history, the agreement of great powers on certain international principles was paramount for peace and stability (Clark, 2007).

The evolution of the international systems has been correlated with war and conflicts. The limits of the security dilemma the realist International Relations school of thought revealed, aggravated by the thinking provided by the offensive realism paradigm, and the prophecy of the unescapable tragedy of power politics, envisaged the counterproductive realist security paradigm when speaking about arms race, for instance, while securing the state (Mearheimer, 2010). As long as human history has demonstrated that the risk of war is enormous, securing the state by military means may become the main source of insecurity. The arms' race represents a global dynamic that endangers

the entire humanity, not only the states. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is such an example.

The constructivist approach of International Relations reveals very important ideas when discussing security issues, namely re-examines the ontological condition of the existence of society. The traditional security paradigms, realism and liberalism, assume the existence of the state, without questioning too much the societal dynamics which may modify dramatically its existence, be that war, migration (emigration or immigration), pandemics or identitarian phenomena. The culture, the ideas and the values people share, as constructivism upholds, have become nowadays the critical infrastructure in securing the state. Moreover, the nexus between education and security is more relevant than ever even for securing the state. The social realities are configured by cultural infrastructure and the goal of securing the state should be mediated by the cultural and educational framework. The ontological assumption of the existence of the states on which IR realism and liberalism are based when designing security strategies overlooks the constitutive “bricks” of a state: the will of people, their identities (Leucea, 2012). As the global order has firstly a cultural foundation, revisiting the principles of the global order should involve a general agreement upon basic principles. What is a state? What is international society? Who are we/they?

The formation or the fragmentation of the states is highly dependent on the legitimation principles, if not on coercion. Who is entitled to decide upon the right of existence of certain states or people? And the right answer might be that nobody or anybody. The formation of the states depends firstly upon the political will of the people, on its recognition on the global political map, preferably by all other states. From an ontological point of view, the national sovereignty assumes valuing the cultural specificity. The constitution of the international system derives from the deep-seated social values, from the intersubjective meanings people share and it is based on the agreement shared by the global actors upon the fundamental organizing principles: the world is composed of national states or it is composed of negotiated identities (Leucea, 2022).

The realist theory of IR places the concept of the balance of power at the centre of the systemic interpretation of security. The constitution of the international society, as David Philpott (2001) discusses, relies on the intersubjective understandings related to organizing social identities and on the function of the states. The international community of humankind cannot be primarily defined by the state's frontiers. The assumed anarchic condition of the international system, the world described in terms of state – system, a number of sovereign states that act for securing their existence, represents a picture depicted as being an objective condition, but it lacks the ultimate rationality: the cognitive maps people share, the tacit constitution of the international society (Philpott, 2001).

From the personal identities towards social identities, the world organization relies on people's perception of international reality. The understanding of our place in the world involves values and personal definitions: are we free individuals or subordinates of some systems? Do we have the liberty to participate in negotiations about who we are in the world or the definition should be imposed by coercion and military force? The idea that security is indivisible, that insecurity is exported and that the security challenges have a global dimension requires as well answers related to values.

While George Orwell in his dystopian novel "1984" describes a perpetual war – "Attention! Your attention, please! A newsflash has this moment arrived from the Malabar front. Our forces in South India have won a glorious victory!" – the description must be read in terms of self-constructed, often adversarial worlds that are permanently challenging one another and making the international system extremely destabilized and vulnerable (Mölder and Shiraev, 2021, 14). Many of these competing worlds have relied on more or less totalitarian or authoritarian ideologies. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes try to play hard with the weaknesses of liberal democracies, be that populism, corruption, control or strategic imagination: "The ability to produce effective strategic imagination becomes more and more apparent these days. Strategic advantage can be obtained by changing the rules or deliberately creating turbulence" (Stan Glaser, 1994, 31).

Failure of imagination leads to serious security failures, as Zbigniew Brzezinski (2007) once argued that the culture of fear “obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue.” A culture of irrational responses, long-lasting uncertainty and fear causes irrational demands. Officials – being under pressure of fear and uncertainty – make policy mistakes, which further lead to irrational reactions of the people (Mölder and Shiraev, 2021).

All this translated into the language of security studies indicates the ideological warfare: “It is a clash of fundamental ideas or principles referring to economy, government, politics, lifestyle, or life in general. For example, social conflict ideologies, like Marxism, focus on capitalism and inequality. Neo-Marxists often focus on race and colonialism. Political ideologies, like conservatism and liberalism, also make judgment calls about the structure and functioning of economic, social, and political forces. Nationalism calls attention to nation – centred models of development – American, French, Russian, and Chinese, among others, strongly emphasizing the idea of their exceptionalism. Civilizational ideologies are rooted in deep-seated cultural principles, such as Western, Eurasian, Muslim, Hindu, and Confucian, among others. These are, of course, just the most prominent ideological clashes the modern world is experiencing.” (Mölder and Shiraev 2021, 17)

If the entire world is experiencing a constant state of fear, anxiety, conflict, we may presume that by extrapolating the security concept to every social domain the result would be very much the same. When presuming the goal of targeting democratic election, the entire socio-political arena becomes a theatre of operations. Yet the aim might be creating a culture of confusion, a revised state of the nature characterized by the Hobbesian phrase “*homo homini lupus est*”.

The weaponization of a nonsense: illiberal democracy

The debates about populism have been extended within the academic sphere, as the phenomenon of populism is correlated with the democratic crises and the proliferation of the hybrid regimes, namely illiberal democracies. The IR realist security paradigm would bring the best arguments for limiting the spread of democracy worldwide. If the

enemy of autocrats are the democratic rules, then the realist paradigm of IR is their best ally. In fact, the axis of autocrats tries to elude the concept of good governance which becomes the indispensable instrument to be employed when speaking about human security and human rights (Leucea and Sofonea, 2022).

Promoting illiberal values¹ by some populist leaders (e.g. Viktor Orbán, Hungarian Prime Minister, the upholder of the idea that “his illiberal democracy despises the tolerance for minorities and rejects the control and the power equilibrium,” or Erdogan’s rhetoric question: Who are you? We are the people!), more often than not means xenophobic discourses that exclude certain minority rights or individual rights, but in terms of power politics the goal would be to weaken the democratic world by valuing the communitarian argument, as if the individual has less rights when confronting the majorities’ will.

Although there are opinions that assume the democratic character of populism, within an autocratic regime this embodies the perfect tool for gaining more power, without resorting to other democratic principles, be that the limited number of presidential mandates. If the main challenge for authoritarian regimes is to deny and reject the democratic rules, the social condition of fear, crises and war favour dictatorial and military attitudes of the leaders. If the world is in great danger, there is no place for democracy. Democracy would be subordinated to military regimes. The proclaimed twilight of democracy (Applebaum, 2020) must be perceived within the context of growing populist leaders and the seductive lure of authoritarianism. The fake-concept of illiberal democracy represents the perfect instrument in order to gain more power and control. When the number of presidential mandates in certain countries were permitted to be more than two, the concept of democracy was reinterpreted not in terms of a mechanism to

¹ The academia promoted the phrase as well, many books being written on the theme of illiberal democracy, among which: *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (2007), *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (1995), *Democracy Denied: Identity, Civil Society, and Illiberal Democracy in Hong Kong* (1999), *Temptations of Power. Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East* (2014), *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia. The Ideology of the Family-State* (2015), *Democratic Decline in Hungary. Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy* (2018).

prevent the centralization of power, yet as an exercise of control. By modifying the Constitutional rules and by resorting to people's will in doing that, the authoritarian leaders exploited the referendums in their favour. Stalin's quote may explain the situation: "it's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes."

The fact that the concept of illiberal democracy is an oxymoron, a contradiction in terms (Cornea, 2019) was not a sufficient argument for the concept not to gain popularity. By reducing democracy to the narrative "we are the people", we are the majority, and the concept of illiberal democracy was strategically launched in the global arena. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, had an important role in doing that in 2014. The same year, coincidence or not, Crimea was annexed by the Russian Federation by employing the democratic device of organizing a referendum most probably with predetermined results. The notoriety of the concept, although being a nonsense, reflects in fact the success of the authoritarian regimes' propaganda. Instead of naming the regimes' dictatorships, by using formulas like hybrid democracies, partial democracies, guided democracy, electoral authoritarian regime, void democracy and so on, the populist leaders sell the idea that they provide democratic regimes but in small portions. Moreover, Viktor Orbán (2014), upholder of the idea that "his illiberal democracy despises the tolerance for minorities and rejects the control and the power equilibrium" has made great steps towards legitimizing it.

Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has become a case study for illiberal democracy. The populist leader has exploited the nonsense of illiberal democracy to achieve power centralization. Andrei Cornea (2019) has written that by using the phrase illiberal democracy we do a favour to those tyrants by playing within their theatre of operations. By naming their regimes democracies we bring them compliments, we make a bow in front of them. Domenico Fisichella (2007, 313) insisted on the idea that in order for a regime to be called democratic it is not enough for people to vote. For the classical liberals like Benjamin Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville or John Stuart Mill, the danger of the tyranny of majority was obvious (Cornea, 2019). The emblematic statement of the Turkish president, "We are the people! So, who are you?", represents the core idea for populism, yet, as Karl Popper revealed, the emergence of

democracy as a political reality and as a philosophic term was not related to people's sovereignty, but it was the name given to a Constitution that is the opposite of a dictatorship (Popper, 1994, 157).

A defining feature of democracy, the majority rule, which often leads to populism should play a secondary role. The theory of democracy, understood as preventing the abuses of power, supports mechanisms such as limited mandates, separation of powers, the rule of law, multiparty system, periodical organization of elections etc., mechanisms that aim to protect the individual and the minority rights, to avoid dictatorship, be it the dictatorship of the parliament, of the masses or of other political groups. Therefore, we question the possibilities of overcoming the contradicting meanings of democracy, its legitimation – through the exclusive vote of majority – of certain illiberal policies, especially those included in the broader spectrum of xenophobia and discrimination by politicizing identities.

A critical reflection on the concept of democracy in relation with the values a society should be upheld and protected from being confiscated by political parties in their electoral fight, as sensible values like traditional family ethos or children's sexual education, subjects haunted for their high impact on society, should not be misused for partisan purposes. Organizing referendums for critical and important issues should be an instrument to fundament politics, yet not the definitive one as it could succumb as well to populism. We believe that the civil society should play an important role in the conduct of political battle by emphasizing and upholding some constitutional rules for the benefit of the whole society. The reconceptualization of national interest or of the public interest in a democratic way would be at stake as it depends deeply on theorizing democracy by emplacing the individual rights and the role of institutions within the political space. There are many voices in society that complain about the politicization of different social institutions which should be apolitical and have civil character.

Conclusions: towards an international constitution

Extrapolating the meaning of security and the expansion of its usages in almost any social sphere, be that internal or external, might indicate in fact the lack of consent in understanding international society. What is international society? How should it be configured for a more

stable security environment? In which degree the transformation of the global scene may bring more security or less security, as it seems every social arena involves a security rationale. For instance, the fight of the dictatorships against democratic rules exploits the camouflage of the fight against the American hegemony and the correlative antagonist concept: multipolarity. The autocrats can hardly reject the democratic values *per se*, yet by conflating the democratic values with the American foreign policy the fight borrows the appearance of a right, one perceived as legitimate in the field of international relations. The autocrats are not directly denying the value of human rights, but they reject US foreign policy as a supporter of the democratic system. By using nonsense concepts like illiberal democracy, the autocrats use the shiny lure to remain for decades in power. The arsenal for discretization of democracies employed by the authoritarian leaders contains as a special ingredient the presumption and the indemonstrable liaisons with the CIA. Applebaum (2025, p. 117) gives some examples in revealing the tactics. The author mentions for instance the writer Gene Sharp, who was accused of collaboration with the CIA and who published in 1994, in Bangkok, the book entitled *From Dictatorship to Democracy*.

Nowadays the authoritarian regimes in order to discredit their adversaries are claiming that the invocation of democracy, justice or the rule of law are nothing more than proofs for treason, foreign connections or external financing (Applebaum, 2025, pp. 127 and 129), assuming that there's no idealism or patriotism to explain the determination of some individuals to risk their life in the fight for freedom. The liberal order constructed after World War I replaced the balance of power system with the common security and the creation of the League of Nations. The liberal order had in centre the human rights concept: the international society was to be understood as an international society of peoples, not simply of states (Clark, 2007, p. 12).

The deep cultural structure of the international system the autocrats try to rewind is the liberal one, based on the value of individual liberty. To revolve in the mind of people that the social identity – our identity – take precedence over the individual identity reflect the deep cultural structure of the informal constitution of international society the autocrats want to change. The constitution of international society as Philpott (2001) name the concept, that the autocrats try to impose is one

composed of states, led by irremovable elites, less by people. The death in prison of Alexey Navalnii, the leader of the opposition party in the Russian Federation may represent such a victory for the elites in power. On the international arena a profound contestation of the fundamental democratic and human rights values is underway, not to question the legitimacy of the dictatorships in the name of stability. The fact that more and more people question the international society's design and organization, its core principles, its units, the fundamental bricks of the international system, may indicate that a revolution in sovereignty is underway. In this regard, Philpott (2001, 5) mentions: "The eccentricity of international revolutions, the reluctance to remember them, I further suspect, lies in the strangeness of the very idea of an international constitution." The modifications involve the cognitive map people use to interpret and perceive the world, the cultural infrastructure functioning like an international constitution and we believe that the extrapolation of security does not imply more security, but less individual liberty, a situation which favours the axis of the autocrats.

References:

1. Applebaum, A. (2020). *The Twilight of Democracy. The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism*. Doubleday.
2. Applebaum, A. (2025). *Axa autocraților [Axis of Autocrats]*. Bucharest: Litera.
3. Aron, R. (1958). *On war: Atomic weapons and global diplomacy*. Secker and Warburg.
4. Arendt, H. (1968). *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. New York: Viking Press.
5. Bell, Daniel, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones. (1995). *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*. London: St. Martin Press and Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Bouchier, David. (2015). *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia. The Ideology of the Family-State*. London and New York: Routledge.
7. Brzezinski, Z. (2007, March 25). "Terrorized by 'War on Terror'." *The Washington Post*. <https://rikcoolsaet.be/files/2007/03/brzezinski-250307.pdf>.
8. Bull, H. [1977]. (2002). *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

9. Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole and Jaap de Wilde. (1997). *Security: A New Framework of Analysis*, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.
10. Clark, I. (2007). *Legitimacy in International Society*. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Clausewitz, Carl von. (1982). *Despre război [On War]*, Bucharest: Military Publishing House.
12. Cornea, Andrei. (2019). "Nu există democrație iliberală" [*There is no illiberal democracy*], *Dilema veche*, no. 784, 28 February-6 March 2019, <https://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/situatiunea/articol/nu-exista-democratie-iliberala>
13. Fisichella, Domenico. (2007). *Știința Politică. Probleme, concept, teorii. [Political Science. Problems, concepts, theories]*. Iași: Polirom.
14. Fitzi, Gregor, Jürgen Mackert and Bryan S. Turner. (2019). *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy*, London and New York: Routledge.
15. Glaser, S. (1994). "The strategic imagination." *Management Decision*, 32(6), 31–34.
16. Hamid, Shadi. (2014). *Temptations of Power. Islamists and Illiberal Democracy in a New Middle East*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
17. Hughes, G. (2014). "Strategists and Intelligence" in Dover, Robert, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, *Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies*, London and New York: Routledge.
18. Jomini, Antoine-Henri. (1992). *The Art of War*, Lexington: Old Army Books.
19. Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. (2010). *Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
20. Leucea, Ioana. (2012). *Constructivism și securitate umană [Constructivism and human security]*, Iași: Institutul European.
21. Leucea, Ioana și Mihai Sofonea. (2022). *Schimbarea și societatea internațională [Change and international society]*, București: Topform.
22. Leucea, Ioana. (2022). "Cognitive Warfare in Designing International Society (and Security Environment)", in *Redefining Community in Intercultural Context*, vol. 11, Sibiu: "Henry Coandă" Air Force Academy Publishing House.
23. Mearsheimer, Jon. (2010). *Tragedia politicii de forță [The tragedy of power politics]*, Bucharest: Antet Press.
24. Mölder, Holger and Eric Shiraev. (2021). "Global Knowledge Warfare, Strategic Imagination, Uncertainty, and Fear," in Holger M., Sazonov V., Chochia A., Kerikmäe T. (eds.). *The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare. Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood*. Springer, pp. 13-32;

25. Mudde, Cas and Rovira Kaltwasser. (2017). *Populism. A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.
26. Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. (2019). *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Authoritarian-Populism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27. Orban, Viktor. (2014). "Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp". <https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp>
28. Orwell, G. (1949). *1984*. New York and Scarborough: New American Library.
29. Pap, András. (2018). *Democratic Decline in Hungary. Law and Society in an Illiberal Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.
30. Philpott, D. (2001). *Revolutions in Sovereignty. How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
31. Popper, Karl. (1994). *În căutarea unei lumi mai bune [In search of a better world]*. Bucharest: Humanitas.
32. Thomas, Nicholas. (1999). *Democracy Denied: Identity, Civil Society, and Illiberal Democracy in Hong Kong*. London and New York: Routledge.
33. Vukovich, Daniel. (2019). *Illiberal China. The Ideological Challenge of the People's Republic of China*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
34. Zakaria, Fareed. (2007). *The Future of Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad*. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
35. Strachan, H. (2005). *The Lost Meaning of Strategy*, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47(3), 33–54.
36. Strachan, H. (2007). *Carl von Clausewitz's 'On War': A Biography*, London: Atlantic.