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RATIONALIST CURRENTS IN ISLAM:

مب'تازيلزم

Alias: Ana POPESCU

ABSTRACT

This study aims to expose the fundamental features that constitute the main rationalist current within Islam: Mu'tazilism, which, given the type of exegesis it applies, namely that based on reason or opinion (tafsīr bi-r-ra'y), is often defined in opposition to the majority of traditional schools which are based on textual exegesis (tafsīr bi-r-riwāya). Thus, Mu'tazilism had a defining role in the development of Islamic thought, with reverberations even in the contemporary period. Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar is the one who managed, in a first stage, to summarize the principles of this school in a consistent and organized manner. By virtue of the ideas presented by him, it can be stated that Mu'tazilism represents a doctrine as coherent as possible, which manages to explain its religious foundations by resorting to science and logic, emphasizing at the same time the necessity and obligation of every believer to exercise reason in order to fully know God.

Keywords: Mu'tazilism, God, rationalist current, Islam, schools, theology.

Definition

Mu'tazilism, a rationalist theological trend that was established in Iraq in the 8th century (Campanini, 2012), is characterized as one of the most important theological schools within early Islam and known especially for its priority to the intellect (*'aql*) and free human will. It reached its peak during the Abbasid¹ Caliphate and until 1252, when it was consecrated by the Caliph al-Ma'mun² (786-833) as the official state doctrine (Cakmac, 2017).

Later on, Zaydism took over certain ideological aspects. Moreover, Rationalism has enjoyed a growing interest among modernist Muslim thinkers, taking on, as various observers assert, including Richard C. Martin and Mark R. Woodward, “the spirit of Mu'tazili speech”, through the emphasis placed on intellect and dialogue (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Contemporary expressions of this current can be noticed within modern Islam, for which Harun Nasution³ (1919-1998) is seen as “a contemporary manifestation of *mu'tazilism*”, in other words, a representative of the so-called “neo-*Mu'tazilism*” (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

It is worth mentioning that Massimo Campanini⁴ does not consider appropriate to describe Mu'tazilism as a theological school, since its doctrine has never developed in an organized framework and has never had a single unifying center or a single founding leader. On the contrary, there were some divergent opinions among the thinkers within this current, even on some defining ideas of a central importance. According to Campanini, *mu'tazilism* is rather “a collection of common tendencies held in common, sharing both a vocabulary and political and cultural views” (Campanini, 2012, p. 41).

History

The debut of the Mu'tazili theology is attributed to the teachings of al-Hasan al-Basri⁵ (642-728), who writes a treaty (*risāla*), addressed to Caliph 'Abd al-Malik⁶ (646/647-705), in response to the

theme of free will and divine predestination, explaining that people are responsible for their acts, as they have been granted freedom of choice. The Mu'tazili school in Basra is shaped around this thinker. The school's promoters are both Wasil ibn 'Ata⁷ (700-748) and Amr ibn 'Ubayd⁸ (d. 761) (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

The origin of the term designating the movement also goes back to Al-Hasan al-Basri. Therefore, according to tradition, al-Basri, asked whether anyone who commits a serious sin can still be considered faithful, hesitated, and Wasil ibn 'Ata answered instead, saying that the person in question is in an intermediate position (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*). That moment he withdrew (“*i'tzāl*”) himself from Hassan's circle, followed by other former disciples, including 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd (Martin & Woodward, 1997). However, as Massimo Campanini claims, this event can also be a mere legend. As such, Van Ess (1979, *apud* Campanini, 2012) states that Wasil ibn 'Ata withdrew himself from Hasan al-Basri's circle rather because of terminological and methodological misunderstandings. On the other hand, some observers suggest that the name originally referred to those who chose a middle way between the Orthodox and the Kharjite routes, at the time of the schism between Ali⁹ and Mu'awiya¹⁰ (Nallino, 1940, *apud* Campanini 2012).

Subsequently, two Mu'tazili centers are outlined, one in Basra and another in Baghdad, the difference between them being reflected in the predilection shown by the Baghdad school for 'Ali ibn Abi Talib in the context of his conflict with Mu'awiya, while Basra school keeps closer to the Sunni political theology of the time. Abu l-Hudhayl¹¹ (d. 841) has the merit of providing an organized form of Basra school's doctrine. He edits the five principles of the Mu'tazili theology (*al-Uṣūl al-Ḥamsa*); Bagdad school is shaped under the care of the poet and theologian Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (d. 825) (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

With the Baghdad school's location in the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, which enjoys an immense political success, Mu'tazilism becomes the official state doctrine. Al-Ma'mun Caliphate institutes a so-called “inquisition” (*miḥna*), making mandatory for the

aspirants to the title of judge to undergo a theological examination and publicly adhere to the Mu'tazili doctrine on the created character of the Quran (*ḥalq al-Qur'ān*) (Martin & Woodward, 1997). Later, with the Caliph al-Mutawakkil¹²'s installation (822-861) at the head of the state, both schools fall into disgrace, Ahmad ibn Hanbal¹³'s (780-855) traditionalist vision becoming more representative for the Islamic society at that time (El-Merheb & Berriah, 2021).

From the 19th century onwards, the Mu'tazili theological school became a real anathema in most Islamic circles, the Ash'ari theological school along with Maturidi school being predominantly recognized and accepted within Sunni Islam. However, with the emergence of central figures of what is known as “Islamic modernism”, such as Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), there is again a new growing interest for Mu'tazilism among Muslim scholars within a trend of challenging Islamic traditionalism (and its postmodern successor, fundamentalism). The Muslim theologian who contributed the most to the renewal of the interest in Mu'tazili Islamic school is Muhammad 'Abduh, who tried to articulate a vision of Islam in a world full of non-Muslim intellectual changes and challenges, responding to the challenge posed by modernity and the encounter with the West perceived as superior both economically and politically (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Rationalism and Traditionalism

In general, Mu'tazilism and Rationalism are defined in opposition to the traditionalist theological schools – more specifically those that apply text-based exegesis (also called *muḥaddithūn*, from *ḥadīth*), Hanbali school being the leading one (Esack, 2005 & Saeed, 2006). Richard C. Martin (1997) defines the traditionalist Islam as the counter-tendency of renewal and revitalization of the *status-quo*, looking towards an idealized past, while rationalist Islam designates the tendency of scholars to adjust the Islamic message to the intellectual and social context of the moment (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

The divergence between traditionalist and mu'tazili scholars is represented by the emphasis placed by the traditionalists on the authority of *ḥadīth*'s (called, otherwise, *ahl al-ḥadīth*) (Martin & Woodward, 1997). This does not deny the applicability of tradition among

mu'tazilites, but from their point of view, considering they practice exegesis based on reason or opinion (*tafsīr bi-r-ra'y*) (Alak, 2016), it is the rational meanings of their content (*matn*) that accredit the validity of the *ḥadīth*, in addition to the chain of transmitters, and texts that contradict reason must be reinterpreted (Alak, 2016, Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Therefore, while the traditionalists practice text-based exegesis (*tafsīr bi-r-riwāya*) and recognize the authority of the Qur'an, the Sunna, alongside the scholars' consensus (*iḡmā'*) and analogous reasoning (*qiyās*), the mu'tazilites, while accepting the authority of the two sacred texts, consider their own judgment as the first criterium for deciphering the meanings of the Qur'an or the *ḥadīth*, without questioning, in any way, the importance of the two texts (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

As a consequence, it can be deduced that the traditionalists do not deny that people enjoy the ability to exercise reason, but what rather distinguishes between the two theological classes is that traditionalists place revelation on the forefront, while the Mu'tazilites display a predilection towards logical thinking (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Principles

According to Binyamin Abrahamov (1998), the basis of Rationalism lies in the notion that God and the world can be perceived through the intellect with which God endows the man. Therefore, he emphasizes the necessity of reason in order to know God, the fact that, for everything, a rational explanation can be identified, everything being subjected to the laws of reason, including God. These ideas are contrary to the traditional perception that God can only be known and understood with the help of Scripture.

The basis of Rationalism is the notion that God and the world can be perceived through the intellect which God creates in man. Concerning God, this perception means that God's existence, His unity and His attributes can be known through reason. Concerning the world, it means that the creation of the world and its structure, man and his actions can be logically understood. From this foundation, it follows that the world is directed according to rational rules and that, hence, even God is subject to these rules. We shall immediately see that according

¹ Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) came after the Omeyyade Caliphate (661-750) in Damascus. During the Abbasid dynasty, the Islamic civilization reached the peak of its development (Abbasid Caliphate, 2023).

² Al-Ma'mun (786-833) was the seventh caliph in the Abbasid dynasty, known for his desire to impose a rationalist system of faith (Sourdel, 2022).

³ Harun Nasution (1919-1998) was a Muslim scientist born in Indonesia, known for his rationalist works in Islam (Saleh, 2001).

⁴ Massimo Campanini (1954-2020) was an expert in Islamic studies.

⁵ Al-Hasan Al-Basri (642-728) was an important Muslim theologian and a central personality in early Islam (Ede, 2022).

⁶ Abd al-Malik (646/647-705) was the fifth caliph of the Omeyyade dynasty, having the capital in Damascus (Khalidi, 2022).

⁷ Wasil ibn 'Ata' (700-748) was a Muslim theologian considered the founder of the Mu'tazili school (Wasil ibn 'Ata', 2022).

⁸ Amr ibn 'Ubayd (d. 761) was a Muslim scholar and central personality in the Mu'tazili school (Donner, 1988).

⁹ Ali ibn Abi Talib (600–661) was the fourth rightly-guided caliph and the first Shia imam (Afsaruddin & Nasr, 2023).

¹⁰ Mu'awiyah I (602-680) was a caliph between 661-680 a. Hr. and was part of the Omeyyade clan which belonged to the Quraysh tribe (Little, 2023).

¹¹ Abu l-Hudhayl (d. 841) was one of the most important theologians in the Mu'tazili school (Abu l-Hudhayl, 2020).

¹² Al-Mutawakkil (822-861) was one of the Abbasid dynasty's caliphs (Al-Mutawakkil, 2023).

¹³ Ahmad ibn Hanbal (780-855) was Muslim theologian and an expert in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), who founded the Hanbali school that was named after him (Makdisi, 2023).

to some Mu'tazilites, God is logically obliged to act in a certain manner. It is no wonder, thus, that God's first obligation on man is to speculate (or reflect) in order to attain the knowledge of God (*al-naẓar al-mu'addī ilā ma'rifat Allāh*). Contrary to the view of the traditionalists, one can know God without the support of the Scripture, and even without a teacher. However, the motive which causes man to reflect is a warning (*hāẓir*) made by God to the effect that if he does not reflect, he will be punished (Abrahamov, 1998, p. 32).

Since very few mu'tazili works have survived to the present moment, the central points of the doctrine in question are collected by Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar¹⁴ (935-1025), characterized by J. Peters (1976) as follows:

He knew the history of his school and its ideas and became the great <compiler> of the Mu'tazili ideas as developed in former centuries by his great predecessors. But he did more than that: he built a comprehensive, coherent, and closed system of theological thinking on the foundations laid for him by the older generations of Mu'tazili. He himself considers his greatest merit to be the making of a systematic approach to theological questions and the elaboration of argumentation in general (Peters, 1976, pp. 14-16, apud Martin & Woodward, 1997, p. 46).

Therefore, Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar expresses in "Kitāb al-'Uṣūl al-Ḥamsa"¹⁵ the five basic principles, the first being that of God's uniqueness (*tawḥīd*). As Farid Esack (2005) states, this is the focal point of the Mu'tazili theology, people considering themselves as "the people of divine unity and justice" (*ahl at-tawḥīd wa-l-'adl*) (Esack, 2005, p. 107).

According to al-Aṣ'ari¹⁶'s (873/874-935/936) description of the Mu'tazilites, they express the statement that:

The Mu'tazili agree that God is one; there is no thing like him; he is hearing, seeing; he is not a body (jism) not a form, not flesh and blood, not an individual, not substance nor attribute... not begetting nor begotten; magnitudes do not comprehend him nor veils cover him; the senses do not attain him; he is not comparable with men and does not resemble creatures in any respect... he is ceaselessly first, precedent,

going before originated things, existent before created things; he is ceaselessly knowing, powerful, living... not as [men are] knowing, powerful, living... he may not experience benefit or harm, joy or gladness, hurt or pain... he is too holy to be touched by women or to have a consort and children (al-Aṣ'ari, Maqalāt, pp. 155-156, tr. Watt, 1998, pp. 246-247, apud Martin & Woodward, 1997, p. 68).

In other words, the Mu'tazilites avoid attributing God certain features, being rather content to define God in relation to what there is not (Martin & Woodward, 1997), considering an act of polytheism attributing God some qualities distinct from His essence (Campanini, 2012). This way, they choose to metaphorically (*ta'wīl*) interpret the divine attributes mentioned by the Quran, God's eye meaning His knowledge, His face, His essence, so on and so forth. Abu l-Hudhayl had said that God is knowing by virtue of a knowledge that identifies with Himself, and He is powerful by virtue of a power that represents Himself, without implying certain eternal traits that are distinct from His essence, therefore, his attributes cannot be coeternal with Him. (Martin & Woodward, 1997, p. 69).

As Massimo Campanini observes, mu'tazilites such as Abu 'Ali al-Jubba'i¹⁷ make the difference between the attributes of His essence (*ṣifātuḥu li-ḍatīhi*) and the attributes of action (*ṣifāt al-'af'āl*). The latter, God can use them or not, more precisely He can create or not, depending on His will (Campanini, 2012). Mu'tazili label those who take all the references to God within the text literally as "*muṣabbiḥa*", which means those who do "taṣbīḥ"¹⁸ (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

The second main principle of the doctrine is theodicy, more specifically, the idea that the existence of evil in the world does not contradict divine goodness. This principle argues that God does not act in an unethical manner, and man is morally responsible to the Divinity for his actions, being free to choose between good and evil (Campanini, 2012). He is guided on the right path, but he is not forced; for this reason, man has free will, whereas it would be unfair for God to punish him for actions He has created (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Furthermore, according to al-Nazzam, it can be attributed to God the power (*qudra*) to do evil, for it belongs only to him to carry out the act of justice (*'adl*):

As al-Nazzam sees it, if God were able to prevent

an evil act taking place, he would be bound to prevent it, since [even] consenting to an evil happening is a vile and blameworthy act. Therefore, [given that in fact God does not prevent the evil] He can only act according to justice ('adl) and it is impossible to attribute to Him the ability (qudra) to act unjustly (al-Shahrastani 1977, p. 57, apud Campanini, 2012, p. 44).

An accusation often made against this assertion is the denial of God's omnipotence, and as most Mu'tazilites claim, just because God does not wish to do harm does not mean He does not have the ability to do so (Campanini, 2012).

Moreover, in the Mu'tazili's vision, man can intuitively know that acts such as injustice, theft, murder are morally wrong, therefore revelation is not mandatory in order for a person to know what is good. Man, even non-Muslim, can live on the basis of revealed teachings, exercising reason, so man is not automatically destined for the eternal punishment, as Abu 'Ali al-Jubba'i states. At the same time, it goes without saying that this statement has caused controversy and opposition from the traditionalist Muslims, as what it entails is, after all, the futility of the revelation (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

Furthermore, Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar discusses the social and eschatological consequences of sin (*al-wa'd wa-l-wa'īd*) (Martin & Woodward, 1997). According to this principle, God promises man, where appropriate, either a reward or an adequate punishment in the afterlife (Campanini, 2012). He claims that serious sin (*fisq, kabīr*), such as murder, debauchery or denial of religion, leads to punishment in the flames of hell. However, in certain situations, when it comes to one of the deadly sins, God can accept the divine intervention of the Prophet or

the saints in the name of the sinner, claims 'Abd al-Jabbar (Martin & Woodward, 1997).

According to the referred question: if those who sin are considered faithful or unfaithful, a person who has committed serious acts (*fāsiq*) is not considered unfaithful (*kāfir*), as Islamic Law does not treat him such as. Therefore, they are not obliged, as unbelievers or the Scripture's People are, to pay tribute (*ḡizya*) (Martin & Woodward, 1997). Moreover, accepting the principle above mentioned, they leave to God the act of justice regarding the conflict of 'Ali and Mu'awiya (Campanini, 2012).

The fifth principle concerns the enforcement of good and the prohibition of evil (*al-'amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahī 'ani l-munkar*), thus the obligation of any believer is to defend religion even with his life (Campanini, 2012, Martin & Woodward, 1997). This obligation is imposed in order to ensure the well-being and harmony of the society, being both a public and personal duty (Corbin, 2005).

Conclusion

Mu'tazilism played a defining role in the development of the Islamic world with reverberations in the contemporary period. Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbar is the one who manages, in a first stage, to summarize the principles of this school in a concise and organized manner. According to his ideas, mu'tazilism is a very coherent doctrine, which succeeds in explaining the religious foundations through science and logic, emphasizing the need and obligation of every person to exercise reason in order to be able to know God.

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¹⁴ Abd al-Jabbar (935-1025) was a Mu'tazili theologian and follower of the Shafi'i school who resumes Mu'tazilism's principles in his work *Kitāb al-'Uṣūl al-Ḥamsa* (McAuliffe, 2003).

¹⁵ The author's translation: "the book of the five principles".

¹⁶ Abu al Hasan al-Aṣ'ari (873/874-935/936) was a Muslim theologian and leader of the school named after him who succeeds in including rationalist notions into the traditionalist Islam (Allard, 2014).

¹⁷ Abu 'Ali Muhammad al-Jubba'i (d. 915) was a Muslim Mu'tazili theologian and philosopher of the 10th century (Al-Jubba'i, n.d.).

¹⁸ This term refers to the action of attributing human features to God (anthropomorphizing).

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THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN DAESH TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The scale that the terrorist phenomenon has gained in recent decades, materialized in the form of the establishment of numerous organizations, such as DAESH (also known as ISIS), continues to attract global attention not only by its bloody atrocities and manner of propagating terrorist ideology, but also by the involvement of women in its structures, invested in leadership positions and actively participating in the planning of terrorist actions. DAESH believes that involving women in their fight for an Islamic Caliphate would legitimize their efforts and present a better image among Muslim and international communities, despite the fact that Islamic society has often blatantly violated the rights and freedoms of women. Using well-developed propaganda to exploit women's vulnerabilities in order to persuade them to join the organization ranging from the desire for adventure to deeper motives such as disillusionment with the society they live in, or the search for purpose and identity, DAESH recruits an increasing number of them into the organization. It is therefore necessary to understand the gender needs of women, especially those in areas considered vulnerable, so that entities involved in counter-terrorism can devise appropriate strategies to prevent the global radicalization process.

Keywords: terrorism, DAESH, women, atrocities, radicalization, propaganda.

In recent decades, researchers have increasingly focused on the role of women within terrorist organizations. Studies show that women are increasingly responsible for acts associated with terrorism and have been recruited into terrorist organizations worldwide. In the case of DAESH (also known as ISIS), women have held significant and diverse roles. As wives of fighters, they have been responsible for raising the next generation of fighters, being involved in the education and training of children according to the organization's ideology. Additionally, they have been involved in propaganda and recruitment activities, used to attract other women to the organization. They have also been recruited to directly participate in terrorist operations, from carrying out attacks to kidnappings and other violent activities.

Although the reasons why women join terrorist organizations may vary, research suggests that among the most common ones are the desire for adventure and a sense of purpose in life, the aspiration to join a group that shares the same ideologies and values, or the desire to escape a difficult life situation (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020, Cigainero, 2016). It is important to note that their involvement in terrorist organizations is not limited to DAESH, but is a global phenomenon that targets a variety of terrorist organizations and extremist groups.

The term terrorism has existed since ancient times, being associated with the concept of terror, and has been practiced by both state and non-state actors worldwide. Throughout history, we find multiple examples of different figures who have written about or practiced terror. For instance, the ancient Greek historian Xenophon (431-350 BCE) (Tuplin, 2023) mentioned in his manuscripts the effectiveness of psychological warfare against populations, while the Roman Emperor Tiberius (14-37 CE) (Pohl, 2023) used exile and execution as means of deterring opposition. We can also mention instances of terror during the French Revolution or the Spanish Inquisition, where torture and execution were used for heresy. After the American Civil War (1861-1865), the Ku Klux Klan emerged in America as an extremist racist organization that sought to intimidate the African-American population through torture and assassination, opposing their equal rights with the white race (Equal Justice Initiative-EJI, 2020). In the second half of the 19th century, terror was implemented by anarchists in Western Europe, the United States, and Russia, who believed that assassinating individuals in positions of power was the best way to achieve political and social change (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime-UNODC, 2018, Chaliand & Blin, 2016). Since the 20th century, the use and practice of terror has begun to

transform, becoming a weapon for a variety of political movements, from far-right to far-left. Terrorism could be considered an official policy in states like the Soviet Union under Stalin or Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler, where arrests, torture, imprisonment, and execution were used to create a climate of fear for those who did not support the respective national ideology (Chaliand & Blin, 2016).

Jihadist terrorism, rooted in the concept of jihad (holy war), is considered the most threatening form of terrorism to Western values and interests (Bakker, 2006). The jihadism has led to acts such as ransom, hijacking of airplanes, assassinations, suicide bombings, and death threats against political figures, journalists, and entrepreneurs.

As a result of modern society and globalization, jihadist terrorist organizations/groups have undergone transformations in their structure and operational scope, extending their reach beyond national borders. Technological advancements and the ability to travel from one country to another have allowed terrorists to carry out their activities in different parts of the world (Bakker, 2006). Additionally, the online environment has played a significant role in propagating extremist and radical ideas and ideologies. Thus, this "new" type of terrorism is characterized by a higher number of casualties, the use of sophisticated weapons, and excessive brutality, such as attacks against civilian populations and the use of suicide attackers.

Furthermore, in the past decade, the world has witnessed a steady increase in the number of women who have not only joined terrorist organizations/groups but also provided logistical and financial support. This trend raises critical questions about the factors and motivations underlying women's involvement in terrorism, as well as the challenges and opportunities for combating and countering this phenomenon (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020). Similar to male individuals, women go through a process of radicalization in which they change their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior in an extreme or radical direction, often in opposition to social values and norms. In a religious context, radicalization can be defined as the adoption of a set of extreme or intolerant beliefs and practices, and can be influenced by various factors, including personal experiences, manipulation, social isolation, access to false or alarming information, or the influence of extremist groups (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020).

The process of radicalization can be described as the evolution of an individual's thinking and beliefs towards an extremist perspective, which may involve support for a group or a violent ideology. It can also be influenced by factors such as the level of anxiety or

social frustration and access to extremist information and interaction with extremist groups or individuals. The process can be dangerous, especially when encountered by young or vulnerable individuals who can be convinced by extremist propaganda and prompted to commit violent acts. Therefore, it is important to understand the causes and mechanisms of the radicalization process in order to develop effective strategies for its prevention.

Extreme ideologies attract followers through simplistic and appealing discourse that offers quick solutions to complex problems. They also provide a sense of belonging and purpose, offering individuals a way to understand themselves and the surrounding world. Extreme ideologies also provide a sense of understanding of individual or collective suffering and a way to act to heal this suffering. They can also be attractive to those who feel marginalized or excluded from society.

It is important to note that while these factors may contribute to the radicalization process, there is no standard profile or single cause that explains this phenomenon. Each case of radicalization is unique and can be influenced by multiple personal, social, historical, and cultural factors (Aly, 2015).

Radicalization has also had a profound impact on individuals from European countries who have adopted extremist ideologies (known as foreign fighters). They have chosen to travel to states like Syria and fight for DAESH. These individuals have abandoned their previous lives and chosen to join a terrorist organization with values and beliefs different from the society they come from. Their participation in armed conflicts and acts of terrorism has had a devastating impact on the lives of many people and communities in Syria and other countries. It has also had negative consequences for the personal lives of radicalized foreign fighters, who now face security, justice, and social integration issues (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020).

DAESH was established in 2013 in Iraq and quickly expanded into Syria and other areas of the Middle East. The organization attempted to impose its own Islamic state and create a Caliphate. To consolidate its power, ISIS resorted to brutal tactics, including the execution of those who did not share their vision of Islam and the use of extreme violence in the fight against other armed groups (Islamic State, 2023).

DAESH managed to attract a significant number of fighters from around the world, including Western countries (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020), and became one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations globally. However, the Iraqi army, Kurdish forces, and an international coalition led by the United States launched a series of offensives against DAESH, ultimately leading

to its territorial defeat in 2019. Recruitment has been one of the key strategies of DAESH. The organization has used sophisticated propaganda methods and utilized social networks to attract young people from around the world to join their fight.

The terrorist organization DAESH has drawn global attention not only through its bloody atrocities and propagated terrorism, but also through the involvement of women in its structures. Surprisingly to many, DAESH has recruited and engaged women in various roles, including leadership and planning of terrorist actions. This movement contradicted conventional stereotypes that considered women limited in their societal roles and incapable of acting independently. Regarding women who have joined DAESH, there are various reasons for their actions, ranging from the desire for adventure to deeper motives such as disillusionment with the society they live in or the search for purpose and identity (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020, Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Within DAESH, women have long been considered an essential element in their struggle for the creation of a global Islamic state. They have been involved in various activities within the organization, from recruiting new members to participating in military operations and even holding leadership positions.

Women were recruited into the DAESH organization through different methods, some similar to those used for recruiting men, and others specific to women. In many cases, they were recruited through social networks and acquaintances (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020). They were often contacted by other women who were already part of the organization and promised a better future within the Caliphate. Recruitment through the internet was also an effective method for DAESH, which used social networks such as Twitter and Facebook to attract female individuals from around the world (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020, Veldhuis & Staun, 2009).

Another method of recruitment was through forced marriages. They were often abducted and forced to marry DAESH fighters or members of the organization's leadership, being compelled to conform to the rules and laws imposed by the organization.

Additionally, DAESH recruited women through religious and educational institutions. They were often attracted by the promise of an authentic Islamic lifestyle and opportunities to participate in educational and religious programs.

Women play an important role in the DAESH organization for several reasons. Firstly, ISIS considers their involvement essential to maintain and expand control over the conquered territories. They are seen as capable of providing logistical support and fulfilling essential

roles as mothers and wives of organization members. Secondly, DAESH views women as an important means of propaganda and recruitment. The organization's propaganda presents them as vital to building an ideal Islamic Caliphate and promotes their image as heroines and fighters in the service of Islam (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020). Furthermore, DAESH uses female individuals to transport weapons and provisions through conflict zones without being suspected or checked by security forces. DAESH believes that involving women in their fight for an Islamic Caliphate would legitimize their efforts and present a better image among Muslim and international communities. By involving women in the organization, they attempt to build a positive perception of their cause and attract sympathy and support.

Imagine equality and justice within Islamic society, despite the fact that it has often blatantly violated the rights and freedoms of women. Traditionally, men have been considered the ones to join such organizations, but this terrorist entity has made special efforts to attract women to its ranks. This has raised questions and prompted researchers to try to understand why women join such a violent and discriminatory terrorist organization against them. Personal trauma is a factor that could lead to their affiliation with DAESH. Some women may be victims of physical or sexual abuse or may witness violence and conflicts in their communities. The extremist group's message of providing a sense of safety and security can be appealing to those who have experienced trauma in their lives (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020).

Feelings of isolation and marginalization can also contribute to their joining DAESH. In some cases, they may feel disconnected from their communities or face discrimination based on their religion or ethnicity. The extremist group's message of a utopian society and a sense of belonging can be attractive to women who feel marginalized in their societies. Lack of education or employment opportunities can also contribute to women joining DAESH. In some communities, they may not have access to quality education or job opportunities, which can limit their prospects for the future. The extremist group's promise of providing opportunities for women to contribute to their society and obtain an education can be appealing to those who feel they have limited options. Some of them have joined the organization to be with a husband or partner who was already a member. DAESH encouraged women to marry its fighters and presented marriage as a religious duty (Khaleeli, 2014). Some women may have felt pressure or coercion from their partners or family members to join the organization or may have been convinced by the promises of a better life in the Caliphate.

Thus, personal relationships can also be a factor contributing to women's decision to join DAESH. Some women may be influenced by friends or family members who have already joined the extremist group. These individuals can have persuasive influence and may use emotional relationships or promises of adventure to convince them to join. This type of recruitment is particularly effective when the individual is experiencing feelings of isolation or loneliness, as they may seek social connection and a sense of belonging (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020).

However, it is important to note that the relationships formed within DAESH are often extremely restrictive and oppressive and can be characterized by abuse, forced marriage, and a lack of freedom and autonomy. Women who join the group through personal relationships may find themselves trapped in situations that do not allow them to leave the organization and give up their affiliation, and as a result, they may suffer significant emotional and physical harm.

For some women, joining DAESH may seem like an exciting adventure or an opportunity to start a new life. Membership in the organization can be seen as a way to escape a boring or unfulfilled life and seek adventure. Propaganda has described life in the Caliphate as interesting and meaningful, with opportunities for travel, fighting, and serving an important cause. Some women have been attracted to the idea of being part of a revolutionary movement, taking risks, and experiencing new things (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020).

Poverty, unemployment, and lack of education can make some women vulnerable to recruitment by extremist entities. They offered women economic support and a way to improve their social status through marriage to fighters and having children. This was a means to escape material hardships and gain a sense of security and stability. Additionally, the group's message of social justice and opposition to corruption may have resonated with those who felt marginalized or excluded from the societies they came from. Women who joined ISIS came from a variety of backgrounds and different countries. There is no typical profile of those who joined the group, as their motives and circumstances leading to this decision were highly diverse.

Some security experts argue that women who joined DAESH often came from disadvantaged backgrounds with socio-economic problems and felt that they were not given equal opportunities and rights in their societies. Among them were those who experienced domestic violence or other forms of abuse, seeking to escape the difficult situations they faced. It has also been observed that many of them were young and were drawn

to the group's propaganda through social media networks and other online communication channels. This allowed them to reach a much larger audience than would have been possible through traditional recruitment methods.

It is important to note that the majority of women did not have advanced knowledge of Islam, but exposure to extremist propaganda manipulation led them to make this decision. Many of the women who joined the organization are from Europe. There have been numerous reports of women from countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium traveling to Syria and Iraq to join the extremist group (Antúnez-Moreno, 2020). According to estimates, around 1,000 women from Europe traveled to Syria and Iraq to join DAESH since the group's expansion in 2014 (Cook & Vale, 2018).

Despite the diversity of their motivations, women have faced many of the same challenges and dangers as their male counterparts. They have often endured harsh living conditions, brutal treatment, and constant threat of violence. Many have also been subjected to strict rules and limitations on their behavior and freedom.

Below are the stories of some women who joined DAESH, highlighting their individual experiences within the organization and their lives after leaving it.

Hayat Boumeddiene, a French citizen, made headlines in 2015 when she was involved in the terrorist attacks in Paris. She was the partner of Amedy Coulibaly (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.), one of the attackers who killed four people in a Jewish supermarket. Boumeddiene was not present during the attacks, but had left France a few days earlier and was believed to have joined DAESH in Syria. Some reports suggested that she was killed in Syria, while others that she may still be alive (Thomas, 2015).

Laura Passoni, of Belgian origin, joined DAESH in Syria in 2014. She was one of the many young women who were radicalized and lured to join the group, attracted by the propaganda and promises of adventure. However, Passoni's story took a different turn when she

realized the true nature of the group and decided to leave. She contacted a friend in Belgium who helped her leave Syria and return to Europe, but she was arrested upon her return and charged with supporting a terrorist group (Cigainero, 2016).

Shamina Begum is a British woman who left the UK at the age of 15 to join the terrorist organization in Syria (Al Jazeera, 2023). Her story garnered a lot of attention and controversy in the media, as well as important questions about the responsibilities of individuals who join extremist groups and the challenges of addressing the threat of terrorism and radicalization. During her time with the group, Begum lived in Raqqa, the de facto capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. She spoke about her experiences, including witnessing public executions and her marriage to an ISIS fighter. She also expressed support for the group's violent ideology, unaffected by the beheading of Western hostages. However, in 2019, Begum was found in a Syrian refugee camp and expressed her desire to return to the UK. She was stripped of her British citizenship by the UK government, which argued that she posed a threat to national security. She subsequently launched legal appeals to regain her citizenship, arguing that she was a victim (Rajvanschi, 2023).

Conclusion

The stories of women who joined DAESH serve as a reminder of the profound impact that extremist ideology and violence can have on individuals and communities. Thus, the reasons they had are diverse and often rooted in personal circumstances, such as a desire for adventure, a search for meaning, or a desire to escape difficult living conditions. However, we have seen how the organization uses a range of tactics, from propaganda and manipulation to coercion and force, to attract vulnerable individuals into their ranks.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF ILLEGAL SOVIET RESIDENTURA IN THE INTERWAR ERA

FIODOR PARPAROV

Alias: Maria RADU

ABSTRACT

Foreign intelligence services have always played a key role in the foreign affairs of the Soviet Union. Fiodor Parparov, who went down in history as one of the most important Soviet intelligence officers, was specialized in recruiting many valuable assets, especially of the fairer sex, and succeeded in infiltrating an agent in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. Handsome and with a remarkable intellect, Parparov became well-known in German society, where he was sent on an undercover espionage assignment. The most outstanding agent was “Marta”, the wife of a high-ranked official in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who provided him access to the records of Hitler’s conversations with his inner circle and with the British Ambassador, where the Führer stated his political intentions towards the Soviet Union and the designs for Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Soviet Union residentura, intelligence officer, undercover, espionage.

Introduction

The Great October 1917 Socialist Revolution¹ and the civil war that followed quickly led to widespread socio-political disorder in Soviet Russia, marked by the collapse of the imperial autocracy in March 1917 and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks², led by Lenin³, on November 7, 1917 (Haslam, 2016). This is the period when an Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage⁴, more commonly known as the CEKA, was established on December 20, 1917. The establishment of the CEKA marks the beginnings of the Soviet secret services. CEKA operates as the secret police of the revolution (Haslam, 2016) and later becomes a crucial instrument of power for those who fought to assert themselves as Lenin’s successors (Haslam, 2016).

The structure of CEKA changed repeatedly, but the most important departments remained: The Counter-Intelligence Department (KRO – *Russian Kontrarazvedivatel'nyi Otdel*), The Special Department of Military Counter-Intelligence, and the Foreign Intelligence Department (INO – *Russian Inostrannij Otdel*) – established on December 20, 1920⁵, by Dzerjinski⁶’s decree, which established as an absolute priority of the organization the exposure of counter-revolutionary organizations in the territories of foreign states involved in subversive activities against Russia⁷. Later on, INO was given more precise tasks, namely to

unmask, in all states, the counter-revolutionary groups involved in both active and passive activities directed against the interests of RSFSR (Soviet Union), as well as against the international revolutionary movement. The main beneficiaries of the information obtained by INO were diplomats (Haslam, 2016).

Vladimir Tismăneanu (2012) in his article *Who was Felix Edmundovici Dzerjinski? Enlightened, ascetic, torturer*, makes clear that Dzerjinski insisted, immediately after the Bolshevik coup d’etats, on the establishment of the Extraordinary Commission against the Counter-Revolution.

In the early 1930s, the most important INO priority was the introduction of spies into the governments of other countries that may have been opposed to Russia in a future war, first and foremost Germany and Japan. Also, during this period, a decree was issued on increasing illegal activity and preparing residenturas⁸ (Russian: *резидентура*) to conduct activities through illegal methods.⁹

Initially, the so-called INO residenturas were constantly using Soviet embassies and commercial missions (Haslam, 2016), but since August 1927, measures were taken to start the movement of these undercover residenturas according to the Political Bureau Directive (Haslam, 2016). Due to his inspirational innovating reputation, Artur Artuzov¹⁰ was promoted to deputy head of INO, having as a main task the implementation of the Political Bureau Directive of January 30, 1930, which

was supposed to mask the so-called residenturas. Being promoted as head of INO on August 1, 1931 and given the worsening political situation in Germany (Antonov, 2013), Artuzov has made a priority the coordination of illegal residents and agents (Haslam, 2016).

Vladimir Serghievici Antonov¹¹ (2013), in his book *Life according to the “legend”*¹² mentions that an officer of an illegal resident is a person who is abroad with a foreign passport, who has no connection with his country’s official representations, which he doesn’t even visit, in order not to draw the attention of the local intelligence services and not be exposed¹³.

A Spy among Germans

It was in this context that Parparov successfully began to carry out his intelligence activity, going down in history as one of the most important soviet intelligence officers, and as a skilled recruiter, especially of female agents, who managed to infiltrate an agent into the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Fiodor Parparov, by real name Faivel Kalmanovici, was born on November 23, 1893, in the town of Velij, Vitebsk Governorate, in a Jewish family. At the age of 14, Parparov started working as an apprentice to a timber exporter in Riga, and after high school graduation, he worked as a bank clerk in Petrograd, joining the Red Army in 1919. In 1924, he graduated from the Faculty of Law at the Moscow State University, and since 1925, he worked at People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade, where he learned German very well (Haslam, 2016), which allowed him to be sent to the Berlin Commercial Office for undercover espionage¹⁴.

Parparov, however, drew the attention of special services since university: as a party member and a connoisseur of several foreign languages – English, Spanish, French, and German. The knowledge of foreign languages was a prerequisite for being sent as illegal intelligence officers to other countries.

Mark Steinberg (2008) mentioned in his article “A Soviet James Bond”¹⁵ in *Chaika* magazine, the

following: upon his arrival in Berlin, Fiodor Parparov was 32 years old and, as his colleagues remembered, he was a man in his prime, who had a kind of a magical attraction for women. He dressed very elegantly, behaved very confidently in any society, and was an interesting companion, due to his excellent mastery of four European languages.¹⁶

Possessing an attractive appearance and an outstanding intelligence, Parparov was successful in German society, being able to recruit several highly promising female agents, who provided him with information of both political and economic nature. But Parparov did not stop here: through his mistress, he also recruited men. According to the INO certificate at that time, during his service in Germany, he managed to recruit two young officers, a military engineer, the wife of major in the German General Staff, the mistress of an important businessman and the secretary of the military attaché of one of the Scandinavian countries. Essentially, the circle of people recruited by Parparov for illegal activities made possible to create a residentura which was taken into consideration in Moscow.

In an interview with Maria Maksimova, Fiodor Parparov’s granddaughter, to Aleksandr Bondarenko of *Krasnaya Zvezda*, she confirmed that, in 1925, her grandfather left in 1925 with his wife and not even a year-old son for Berlin. Officially, this was a foreign trade line business trip, and unofficially a spy line trip (Bondarenko, 2010).

According to Maria Maksimova, in 1929, an industrial espionage section was set up at INO OGPU¹⁷. Its task was to get, by illegal means, what the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade - whose official employee Fiodor Parparov was – could not get by legal contracts or economic licensing. Therefore, by 1929, Parparov’s activities among the high-level German society began to draw an increased attention of the German intelligence services. Moscow decided to recall Parparov for training as an intelligence officer and resend him to Germany as an illegal officer.

According to Haslam (2016), Parparov returned to Berlin in 1930, with his wife and son, Lev, where,

¹ The Bolshevik Revolution or October Russian Revolution on 6 and 7 November 1917, led to the overthrow of the autocracy and its replacement by a totalitarian regime, based on punishment, until extermination, of all persons suspected of being part of the bourgeoisie. The revolution was led by Vladimir Ilich Lenin, a politician and a revolutionary who reached Russia with the help of Imperial Germany from Switzerland. In Russia, he led the population to rebel against the Tsarist regime (Rador, 2022).

² The Bolsheviks represent the radical faction of the Russian Democratic Labor Party from which they were detached at the famous congress held in Belgium, in 1903. Although a minority among Russian Marxists, they called themselves Bolsheviks, after the Russian word that means “majority”. As their main objective, they had proposed the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, but they distrusted the workers’ class consciousness and wanted the revolution to be led by a small group of fanatical professionals. The leadership was intended to be “democratic centralism”, a concept that camouflages their view of an authoritarian government, assured by a revolutionary elite, whose leader was the revolutionary Vladimir Ilich Lenin (Jitea, n.d.).

³ Vladimir Lenin, also referred as Vladimir Ilich Lenin, on his original name Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov (10 April 1870, Simbirsk, Russia - 21 January 1924, Gorki, nearby Moscow), is the founder of the Russian Communist Party, leader of the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the architect, constructor, and first head (1917–1924) of the Soviet State. He was the founder of an organization called Comintern (Communist International) and the posthumous source of the Leninism, a doctrine codified and combined with Karl Marx’s works by Lenin’s followers to form the Marxism-Leninism, that became the communist worldwide view (Resis, 2023).

⁴ “The Russian Extraordinary Commission of Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage” (Russian: Vserossiyskaya chrezvychaynaya komissiya, abbreviated ChK or CEKA.). Over time, the Soviet Union had a large number of secret service agencies. Therefore, the first agency founded by Lenin after the Bolshevik Revolution was the CEKA(ЧК), established on December 20, 1917. This police organization’s officers were called Chekists, a name used, unofficially, even today, for the employees of the Russian Federal Security Services, successor of the Soviet KGB (Chronological table of the Soviet Secret Police Agencies, n.d.).

⁵ In detail in The all-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VCheka) Founded (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, n.d.).

⁶ Felix Edmundovici Dzerjinski (in polish: Feliks Dzierżyński, russian: Феликс Эдмундович Дзержинский, in Belarusian Фелікс Эдмундавіч Дзяржынскі, September 11th, 1877 – July 20th, 1926) was a communist revolutionary, known as the founder and the first leader of the Bolshevik political police, CEKA (Felix Dzerjinski, n.d.).

⁷ Originally: “Выявление на территории иностранных государств контрреволюционных организаций, ведущих подрывную деятельность против нашей страны” (Antonov, 2012).

⁸ In Soviet espionage, residentura (Russian: резидентура - rezidentura) is a secret branch outside the country, led by a resident. The residenturas are legal and illegal. While legal residenturas are under the cover of official Russian missions abroad (in addition to embassies, consulates, trade missions), illegal residenturas are autonomous structures, with strong coverage, without any connection with Russian foreign missions, which collect information through “illegal” agents (Резидентура, n.d.).

⁹ Originally: “издано распоряжение об усилении нелегальной работы и о готовности легальных резидентур к переходу на нелегальные условия работы” (Haustov, n.d.).

¹⁰ Artur Artuzov was an Italian of Swiss origin. He graduated from the Polytechnic Institute in Petrograd (1917) and took part in the establishment of Soviet power in the north. In 1918 he was a supply inspector of the northeast sector of the eastern front and, also, chief commissar of the counterintelligence structures of the revolutionary Military Soviet of the Republic. From 1919, he held positions with great responsibility in the central apparatus of CEKA and GPU and was a member of their college. As one of the prominent directors of Soviet counterintelligence, Artuzov participated in the liquidation of the large counter revolutionary and espionage organizations in Russia and abroad (The free dictionary, n.d.).

¹¹ Vladimir Serghievici Antonov was a writer, journalist, editor, military historian, biographer of famous soviet intelligence officers and colonel in the Foreign Intelligence Service (Russian SVR). He was the author of over 50 books and articles about the Russian foreign intelligence history (Livelib, n.d.).

¹² Originally: “Жизнь по "легенде", Jizni po “leghende” (Antonov, 2013).

¹³ Originally: “Что же касается сотрудника нелегальной резидентуры, то он находится за рубежом с паспортом иностранного гражданина, никак не связан с официальными представительствами своей страны и даже не посещает их, чтобы не вызвать к себе внимания со стороны местных спецслужб и не расшифровать себя” (Antonov, 2013).

¹⁴ Originally: “для шпионажа "под прикрытием" (Steinberg, 2008).

¹⁵ Originally: “Советский Джеймс Бонд” (Sovetskij Djeims Bond).

¹⁶ Originally: “К моменту приезда в Берлин Федору Парпарову исполнилось 32 года и по воспоминаниям его сотрудников, это был мужчина в полном расцвете сил, обладавший какой-то магической притягательностью для женщин. Одевался он весьма элегантно, в любом обществе вел себя очень уверенно, собеседником был интереснейшим, чему способствовало великолепное владение четырьмя европейскими языками” (Steinberg, 2008).

¹⁷ State Political Directorate, Obedinenje Gosudarstvennoe politiceskoe upravlenie, russian: Объединённое государственное политическое управление, predecessor of KGB.

according to a legend developed at the Centre, he declared himself an *emigrant*¹⁸, announcing his break with the Soviet Government. To further mislead, he formally gave up his Russian citizenship, becoming temporarily stateless, and then he managed to obtain a Romanian passport. He set up an export company in Berlin in order to legalize his activity. Later on, he opened branches of the company in several European countries, as well as in North Africa, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, thus being able to create, as a commissioner, a veritable official coverage for his travels in regions of interest to Moscow, in order to carry out reconnaissance missions. After some time, he filled in the necessary formalities to obtain documents from Costa Rica, both for himself and for the other family members.

Parparov's pursuits included journalism as well as seeking for valuable information about diplomats, an activity which he carried out among his cronies, especially women.

“Marta”

As Haslam (2016) mentioned in *A New History of the Soviet Secret Services*, Parparov tried to make useful connections by publishing an advertisement in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* newspaper in Berlin, in 1931: *Young entrepreneur, seeking a lady partner to spend time with and help me in journalistic activities. I guarantee absolute confidentiality* (Haslam, 2016). The result exceeded his boldest expectations. A week later, Parparov received a reply to his ad: *I would love to meet you, if you are as modest as you promise. I am part of the Berlin high-level society among which I am willing to introduce you after we get to know each other. I am married, but I am often alone because I am too honest. You decide if you want to meet me. As soon as you answer, you will find out who I am. Naturally, confidentiality is essential* (Haslam, 2016).

Incidentally, he had come across a source he would never have encountered by any other means (Haslam, 2016). Parparov did not reply immediately, but

only after requesting approval from the Center¹⁹, where he received the recommendation to continue developing the relationship, and recruitment to be carried out only after the verification measures were carried out. The Center, however, gave her the codename “Marta”, suggesting to Parparov the following: *Give “Marta” the impression that you are interested in her, first as a woman, and also as a possible assistant in your journalistic activities*²⁰. Her identity is yet to be discovered. The meeting took place at a café, Parparov discovering in “Marta” an attractive 30-year-old woman, unhappy with her insensitive and boring husband, but devoted to his work as a senior official at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Haslam, 2016).

Following orders, Parparov began to meet cautiously with “Marta”: at first, he himself did not trust his new acquaintance, but checks proved that she was not a supporter of fascism and that she had no links with the German special services. “Marta” was lured by the fascinating Parparov, feeling attracted by his opinions, which differed from his husband's and, at the same time, being confident that she is appreciated for her journalistic talent.

Soon, it was obvious to the agent that the young woman might become a serious source of political information and that she would agree to the transfer of materials obtained from her husband (Antonov, 2013).

In one of the operative letters sent to the Center, Parparov wrote: *Family life burdens “Marta”, and therefore she seeks satisfaction in any activity. The husband is stingy, and the lack of his own funds is indisputable, often talking about it. One day, she asked for money to buy a coat. She was given 150 marks. The achieved level of the relationship now makes it possible to raise the issue of gradually engaging her into the work necessary to our interests. I asked her to find out the economics we are interested in. She related the content of an unofficial report on the subject, seen from one of the well-known journalists*²¹. Sometime later, the Center authorized the recruitment of the German woman under the name of another country (Haslam, 2016), Parparov

implying it was Japan. She readily accepted Parparov's offer to earn extra money by selling her husband's documents to a foreign state. In a report to the Center, the agent wrote: *Without any resistance from her side, we agreed that “Marta” would withdraw the documents from her husband's file or rewrite them (...) She was given 400 marks for treatment*²².

With “Marta”'s help, Parparov had access to transcripts of talks between German foreign ministry employees and counterparts from England and France. Under the pretext that she was interested in photography, “Marta” also received a camera, with which, in reality, she was taking photographs of original documents, which allowed Moscow to break German one-time pad diplomacy ciphers²³. Between 1935-1936, “Marta” gave Parparov recordings of Hitler's conversations with people in his circle and with the British ambassador, in which the Führer expressed his intentions regarding policy towards the Soviet Union and projections for Eastern Europe.

Often, finding out about “Marta”'s husband's journeys, in which “Marta” accompanied him, Parparov traveled in advance to that country. On one of the trips, with “Marta”'s help and a duplicate of a key to the safe in the room she shared with her husband, Parparov obtained access to the secret documents of the German delegation. Subsequently, when she discovered that Parparov was working for Soviet intelligence services, this novelty had no noticeable impact²⁴ on “Marta”.

Meanwhile, the Nazis came to power in Germany and launched massive preparations for the war. Information from “Marta” certified unequivocally that the Soviet Union would become the primary target of German aggression in Europe. In this respect, the documentary materials received from her became increasingly important.

In 1937, “Marta”'s husband was appointed German Ambassador in one of the European countries. After moving to a new residentura, “Marta” categorically refused to cooperate with other residents and transferred

all the information she collected personally to Parparov during his brief visits to Berlin (Komissarova, 2021).

Identity Disclosure and Subsequent Consequences

At the end of February 1938, Parparov's identity was revealed by Soviet intelligence officer Walter Krivitsky²⁵, who had defected to the West and knew him. Parparov was recalled to Moscow, however, managing to contact “Marta” and communicate her the reason for his disappearance. In response, “Marta” assured him she would wait for a new meeting, but that was their last conversation.

In Moscow, Parparov was arrested on charges of collaborating with German intelligence, imprisoned and savagely beaten, accused of being the one recruited by “Marta”. After a year, resisting torture and without any confession, he was released from prison but dismissed from the NKVD²⁶.

His release was also due to “Marta”'s letters to him, as well as the fact that she continued to collaborate with INO. Allegations of working with “Marta” under the Gestapo also went unfounded²⁷.

Instead of him, Elizaveta Zarubina was sent to Germany to meet “Marta”, give her the password and hand a letter from Parparov. Although “Marta” insisted on communicating only with Parparov, in the end, the dialog was restored and “Marta” began to transmit very valuable information, from which it was indisputably that Hitler would start an invasion of the USSR in the spring or early summer of 1941. But, as it has been mentioned several times, the Kremlin did not believe this information²⁸. In the summer of 1941, a difficult period followed for “Marta”, her husband being seriously wounded by bombing. She ended up in a psychiatric hospital, where she was killed by the Nazis.

¹⁸ Emigrant is a colloquial name for citizens of the socialist camp countries, as well as for the subjects of the Russian Empire or other states who refused to return to the country from legal or business trips abroad, for various reasons. The official name of the phenomenon in the Soviet Union in the 1930s was “Emigration abroad”. Nonreturn is a form of flight, that is, emigration from a country with a totalitarian or “permissive” migratory regime which defines such an action as presumed illegal, but usually defiant of official support for human rights at the level of the constitution and international agreements (Невозвращенцы (trad. Emigrantii), n.d.).

¹⁹ With reference to the headquarters of OGPU (State Political Directorate), Obedinenje Gosudarstvennoe politiceskoe upravlenie, russian: Объединённое государственное политическое управление, predecessor of KGB (GPU, n.d.).

²⁰ Originally: “Создавайте у Марты впечатление что она интересуется вас прежде всего как женщина, а также как возможный помощник в вашей журналистской деятельности” (Komissarova, 2021).

²¹ Originally: “Семейная жизнь тяготит Марту, и поэтому она ищет удовлетворения в какой-либо деятельности. Муж скуп, и недостаточность личных средств несомненна, о чем она часто говорит. Однажды она обратилась с просьбой дать ей денег на покупку пальто. Выдано 150 марок. Достигнутый уровень отношений позволяет уже сейчас ставить вопрос о постепенном втягивании ее в работу в наших интересах. Попросил ее выяснить интересующие нас сведения экономического характера. Она сообщила содержание неофициального доклада по данной проблеме, увиденного у одного из знакомых журналистов” (Antonov, 2013).

²² Originally: “Без сопротивления с ее стороны договорились о том, что Марта будет изымать документы из досье мужа или переписывать их... Ей передано 400 марок на лечение” (Antonov, 2013).

²³ In cryptography, a unique cipher is a system in which a randomly generated private key is used only once to encrypt a message that is then decrypted by the receiver using a unique cipher and key (Froehlich, 2022).

²⁴ Originally: “Марта совершенно спокойно отреагировала на его признание о работе на советскую разведку” (Antonov, 2013).

²⁵ Walter Germanovich Krivitsky was a Soviet intelligence officer who unveiled plans to sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, after deserting in the West. Krivitsky worked as an illegally resident spy with false names and papers in Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Italy and Hungary. He is credited with organizing industrial sabotage, stealing plans for submarines and aircraft, intercepting correspondence between the Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, and recruiting many agents, including Magda Lupescu (“Madame Lupescu”) and Noel Field). The assassination of his childhood friend and companion, Ignace Reiss, in September 1937, caused Krivitsky's immediate breakdown (Walter Krivitsky, n.d.).

²⁶ The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, *Narodnii komissariat vnutrennih del* – NKVD, was the Ministry of Interior of the Soviet Union (NKVD, n.d.).

²⁷ Originally: “Обвинения в том, что Федор работал с Мартой под колпаком гестапо, также отпали как беспочвенные” (Antonov, 2013).

²⁸ *О Любимце женщин и гениальном разведчике – майоре госбезопасности Федоре Парпарове* - Lyubimecz-zhenshin-i-genialnyj-razvedchik-major-gosbezopasnosti-fedor-parparov (A woman's favorite and a brilliant intelligence officer – State Security major Fiodor Parparov - Любимец женщин и гениальный разведчик – майор госбезопасности Федор Парпаров n.d.). In original: “Связь была восстановлена, Марта стала передавать весьма ценную информацию, которая неопровержимо свидетельствовала, что Гитлер начнет вторжение в СССР весной или в начале лета 1941 года. Но, как уже не раз упоминалось, в Кремле этой информации не верили.”

Subsequently, at the initiative of the new INO head, Pavel Fitin²⁹, who managed to convince Lavrenti Beria³⁰, Parparov was brought back to the service and handed the medal rewards for his earlier work, as well as the orders of the Red Flag and Red Star. Furthermore, he was awarded the rank of Major of the State Security Service, corresponding to the rank of Army Colonel (Steinberg, 2008). Returning to INO, Parparov repeatedly tried to reconnect with “Marta”, insisting on the need to travel to Berlin. His persistence on traveling to Germany, though it would have been dangerous³¹, for him, implied that he probably had some feelings for her.

After the Soviet victory in the Second World War, Parparov was appointed in charge of the security of the participants of the Postdam Conference of the Heads of State winning the war, prepared materials for the Nürenberg trials and attended meetings as an interpreter.

During a visit to Germany, Parparov met his son, whom he had not seen since the beginning of the war. Lev Fiodorovici Parparov had fought on the front and arrived in Berlin, where he remained to continue his life (Komissarova, 2021). Searching for traces of “Marta” in the hope of meeting her, Parparov received in 1946 accurate information about her life in his absence, the circumstances of her death and the place where she was cremated (Ioffe, 2018).

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²⁹ Pavel Mikhailovici Fitin was a Soviet intelligence officer, the director of Soviet Intelligence during the Second World War (Pavel Fitin, n.d.).

³⁰ Lavrenti Pavlovici Beria was a politician and marshal, minister of Internal Affairs, in charge of the security and repression services of the Soviet regime, one of the main perpetrators of Stalinist purges of the fourth decade in its final phases (Lavrenti Pavlovici Beria, n.d.).

³¹ Любимец женщин и гениальный разведчик – майор госбезопасности Федор Парпаров- Lyubimecz-zhenshhin-i-genialnyj-razvedchik-major-gosbezopasnosti-fedor-parparov, A woman's favorite and a brilliant intelligence officer – State Security major Fiodor Parparov (A woman's favorite and a brilliant intelligence officer – State Security major Fiodor Parparov, n.d.).

Conclusions

Major Fiodor Parparov retired in 1950, later coordinating the Military Department of the Moscow State University. He was only one of the many intelligence officers that Soviet Russia used to collect intelligence on the territories of the states of interest, in a period dominated by the global economic crisis between 1929 – 1937, which showed the fragility of the existing order in the world.

Intending to publish a book of memoirs about his father, Lev Fiodorovici Parparov collected material related to his father's activities, met his father's colleagues and friends. However, he failed to complete the work he had begun due to his premature death in 2001 (Antonov, 2013).

Many authors have excelled in accurately rendering the realities of those times, but the activities of the intelligence officers, legal or illegal, have always been surrounded by mystery. The Soviet foreign secret services had always played an important role in foreign policy of the Soviet Union, long before its establishment and had many achievements, especially in the interwar period, due to people motivated by the communist ideology.

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*When I use a word [...] it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.
(Humpty Dumpty, by Lewis Carroll. Through the Looking Glass)*

ENGLISH INTELLIGENCE TERMINOLOGY

INTERVIEW PROF. DR. JAN GOLDMAN

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ABSTRACT

The present paper is an interview with Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman, a renowned professor of intelligence and security studies and author and co-author of English intelligence dictionaries. The discussion revolves around the idea that language can frame both people and concepts, considering the importance and challenges of terminology and definitions within the intelligence community. We will also explore the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of terms and the extent of their potential implications, bearing in mind the importance of clear and accurate language in the intelligence field. Given the lexicographic interest of the interviewer, Prof. Dr. Goldman will touch upon his methodology while compiling the dictionaries, highlighting the added value a glossary of intelligence terminology would bring to the Romanian intelligence community.

Keywords: terminology, intelligence, information, lexicography, dictionary, intelligence community.

Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman is a former United States Intelligence Community analyst, he is a highly experienced professional in the field of *intelligence* and security studies. Currently, he is a professor of *intelligence* at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, USA. With over 35 years of experience in the US *intelligence* community, he has taught at institutions like the National Intelligence University and the FBI Academy. He is also a professor at the Faculty of Business Administration in Foreign Languages (FABIZ), at the Master of Business Intelligence, program endorsed by the Bucharest University of Economic Studies and “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy. He specializes in various research areas such as ethics in intelligence operations, secrecy, intelligence analysis, psychological operations, intelligence in civil society, and intelligence education. Prof. Dr. Goldman is also known for organizing international intelligence conferences and holding significant editorial roles, which include, but are not limited to, editor-in-chief of the *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, the founding editor for professional textbooks – *Security Professionals Intelligence Education Series* (S.P.I.E.S. at Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), and author or co-author of four *intelligence* terminology guides, namely *Intelligence Warning Terminology* (2001), *Words of Intelligence* (2006, 2011), and *Intelligence and Information Policy for National Security* (2016) (FABIZ, 2023). His new books are *Ethical Espionage: Ethics and the Intelligence Cycle* (2024), and *Ethics of Spying: A reader for the intelligence professional, volume 3* (2024).

Interview Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman March 28, 2023, Bucharest

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Dr. Goldman, thank you for having accepted the interview! We are very honored to have you here with us today!

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Thank you for inviting me to speak for this research that you are working on!

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Our first question would be about your four terminology guides, *Intelligence Warning Terminology* (2001), *Words of Intelligence* (2006, 2011), and *Intelligence and Information Policy for National Security* (2016) are the intelligence terminology guides that you have developed so far. Alongside other professional glossaries of intelligence terminology and similar lexicographic databases (such as NATO Standard 2-A-7, UNTerm, DOD Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, etc.), these lexicographic products are invaluable tools for intelligence and national security specialists. Thus far, you have given us not one, but four terminology guides that all build on each other. In your opinion, what was the most difficult challenge you faced while compiling these intelligence terminology guides?

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** The first of the four guides that I have developed began on a napkin, when someone had asked me about a word I had not heard before. The word was *hugger-mugger*. I had not heard about what *hugger-mugger* was, but I was working in the intel community, and someone mentioned *hugger-mugger* and I did not know what it was. I went to the dictionary, it was not in the dictionary, so I wrote it on a napkin, and I said *I am going to look to see what this word is*. Actually, the term *hugger-mugger* is an old spy term, which means that when one agency is doing something and another intel agency is unaware of what the other intel agency is doing and, by doing this, one agency is testing the limit. So, if American intelligence was pushing Russia and so we set up false information, Russia would then see this false information thinking it was real and then suddenly alert its forces. Another intel agency would watch Russia and see that they had alerted their forces and suddenly write reports and analysis on why they are standing to be activated when, in fact, the only reason they are being activated is because we have lit the match. This is called *hugger-mugger*. So, I wrote this down, I found the information and after that there were some other words and solely, I put together this information terminology, which is free and you can download, and then I came out with *Words of Intelligence*. In the US intelligence community, we have 18 agencies that make up the US intelligence community and probably 12 of the 18 agencies have unique words to their agency. You would think in the US Intelligence community everyone would agree what intelligence is, but no. In my last book, you will see there are 5 or 6 definitions for *intelligence* and then I cite where I get them from. So, for example, the CIA would have a different definition for *intelligence* than the FBI, and the military. Everyone looks at *intelligence* differently. *Intelligence* can be a process, like: *I am doing intelligence*. Some people look at intelligence as a product: *I have received intelligence*. And so, you have either a product or a process and it gets kind of tricky. My goal was to develop one definition for one word, instead I have got one word and five definitions. That was not what I set out to do.

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** So, the most difficult challenge was to identify, to define those words so that all the intelligence agencies would relate to it and understand it, to agree on their meaning.

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** That is not the case. It is obvious. This is what I take away, overall, trying to come to one meaning. In some words, this is possible, in other words this is not.

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** You said that they do not even agree on the definitions of *intelligence*. What about the distinction between *information* and *intelligence*? At least do they all agree that there are different meanings?

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** When you look at the term, *information* and *intelligence* are two different words. We are surrounded by *information*, we are not surrounded by *intelligence*. But you can garner *intelligence* from *information*. For example, when you have some intel agencies, they may be part of the intelligence community, but they look at *intelligence* differently, not as *information*, but they look at it as evidence. Now the term *evidence*. *Evidence* means something has occurred which means it has occurred in the past and when you commit a crime, you collect evidence. So, you kill someone, they collect evidence and the goal here is to put you on trial so that you may go to jail. This is called *evidence*. *Evidence* looks in the past and it is based on history. To me, from someone who has been in the intelligence community for 40 years, I always look at *intelligence* as the future, to prevent something from happening. If it happens, then it is *evidence* and quite frankly there is not much we can do. But when I went to law enforcement, the FBI, when they recruited me to teach their analysts, I noticed that they were interested in evidence, the past. I am not a cop, I am not a policeman, I am an intel analyst and I look towards the future. The future is a lot harder than the past. But that is how they viewed *intelligence*. And why did they view *intelligence*? It is because the FBI is really the only agency of the 18 agencies in the US intelligence community that puts people in jail. Also, the FBI is concerned about *intelligence* because we have the Constitution and we have civil liberties, and everyone has a right for unwarranted search and seizure, so you cannot just break someone's door, this is not the Soviet Union anymore, or Russia, everyone has rights, and they are concerned about that. They are concerned about the law, and this affects how they view *intelligence* as we can see from *evidence*.

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** The editor of the second edition of *Words of Intelligence* mentioned that “this book is the culmination of five years of research and extensive interviews with intelligence analysts, collectors, and managers in the law enforcement and foreign intelligence communities” (Goldman, 2011, p.ix). On the other hand, for *Intelligence and Information Policy for National Security*, you observe not only the rational language, institutional texts, but also the culture language and

the culture clash caused by multiple meanings of the same concepts. Could you please develop a little bit the research methodology you used and in case you also employed other techniques in the creation of these two terminology guides, could you give us some examples?

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** First, my background is in journalism, so I was a reporter. When I was very, very young, I got to college and I became a reporter, because I liked to write, and I liked to report. Intelligence requires communication, so journalism is extremely part of intelligence. And I tell people that if you do not like to write, you do not like words, words are pictures that you develop for your consumer who is your policy maker, then you really should not be in this business. Intelligence is all words, it is all information, it is breaking down, deconstructing this information. So, as far as the culture language clashing of rational language, I can give you an example. When we talk about *intelligence analysis*, what does the word *analysis* mean? Any ideas?

◆ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** *Analysis* is what you *know*, as opposed to *assessment*, which is what you *think you know*. I have read it in your book.

◆ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Good for you! Because I would say over 90% of the people do not know that. But that is a term that in some agencies, they do not make the distinction, they think *analysis* and *assessment* are the same thing. And this is why the United States went into Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction when we did an assessment without analysis and so, looking for weapons of mass destruction that did not exist and that is because intelligence failed in their analysis. And then you look deeper, and, if you see, US intelligence did not do analysis, they did assessment. But for the administration, what they have done is that they have put those two words together and they have politicized analysis and assessment, so now they say the intelligence community failed in its assessment or its analysis of finding weapons of mass destruction when, in fact, there was no analysis. The analysis was based on one person who said: *Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction*, which was not credible, and you can say: *But what is credibility, right?* This fellow had no credibility because he had never been a source, he had never been a human intelligence source, so the fact that he had never worked for us, that we knew nothing about him and now he is telling us suddenly that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, we are not ready to do an assessment yet, because we have satellites, we take pictures, we listen to hear what Saddam Hussein was talking about and none of that came open, none of that was available. And yet we relied on this one person who clearly was lying to us, and we quickly skipped the analysis and went straight

to assessment. And this is the problem! But 90% of the people in the intel community, I would say the agencies, they do not know the difference. I will give you another term that is confusing—the terms: *clandestine* and *covert*. *Clandestine* is something that is done secretly, and *covert* is something that is done secretly but if it is found out, there is deniability, which means you do not know who is responsible. *Clandestine* means if it is found out, you will know who is responsible. But how many times have you seen a movie where they interchanged the word *clandestine* in *covert* when it is very obvious who is responsible? They say: *we are doing a covert operation*, which means there is deniability, which means you can say we are not responsible, even though you are. That is the difference between *covert* and *clandestine*. But I watch movies all the time and they are doing clandestine action, and they are calling it covert, so you know where the public gets its meaning from.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** The third question would be about the most important criteria you took into consideration when you compiled these dictionaries, and by criteria, I mean whether you took into consideration size, relevance, reliability, type of the dictionary, the specialists' needs maybe? Have you thought of what their needs are with respect to these dictionaries?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Actually, I was not concerned about their needs. My need was to collect words that are relatable to intelligence professionals. What would a professional do? When I talk about professionals, I am talking about people who see themselves as in a profession, that this is their career and they want as much knowledge as possible, knowing that there are many different words and many different terms that are used in different situations so that they are at least aware. So, when you write something, you should have a sense that there may be some ambiguity, some confusion about what you are writing. Because writing wants to be clear, you do not want the policy maker, the leader, or the consumer of your products to have doubts or to misinterpret the information. So, when we started compiling the information of the last book, with Susan and myself, we would ask ourselves: where is the definition, if there is a definition, in the US Government, what documents exist and let us get that information. And what we found out was that in the US Government there were several documents that may have had several different definitions for the same word. And instead of choosing, we have put in all the information and said: this is where it is coming from. Because we cannot choose. It is very similar to, I also teach ethics and I can pose the problem, but I really cannot give you the answer. But then we would also go and see if there were any very small population of words that are being

used online, in chat rooms and so forth, that are related to intelligence, but have some meaning, but they are not official words. Those were not too much because I am not a social media, so I left that for Susan, but that was something that we have considered. Anything that an intel analyst or intel professional would come in contact with, this is what we have considered.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** During the interviews you had with the intelligence analysts, did you ask them about how they would work with the dictionary?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Yes. When I was at some of the institutions in the government, we would give each new employee a copy of the book, so the book that you have there, *Words of Intelligence*, when I was at the FBI Academy, since it was geared towards law enforcement, every intel analyst for the FBI received a copy of that book. And that was to help them understand that the intelligence that they are working on, evidence, is different from the rest of the community. So that is why I wrote that book. It was really for law enforcement, and as you can see in the subhead lining, it is for the domestic threat. Interesting story though, when this book was published and I was talking about developing a program for domestic intelligence that I was chastised and said *do not use that word*, because domestic intelligence means to them, the senior officials, that we spy on Americans in the US, and we do not. So, *you must stop using that term: domestic intelligence*. Really? Cause we do, cause of course, if we see that there is a crime that may be committed or could be committed, we get a warrant, we do it all legally and they say yes, and then we gather evidence to put them in jail, but that is not to be considered *domestic intelligence*, that is a no-no word. You also have to understand that, in 1947, when President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947, he said: *I am going to sign this act*, which created the CIA, *but I have some concern, I do not want to develop a Gestapo, I am not here to create a domestic intelligence, neighbors spying on neighbors, turning them into the government, this is what it happened in Nazi Germany, we do not do that*. So, when the CIA was created, the goal was the CIA can spy all they want, but they can do foreign intelligence, but they are not allowed to do domestic. We do not do domestic intelligence, which means we do not collect on Americans, which is certainly not true, because you must collect if we are going to collect evidence, but it is called investigation, evidence, not domestic intelligence. And so, senior officials came to me and said: *Doctor Goldman, you need to take that word out, we do not use domestic intelligence*.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** And is it still up to the present, this distinction between foreign intelligence and domestic

investigations?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** It is a big concern. Domestic intelligence wreaks of Nazism, the Soviet Union, Ceaușescu, this is domestic intelligence, we do not do that.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Now getting back to our questions, starting with the premise that dictionaries are utility tools (see Wiegand, 1998, 2001, Bergenholtz & Tarp, 2003), instruments that users consult in order to learn or use a word in one specific situation, we know that for the entries in *Words of Intelligence* you conducted interviews with intelligence specialists. For sure, your own professional expertise in the intelligence field carried a lot of weight in the process. How did you mix the techniques employed in the compilation of the dictionary? Would you say that it was “introspection” (based on your mental lexicon and subjective experience in the field, see Atkins & Rundell, 2008) or rather “informant-testing”, the technique that you used the most often for the selection and definition of dictionary entries and informant-testing would be a technique by which speakers of a language are questioned about their use of words?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** This is a very good question, and it shows to me that this is the weakness of my publication! So, thank you! It is mostly mental lexicon and subjective expertise, and if I had to do this again, I would look at the other techniques. Clearly this is not done from a lexicon expertise, and I would say Susan Maret is probably much more qualified in that. Just as a background note, Susan's expertise as a librarian PhD doctorate is conspiracy theories. What is a *conspiracy*? And she looks at how to deconstruct conspiracy theories. I am the complete opposite, I do not look at conspiracy theories, but I thought I had from my experience to pull something together as only as a reference and as I started it on a napkin, it was only for my own use and then slowly it just grew and grew. But here is what I did do though! Because I was in the intelligence community, I did go to every agency, and I asked them: *Do you have a reference book? A lot of them said: No, we do not use a reference book, we think it is common knowledge*. But those that did have a reference book, I asked them, and I got it. And I would say that 90% of the time, even the reference books, they were unclassified, but there were 10% that were classified. I said: *These are just words, why, how can you classify?* This is where it became difficult, because even in this research of doing words you get overclassification, and the overclassification is information that you do not want the public to know when, in fact, there is no reason to classify. There are only two reasons that you classify information: sources, which is like where are you getting

this information, then you must protect your sources, and the second is called methods – how did you get this information, not who did you get the information or what satellite you used, but the means to collect it. So, sources and methods. Those are the only reasons you deal with classified information, then you have the classification series: top secret, secret, confidential. Damage, it is all based on the damage inflicted on US National Security at least for the US classification. But I would say in other countries like Romania, it is the same thing. How badly will this damage our security? So, given all that, and given classified, trying to find the common and then looking at the official, it would have been way too much for me to try to come up with and I just said no, I am going to just, based on my experience, based on the words I see, this is what I am going to. I think *Words of Intelligence* is a very good book because it is very succinct, it is to the point. The other book that you got is much broader and I think there are some words, they are definitely Susan's words, but the reason I do not relate to them is because they are from the public. I am looking at them from an intelligence perspective. Except for that, there is no real methodology to my madness except to write this down.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** How did your previous expertise in the intelligence field help you in your lexicographic work? Is it preferable for a lexicographer to also have, in addition to linguistic competences, professional expertise and knowledge in the intelligence field? Does this professional expertise help with the lexicographer's observation of the language in use or not (Atkins & Rundell, 2008)?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** For me, having professional expertise was a hindrance. It prevented me from seeing outside of the intel community. So, this points out to how we look at words. There are words that are used inside the intel community that are perceived differently from outside the intel community. Probably one of the terms that comes rarely to my mind is the term *torture*. How do you view *torture*? There are some, who are in human intelligence collection, who view torture different than the public would see. What is *torture*? I use it as an example: the administration and the intel who works for the administration, they can change the definition of *torture*. This is all just an example. When World War 2 ended, the US put on criminal charges, charges against humanity, human rights violations, individuals, the Japanese particularly, for torturing American soldiers. What did they do? They did this where they put someone on a board and they slowly poured water over their face until they felt like they were suffocating and this is a term which we use - *waterboarding* - and they were crimes against humanity and they were held accountable, the

Japanese. Fast forward, 65 years, US is doing the same technique, but we do not call that *torture*, because US will never torture. But it was *torture* in 1949 when we did for the Japanese, we held them, it was right after the war, 47, but now here we are after 9/11, and we are doing the same thing and it is not *torture*, no. And why is it not *torture*? Because we have a legal document, and the legal document says: *this is not torture*. Oh, so now the law defines the words. So, this is what we see, where the law's interpretation of what a word is and that is outside the public and it was a great debate. Should we be torturing? People have said to me: *What do you think?* And I said: *It has already been decided 60 years ago. So why are we having this question?*

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** That is why it is very important how you define words.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** And how you change the definition. Ultimately, a memorandum came out from the administration that said: *You know, we are going to redefine torture, waterboarding is not torture*. Instead, the Gonzales Memorandum has some absurd where it is said: for torture to occur you must lose a certain amount of blood and you must have a certain number of bones broken and this would be torture. But if you do not lose blood and you do not break bones, waterboarding and you just think you are going to die and suffocate... the water is not going to break your bones, but you may drown, but that is different. That is why it is not torture. And you think: this is crazy. But the definitions, the terms, this is why it is so important.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Indeed. Now a little about our Romanian specialists. The Romanian specialists' need to align themselves to the NATO and EU intelligence terminology, as well as the need for smoother communication with their counterparts, has led to a process of extensive borrowing from English and code-switching. How would you see this process in terms of both advantages and drawbacks to the development of the intelligence terminology? Is intervention within language, as I have seen it in your recent dictionary, an anticipatory indicator of languages' evolution, speaking of our national intelligence?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** As far as the Romanian intelligence specialists, there is no reason to reinvent the wheel, as we say. The British certainly have a lexicon of terms, which is in some ways very different from the US. I know their spelling is different. So, the fact that they spell words differently, this is where probably in your study would probably come in most handy. For example, in developing a lexicon, I do not know, and I have to be honest, for my weakness, do you use British spelling, or do you use American spelling?

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** I personally use American spelling; we do not have a national standard in respect to using British or US spelling.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Now we have found a weakness. So, if you are going to do something in intelligence, you need to decide if you want to go with British or American spelling. It is probably 75% overlap and 25% unique. But even in that respect, taking a word like a *biscuit*. I am leaving the intel, I am just looking at the word *biscuit*. *Biscuit* in British vocabulary, vernacular, a *biscuit* is a cookie, right, they have biscuits. In the United States, *biscuits* are not cookies, *biscuits* are square pieces of bread, dough that is piled high, usually with butter and eaten for breakfast. For them, this is called the *biscuit*. Sometimes you put gravy over your biscuit. Biscuits and gravy. The British say it is a *cookie*. So, when you write the word *biscuit*, what do you mean? Because you are developing your Service and I know you are at your 30th anniversary [ANIMV's 30th anniversary], maybe it is time you should be focusing on establishing your own language and decide if you want to go with *cookie* or *biscuit*, in what you mean. You can look at the Americans, you can look at the history, you can look at the British. Even more important is awareness since you do not have a standardized lexicon. You should establish like where you are getting this information and how it is being used even though you have said to me just now that you like the American. But if another of your colleagues says British and then, ultimately, a good profession has to have its own terminology regardless of where it is located. We are not there yet, but if Romania is to be a professional, you need to develop a professional language. Like everyone should know the difference between *analysis* and *assessment*. But I have no doubt, 90% of the students who graduate here, like in the US, think those two terms are the same. The fact you are dealing with NATO and EU, you are now talking about an international organization, so you are dealing not just with the Brits, but the French, and you know everyone else involved in NATO. And the EU, which are countries that are not in NATO. We have tried to maybe establish an international lexicon for use at the United Nations, because we give them information, we do not give them classified information, but we give them information. And I have tried to define what kind of information we can give them and what kind of words we should use that are understandable by 192 countries because that is how many make up the UN, 192 countries. Can you make a standard that includes 192 countries? I do not think so. So, you are asking me: Doctor Goldman, can we do a standard with NATO? Which has 22 countries? And then add another 30 countries to the EU and have a standard

lexicon. And I would say: why do not you just develop a standard for yourself? And not worry about those.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Because our specialists mostly borrow the words, such as *intelligence* and *tradecraft*, for example, and they use them as such in Romanian and, we also have some inflection morphemes attached to *intelligence* and that is why they are borrowed, but they have not been yet lexicographically attested anywhere because our intelligence literature has not reached that point so far.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** But that should not stop you because the thing is that any time that you develop a word, the word is going to have much more distribution. Like you will always be following the word. You are not going to lead the word; you will follow the word. Every year *The Oxford English Dictionary* comes out with words that we are adding to our dictionary. And they have used words which were mostly slang, words that have appeared with no permanent definition, but people knew what they meant. And so, someone collected all the terms and said: *Here is what we believe is the definition for this word, because everyone is using it*. And it would be silly for us to ignore this word when everyone is using it. So, my response to you is: if you want to develop a Romanian one, I think it would be great, because if you wait to test it and people think about it, the word is already out there, the horse has already left the barn, as we say, and now you have to go get the horse and put a saddle on it and drive it back to the barn. That is why I would have loved to have put one definition for all the words.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** What would you do differently about the compilation?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** There are some definitions that I have given too much credence to, I have said that this is the definition when, in fact, it was very technical that very few people used it and maybe that could have been eliminated. So, I could have been more selective. I will give you an example. I am teaching a class online, back in the United States, and I had the students develop threats scenario to anticipate fighting China-Taiwan and I told them how to develop a scenario, but the thing is I talked about what are key drivers, and when you go to my book and you look under *key drivers*, it is a very technical definition and then underneath it says *see critical indicators* and you go to *critical indicators* and basically what it says is something that tells you that the scenario is occurring and it is unambiguous, which means that there is no doubt that it goes right to the scenario. I should have just written *key drivers, see critical indicators*. Instead, I had this long information and I tried to make it readable, so I talked about *key drivers* and *weapons of mass destruction* and like what was pushing

that because I could not really find a good definition, so I gave an example, which is not really very good and then it says *see critical indicators*. I should have just written *see critical indicators*. So, the bottom line is I would do it simpler.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Our last question would be about bilingual glossaries, to get back to our Romanian terminology. In your opinion, what is the added value a bilingual glossary of terminology in the intelligence field would bring to Romanian intelligence and national security specialists?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** I think it would be very helpful. It is helpful when you are learning words about a profession that appears in your native language. Because if you have to learn about a lexicon, and you need to learn the words and then you have to translate the words and then it loses its meaning. And I use Google translate. So, whenever I get something from Romania, sometimes my friends, they write in Romanian, I will translate it into English and then sometimes I will type it in English and translate it into Romanian for them. But sometimes it is silly. You are not getting the real information, because you are doing a transliteration, not a translation. And a transliteration is you are going word for word. When you are dealing with intelligence, and you want to be accurate, you want to be clear, you cannot do transliteration because it is a concern that if you transliterate it versus actually translate it, anyway it is going to lose its meaning and intelligence is all about meaning. So, having a properly translated, not transliterated, but a translation of what it means and to adapt it and note that it is from the British and not the US or vice-versa, it would be very helpful for the intelligence professional. If we are to become a professional and the Academy is now 30 years old, you develop your own language and your own words and there are probably things that do not need to be translated that apply directly to Romania. For example, if you come to my country, where I live in South Carolina, we have a term that is *called the low country*. I do not know what *the low country* is, but where we are located in *the low country* means where all the plantations were, this is where all of the slaves were located, where all the cotton was picked, and this is known as *the low country*. I did not know, I just knew it was called South Carolina. But if you talk to someone in law enforcement and they are looking for a criminal, they will say: *We believe the criminal is in the low country as opposed to the high country*. Well, you have just eliminated half of the state. And now I know what that means. That is the same thing I would say with a country like Romania or any country. What do your terms mean? That is not only when we talk about translation or transliteration, but we are also

talking about dialect, what words mean in a dialect. In the United States, where I come from, in New York city, you go to the store and people would call it a *grocery store*, somebody will just say a *shopping store*, some people call it a *food market*, this is all on and off. And then in the south, where do you put your groceries? They put their groceries in a *bag*. But in the south, you go to the same stores that I have mentioned, given different names, and they will put your groceries in a *sack*. So, if you are looking for someone that may have robbed the bank and they put the money in a *bag*, grocery bag or did they put it in a *sack*? So, it would be nice to differentiate or just say *grocery bag and sack are two enclosures that people put stuff in, normally food stuff, which carries in it by one foot, by two feet and it is usually made out of paper*. There is your grocery bag and there is your sack.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** And culture knowledge, besides linguistic competence, is very important, as you gave us this example, and dialect.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** And then they get into dialect. They will tell you that that is how they are using the words. And you need to collect on that because that is how that people talk. And yet, they mean the same thing. So, if we stretch that further now and look at the United States and say *what is intelligence* and I go to Romania, and they say: *What is intelligence? Is that a process or is it a product?*

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** And is it *information* or *intelligence* into Romanian? Because we also have this discussion whether to translate it with *information*?

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Does it become *intelligence* after you translate it, because no one understands it when it is not being translated?

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** They use it as *intelligence*, most of them, they do not translate this word. They know the difference, at least most of them, because we also have some situations where we have seen that our specialists cannot tell the difference between *information* and *intelligence*, and whether to translate *intelligence* with *information* or leave it as such: as *intelligence*. It is a clear difference of meaning, but with respect to the translation we still have some discussions.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** Are you familiar with the *intelligence cycle*?

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Yes.

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** I typically ask when I teach intelligence what is the most important part of the *intelligence cycle*? If you look in my book, you will see the *intelligence cycle*, some of the US intelligence

agencies have 5 steps into the process and some have 6. Why do they have different things? When we are talking about the Intel Cycle, the FBI has 5 and the CIA has 6. It is important to know how many steps. The other thing is when we talk about the intel cycle, I always ask my students: *what is the most important part of the intelligence cycle?* And everyone looks and then people say: analysis or assessment, some will say collection, exploitation, which is when you translate. I would say: *You are all right to say that, but I will tell you the answer. The answer is number one: plans and requirements.* What does that mean? That means what are we looking for, what are the questions, besides what platforms we are going to use, what do we want answered? Because this will determine our answers, which is going to drive the words that we accumulate for our analysis and our assessment. And we have a saying in the US Intelligence Community: *garbage in, garbage out*. If you do not know what you want, and you are unclear, and you give me many words, which mean nothing, then you will get garbage out, which means you get many words that mean nothing, and you are done. And this will drive your production, your collection, your exploitation, and you will find out that this is all meaningless and now you have got to do it all over again and hopefully you will be better, you will be clearer, you will understand the words better and then you can proceed. I will give you an example. When people are gathering for a demonstration, if it is a big demonstration, we need to collect on it because this tells us that the government is in trouble. So, we fly over, we take pictures, and we give it to an imagery interpreter, and the imagery interpreter looks at it and says *there are 175 people at this gathering*, ok. So, then you write the report, and you say *there was a huge gathering of individuals, demonstration* and you can even say 175. Well, let us just leave the number out. When it goes to the policy maker, he sees *huge*, what are we talking about like 75,000, I mean how big is it? Well, knowing this country and knowing the restrictions, knowing the limitations of the liberty they have, 175 is huge. It is not 75,000, it is not 175,000, it is 175, which we think it is very large. Ok, but you have to convey that and tell the policy maker 175 is huge. For this country it is huge. And that is all you can do. And that is why having a single lexicon unclassified not just for the professional, but also for the consumer.

✦ **Ana-Maria Surugiu:** Thank you very much, Doctor Goldman!

✦ **Prof. Dr. Jan Goldman:** It was my pleasure! Thank you for inviting me!

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SĀMARRĀ

AN ARCHEOLOGICAL CITY FROM THE WORLD HERITAGE

Alias: Loredana MANOLESCU

ABSTRACT

In a world full of violence, fear and awful situations, we are also able to enjoy beautiful things such as music, art, or culture. These can change the perception of people by making them feel emotional, give thought to a certain thing or even smile. These are some reasons why we need to preserve these works of art and to transmit them from generation to generation.

Entitled "Sāmarrā", the paper is a brief presentation, starting from information about the country Iraq, to general aspects related to the city of Sāmarrā'. The chosen topic is treated from a historical point of view and this article aims to give the readers a better perspective on the city of Sāmarrā', but also on the archaeological site located in this city. The archaeological city of Sāmarrā' is the site of a powerful Islamic capital that ruled over the provinces of the Abbasid Empire for a century.

Keywords: *Iraq, heritage, Sāmarrā, history, archaeological site.*

Overview of the Iraqi State

Since Iraq's inception in the 1920s, it has been obvious that there are very different ideas about the future of the state. Throughout the country, the boundaries between these ideas have changed as different, empowered groups tried to assert control, bring others into line with their own vision of Iraq. Throughout Iraq's history, these views have been contradictory. The British authorities in the 1920s, tribal sheiks under the control of the monarchy and the republic, Arab nationalists in the 1930s, Shiite scholars in this period, the Iraqi Communist Party in the heyday of the 1950s and early 1960s, Kurdish parties in their struggles with each other and with the central authorities, Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath party in the 21st century and, most recently, the United States and the forces that its brief occupation brought to the fore, all left their mark on the formation of the state of Iraq (Tripp, 2007).

Situated in the Middle East, in the South-West Asia, the Republic of Iraq borders the Islamic Republic of Iran to the east, the Republic of Turkey to the north, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the west, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the south, respectively. The country's territory consists mainly of dry desert land west of the Euphrates River, a large central valley between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and the mountains in the northeast (Infoplease, n.d.).

In the distant past, the area now known as Iraq carried the historical name of Mesopotamia, often referred to as the "Land between rivers." This region gave rise to some of the world's earliest civilizations, such as Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria. The rich region, comprising much of what is called the Fertile Crescent¹, became a valuable part of the imperial policies, namely the various Persian Greek and Roman dynasties, and after the 7th century the region became a central point of the Islamic world. Iraq's capital Baghdad, became the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate in the 8th century. Iraq derives its name from the Arabic term used in the premodern times to describe a region roughly corresponding to Mesopotamia ('Irāq' Arabī, "Arabian Iraq") and the modern northwest of Iran ('Irāq' Ajamī, "Foreign Iraq" - meaning Persian) (Woods, n.d.).

The period of the Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258) has long been recognized as the stage of the formation of Islamic civilization, with various achievements in

the field of science, literature and culture. The Abbasid Caliphate, from its foundation in 750 and the golden age under Hārūn al-Rashīd to the conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 was a grandiose empire and had a strong influence on Islamic culture and society (El-Hibri, 2021).

The kingdom of Iraq gained its independence in 1932, but remained under British imperial influence for the next quarter-century of monarchial rule. The political instability following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958, but the establishment of an Arab nationalist and socialist regime – the Baath Party – in a bloodless *coup d'état* 10 years later brought new stability. With oil reserves, the regime was able to finance development projects and plans throughout the 1970s, thus building one of the largest and best equipped armed forces in the Arab world. Oil revenues almost doubled between 1973 and 1975 and, until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, this allowed the Baath regime to set ambitious development goals, namely in the construction industry, reducing the amount of imported manufactured products, improving the agricultural sector and significantly increasing non-oil exports. Investments in infrastructure have been high, particularly for projects involving irrigation and water supply, roads, and railways, and rural electrification, and health services have also been greatly improved (Woods, n.d.).

Saddam Hussein, who led the country in the disastrous military confrontations, namely the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991), quickly took over the leadership of the party. These conflicts have isolated the country from the international community, especially in financial and social terms. However, the Iraqi leader was able to maintain a firm grip on power in the early years of the 21st century. He and his regime were overthrown in 2003, during the war in Iraq (Woods, n.d.).

Between 2014 and 2017, Iraq was engaged in a military campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)², aimed at regaining lost territory in the western and northern parts of the country. Iraqi and allied forces retake Mosul, the country's second largest city, in 2017 and expelled ISIS from its other urban strongholds. In December 2017, prime minister Haider Al-Abadi³ publicly declared victory against ISIS while continuing operations against the remaining group in rural areas. Also, at the end of 2017, Al-Abadi responded to an independence referendum organized by the Kurdistan

regional government, ordering Iraqi forces to take control of territories in central and northern Iraq that had previously been occupied and governed by Kurdish forces (The World Factbook⁴, 2022).

The ongoing struggle to dislodge the Islamic State has deepened amid underlying sectarian tensions in Iraq, between Sunni and Shia groups, as well as tensions between northern Kurdish groups and the government in Baghdad, which have intensified since the 2003 U.S. invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein. These tensions now threaten the stability of the new Iraqi government that is trying to rebuild the country and prevent the Islamic State from reborn (Center for Preventive Action⁵, 2023).

Iraq faces significant challenges in its recovery from the war against Islamic State. More than two million people remain internally displaced and nearly nine million need humanitarian assistance in the wake of the nearly four-year war, with the reconstruction estimated at, at least, 88 billion dollars. In addition to reintegrating Sunni communities into the political systems, the new government must also address the demobilization and integration of powerful Shia militias that transformed during the fight against Islamic State into Iraqi security forces, as well as tensions with Kurdish groups, pressing for greater autonomy in the country's north, following a failed independence referendum in October 2017 (Center for Preventive Action, 2023).

On 1st October 2019, thousands of Iraqis took to the streets leading anti-government protests to mark, at national level, the anniversary of demonstrations that burst out three years ago and have since sporadically continued. The 2019 protests were largely organized by a young and passionate generation of Iraqis, who are demanding political and economic reforms, but also an end to foreign interference in Iraqi politics. The emergence of the protest movement in 2019, called Tishrīn (ar. تشرين - October), seemed to herald a different Iraq, where some of the demonstrators' goals seemed to be achieved – especially less than a month after the beginning of the unrest, the prime minister at that time, 'Ādil 'Abd Al-Mahdi, was forced to resign due to the pressures of the protesters. Young people have been coming to Tahrir Square for months demanding an end to widespread government corruption, precarious public services and unemployment. They also called for the dismantling of the political system, which relies on a sectarian arrangement of power-sharing among an older generation of political elites. Some of these demonstrators

organized themselves, coming with polls and forming political parties, and some of them passed the electoral threshold in the October 2021 national elections, securing seats in the parliament (Abdo, 2022).

Today, Iraq enjoys the most stable period since 2003. Armed violence persists in various forms, but it is sporadic, fragmented and only in certain areas, especially rural ones. However, the country remains fragile and divided, and its people face a series of deepening challenges the state is striving to address (Fazil & Tartir, 2023).

Sāmarrā'

During the reign of the Abbasid Caliphate from 750 to 1258, there was a significant shift in the epicenter of Islamic cultural and political life. This shift led to the relocation of the capital from Syria to Iraq, with Baghdad assuming the role of the new capital in 762. Subsequently, the Abbasids founded another city, Sāmarrā', located to the north of Baghdad, which briefly served as the capital from 836 to 892. The initial three centuries of the Abbasid rule are often described as a golden age. During this time, both Baghdad and Sāmarrā' played pivotal roles as cultural and economic hubs within the Islamic world. This era saw the emergence of a distinct artistic style and the development of innovative techniques that had a far-reaching impact on Islamic art and architecture, influencing the broader Muslim domain (Yalman & Komaroff, 2001).

The city of Sāmarrā' is located in the governorate (muḥāfazah) Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, in central Iraq. Located on the banks of the Tigris River, Sāmarrā' is the site of a prehistoric settlement from the 5th millennium BC. The city was founded between the 3rd and the 7th centuries AD. In 836, when the Abbasid Caliph Al-Mu'taṣim was forced to leave Baghdad, he transformed Sāmarrā' into its new capital, building palaces and gardens, and under the domination of its successors, the city expanded along the Tigris for a distance of 32 km. In 892, the capital was moved back to Baghdad by Caliph al-Mu'tamid, and by 1,300, almost all of the city was in ruins, but it has since been resurrected (Gaur, n.d.).

The city's original plan consisted of a congregational mosque, squares, military cantonments, and the great principal complex of the Caliphal Palace or the original Dār al-Khilafa. A broad arterial alley connected the squares and the mosque at the southern

¹ The Fertile Crescent – The eastern arch between the Nile, the Tigris, and the Euphrates is called the "Fertile Crescent" and this is where the first social organizations of the Mediterranean basin emerged in the fourth millennium BC (Oprea, 2011).

² Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a political-military terrorist organization.

³ Haider Al-Abadi (b. 1952) is an Iraqi politician who served as prime minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018 (Haider Al-Abadi, n.d.).

⁴ The World Factbook is an official annual publication of the online Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that covers information about the world's countries.

⁵ Center for Preventive Action is a program that focuses on preventing, reducing or solving armed conflicts around the world. The CPA is an interactive online guide to ongoing conflicts all over the world, especially in areas where U.S. interests are most at risk (Center for Preventive Action, 2023).

end of the site with the palace complex to the north. The cantonments stretched between the mosque and the palace. After the death of al-Mu'tasim⁶ in 842, his successors al-Wāthiq chose to remain in Sāmarrā' (Archnet, n.d.).

The population of Sāmarrā', along with the population of the surroundings areas, is about 300,000 people according to statistics of the Ministry of Commerce in 2003. Most of them are Sunni Arabs and belong to different tribes and clans, the most important being Al-Dulaim, Al-Sawamarah, Al-Bubdran, Al-Jubūr and Al-Anzza. The city is also inhabited by Sunni and Shia Kurds (Al-Jazeera, 2015).

The economy of the city depends on the agricultural and industrial sectors. Here the company Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn existed for electronic industries and communications, but it was affiliated with the Ministry of Military Industry, ending its activity in April 2003. There is also the General Company for Pharmaceutical Industry, which has a great reputation, as it worked to meet local needs during the period of sanctions imposed on the country. Drug production was not interrupted, as the company employed about 3,000 people. The city's economy is also based on the service sector and domestic and foreign tourism, including ancient historical monuments and Shia religious shrines (Al-Jazeera, 2015).

In the city there are Christian and Jewish monuments, such as the temple of the Thora or what is known as the Jewish Quarter, which lasts until the fifties of the twentieth century. The Jewish market in the center of Sāmarrā' is now surrounded by a series of dilapidated houses, after the Jews left for Israel with the formation of the state of Israel. The inhabitants of Sāmarrā' were left only with the memories that the Jews left behind when they lived side by side with the Muslims. Samad Abbas, 70 years old, a resident of the Jewish Quarter, recalls his Jewish neighbors before they left and how they performed their rituals, their numerous holidays and year-round events, noting that they owned shops and properties and were good people (Othman, 2014).

The archeological city of Sāmarrā' is the site of a powerful Islamic capital that ruled, for a century, over the provinces of the Abbasid Caliphate, extending from

present-day Tunisia to Central Asia. The city is located on both sides of the Tigris River, 130 km north of Baghdad, with the length of the site from north to south being 41,5 km. Also, the Ninth Century Grand Mosque and its spiral minaret are among the many outstanding architectural monuments on the site (World Heritage Center, n.d.).

The Great Mosque and the Spiral Minaret of Sāmarrā'

The mosque has a rectangular appearance, consisting of an outer brick wall 10m high and 2,65m thick, and supported by a total of 44 semicircular towers, including four corners.

Access to the mosque was possible through one of the 16 gates, and above each entrance there were a few small arched windows. The mosque had 17 corridors, and its walls were covered with dark blue glass mosaics. The courtyard was surrounded on all sides by an arcade.

Approximately 27m from the center of the north-facing part of the mosque is the Malwiya Tower, with its vast 52m high and 33m wide spiral cone at the base. During his time at the helm, Al-Mutawakkil⁷ often rode his donkey to the top of the tower to enjoy the view (Amusing Planet, 2014).

The spiral minaret of the city of Sāmarrā', more than 1,000 years old, is one of Iraq's main tourist attractions. Iraqi police said in 2005 that an explosion damaged one of the most important monuments of Islamic architecture. The same source reported that the insurgents blew up the upper Malwiya tower, which had been used by American soldiers as an observation post (BBC News, 2005). Thus, the explosion left scattered debris on the minaret's outer steps. Officials in Iraq have voiced concerns over the damage U.S. troops have caused to other historical sites in Sāmarrā' and have demanded compensation after the walls of the ancient palace in Sāmarrā' were cracked. According to Caroline Hawley, the BBC correspondent in Baghdad, the looting of archeological sites, especially in southern Iraq, is a disturbing phenomenon, focusing on the effects of the war on the country's heritage (BBC News, 2005).

Archaeological Sites Destroyed by Attacks

Ten of thousands of people rallied in the Shiite towns of Iraq in 2006, expressing their anger after the attack on the mausoleum of the Imam 'Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Hādi (827-868) and the mausoleum of the Imam Ḥasan al-'Askarī (845-872), one of the most sacred places in Sāmarrā'. In Baghdad, the population of the Shia neighborhoods Ṣadr and Al-Kāzimiyyah rebelled; hence, the mosque's muezzins issued a call for a protest to condemn it. A crowd gathered around mosques and political party premises, awaiting instructions. One Islamic Party headquarters and three Sunni mosques were attacked in the capital after an attack on the Shiite mausoleum. The highest Shia authority, religious leader Ali Sistani, immediately appealed for calm and asked the people not to attack Sunni mosques. The head of state at that time, Jalal Talabani, called for unity to thwart the plans of Sunni extremists (L'Obs, 2006).

The right side of the mausoleum, 1,200 years old, was also destroyed by a double explosion. The golden dome and the turquoise mosaic cladding were totally destroyed (L'Obs, 2006).

Conclusions

Remembering the ancient world, our minds are attracted to the powerful old cities in the heart of the great empires and civilizations, such as Babylon, Athens and Rome, as they all shaped the course of history in their own way. Some of them were the seat of powerful empires that ruled the world. Some have suffered tragic falls, while others remain standing, in various states of preservation. It is hardly surprising that Iraq today, despite all the destruction, and conflicts that have been caused over the centuries, is still full of archeological treasures and fascinating world heritage.

Historical and cultural monuments are found in the town of Sāmarrā' which have made it an important tourist destination internally and externally, and UNESCO has included it on the World Heritage List in 2007 (Al-Jazeera, 2015).

Throughout the 20th and 21st century, Sāmarrā' inspired some of the most important works of modern architecture and urban planning in the Middle East.

The grandeur of its architecture was noted by many writers, Thomas Leisten recounting in the first volume of his work "Excavation of Samarra", entitled "Final Report on the First Campaign 1910-1912", the impressions of

the Syrian historian and literary critic Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, that Sāmarrā' was a model of "an Arab city" and used it as an example to counter the tendency of modern western scholars to ignore Arab contributions to the history of urban civilization (Leisten, 2003). Both the ruins and poetic descriptions of Sāmarrā' inspired two of the modern architects who helped transform buildings in Iraq in the middle of the 20th century, namely Rifat Chadirji (d. 2020) and Mohamed Makiya (d. 2015). They designed the State Mosque in Baghdad, which unfortunately was never built. For these writers and architects of the post-colonial Middle East, Sāmarrā' was not only a source of national pride, but also an archive of indigenous architectural knowledge (Saba, 2022).

Iraq has the privilege of holding over 15,000 archeological sites and many other heritage and religious buildings, monuments and historical centers, as well as archives, manuscripts, cultural artifacts, and nationally significant paintings. However, the country is witnessing cultural losses on an unprecedented scale (Kathem et al., 2022).

The large differences in living standards, the failure of development, high unemployment rates and low living standard are among the reasons that have helped to encourage terrorism in Iraq (Sabah, 2020).

The country has suffered a series of economic, psychological, sociological and political shocks, stemming from civil conflicts and terrorism. Indeed, in recent years, the Republic of Iraq has faced a complex problem, namely terrorism, as ISIS has expanded ever further (Yaseen, 2019). In addition, despite Iraq having large natural gas reserves, the country is currently relying on imports of gas from Iran. The U.S. and Iraq's European partners are keen to end this dependence and to help Iraq become energy independent. However, political and economic turmoil in Iraq in recent years has blocked investments in the separation and processing capacity of Iraqi oil fields (Fazil & Tartir, 2023). The last two decades in Iraq's history are marked by conflicts with ethnic Kurds, conflict with neighboring Iran, invasion of Kuwait, the Gulf War, and international sanctions, all of which have a huge impact on citizens (Catholic Relief Services, 2002).

Unlike other war-torn countries in the Middle East, and despite being in some form of conflict or other, for four consecutive decades, Iraq proved to be remarkably resilient. It is also a country with significant financial and human resources, and with a strong potential for recovery and development. However, in order to bring about a successful transition and post-conflict country's reconstruction, the Iraqi leadership will need a strong will for cohesion and to meet growing challenges (Kadhim, 2019).

⁶ Al-Mu'tasim, also known as Mu'tasim bi'llāh, is the eighth Abbasid caliph. He ruled from 833 to 842 AD., as the youngest son of Hārūn ar-Rashīd (the fifth caliph of the Abbasid Dynasty). He was a skillful commander in Anatolia (a region southwest Asia that today corresponds to the Asian part of Turkey) (Al-Mu'tasim, 1993).

⁷ Al-Mutawakkil 'alā Allāh (b. 822 – d. 861) was the tenth Abbasid caliph and son of al-Mu'tasim; he became a caliph after the death of his brother, al-Wāthiq, who was known for his extension of the empire, his religiousness, and the harsh rule he implemented (El-Hibri, 1999).

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**DAESH JIHADI
PROPAGANDA**

THE VIRTUAL CALIPHATE

Alias: Alia LISANDRU

ABSTRACT

DAESH has invested significant resources in transferring propaganda techniques from offline to online, manipulating public opinion and attracting sympathizers through religious and ideological justifications for violence against perceived enemies, and promising a utopian state represented by the Islamic Caliphate. Thus, the Islamic Caliphate has transformed itself into a virtual Caliphate, free of territorial constraints, with global reach which has allowed the organization to survive and build networks of sympathizers around the world, with propaganda in the virtual environment playing a significant role. Although authorities continue to make efforts to eliminate the jihadist presence online, the internet's versatility and the organization's adaptability allow DAESH members and sympathizers to resurface each time, which demonstrates that although DAESH has lost its physical territory, the organization still poses a threat, with the risk of its resurgence at any time.

Keywords: DAESH, organizations, Caliphate, violence, terrorists' attacks, abuses.

Introduction

Exploiting the instability in Syria, Iraq, and Africa, combined with the manipulation of public opinion, consequently attracting sympathizers through radical interpretation of religion and ideological justifications for violence, calls for unity among Muslims, demonization of perceived enemies, and the promise of purpose and belonging to a utopian state represented by the Islamic Caliphate, all these elements have contributed to the rise of DAESH on the global stage from 2014 to the present-day. The organization's high degree of adaptability to military situations in conflict regions, as well as technological and social changes, has facilitated the emergence of the "virtual Caliphate", compensating for territorial losses through the use of online platforms for recruiting, inspiring, and training followers in carrying out violent attacks.

Terrorism – From Concept to Global Threat

The phenomenon of terrorism has become a global concern once national security crises and extremist threats from areas with terrorist potential - through the transit of radicalized individuals and religious propaganda, specifically of an extremist nature conducted beyond the MENA region - were transferred internationally, specifically in the West and Europe.

Despite terrorism not being a new concept, the identification and classification of terrorist acts have proven difficult due to the lack of an internationally accepted definition. Following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, experts theorized the evolution of modern terrorism, categorizing it into 4 distinct waves, each lasting between 30 and 40 years. These waves include anarchist terrorism from the 19th and early 20th centuries, anti-colonial terrorism from the 1920s to the 1960s, and left and right-wing terrorism from the 1970s to the 1980s (Rapoport, 2013).

In the early 1990s, Islamist groups carried out violent attacks both regionally and internationally. They used religion as a justifying force for acts of violence

against "infidels"¹, the perpetrators considering this behavior a divine duty based on certain theological imperatives (Hoffman, 1993).

At the same time, the context (determined by a variety of social, economic, political, geographical, and cultural factors) amplifies the religious factor in justifying terrorist actions. Thus, religion cannot be considered the sole factor used as a cover for gaining legitimacy (Stoian-Karadeli, 2020). Moreover, many terrorist groups have emerged in response to political repression, social inequalities, economic deprivation, or military interventions, with extremist activities being openly justified through religious or cultural factors (Volpp, 2002).

Regarding the *modus operandi* of terrorist acts, assassinations, and hostage-taking have persisted, but the suicide bombing has been the most impactful and lethal tactical innovation, as it can be carried out on land, in the air, or at sea, almost always resulting in mass casualties and significant structural damage to the surrounding areas. This practice has reaffirmed the concept of the "martyr" (شهيد in Arabic, transliterated as *shaheed*), according to which the death of a fighter during an attack is noble, and self-sacrifice represents the ultimate way to show total devotion to the cause. Although only the perspective of rewards in paradise could inspire such acts, suicide attacks have also been used by secular groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, who are credited with inventing the suicide belt and pioneering the involvement of women in carrying out suicide attacks (Walls, 2017), methods widely adopted by DAESH as well.

Given the complexity of the phenomenon, it is difficult to establish which terrorist groups have had the greatest impact on society. However, on an international level, there are only a few entities that, through their operational and propaganda techniques, have managed to entice a significant number of adherents, ensuring their global expansion and subsequent survival (despite the joint efforts of counter-terrorism organizations). Among these entities are DAESH, Al-Qaeda² (Al-Qaeda, 2023), Boko Haram³ (Boko Haram, 2023), Hezbollah⁴ (Hezbollah, 2023), and the Taliban Movement⁵ (Taliban, 2023).

DAESH

The terrorist organization known today as DAESH (an acronym derived from the Arabic phrase *الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام* transliterated as *Ad-Dawlah Al-Islāmiyya fir Al-Irāq wa-l Shām*, meaning Islamic State in Iraq and Levant/ISIL), also known as ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or the Islamic State⁶ (Islamic State, 2023), emerged in the early 2010s under the leadership of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. DAESH gained notoriety from 2014 onwards through its campaigns in Iraq and Syria, as well as the attacks carried out on European soil (e.g. Paris in 2015; Nice, Berlin, Brussels, and Istanbul in 2016) (Europol, 2021).

The origins of DAESH can be traced back to the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003; in 2004, the group initially emerged as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Although this association was a symbiosis for both groups, Al-Zarqawi gaining support and notoriety from Iraqi jihadists with the help of Al-Qaeda, and the latter developing a significant presence in Iraq, from the outset, there were divergences in operational objectives: Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri focused their attacks on American targets, while AQI waged campaigns of violence against Iraqi security forces and civilians, both Shiite and Sunni, who were considered apostates (McCants, 2015).

After the death of Al-Zarqawi in a U.S. airstrike in 2006, AQI went through a forced process of reorganization and rebranding, coming close to extinction due to the intervention of the US forces in the region. This was avoided through the unification of different jihadist groups active in Iraq by Al-Zarqawi, with the joint council announcing, after his death, the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), led by Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, who continued their activities according to previously conceived objectives and tactics (Stern & Berger, 2015).

After the elimination of ISI leader Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and other members by American forces in 2010, two major events contributed to the survival of ISI. Firstly, the persecution of Sunni Muslims by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki led to the joining of Sunni resistance with the extremist movements active in the region, specifically ISI (Cockburn, 2014). Secondly, the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 provided

the perfect premise for ISI to expand its territory by entering the Syrian conflict through the group Jabhat Al-Nusra (established in 2012 and affiliated with Al-Qaeda) (Byman, 2016). The Jabhat Al-Nusra – ISI merger on April 9, 2013 became the turning point between the newly established organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS/DAESH), and the parent organization, Al-Qaeda, which repudiated the unification and denied any connection with ISIS (Stern & Berger, 2015). During this period marked by changes and adaptations to new operational situations and the emergence of new technologies with the phenomenon of digitization, DAESH was led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who persisted as the leader of the organization until 2019.

On July 4, 2014, after occupying significant portions of Syrian and Iraqi territories, Al-Baghdadi announced the formation of a global Caliphate, declaring himself the caliph and calling on Muslims worldwide to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (Gomes & Mikhael, 2018).

Although DAESH shares some similarities with Al-Qaeda, such as the context of their emergence, namely U.S. interference in Arab states, and the desire to change the state of inferiority/submission of the Arab world to the West, at a political and administrative level, DAESH prioritized territorial assertion through the use of terror as a weapon to dominate the populations in the occupied territories, as well as the identification of local and international enemies. In this context, it aimed to create a state-like organization that allowed for better control of the seized areas and minimized the impact that the occasional death of a leader could have had on the organization's functioning. The state-like structure also enabled the organization to finance itself through taxes, in addition to donations from local/international sympathizers and funds from illegal activities. In contrast, Al-Qaeda initially relied on the income sources of Osama bin Laden and only later on donations and illicit activities to finance its objectives (Napoleoni, 2014).

Both organizations were significantly influenced by the Wahhabi teachings, which rejected any religious innovation, warned against cultural influences, and asserted that only some Muslims were truly faithful. However, DAESH pursued a more extreme interpretation of these teachings, focused on purifying Islam, which explains why DAESH targeted and killed both Muslims and non-Muslims alike (McCants, 2015).

¹ Kafir - كافر in Arabic - a term used to represent a person who does not believe in Allah, denies divine authority, or rejects Islamic principles (Kafir, n.d.).

² Sunni Islamic extremist organization founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden; has particularly encouraged attacks against Western targets (Al-Qaeda, 2023).

³ Terrorist organization based in Nigeria, responsible for numerous attacks in West Africa (Boko Haram, 2023).

⁴ Shiite militant Islamic group and political party based in Lebanon; has been involved in various conflicts in the Middle East (Hezbollah, 2023).

⁵ Sunni Islamic extremist group based in Afghanistan, involved in insurgency against the Afghan government (Taliban, 2023).

⁶ A term frequently used in reference to DAESH, often avoided to prevent universal validation of the organization (Islamic State, 2023).

When it comes to their objectives, DAESH constructed a strategy aimed at transnationalizing the Caliphate through infiltrating conflict zones and intensifying tensions through calculated armed attacks, extracting resources for self-financing, utilizing regional and global propaganda, enticing leaders or other organizations to join them, recruiting and indoctrinating new members in an extremist manner, motivating and inspiring "lone wolves" to commit terrorist attacks in their home countries (Stern & Berger, 2015).

Propaganda and the Virtual Caliphate

Jihadist propaganda has been an important strategy through which terrorist organizations have achieved certain objectives. Initially, DAESH adopted the propaganda model of Al-Qaeda, distributing video materials through platforms like YouTube, with content similar to Al-Qaeda's productions, the only difference being the comments inciting violence against Shiite Muslims (Perper, 2021).

However, as of 2014, realizing the importance of the online environment, DAESH invested significant resources in transferring propagandistic techniques from offline to online, compensating for the decrease in physical territories by utilizing the internet as a platform to provide information on training activities, planning and execution of attacks, as well as to motivate, inspire, and encourage believers to join their cause. They produced more content, of a higher quality. The most notable difference between Al-Qaeda and DAESH with regard to propaganda was the latter's adaptability to new technologies, maximizing the use of all tools of digitalization. While Al-Qaeda was the first organization to use propaganda as a weapon, it failed to keep up with technological progress, focusing its propagandistic activities on videos and websites, neglecting the significance of social media platforms that DAESH fully exploited to recruit young individuals (Choi et al., 2018).

There are multiple factors - social, cultural, economic, ideological, and religious - that underlie the desire of young individuals to join terrorist organizations. Shaping a particular problem or crisis (e.g., the abuses by the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria) and justifying violence as a means to resolve it are the premises upon which jihadist propaganda recruitment relies, while also exploiting the vulnerabilities and individual motivations

of those susceptible to radicalization. Furthermore, terrorist organizations tailor their narratives according to the type of audience. On the one hand, they use trauma and the desire for revenge to attract individuals from conflict zones, and on the other hand, they exploit discrimination, marginalization, and frustration among individuals from non-conflict or Western regions, creating a connection between the latter group and ostracized Muslim communities through graphic materials (e.g., Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq, or Afghanistan) (Speckhard, 2016).

Functioning as tools of emotional persuasion, most visual elements used in jihadist propaganda count on conscious or subconscious associations that the younger generation makes between the presented images/symbols/actions and their personal experiences or perceptions (e.g., the victims and destruction of holy sites, the revenge offered by jihadist fighters, the abuses of foreign armed forces, and the salvation provided by terrorist organizations) (Hassan & Azman, 2020).

The sense of belonging plays an important role in the radicalization of young individuals in search for a personal or religious identity, often turning to online platforms to find answers. Online self-radicalization is based on the fascination that young people develop for belonging to a group that demonstrates loyalty to Islam or retaliatory actions on behalf of the Muslim community through the materials they distribute (Hassan & Azman, 2020). Terrorist organizations exploit such sentiments in order to captivate followers by interpreting religious texts in a way that allows them to justify the use of violence, disguising armed actions under the guise of self-defense (e.g., DAESH uses specific verses from the Quran, such as Surah Al-Anfal 8:60, to justify armed attacks, including against civilians) (Poljarevic, 2021) and promoting extremist ideologies, such as glorifying suicide attacks, invoking the idea of martyrdom (e.g., terrorist organizations like DAESH, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad argue that death in their cause is an honorable and righteous act, rewarded in the afterlife) (Henne, 2012).

Analyzing the speeches of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, it has been noted that beyond the military-operational context, the leader conveyed messages to sympathizers on Islamic holidays (Ramadan, Eid Al-Adha), aiming to intensify the sense of duty of the followers towards Islam, or at times when information about his death was circulating, to assure the public that he was alive and the organization will persist in its effort to wage jihad. Furthermore, Al-Baghdadi's discourse

exhibits characteristics of religious propaganda in which the author glorifies divine power, with Allah being all-powerful and controlling the fate of all men, thus the leader seeks help and protection from anything that could divert him from the path of Allah. For Al-Baghdadi, the ideal Muslim state is the one inherited from Muhammad, namely the Caliphate, which, at least theoretically, should encompass all territories where Muslims reside. Therefore, the name of Allah is frequently repeated in the disseminated speeches.

A prevalent theme in jihadist propaganda, including that of DAESH, is hostility towards the West, Christianity, and non-Muslims/apostate Muslims (takfiris), accused of oppressing the ummah (Muslim nation) and hindering the formation of a global Islamic state (Allendorfer & Herring, 2015). By utilizing important aspects of Islamic identity (the legitimacy of Sharia, the duty of Muslims to wage jihad, the unity of the ummah, divine sanction, martyrdom, etc.), DAESH aims to sensitize its audience by portraying justifications for their initiated actions. A relevant example is the speech delivered by Al-Baghdadi on September 28, 2017, in which he explicitly emphasized the importance of "offensive jihad," underlying the fact that "apostate unbelievers" should be attacked "in their own territory." Subsequently, one of the attacks that followed was carried out in France by a Tunisian ethnic, a DAESH follower, who stabbed two young women at the Saint-Charles metro station in Marseille and was later shot by the police forces (BBC News, 2017).

Except the audio messages directly addressed to the target audience by terrorist organizations' leaders/representatives, jihadist propaganda predominantly relies on the visual aspect of distributed materials, using imagery to expand the audience, including those who lack reading or text-processing skills, in regions with a large population of young individuals and high illiteracy rates (Winkler & Dauber, 2014). Terrorists employ various visual means to achieve their objectives, such as: chromatic elements associated with specific meanings (black for the importance of jihad, blue and white evoking hope and heavenly paradise, and green synonymous with Islam), natural elements (the sun, moon, crescent, water, flowers, and desert) to represent aspects of Islamic identity, weaponry to illustrate the violent nature of jihad and the military strength of the organization, Islamic symbols and texts (including the Quran and the testimony of faith - shahada) that serve as calls for Muslims to uphold their religious duty and

participate in jihad, different animals (particularly lions, eagles, and horses) used as symbols of courage, power, and victory. Moreover, martyr photographs are considered central in jihadist propaganda as they praise and celebrate individuals who have made the ultimate sacrifice, while images portraying children and women are used to stir feelings of injustice, anger, and the desire to retaliate.

Terrorist organizations, specifically DAESH, which exhibit a strong anti-Western sentiment, frequently use edited images depicting symbols from Western traditions and religious or political figures, often accompanied by calls to violence (in various regional or internationally recognized languages) in their propaganda campaigns. An example is DAESH's propaganda campaign in December 2018. In the context of President Donald Trump's announcement of withdrawal of the military troops from Syria, DAESH and its affiliates disseminated threats against Western states, as well as against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu through channels such as Telegram and the official Al-Ghurabaa website. The materials included graphic images of the mentioned political leaders, as well as a video of the organization's leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, urging supporters to engage in violence and seek revenge (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2023).

Furthermore, terrorist organizations present themselves to their audience in a favorable light aligned with their established objectives. In this context, DAESH utilizes propagandistic techniques to portray itself as a pure Islamic utopia engaged in a holy war against its enemies, while also ensuring social justice, fair governance, and an authentic religious and moral existence for its followers/believers. This image created and propagated through social media appeals to sympathizers who are eager either to contribute to changing the operational situation (e.g., overthrowing the oppressive regime of Bashar Al-Assad) or to be part of an apparently united Muslim community (DAESH presenting itself as a home for Muslims worldwide), despite the lack of direct contact with extremist ideologies. There are numerous examples of individuals from different backgrounds for whom jihadist propaganda messages have had the intended impact, such as the case of three women from the UK who left their spouses and traveled to Syria with their children to join the Islamic Caliphate, or a young couple from Mississippi, graduates in Psychology, who made efforts to reach Syria with the same purpose (Hoffman, 2016).



In fact, since the early 2000s, the arsenal of terrorist organizations has expanded to include not only traditional weaponry (such as AK-47 assault rifles, explosives, hand grenades, ammunition cartridges, etc.) but also technological devices for the production and dissemination of propaganda materials, such as CDs, DVDs, tapes, recording cameras, laptops, computers, and internet connectivity. DAESH even established Diwan al-I'lam al-Markazi/Central Media Office, dedicated to producing propaganda content (including beheadings, suicide attacks, testimonials of jihadist fighters) distributed online through official websites, magazines, and social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018). Telegram emerged as a communication tool for jihadists following the constant actions taken by authorities to block or remove extremist-terrorist content online. With territorial and personnel losses experienced between 2015 and 2017, DAESH shifted its funding to other operational segments, leading to a visible decline in its media activities, as evidenced by the reduction in the number of materials promoted online.

Concerning the means used to disseminate propaganda materials online, the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC)⁷ identified numerous platforms either officially belonging to DAESH or connected to its content. Throughout the evolution of this entity, its media activities have changed, and currently, only a few of DAESH's jihadist propaganda platforms are confirmed as active, such as the weekly magazine Al-Naba, the news agency A'maq, Al-Furqan Media (responsible for producing official video and audio recordings), as well as social media networks.

In 2019, an operation led by Europol and the European Union, in cooperation with various online service providers (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram) and authorities from EU member states, resulted in the elimination of hundreds of thousands of accounts and servers affiliated with DAESH. This significantly hindered the group's online activity. Among the mentioned platforms, Telegram (preferred by terrorists due to its default security settings) had the highest number of channels and accounts removed. Additionally, new mechanisms for detecting and removing terrorist content were implemented, preventing DAESH members from returning afterward (Seldin, 2019).

⁷ITIC - An online think tank that issues informative bulletins and studies about terrorist organizations (Palestinian, Lebanese, and affiliates of global jihad), monitoring various aspects of terrorist activities in the Middle East and elsewhere: countries sponsoring terrorism, terrorist attacks, terrorist infrastructure, weaponry, financing, media institutions of terrorist organizations, etc. (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, n.d.).

Moreover, the spread of messages to specific audiences or translating them into regional languages can provide clues about DAESH's future plans. For example, the Al-Azaim Media Foundation, operating in Afghanistan, has predominantly published materials in African, Asian, and Eastern European languages since 2022, which could indicate a potential shift in DAESH's recruitment or operational cell formation objectives in these areas (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2023).

The rhetoric employed in the disseminated materials aimed to validate the organization globally and attract new followers from diverse origins and ethnicities by presenting enhanced offensive capabilities and extreme violence portrayed directly through images/videos to intimidate enemies, as well as utilizing Islamic concepts/symbols to ideologically justify the organization's actions (McDearis, 2016). Additionally, personalized content and the physical and ideological aggressiveness portrayed in DAESH's shared content have a greater mobilizing effect on "lone wolves" for carrying out terrorist attacks in their home countries, particularly in the West. Although these individuals have limited contact with the terrorist organization, they resort to self-radicalization through consuming extremist content and act on their own behalf in its name (Byman, 2015).

DAESH – Past, Present, Future

DAESH emerged as a major terrorist threat to both the Middle East and the West in 2014. At its peak, the organization controlled approximately one-third of Syria and 40% of Iraq, declaring the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and pursuing continued expansion through strategies based on extreme violence and jihadist propaganda. Despite its influence, by December 2017, it had lost 95% of its territory, including its two major strongholds: Mosul (Iraq's second-largest city) and the de facto capital, Raqqa (a city in northern Syria), due to the military intervention by the US-led coalition.

Despite the territorial and resource losses suffered, as well as the operational efforts made to maintain territorial control between 2014 and 2017, the organization managed to coordinate and inspire numerous armed attacks resulting in hundreds of casualties beyond

the borders of the so-called Caliphate. This was due to the organization's ability to adapt and establish global connections by expanding its network of affiliates (Glenn et al., 2019).

During this period, the organization's online activity also significantly contributed to its presence and survival. Jihadist propaganda inspired numerous attacks in the West through lone wolves (e.g., the coordinated attacks in Paris, in 2015, and Brussels in 2016, resulting in 130 and 32 deaths, respectively, and hundreds of injuries) (BBC News, 2015). DAESH propagandists conducted extensive campaigns demonizing the United States, successfully inciting anger among Muslims in the West. This is evidenced by the terrorist attack in June 2016 on a nightclub in Orlando, Florida (USA), resulting in 49 deaths and 53 injuries. The 29-year-old perpetrator pledged allegiance to the organization and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during his conversations with the authorities, citing the killing of Abu Waheeb in Iraq by US military forces as the trigger for the attack (Ellis et al., 2016).

The threat posed by DAESH has not disappeared despite the campaign issued by the US-led coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against its members and the death of its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 during a raid in northern Syria by US military forces (Glenn et al., 2019).

The Islamic Caliphate has transformed into a virtual Caliphate, free from territorial constraints, with a global reach. This has allowed the organization to survive and form networks of sympathizers worldwide, despite dwindling resources and reduced online activity. DAESH has demonstrated a high level of adaptability by exploiting the virtual environment to achieve its objectives (e.g., using encrypted messaging applications like Telegram to communicate with followers and coordinate remote attacks; utilizing social media platforms to radicalize individuals and motivate them to act in the name of jihadist ideology) (Hadra, 2015).

On the other hand, in order to enhance the effectiveness of lone wolf attacks, DAESH has made some modifications to its disseminated modus operandi by coordinating smaller, decentralized cells that are harder to detect and eliminate. These cells typically consist of a few individuals who communicate through encrypted messages and are capable of carrying out armed attacks with minimal coordination from the organization.

DAESH propagandists have encouraged their followers to target civilian populations in crowded public spaces, tourist areas, or places of worship (in contrast to

the era of al-Baghdadi when attacks were concentrated on political or military targets, government buildings, military bases, etc.), with the aim of maximizing the number of victims and inducing a sense of panic among the population. Attackers are also encouraged to use low-tech tools that are easier to acquire and less costly (e.g., knives, vehicles, small-caliber firearms), which still have the desired effect when used against a crowd of civilians. Among the relevant examples are the terrorist attacks in February, October, and November 2020, in London, Nice, and Vienna, respectively, claimed by DAESH (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2018).

In recent years, DAESH has demonstrated a high level of versatility by returning to guerrilla warfare and undergoing organizational restructuring in terms of military-security, administration, and media. The attacks have been focused on strategic points, such as the Sina'a prison (January 2022), with the goal of releasing 3,500 jihadist militants. The attacks were also publicized online through the Amaq News agency to ensure the audience and supporters are aware of the organization's constant presence in the region (Mazel, 2022).

Although authorities continue to make efforts to eliminate the jihadist presence online, the internet's versatility and the organization's adaptability allow DAESH members/sympathizers to resurface each time, creating extremist content that inspires and motivates violent actions, as well as virtual groups for disseminating this content and coordinating attacks. This demonstrates that although DAESH has lost its physical territory, the organization still poses a threat, with the risk of its resurgence at any time.

Conclusions

Propaganda plays a significant role in the strategic objectives of terrorist organizations, including DAESH. These entities employ various mechanisms to ensure their continuity, such as utilizing Islamic concepts and symbols to justify violent actions and exploiting online platforms for recruitment, mobilization, and inspiration of terrorist attacks.

The virtual environment has proven instrumental in the radicalization of vulnerable individuals. The availability of terrorist content online, the presence of extremist elements on social media platforms, and the use of visually appealing and technically sophisticated

propaganda messages have contributed to an increase in radicalization cases.

DAESH has capitalized on situations of instability in regions like Syria, Iraq, and Africa. They manipulate public opinion, attract sympathizers through

religious and ideological justifications for violence, demonize perceived enemies, and promise a utopian state represented by the Islamic Caliphate. These factors have facilitated the organization's rise and survival on the global stage.

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ART PROPAGANDA

SOCIAL INFLUENCE TECHNIQUE

Alias: Ion TEODOSESCU

ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of using art as propaganda has been validated for hundreds and thousands of years and is considered to be a constant threat because one of the key objectives of information warfare is to distort public perception through propaganda and disinformation. This can damage a country's security system, especially when the dissemination of information is accompanied by suggestive images that can generate emotional reactions. It is therefore necessary to stimulate an increased need for knowledge in order to identify and define risks and vulnerabilities to national security, by developing a security culture among the population that actively contributes to strengthening the capacity to understand, prevent and control the factors that can result in disrupting our security situation. Active involvement at institutional level is therefore necessary to raise public awareness of forms of propaganda.

Keywords: *art, propaganda, manipulation, threats, disinformation, intelligence services.*

Art – A Strategic Means of Communication

Romania is a European country with an important geostrategic position, which is part of the strongest political-military alliance in history, being thus directly concerned by the evolution of security risks existing at international level. In today's society, the risks and vulnerabilities to national and individual security have a permanent dynamic, which requires increasing the need of knowledge for their identification and definition, through the development of a population-level security culture, which actively contributes to strengthen the capacity of understanding, preventing and controlling the factors that could contribute to the disruption of our security status.

The power of information has become as great as the power of weapons and tends to prevail in future political-military confrontations, and propaganda has always been used as a formidable weapon of war, which requires further attention on the ways in which it can act against legitimate national interests.

At the same time, art is increasingly prevailing in our lives and no matter what we do, we cannot avoid or ignore it. In addition to its cultural value, through this high public exposure, art can be the right environment for interaction between population and organizations (public or private).

It is difficult to imagine that associating art with propaganda can be considered an effective solution of psychological influence, which has been used since ancient times, but by analyzing known works of art from the perspective of their use as propaganda tools we can highlight the hypothesis that art can represent an important communication channel, which can be exploited as part of strategies aimed at promoting ideological messages.

National security, as a fundamental element of the existence of a state, can be impacted in the long term, in a subtle manner, sometimes hard to perceive, using art as a strategic means of communication, which can be controlled by raising the public awareness of the capacity of social influence that a work of art can acquire, by stimulating critical thinking and objective perception of the message transmitted through the work.

What is Art?

Art can be found through a variety of visual representations such as painting, sculpture, graphics, decorative art, photography or contemporary installations, but we will

mainly refer to painting, being one of the most complex forms of artistic manifestation, which evolved during thousands of years from cave painting, to the present abstract compositions, which testifies to the primordial human need for affective expression, to surround itself with beauty, to translate thoughts and messages through colors.

Appreciation of art does not require the acquisition of specialized knowledge, it is simply enough to look at a work in order for it to convey a state, a sensory perception, to challenge you intellectually, to want to understand more the meaning of the image.

Many books have been written about art, and there is still no definition that would encompass all its meanings, because, like human feelings, each individual has their own filters through which he/she sees and feels the world around him/her.

Looking at an artwork, we automatically enter the bridge that connects the visual to the verbal. What we see, we try to understand with words, and what we think it represents, relates to our own cultural and social perceptions. From here, we could outline the idea that art is like a form of illusion because, in reality, what we see are the strokes of color on the painting medium, the rest being made up of our intellectual and cognitive process that forms the image and assigns it a meaning.

Public Visibility

In contemporary society, art is more and more common, both in indoor spaces, such as those specifically intended for its display (museums, art galleries, auction houses, exhibition fairs), or in which man lives and works (in the intimacy of his own home or workplace), but also externally, in the form of monumental art or street art. Basically, interaction with art is almost inevitable.

The appetite for art can be observed statistically in the number of over 10 million visitors that the Louvre Museum in Paris had in 2018 (Marinescu, 2019). The photo below is relevant in this respect, showing the crowd willing to sacrifice their time and patience to get in touch with the artworks sought.

The increased interest in art has also generated the appearance of private museums, in which important collections come to the public's attention and carve the cultural landscape through the huge budgets allocated to acquisitions, the influence of the founders and their intense promotion (Brown, 2017).



Fig.1 People queue in front of the Pyramid of the Louvre.

These initiatives deserve the appreciation of art lovers because they bring, from the private area, into the public space, works unreachable until that time, as an addition to the state museum system. At first glance, normally should be an added value that culture receives, but in the absence of curatorial coordination with state institutions, deformation of national heritage values may occur, which future generations will assimilate, especially given the ability of the art to transmit messages with a strong impact on the public and which, in such private institutions, may especially reflect the interests, tastes or ideology of the founders and administrators.

The public visibility that art has today has reached impressive levels, becoming a platform of socialization built on a hot topic nowadays, practically a channel of communication between public or private institutions and people.

Art has an ongoing-increasing public exposure, regardless of what we consider: its decorative or investment value, its practical use (in psychological therapy, advertising campaigns, etc.) or art from a cultural and educational perspective. On the other hand, art has the ability to produce changes in human psychology, managing to influence our emotional state, which causes an influence on rational thinking and, implicitly, on the decisions we can take or the opinions we can have. Thus,

we can conclude that art is a very efficient communication channel, able to transmit messages with a strong impact on the public, both in direct, obvious forms, and in other subtler and more difficult to perceive manners.

Disseminating the Message through Art

Propaganda is a systematic action aimed at influencing or persuading an audience about a particular ideology, which may not be objective and may selectively present facts, to encourage perception and produce an emotional rather than rational response.

Propaganda can manipulate people's beliefs, attitudes, or actions through specially selected symbols, facts, and arguments that are presented in ways that are thought to have a strong impact on the perception of the message that is intended to be communicated, in order to create a social consensus.

Terence H. Qualter (1962) highlights the need for propaganda efficiency. The author believes that "propaganda, in order to be effective, must be seen, memorized, understood, and followed [...], and adapted to the particular needs of the situation and the audience

to which it is directed" (Qualter, 1962, p. xii). Thus, through lack of efficiency, the propaganda test turns into a simple little manipulation that does not produce significant effects in the cognition of the masses. In a modern view, propaganda is seen as "the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2015, p. 7). In essence, propaganda is intended to show us what to believe and not how to reach our own conclusions, independently and fairly.

Propaganda is found throughout almost all media and forms of communication of society: art, television, literature, music, film, media or the internet (which is the most generous propaganda environment).

In history, propaganda did not have a negative connotation as it is perceived today, but was an honorable way to spread perceptions of appreciation or antipathy on such goals as trade campaigns, social debates or cultural debates. Through its use for political-military purposes, especially by fascist or communist regimes, the word propaganda has become stigmatized, which the world is watching out for, although the concept itself is still being used without embarrassment, both in peace and in wartime (Hentea, 2002).

Through its manifestations, propaganda mainly appeals to human emotions, and these have remained unchanged for thousands of years. Technological developments, however, have allowed the use of new types of communication tools that facilitate the dissemination of messages with expected effect on an increasingly large audience. This raises the importance

of propaganda as an element of social influence in contemporary society.

A propaganda campaign is carefully planned by characters who have the interest, strength and means to implement a mass-premeditated influence action, and this is difficult to do individually, having chances of success when carried out by an organized collective, which generally forms part of a state structure.

In Romania's Military Strategy, the inventory of the action means of the challenging powers of the current world order mentions first: the manipulation of information (Secretariatul General al Guvernului, 2021). In the same document, other challenges that would have the potential to manifest themselves in the form of security risks for the Romanian state are specified, such as: intensification of influential actions and information aggressions, as well as actions of hostile intelligence services, with the aim of destabilizing society, fragmentation of social cohesion, and increasing divergences of interests and opinion between different social or professional categories, against a background of reduced resilience to disinformation (Secretariatul General al Guvernului, 2021).

In a dynamic environment of international security, in which information wars take on new dimensions with the support of technological evolution, the propaganda phenomenon requires increased attention, both from state institutions and from the population, so that the objectives proposed by initiating these hostile actions can be realized and prevented.

Over time, art actively contributed to evoking an event, an idea or a representative character of the times,

in order to convey a message to viewers, and when the work was larger and more expressive, the story became more convincing.

Art, left as a historical testimony, gives us clues by which plastic artists would have produced works from ancient times at the command of kings, nobles or church representatives, who could choose the theme and the message they wanted to promote, with the interest of obtaining personal benefits of the image or results from the message they wanted to promote.

Ancient Egyptian frescoes are probably the earliest evidence of the use of painting as a means of propaganda, in which pharaohs are depicted on a larger scale than other characters, to emphasize their power (Roller, 2021).

Art can support the political and ideological opinions of organizations in the leadership of a state, serving as a tool for changing the existing political and social realities.

During the communist period, Romanian art was used by the totalitarian regime as an instrument of propaganda and, using the abuse of power, the party ideology was transposed into the creation of artists, who became indirectly biased in the formation of that society. The international exhibition participations were marked by a visible differentiation in the selection of the works presented outside the country, which had to promote a picture of Romania aligned with the West in all fields, such as industry, culture or art, compared to what could be seen in the exhibition spaces in the country. This strategy was allegedly understood by artists, who would come to play a role as double agents (Barcan et al., 2018).

Art Propaganda, Implications for National Security

In today's society, terms such as propaganda, psychological/media/information war, promotional campaign, and others are part of our common language and we use them mostly with a negative connotation, because we feel that someone is trying to influence what we think or feel and especially important decisions we make.

Art propaganda is a component of the mechanism of this unconventional war and these programs are elaborated with extreme rigor in terms of the image structure that is used for the purpose of transmitting the proposed message. In this respect, it must simultaneously correspond to certain representation requirements, such as page layout, visual language transmitted, color used (red

and yellow predominated in all communist propaganda images, stimulating sexual and combative pulsation).

National security is a public asset valued by the citizens of any state, and its stability depends on how the population relates to the dynamics of risks, vulnerabilities and threats in a dynamic climate. One of the key objectives of information warfare is to distort the perception of the population through propaganda and disinformation, which can damage the security system of a country, especially when the dissemination of information is accompanied by suggestive images, which can generate emotional reactions (David, 2018).

The artwork has the capacity to store a large amount of information, being able to influence, orient and change perceptions, and through technological development, it can be multiplied into millions of copies, thus becoming a true channel of mass communication. According to historian Călin Hentea (2004), precisely because of its ubiquity, respectability, and persuasiveness, the artwork can be recorded today, with maximum efficiency, in the long-time information arsenal (Hentea, 2004).

CASE STUDY

Intelligence Services and Art Propaganda

Until the Second World War, there was no significant artistic trend in the United States, and most American artists had a conservative approach to their work, but after this period, the world of art turned its attention to the new world capital of art, New York, where artists such as Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, Willem de Kooning, who were painting in a radical and new style, gave rise to the artistic trend: abstract expressionism (Modern art was CIA 'weapon', 1995).

It was remarkable the speed with which the current reached international fame, in the late 1940s, quickly gaining notoriety and respect. In the 1950s, it was accepted that new world art trends were taking place in New York rather than Paris. In 1957, the Metropolitan Museum in New York paid an unprecedented amount of money for a painting by a contemporary artist at the time, namely \$30,000 for *Fall Rhythm*, signed by Jackson Pollock.

Abstract expressionism became an art movement with international exposure, well represented by American



Fig.2 The Pharaoh Tutankhamun destroying his enemies. Note: photograph of a painting on wood of the Pharaoh Tutankhamun destroying his enemies located in the Egyptian Museum of Cairo. Source: www.historyhit.com/entrance-tutankhamens-tomb-found/



Fig.3 Fall Rhythm. Note: photograph of Pollock's painting located in the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. Source: www.bbc.com/culture/article/20161004-was-modern-art-a-weapon-of-the-cia

cultural institutions, and in some circles of the art world, there were rumors that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was directly involved in supporting modern art, using it as a tool of propaganda against the Soviet Union, which, in the late 1940s, spent \$250 million annually on communist propaganda.

The decision to include culture and art in the US Cold War arsenal was taken as soon as the CIA was established in 1947, and the Propaganda Assets Inventory division was formed, which at its operational height had the capacity to influence over 800 newspapers, magazines and public information organizations (Modern art was CIA 'weapon', 1995).

Abstract expressionism conveys a strong message of the freedom of expression, creativity, intellectual freedom and cultural power of the USA, in contrast to the socialist realism imposed by the Soviets, which aimed to harness the party's beliefs, to glorify communist leaders, and was supposed to present life in the totalitarian regime exclusively from a pro-state perspective. One example of this is the contribution that the CIA has made to the creation and funding of the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), an anti-communist organization, which included intellectuals, writers, historians, poets, artists and was run by a CIA agent. The Congress for Cultural Freedom was involved in a visible way in promoting American contemporary art by funding the most important art exhibitions. CCF is known to have been active in 35 countries, including the UK, where it launched the popular Encounter magazine.

The Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA), with the support of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, has launched a one-year exhibition tour of

major European cities, including Basel, Berlin, Brussels, Milan, Paris and London, to promote the exhibition "The New American Painting". It was assumed that Tate Gallery could not afford to insure the costs of the exhibition in London, so the American millionaire Julius Fleischmann sponsored this (Modern art was CIA 'weapon', 1995). Fleischmann was the president of the Fairfield Foundation, which was funded by the CIA (Modern art was CIA 'weapon', 1995).

The most representative exhibitions organized with the support of the Congress for Cultural Freedom were: Modern Art in the United States in 1955 or the special titled Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century, in 1952.

If we consider that the American art market currently has a share of more than one third of the global sales, which represents billions of dollars of revenues annually, amounts which should be of interest for the economic security of the state, the American Intelligence Service also envisaged the economic objective by promoting American contemporary art, in addition to the ideological propaganda component (Dasal, 2020).

American President Dwight Eisenhower himself (1890-1969) stated at the time:

"as long as our artists are free to create with sincerity and conviction, there will be a healthy controversy and progress in art. How different it is in tyranny, when artists are turned into slaves and tools of the state! When artists become the chief propagandas of a cause, progress is arrested, and creation and genius are destroyed" (The Conspiracy of Art, 2021).

This message from the leader of the United States confirms the strategy of the American Intelligence



Fig.4 The New American Painting as shown in eight European countries - 1958-1959. Note: photograph of a painting exhibition located in the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Source: www.moma.org/calendar/exhibitions/1990

Service to dominate the war of propaganda by art against communists, especially since later, in the 1960s, the same President blamed the moral decline of modern American art and the crazy twist dance.

It is important to note that the success of abstract expressionism would have occurred without the support of the American Intelligence Service, but it is not possible to determine the actual extent of this trend and the time frame in which this would have been achieved, but this technique of social influence, which was organized by the CIA, seems to have worked.

Using Art as Propaganda in Wartime

We are all witnessing in this period the most important military conflict since the Second World War, the war started by Russia against Ukraine, which is being conducted both in trenches and in psychological form, propaganda being intensely used through false accounts on social networks, falsified documents, videos and manipulated images.

The role that art has in this process is an important one for maintaining high morale among the population, for motivating the armies, but also for protesting against this war and the horrors that are committed among civilians.

Artists who support both sides created custom art or of their own desire for active and non-violent involvement in the fight, and many of these works were distributed in the public space, being now known all over the world, especially when famous contemporary artists directly showed their support for the Ukrainian people.

One such example is the British anonymous artist, Banksy, who created a few murals on the walls of war-torn buildings in Ukraine, whose messages, loaded with meaning and intelligence, have a powerful impact on the public. His creation, on the wall of a kindergarten destroyed by Russian missiles, depicts a child who takes down an adult in a judo battle, the image being an affront to Vladimir Putin (sport champion) and referring to David's biblical fight with Goliath, symbolizing also the difference between the two-armed powers (Howie, 2022).



Fig.5 Banksy- style mural in Borodyanka, Ukraine. Note: photograph of Banksy's mural art, MyArtBroker. Source: www.myartbroker.com/artist-banksy/articles/new-banksy-mural-for-ukraine-2022

Art propaganda in this war calls for the use of symbols or images associated with positive emotions, to convey them in the form of emotions to people or to promote the ideology of the state among them. For

example, the image of the Kremlin was used to associate their actions with national pride, while Ukraine used images of Ukrainian soldiers and the national flag to associate their cause with heroism.



Fig.6 Mural painting depicting the hands of a Ukrainian soldier repairing the national flag. Source: <https://romania.europalibera.org/arta-propaganda-inspiratie-artistica-razboi-ucraina/32091626.html>

With the support of the Kiev Government, an international art exhibition was made, in which, since the beginning of the war, works of art made by 50 contemporary artists from Ukraine have been exhibited in major European capitals (Berlin, Rome, Amsterdam, Brussels), continuing with New York, Washington, and San Francisco, an official endeavor to present the cruel

reality of the war, as the Ukrainian people feel every day. One of the most impressive works is by Daria Koltsova, who sculpted faces of children screaming, one for each child killed. The impact on the public was strong, for example, in Berlin, there were people leaving the exhibition in tears (Rankin, 2022).



Fig.7 Daria Koltsova's clay heads. Source: www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/31/ukrainian-war-art-exhibition-arrives-brussels-captured-house

Conclusion

Art is a complex field, encompassing a variety of concepts such as creativity, imagination, esthetics, and public communication, and access to art has become inevitable in contemporary society, manifesting an effect on each of us.

Through the ability of art to convey messages, which remain active in the long term and are addressed to the masses of people, appealing to emotion at the expense of reason, art becomes power. When this power is controlled and exploited by actors interested in influencing opinions and making decisions appropriate to their own interests, through art a risk to national security can be generated from the perspective of propaganda.

The effectiveness of using art as propaganda has been validated for hundreds and thousands of years, and this is considered to be a constant threat, currently


supported by the development of technology, which facilitates access to information, but also the depth of specialized studies about psychology, which makes progress on understanding human behavior and ways in which it can be influenced.

Propaganda or mass influence attempt, as it is differently named, will have a growing trend in the future, both in the military world and in the civilian world, especially since the multitude of documentary sources that we currently have access to, do not guarantee that we are more informed, more knowledgeable and better protected informationally.

In this situation two perspectives should be considered: active involvement at institutional level in raising awareness of the forms of propaganda among the population and establishing our own sets of values through which we can objectively analyze the messages received through public communication channels, which also include art.

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