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**INTELLIGENCE
AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPERT AND INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT IN LIGHT OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN DATA COLLECTION: A CASE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Silviu C. PAICU*

Abstract:

The Snowden revelations concerning the use of bulk surveillance have uncovered shortcomings in the existing intelligence oversight architectures in several leading democracies and confronted them with a variety of new challenges generated by rapid technological advances. The impact of the disclosures has also been reflected in scholarship, namely in the way intelligence oversight is being reconceptualized as a broader form of governance beyond legal compliance. This article examines the case of the UK and investigates instances when the two main oversight institutions, namely IPCO and the ISC, have been shaping the public debate through their published reports and their engagement with civil society actors. The paper argues that oversight institutions are better equipped for shaping the democratic debate on bulk surveillance than any other societal actors due to their configuration of institutional features and statutory power. Empowering existing or creating new independent oversight entities with access to classified information and reliant on technical expertise is the way forward for democratic governance of intelligence services.

Keywords: *intelligence oversight, bulk surveillance, Big Data, societal debate, democratic intelligence governance, United Kingdom.*

Introduction

Intelligence oversight institutions are key actors in shaping the societal framing and public understanding of intelligence collection

* Early Stage Researcher on the European Joint Doctorate Grant “Evolving Security Science through Networked Technologies, Information Policy and Law” (ESSENTIAL). PhD candidate at “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy and University of Malta. This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement No. 722482.

technologies in liberal democracies. This is because the rationale of an intelligence oversight mechanism is to protect citizens against misuse of these technologies and to facilitate informed public debate on ensuing societal issues. Having said that, an issue which has yet to be adequately addressed is the increased reliance of intelligence services on Big Data and bulk data collection. While civil society, including the media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academia, and other watchdog bodies, such as whistleblowers, all contribute to and shape the public debate on bulk surveillance, these actors are limited in their understanding of the matter by their lack of access to classified information. Intelligence oversight institutions, on the other hand, are optimally placed to act as a liaison between the intelligence community and the community of citizens due to their access to classified information and direct working with intelligence agencies. This privileged position permits oversight institutions to initiate and play a key role in framing relevant public debates on important public issues, such as the use of large-scale surveillance technologies for national security. Given their independent status, oversight bodies are thus “ideally placed to provide credible and reliable information to educate the public about the activities and role of intelligence services” (Fundamental Rights Agency [FRA], 2017, p. 87). This article therefore argues that oversight institutions are better equipped than other stakeholders for shaping the current and future public debates on intelligence and security practices involving controversial technologies such as bulk collection and algorithmic surveillance. The high-level security clearance and reliance on experts on the one hand, and the ability to engage with civil society and citizens in an open manner on the other, are features that place certain oversight bodies in a pivotal position for shaping this societal debate.

The empirical focus of this research is the United Kingdom (UK). There are several reasons for this choice. One of these is that the UK has a long history of technological innovation in the field of signals intelligence and are currently wielding one of the most advanced and extensive SIGINT collection infrastructures in the world. Another important justification for this selection is the ongoing public debate about the use of bulk surveillance powers in the UK. A study from 2019

focusing on bulk interception regimes placed the UK alongside a few other democracies (Finland, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands) which have or are having consistent public debates on this issue (Kind, 2019). According to the same study, the United States (US), for example, still lacks a debate mainly due to the secrecy constraints advocated by the intelligence community on grounds of national security (Kind, 2019). Lastly, an important reason for choosing to focus on the UK was the availability of a considerable number of public documents, legislation, and official expert reviews offering detailed information about the operational and regulatory aspects of the current bulk collection regime, thus allowing this analysis.

The article takes a qualitative approach and will start with a literature review of theoretical approaches on how intelligence oversight can engage more with the public. Next, we will examine how this approach has been implemented in practice by focusing on the UK's main oversight bodies, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office (IPCO) and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC). Finally, we will analyse how the activities, discourse, and reports of these two oversight bodies have been reflected by civil society. In this way, we can get a sense of how the oversight has been shaping the public debate on bulk surveillance in the UK.

The elements of an intelligence oversight system

Intelligence oversight can be broadly interpreted as a function of controlling intelligence services both in democratic and non-democratic systems, albeit with different objectives. Intelligence oversight as a functional concept is an attribute of liberal democratic systems and formally emerged in the US in the 1970s as a result of the congressional investigations into the misconducts of the intelligence community. Used interchangeably with terms such as "accountability" and "review", intelligence oversight refers fundamentally to "mechanisms for scrutinizing the intelligence services, with the aim of ensuring their compliance with specific standards or guidelines, such as legal frameworks, executive directives, or international law" (Wegge, 2017,

p. 688)¹. In a democracy, therefore, intelligence oversight must fulfil a twofold role. On the one hand, it must oversee the quality and efficiency of the intelligence product, and on the other hand, try to guarantee that intelligence activities are conducted legally and in accordance with citizens' rights and liberties. Hence, another defining feature of intelligence oversight is this duality, referred to by Clift (2007) as the "coin of intelligence accountability." Nevertheless, the side of the coin which is of interest for our current research is the one about the propriety of the intelligence services, namely their conduct and compliance with legal and ethical norms required in a democracy (Caparini & Born, 2007). These dimensions are especially important, if not necessary, in order to have an open and comprehensive public debate on a sensitive topic such as the use of bulk surveillance. In other words, the activities and policies of intelligence agencies must be reviewed in terms of legality, proportionality and effectiveness. In this way, intelligence oversight is a vital element for both democratic mechanisms and national security as "[g]etting it [intelligence oversight] right is hard and getting it wrong is dangerous", as Zegart (2011, p. 5) succinctly argues.

Main actors and scope of control

According to the *Report of the Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin*, "intelligence services are overseen by a combination of internal, executive, parliamentary, judicial and specialised oversight institutions whose mandates and powers are based on publicly available law" (United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC], 2010, as cited in FRA, 2017, p. 63). In addition, there are actors performing watchdog functions in democratic states, such as media, national human rights institutions, civil society organisations, ombuds institutions and whistle-blowers (FRA 2017). In this way, intelligence oversight is usually a function shared between all three branches of state power – executive, judicial and legislative – of which parliamentary oversight has been the most

¹ It is important to note that, for the sake of clarity, we decided to use "oversight" as a general term with reference to all branches of power and institutions involved in the accountability of intelligence community, including internal compliance departments of intelligence agencies, external expert bodies and watchdogs.

analysed and discussed (Krieger, 2009). However, while most democracies have a hybrid oversight system (e.g. the UK, France, the Netherlands), in which the intelligence oversight function is shared between several branches of power, some countries assign the intelligence oversight function exclusively to a single branch of power: executive oversight (e.g. Malta), legislative oversight (e.g. Romania), and judicial oversight (e.g. Ireland).

Executive actors exerting control on intelligence agencies include cabinet ministers (usually foreign and interior ministers) and the head of government. In the UK, for example, the Secretary of State is supported by teams of policy officials who have full access to classified activities of the intelligence agencies. Executive control of intelligence agencies can be exerted in various manners: through appointments of the agencies' senior management, by setting up priorities, or authorising certain surveillance measures (FRA, 2017). Although in a strictly technical sense, internal control within the intelligence services and control by the executive do not qualify as components of an oversight mechanism, executive and internal actors play an important role in ensuring the accountability of intelligence activities.

Parliamentary or legislative oversight is perhaps the most widespread form of intelligence oversight, becoming a standard practice for democracies and thus carrying considerable symbolic weight. Parliaments usually oversee intelligence services via specialised or non-specialised parliamentary committees. As the legislative power, it is responsible for enacting intelligence legislation and approving intelligence agencies' budget. Additionally, parliamentary committees can play a key role in scrutinising intelligence operations and policies on the basis of their legality and compliance with fundamental rights.


Judges provide valuable independent oversight and judicial review is thus an essential component of an effective intelligence oversight system. More concretely, judicial participation in oversight of intelligence agencies is related to issuing of warrants and monitoring of surveillance measures (FRA, 2017). Judges are independent, sometimes specialised, and have the task of evaluating ex-ante requests from intelligence services for the use of surveillance. In some countries, such as Ireland, judges also do ex-post oversight. Their oversight role is

therefore focused on the aspects of legality and fundamental rights protection. As a report issued by the Venice Commission states, “the value of judicial control depends upon the expertise the judges in question have in assessing risks to national security and in balancing these risks against infringements in human rights” (2007, para. 206, as cited in FRA, 2017, p. 94).

Independent expert bodies are another valuable oversight actor, focusing primarily on aspects of legality and intelligence policies but also on fundamental rights protection. Their strong expertise and independent status are usually complemented by a high-level access to classified information. Prominent examples of independent expert bodies are, as mentioned, IPCO in the UK, Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD) in the Netherlands, and Commission nationale de contrôle des techniques de renseignement (CNCTR) in France. Some of these independent expert bodies have developed strategies and procedures of engagement with the civil society organisations, as we will return to in a later section.

Finally, watchdogs, e.g., civil society organisations, media, academia, and whistle-blowers, have an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of oversight. Watchdogs focus on policy aspects of intelligence and the protection of human rights (FRA, 2017). As illustrated in Figure 1, oversight entities are located between intelligence services and the public sphere, serving as a liaison between the intelligence community surrounded by secrecy, on the one hand, and the community of citizens in an open democratic society on the other.

Intelligence services' accountability scheme



Adapted from FRA Report 2017.

Figure 1: Intelligence oversight actors
(Source: Adapted from FRA Report 2017)

Stages of oversight: *ex ante*, ongoing and *ex post*

When oversight occurs before the surveillance measures are implemented, it is a case of *ex ante* authorisation or approval by an oversight body. Activating the control mechanism prior to the implementation of surveillance in this way is an important safeguard against the misuse of bulk surveillance powers (Wetzling & Vieth, 2018). Moreover, *ex ante* oversight offers the possibility to review the necessity of surveillance operations requested by the intelligence authority in question. This form of oversight usually involves an independent body authorising the warrant or reviewing and approving a signed warrant before its entering into force. The latter model can be observed in the UK

where intrusive surveillance warrants must be authorised first by the Secretary of State and then approved by an independent Judicial Commissioner as part of a “double-lock” approval process (Investigatory Powers Act [IPA], 2016).

Ongoing monitoring and *ex post* review are forms of oversight occurring at a later stage, either while the surveillance operations are being implemented or retroactively after the operation has ended, respectively. For example, IPCO has an *ex post* oversight function concerning the use of investigatory powers by intelligence agencies: after carrying out their audits, IPCO inspectors can share observations acquired during the review process with the Judicial Commissioners, especially when their findings are relevant to the warranty process (IPCO, 2018b).

By carrying out retrospective in-depth inspections of intelligence operations, in addition to the review of warrants mentioned earlier, IPCO is an oversight institution that performs both stages of oversight, *ex ante* and *ex post*. Combining these two responsibilities is considered very beneficial by IPCO authorities as it provides them with “a detailed level of insight into the factors relevant to applications for warrants and the use of covert powers which otherwise would not exist” (IPCO, 2018b, p. 10). Conversely, some scholars and think-tanks endorse a clear institutional separation between the two functions, arguing that the dual role of IPCO is a “basic error” which predisposes it to “conflicts of interest” (Gill, 2020, pp. 9-10; RUSI 2015). In the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to Privacy’s *Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy*, Cannataci (2018b) lists an independent pre-authorisation authority (*ex-ante* oversight) and an independent operational oversight authority (*ex-post* oversight) as essential components of a system of checks and balances for government-led surveillance.

Intelligence oversight and public engagement

The Snowden disclosures in 2013 have exposed significant limitations in the existing oversight systems in some major Western democracies and confronted them with a diversity of new challenges generated by the rapid technological developments. The impact of the revelations is also reflected in scholarship, namely in the way

intelligence oversight is being reconceptualized as part of a broader framework of democratic intelligence governance. The use of *governance* as a research framework has translated into more focus on improving and drafting new modes of oversight, especially as it concerns bulk surveillance (see Bradford Franklin & King, 2018; Goldman & Rascoff, 2016; Omand & Phythian, 2018; Vieth & Wetzling, 2019). In light of this, an important avenue of research has been the exploration of various strategies for increasing engagement between oversight institutions and the public on matters of intelligence policy. Through engaging with the public, oversight institutions can better represent and protect citizens' interests and values and can play a crucial role in building public trust and confidence in intelligence agencies. To illustrate this, Goldman and Rascoff (2016) make a case for expert bodies, such as the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) in the US, to acknowledge and strengthen their roles as proxies for the American people in the governance of intelligence. Worth mentioning here is the PCLOB's capitalization on public input as part of their review process of the surveillance program based on Section 702.² More specifically, the Board organised public hearings with participants from a variety of fields, including privacy advocacy and academia, and temporarily introduced an online public comment section (Renan, 2016). The outcome of the PCLOB's review was a public report, published in 2014, offering recommendations for the adjustment of the surveillance program, making it a valuable resource for policymakers. In this way, the PCLOB has been framing the policy debate on bulk surveillance in the Congress. In the words of Zachary Goldman:

² Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted in 2008 for legalising the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program and has been hailed ever since by the Executive and the intelligence community as a crucial counterterrorism tool. Section 702 is directed towards targeted collection of communications belonging exclusively to non-US persons believed to be located outside the US. It forbids surveillance of American persons, including the use of foreign targets as a vehicle for gathering intelligence about Americans. However, a backdoor search loophole allows the National Security Agency to collect without a warrant, communications belonging to US citizens as part of the collection process targeting foreigners and their communications with US citizens.

“[i]n an era of unprecedented threat and unprecedented transparency, institutions of governance must be able to mediate between the I[n]telligence[C]ommunity and the people in order to ensure that intelligence activities in this [the US], and in all Western democracies, remain effective, legitimate, and sustainable.” (Goldman & Rascoff, 2016, p. 208)

A convincing case for increasing the public engagement in the oversight process was made by Bradford Franklin and King (2018). They argue that the engagement between civil society organisations and oversight bodies can be an effective mechanism for limiting the risks posed by certain practices of intelligence collection to civil rights and liberties. They observe that engagement between oversight bodies and civil society entities largely concerns the oversight bodies’ “policy or governance roles” (Bradford Franklin & King, 2018, p. 7), and, after examining the relationship between civil society organisations and bodies conducting oversight of surveillance in eight different democracies, identified several distinct models of engagement.

An important model of engagement outlined by Bradford Franklin and King (2018) is “cooperation toward a shared goal.” This refers to the mobilisation of resources and expertise offered by civil society organisations in order to strengthen oversight or improve legislation with new safeguards. Particularly important is their technological expertise as it can offer valuable insights into current digital intelligence practices, including the modus operandi of bulk collection technologies and algorithmic practices. Another model of engagement is “promoting better understanding between civil society and oversight” via public forums and meetings under Chatham House rule (Bradford Franklin & King, 2018, p. 13). While public forums can help educate the public at large on aspects of intelligence activity, meetings under Chatham House rule between representatives from the governmental sector and civil society can help deepen trust and foster dialogue (Bradford Franklin & King, 2018). Concerning the potential obstacle posed by the secrecy restrictions that govern a large part of oversight activities, Bradford Franklin, a former Executive Director of the PCLOB, argues that these restrictions make the regular consultation with civil society groups even more valuable for both parties. Specifically, “it helps oversight bodies to

not only diversify their views, but also to identify and address civil liberty risks, and it allows non-government actors to better understand declassified documents and have their voices heard” (Bradford Franklin, 2020, para. 1). A relevant example for both models of engagement described above is IPCO. The British independent oversight body organises periodic consultations with civil society organisations on various aspects of intelligence accountability. One of these public consultations, for example, was focused on the issue of proportionality standards for the review of bulk powers. This illustrates IPCO’s model of engagement with civil society for outside assistance and input, described by Wetzling and Vieth (2018) as “open oversight” (p. 94).

The post-Snowden trend of rethinking intelligence oversight as a more public and participatory process is also captured in David Omand’s “social compact model” of security and intelligence work. Largely modelled on the British experience after 2013 and conceptually framed as a social contract, the model is based on:

“an ideal of a democratic licence to operate being given, after open debate, to the security and intelligence authorities [...] that defines their lawful purposes, regulates their intrusive methods, provides for independent oversight by judicial commissioners and by a committee of senior parliamentarians, and establishes a specialist court (the Investigatory Powers Tribunal) to investigate and adjudicate on allegations of abuse.” (Omand & Phythian 2018, p. 50-51)

In other words, intensifying public dialogue and open debate as to why secret intelligence activities are important for a democratic society would eventually persuade the public and their parliamentary representatives into accepting the ratification of such investigatory powers. Under the social compact model then, intelligence operations are being “tolerated” on the condition of the three Rs: rule of law, regulation, and restraint (Omand & Phythian, 2018, p. 51).

Omand and Phythian’s (2018) conceptualization focuses on the ethical risks of intelligence collection, drawing on Just War theory and its conceptual apparatus, an analogy first introduced in intelligence studies by the British military thinker Michael Quinlan (2007). The classic concepts of *jus ad bellum* (right to resort to war) and *jus in bello* (right

conduct in war) are applied in an analogous manner to the field of intelligence collection under the newly coined expressions *jus ad intelligentiam* and *jus in intelligentia* (Quinlan, 2007). Currently, *jus ad intelligentiam* can be found in laws, publicly available codes of practices and other documents justifying secret intelligence activity, all of which are debated and ratified democratically (Omand & Phythian, 2018). Through the means of ratified statutes and codes, the range of purposes considered legitimate for intelligence agencies is limited. In other words, *jus ad intelligentiam* represents the social contract between the legislative and the executive branch, the latter of which includes the intelligence community itself. The contract determines the role which should be assigned to intelligence within a democracy, “a subject that can sensibly be debated publicly at a suitably general level of principle” (Omand & Phythian, 2018, p. 99) prior to its application. On the other hand, *jus in intelligentia* refers to the translation into action of existing statutes and ethical standards through classified orders and internal rules and authorisations. *Jus in intelligentia* concerns all the routine intelligence activities and decisions conducted under the veil of secrecy, subject to scrutiny through internal and external oversight and “hopefully [...] consistent with a set of ethical principles” (Omand & Phythian, 2018, p. 100). Therefore, the open public debate and the input of the public on the role that secret intelligence activity should play in a democracy is possible in the initial phase of the making of such a social contract (*jus ad intelligentiam*). The appropriateness of intelligence agencies’ behaviour under conditions of secrecy (*jus in intelligentia*), namely compliance and adherence to certain ethical standards, is reviewed ex post by oversight bodies that should protect the interests of the public. In other words, oversight bodies, such as IPCO, can serve as proxies for citizens by “reflecting their views and their values in an arena in which secrecy poses an obstacle to utilizing the normal mechanisms of obtaining popular assent” (Goldman & Rascoff, 2016, p. 220). As mentioned previously, the UK is one of few states in which there has been a public debate concerning the use of mass surveillance for national security purposes. In the next section, we explore the UK case in more detail.

How oversight institutions have been framing the societal debate on bulk surveillance in the UK

A major effect of the 2013 Snowden disclosures in the UK was to expose the existence of a gap between an outdated statutory scheme for surveillance, and the novelty of technological capabilities employed by intelligence agencies. In other words, existing legislation could no longer provide an adequate regulatory framework of surveillance in light of dramatic technological changes. The uncovering of this gap through the Snowden leaks has generated a series of policy debates between different social forces engaged in the process of shaping the new legal framework of surveillance policy. Within this analytical framework which focuses on the “politics of policy-making”, surveillance policy can be seen as “a site of struggle” between different social forces, and the resulting legislation as a direct effect of these complex dynamics (Hintz & Dencik, 2016, p. 1-2).

The process of defining a post-Snowden surveillance policy in the UK has involved a variety of actors, such as oversight institutions, civil society organisations, media outlets, parliamentarians, national security institutions, and private companies. In particular, the comprehensive review carried out by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC), had a key role in shaping the policy debate that eventually led to the adoption of the IPA of 2016. The IRTL at the time, David Anderson QC, was commissioned by the Executive to review the activities of the UK intelligence agencies on an ad hoc basis and with the highest level of security clearance. Anderson’s first report, *A Question of Trust: report of the investigatory powers review* (2015), became a blueprint for the IPA of 2016. Equally impactful was the report compiled by the ISC, *Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework* (2015), offered for the first time in a consolidated form, a review of all intrusive capabilities available to the British intelligence community. As such, it can be seen as “a landmark in terms of openness and transparency surrounding the agencies’ work” (ISC, n.d.). As Hintz and Dencik (2016) observed, these reports “provided a strong normative framework (and limitation) for the government’s intended expansion of surveillance powers” (p. 7). A further report published by Anderson in

2016, *Report of the Bulk Powers Review*, assessed the operational case for the different bulk collection powers available to the British intelligence agencies. Through these public reports, the IRTL has also facilitated the framing of the public debate on bulk collection. However, our main focus is the two independent oversight bodies in the UK, IPCO and the ISC, and how they have been shaping this debate. We look next at instances when these two oversight bodies have engaged with civil society actors and how their reports have been reflected in the UK news media.

Direct engagement with civil society actors

Engagement with civil society was listed by the first Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Lord Justice Fulford, as one of the guiding principles underpinning the work of IPCO. (IPCO, 2017). The rationale behind this engagement policy has multiple dimensions. A key dimension, as stated by IPCO itself, is to enhance public confidence in the use of investigatory powers. Other dimensions of the engagement process are to explain IPCO's role to all stakeholders, including NGOs and academia, and to consult and seek their views on relevant aspects of intelligence activities.

An examination of the two IPCO Annual Reports published to date (for 2017 and 2018 respectively) reveals a consistent collaboration of the expert oversight body with academics and NGOs working in the field of human rights. For example, in 2018 IPCO was involved in a project at the University of Essex called the *Human Rights, Big Data and Technology Project*. As part of the project, it contributed to debates and workshops about best practices in the oversight of new surveillance methods (IPCO, 2018b). As the Report states, these workshops "enhanced IPCO's understanding of some of the public concerns about intrusive powers, including bulk collection of communications data [...]" (IPCO, 2018b, p. 24). Another instance of civil society engagement is the involvement of prominent representatives from key NGOs in the induction and training programme for the Judicial Commissioners (IPCO, 2017). Moreover, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner liaised with NGOs on matters related to the use of bulk powers and organised meetings with representatives from Privacy International (PI), among others (IPCO, 2018b).

Although the lack of security clearance at times restricts the possibility of fully informing civil society representatives on intelligence operations and capabilities, IPCO's purpose, as stated by its former head, Adrian Fulford, is "to act as a bridge" (IPCO, 2017, p. 11). Engaging with civil society directly, as it is the case with IPCO, thus opens the possibility of influencing the public debate on bulk surveillance in a more pivotal manner. Given that civil society actors are liaising with the general public, making them part of the oversight process and integrating their input increases IPCO's influence and messages at a societal level. At the same time, the privileged position of having access to classified information offers IPCO a principal role when compared with the other stakeholders shaping the societal debate on bulk surveillance. Given their access to classified information and ability to review secret documents, reports published by these oversight bodies constitute a valuable resource for NGOs in the field and an important way to understand more about the use of surveillance technologies.

Shaping the public debate on bulk surveillance through publishing reports

Oversight institutions also shape the public debate by publishing reports of activity or specific programs. These are then covered and disseminated through media and NGOs, although sometimes in a critical manner. In this sense, analysing how NGOs and the media relate the findings of these reports and the following discourse is key for understanding how oversight bodies shape the public debate on bulk surveillance.

A good example of an influential report is the *Report on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill* issued by ISC in February 2016. The report was well received by the civil society and its demands for more privacy protection and transparency regarding the use of bulk powers were propagated in the public space by prominent NGOs in the field. Gus Hosein, Executive Director of PI, stated in a press release that the ISC's report "is clear on the requirement of a root and branch reconsideration of the legislation, pushing privacy to the forefront" (Lomas, 2016, para. 5). Hosein also emphasized the strong legitimacy of the report given the ISC's privileged position and access to secret documents. Another civil

society organisation, the Open Rights Group (ORG), also praised the report, with its executive director, Jim Killock, declaring that the ISC “should be given credit for highlighting the Bill’s failure to consistently apply privacy protections” (ORG, 2016, para. 3). Furthermore, the report was hailed by actors from the tech sector in the UK. As the deputy CEO of TechUK put it, the ISC report “makes it clear that the bill lacks clarity on fundamental issues, such as core definitions of key terms, encryption and equipment interference” (Holden, 2016, para. 12).

Another example of the impact of publications issued by oversight bodies was the reports of inspections carried out by IPCO in 2019 regarding the inadequate manner in which MI5 stored and mishandled data obtained under warrants. These reports became public, albeit in redacted form, because of a judicial review brought against the new IPA by the UK human rights organisation Liberty and other privacy campaigners. The inspection reports and other documents, such as correspondence between IPCO and MI5, reveal important observations concerning privacy safeguards raised by IPCO at the time. In one of these documents, Commissioner Fulford characterised the MI5’s handling and storage of collected data as being managed in an “undoubted unlawful manner” (Bond, 2019, para. 6). The disapproval of MI5’s approach to data handling is also present in IPCO’s Annual Report from 2018, which states that:

“[t]here were serious deficiencies in the way the relevant environment implemented important IPA safeguards, particularly the requirements that MI5 must limit to the minimum necessary the extent to which warranted data is copied and disclosed, and that warranted data must be destroyed as soon as there are no longer any relevant grounds for retaining it.” (IPCO, 2018b, p. 42)

Thus, we can argue that IPCO’s inspection reports and the Commissioner’s declarations regarding MI5’s lack of compliance has influenced the debate on bulk surveillance powers by raising concerns about the effectiveness of existing safeguards. In light of these disclosures, Liberty and PI have initiated joint international legal action against MI5 (Liberty, 2019), illustrating IPCO’s contribution to civil society’s efforts to ensure accountability of intelligence agencies.

Oversight bodies' findings and reports regarding intelligence activity normally reach the general public through the media. The informed views of oversight authorities, which are based on expertise and access to classified information, are conveyed to citizens through the media in a less technical language. Consequently, the manner in which media frame the information and findings delivered by oversight reports on the issue of bulk surveillance influence the way and extent to which oversight institutions shape the public debate on this issue.

The UK oversight system as best practice

The efficient oversight of bulk and algorithmic intelligence collection practices in the post-Snowden landscape can be seen as a key test for contemporary democracies. Bulk collection technologies are raising serious difficulties to legislative and judicial oversight authorities who often lack technical and operational expertise, resources and access to relevant information. The Snowden case has acted as a major catalyst for rethinking the role and design of intelligence oversight across the liberal democratic world towards more public engagement. With parliamentary oversight displaying clear limits and legal compliance deemed insufficient to cover the complexities of the new digital intelligence practices, a novel category of external independent oversight bodies has emerged in recent years. These external entities have been described under different names, as “expert bodies” (FRA 2015; 2017), “institutions of governance” (Goldman & Rascoff, 2016) or “hybrid institutions” (Scott, 2019). As the FRA Report notes, “[e]xpert oversight is exceptionally valuable as it allows for the actions of the intelligence services to be scrutinised by those familiar with the subject, who have time to dedicate to the matter, and are independent of political allegiances” (2015, p. 41). The main point that we would like to emphasize here is that these independent expert bodies combine specific features that place them in an optimal position for shaping the societal debate on bulk surveillance. These core features are: reliance on experts – especially technological experts –, high level security clearances, openness towards collaboration with civil society and independence from executive. This set of characteristics allows them to shape the public discourse and dialogue on important controversial matters like

bulk surveillance. While these bodies are neither judicial, nor legislative or executive, they are “hybrid” in that they “marry” some of the features typical of political institutions with features typical of legal institutions (Scott, 2019).

The UK sets an example of how to effectively develop intelligence governance in the context of Big Data proliferation. The IPA 2016 was the outcome of a series of public policy debates sparked by the Snowden disclosures, trying to address major deficiencies in the accountability of intelligence and surveillance in the U.K. The act marks the transition towards a new phase of “expert oversight” (Leigh, 2019) through the establishment of IPCO. The new oversight body described by Anderson (2018) as a “larger, more powerful and outward-facing regulator”, introduced the consolidated position of Investigatory Powers Commissioner [IPC] assisted by a number of Judicial Commissioners. IPCO took over all the prerogatives and responsibilities of three precursor organisations: the Office of Surveillance Commissioners, the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office and the Intelligence Service Commissioner’s Office. In this sense, IPCO not only that operates a broader range of functions than its precursors, but also does so in a post-Snowden societal context defined by widespread public awareness of the national security activities carried out by the executive (Scott, 2019). Furthermore, as Leigh (2019) observed, “instead of being a responsive institution that either reports or is tasked the IPC has own-initiative powers to conduct thematic reviews of capabilities and to investigate serious errors” (p. 576).

The game-changing shift brought by the IPA 2016 is the prior approval function of the Judicial Commissioners, applicable to surveillance warrants authorised by the cabinet ministers. Within this approval system known as the “double-lock” (Fig. 2) the Judicial Commissioners assisted by a Technology Advisory Panel, review all warrants for targeted surveillance and bulk powers on the basis of their compliance with the principles of necessity and proportionality. As an IPCO document states, “the purpose of the so-called “double lock” provisions of the Act are to provide an independent, judicial, safeguard as to the legality of warrants, in particular to their necessity and proportionality” (IPCO, 2018a, S. 19). From a historical point of view, the

introduction of the “double-lock” put an end to a centuries-old practice under which cabinet ministers were the sole authority granting warrants for interception (Leigh, 2019). From an institutional perspective, an important consequence of the “double-lock” scheme is the allocation to Judicial Commissioners of a prerogative (granting warrants) that has traditionally been monopolised by the executive power (Scott, 2019). Moreover, under the new law, a Judicial Commissioner “may carry out such investigations, inspections and audits as the Commissioner considers appropriate for the purposes of the Commissioner’s functions” (IPA 2016, S. 235). This provision reflects the high degree of access to classified information that Commissioners are granted with. Also, the ‘double-lock’ mechanism is underpinned by a significant expertise component, in the sense that all Judicial Commissioners are appointed only if they hold or have held a high judicial office (IPA 2016, S. 227). The judicial “double-lock”, can therefore be seen as a strong safeguard against the use of the most intrusive techniques including bulk interception and bulk hacking. By requiring that warrants must be reviewed by a Judicial Commissioner before they enter into force, the “double-lock” system establishes IPCO as an *ex ante* mechanism of intelligence oversight. This component of judicial review has been commended by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to Privacy who described it as “one of the most significant new safeguards introduced by the IPA” (Cannataci, 2018a, para. 9).

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


Figure 2: The “double-lock” approval process
(Source: Cannataci, 2018a, para. 9)

Besides IPCO in the UK, other examples of expert oversight include CTVID in the Netherlands and CNCTR in France. It is important to highlight that both CTVID and CNCTR have an enhanced form of access to classified information via technical oversight interfaces that offer them direct digital access to intelligence databases. A technical interface with access to collected data opens the possibility of random oversight inspections and reviews at any time and generates more incentives for intelligence agencies to comply with the regulations (Wetzling & Vieth, 2018).

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated that a key stakeholder in the process of shaping the societal debate on bulk surveillance in a

democracy is represented by intelligence oversight institutions themselves. It focused on the public dimension of oversight and their various strategies of engagement with civil society actors. We argued that independent expert oversight bodies are better equipped than all other societal actors for shaping the public debate on bulk surveillance. While societal actors like media outlets, civil society organizations, politicians, national security institutions and judicial courts all contribute and shape the public understanding of this complex issue, they still have obvious limitations. Media and civil society organizations can benefit from expert views and have a strong voice in the public arena but they lack access to classified information and, thus, to a comprehensive understanding of the matter. Although some politicians as members of parliamentary oversight committees have special security clearances, they usually demonstrate a lack of knowledge in technological aspects of intelligence collection nonetheless. Moreover, a laborious activity restricted by the rule of secrecy becomes less attractive for MPs and their electoral logic. Judicial courts have other limitations in this sense, mainly related to the exceptional character of the national security field but also because of the legislation lagging behind the new technology of surveillance. Finally, intelligence agencies shape the public debate on bulk surveillance, albeit in a limited manner, given that public trust in these institutions has been strongly damaged by the 2013 Snowden leaks exposing for the first time the scale and use of bulk collection techniques.

The paper's main argument is that external independent oversight bodies such as IPCO in the UK can play a pivotal role in the societal debate on bulk collection given their unique blend of institutional features and statutory power. The high-level access to classified information and reliance on experts on the one hand, and the ability to engage with civil society and citizens in an open manner on the other, are features which allow this independent expert oversight body to shape the societal debate on bulk surveillance and contribute to democratic governance of intelligence.

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SECURITY CULTURE: THE CURE TO VOTER DEPRESSION IN ROMANIA

Adrian LESENCIUC*
Corneliu-Mugurel COZMANCIUC*

Abstract:

Toppled with current political turmoil and crises on multiple fronts, Romania has undoubtedly been a highly challenged state since the fall of communism in 1989. Today, the Covid-19 pandemic has amplified many of these crises, including facilitating voter fatigue and depression, behaviours that eventually end up harming democracy. Moreover, the concerning status quo drawn by the last parliamentary elections, scoring a record low number of votes indicates numerous warning signals and asks for a solution-oriented debate between and within political parties, but also with the electorate above all.

This paper entails an original approach by connecting two preeminent phenomena, both having political, social, and economic implications – a low voter turnout, and the global pandemic. As a proposed solution, the research hypothesis is if investing in security culture became a priority, then the citizens' trust in their government would be restored, and the legacy of doubt and suspicion inherited from the communist era would be overcome. The outcome anticipated from building a solid security culture could reverse the ongoing voter fatigue in Romania, leading to higher turnouts in the new elections to come. A stronger bond is expected to emerge between politicians and citizens while the level of trust in public authority would increase.

Keywords: *security culture, low voter turnout, voter fatigue, corruption, Covid-19.*

Introduction

Romania has the second-lowest vaccination rate in Europe¹ and has been facing multiple occasions of collapse since the pandemic

* Professor, PhD Coordinator, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy.

* PhD Student, “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy.

¹ At the moment this article was written, Romania had 15.633.775 shots administered. More specifically, there were 7.731.860 people vaccinated, representing 40,42% of the

started. Going back to 2020, the Parliamentary Elections of December 6th witnessed the **lowest voter turnout** so far, with only 30% of citizens exercising their vote. Moreover, the latest statistics conducted by IRES showed surprisingly 88% of Romanians believe that the country is not evolving in the right direction². These two pessimistic facts – the first concepts analysed in this paper – are indicators of a low-trust society, a vice inherited from the communist past, that has been troubling the process of governance ever since (Chiru, 2016, p. 280) and threatens to impede it during the Covid-19 crisis as well. This is the unpleasant status quo that has to be changed soon.

The following issue that this article explores concerns an insufficiently developed field in Romania, **security culture**. We mainly argue that the dissemination of basic security knowledge would raise awareness, and the population would gain insight into the most pressing threats, in the end trusting their politicians and experts to apply the *National Defense Strategy 2020-2024* accordingly³ (Coldea, 2021, p. 50-55). Conversely, the policies created would be granted legitimacy. Bluntly put, the lack of security culture in Romania is damaging the democratic process, and investing in building a resilient security culture shall be accounted for as a solution to the previous-mentioned situation.

All the three key matters unveiled above – low voter turnout, Covid-19 pandemic, and security culture – would come to mutually solve each other and extract Romania from the current blockage it finds itself in if being included in the same debate on the future of the country. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis used a comprehensive concept to clearly describe the state of Romania at the moment: *crisis*.

total population, according to the data provided by Covidvax.live. In Europe, only Bulgaria topples Romania in what concerns the smallest number of citizens vaccinated, as the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control's current statistics indicate. More details on <https://vaccinetracker.ecdc.europa.eu/public/extensions/COVID-19/vaccine-tracker.html#uptake-tab>

² The interpretation of the IRES results are available here: <https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/cel-mai-nou-sondaj-ires-ce-partide-ar-vota-romanii-daca-duminica-ar-fi-alegeri-parlamentare-1639263>

³ It is important to mention here that among the threats encompassed by the National Defense Strategy 2020-2024 in Romania, the Covid-19 pandemic is clearly underlined. The document is available here: https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/National_Defence_Strategy_2020_2024

To explore the phenomenon of voter depression – which embodies both the cause and the effect of low voter turnout, we ought to engage mainly with quantitative data. In this sense, the latest reports, statistics as well as opinion polls conducted by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES), the Council of Europe Electoral Assistance (Elecdata), and INSCOP Research are given as references. Furthermore, the analysis would be yet incomplete without properly referring to qualitative data and secondary sources. Content analysis is the main research method used, especially to exemplify the main expert and journalists' perspectives on the matters, and then cross-section them so as to draw a general conclusion. There is sufficient literature on the causes of low voter turnout⁴, especially in the Eastern Europe region. But, on the contrary, the very limited literature on security culture in Romania demands an enhanced engagement with the topic and the connections with various social and political phenomena.

In the first section, the rationale or causes of low voter turnout would be approached from two perspectives – global and continental, and national (the case study of Romania). The goal is to clearly express the dangerous outcomes of this long-lasting phenomenon. Then, the second section focuses on the significance of security culture as an instrument against voter depression. The three-step approach of obtaining the desired product of security and intelligence – national stability and a threat-free environment – involves security awareness, education, and culture (Furnell, 2017, p. 5).

The main premise of this article revolves around the existing pressure placed on Romania's security system, caused by low voter turnout, and the Covid-19 crisis, which would utterly worsen in absence of security culture, a general lacuna of the Romanian society.

The trust deficit and low voter turnout

Before grasping the concrete instruments employed by security culture, the phenomenon of low voter turnout will be explored, firstly

⁴ These concepts are distinct and it is advisable to treat them separately in order to avoid confusions. Here, however, we envision security culture as the final product to be achieved after investing in security awareness, and education.

alone, then linked with the Covid-19 crisis through a cause-effect relationship in the following section.

The present-day context extends the low turnout problem across the globe, and, implicitly, in Europe as well. Decreased interest for voting in elections is not an isolated phenomenon, but it encompasses rather a trend that has been affecting numerous states across the world. The IDEA – International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance – longitudinal study published in 2016 seeks to reveal the changes in patterns of voting since the 1990s, more specifically, starting from the end of the Cold War. The findings are somehow surprising. First of all, the number of states organizing democratic elections has increased, and the number of people qualified to exercise their right doubled in the last four decades (until 2010) as a consequence of the dismantling of the Soviet Union and numerous regions in Africa gaining independence. Second of all, despite this fact, the general voter turnout around the globe and in Europe has decreased significantly, proving the development of a dangerous trend (Solijonov, 2016, p. 24) that threatens democracy and weakens the state's legitimacy. Whenever a crisis of political participation occurs, a debate on the seriousness of such a democratic deficit reignites between scholars (Cześniak, 2006).

Europe is, however, an exceptional case, the region that witnessed the highest decrease in voter turnout since the fall of communism in East and Central Europe (Solijonov, 2016, p. 26). The perspective of emerging democracies and the event of the first free elections held during the 1990s do not quite match with the current lack of political participation. Hence the low voter turnout trend seems illogical. It is important to explore the potential causes for the expansion of such a phenomenon. Among the factors influencing voter turnout in one country, we could encounter individual factors, but also institutional, economic, social, and political. In addition to these, it is argued that elections are particularly important to a democracy, therefore the lack of interest on behalf of the citizens indicates a democratic recession (Diamond, 2015, p. 141-155).

Arendt Lijphart manifested concern about this trend and explained why it is particularly dangerous. The threat of weakening the democracy does not limit itself to the case of the United States, as it was frequently proclaimed, but it indeed overwhelms Europe as well. His

particular experience with the Netherlands argues that the situation of dramatically low political participation shall be resolved immediately (Lijphart, 1998, p. 1). Besides certain institutional mechanisms which are to improve voter turnout, mandatory voting is the most efficient solution. However, Lijphart admits that it is not at all popular among political leaders.

We shall now analyse the unique case of Romania. The communist past inextricably transmitted the vice of lack of trust in public authorities (Chiru, 2016, p. 280) which led to the pessimist outcome of every election. This reality was visible in the last 30 years of free elections with a voter turnout mostly below 50% (Comşa, 2015, p. 60-63), but more than ever in the last parliamentary elections held on December 6, 2020. Only 31.84% of eligible Romanians exercised their vote, a right which was gained after the violent Revolution of 1989 ousted Communist leader Nicolae Ceauşescu. The Social Democratic Party won once again the Romanian population's vote, this time scoring close with the National Liberal Party. But the surprise lies elsewhere. The nationalist, populist rhetoric of the newly-established party – Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) – succeeded in making the threshold of 5% of total number of votes legally required to enter the Parliament, proving the degree to which, the populist wave reached Romania as well (Barberá, 2020).

The result of the 2020 Parliamentary elections features a serious detachment of Romania's citizens with politics and state affairs. This would come as a surprise if we are to compare the situation with the pre-pandemic elections for the European Parliament (May, 2019), during which voter turnout was at a record high 52.8%⁵. At that time, the Romanian population took a stand against corruption as the referendum against corruption took place at the same time, and tried to correct the situation. Hence, two main reasons could explain the pessimistic outcome of the elections: voter depression or fatigue, and the critical epidemic situation, both leading to a record low voter turnout which in turn produced a destabilization of the state's legitimacy. Firstly, being aware of the fundamental problem Romania has been confronting since

⁵ Voter turnout for the 2019 European Parliament elections in Romania are available here: <https://prezenta.bec.ro/europarlamentare26052019/romania-counties>

the end of the Communist regime – corruption – it would make sense why citizens lost hope in an equitable, democratic system, where their voices matter. This attitude of voter depression is quite dangerous especially in times of crisis, such as the global pandemic. The state cannot act as a good manager of the crisis because the population does not trust its capabilities.

A vivid exemplification of Romania's distrust in their government is marked by the last years' events. For instance, the decisions taken by Social Democrat-dominating Government in 2018 unleashed an unprecedented wave of anti-corruption protests (Luca, 2019). The street manifestations managed to gather 50 000 people in only one day. The population envisioned itself as a force against its own elected government which has succeeded in failing them by trying to adopt the infamous Government Emergency Ordinance no. 13 and interfere with the impartiality of the judiciary and the rule of law, core principles of democracy. Corruption and the long-lasting struggle of the Romanian citizens against it are argued to have led to the so-called voter depression (Scherle, 2020) which prevented them from going to the polls and exercising their rights in December 2020.

Voter fatigue, on the other hand, is somehow different from what has been described above. It rather focuses on the conviction that citizens' votes do not matter and would not bring any change (De Rosa and Soo Kim, 2018). This need for change was unfortunately encompassed by the AUR's performance of entering the Parliament by scoring 9% of the votes. Their electorate claimed their need for a new face in Romanian politics. Consequently, the populist discourse of AUR party⁶ managed to capture their votes. Such voting behaviour is vicious for the development of any nation, especially one that had conducted its transition to democracy in a difficult, violent matter.

This chapter particularly addressed the necessity to shape voter behaviour and separate Romania as soon as possible from the *low-trust society* label. The perspective employed focused on the authorities' failure to rather win citizens' trust than damage it, and it also assessed

⁶ *Alliance for the Union of Romanians* run for the first time in Romania's Parliamentary elections in 2020. It is a new party, formed in 2019.

the most recent indicators which confirm the phenomenon of voter depression and fatigue.

The following section correlates the low voter turnout and the pandemic – a facilitator and promoter of vicious voter behaviour and the safe haven for sentiments of suspicion, misinformation, and conspiracy theories that ultimately weaken democracy. By approaching the national security perspective, it would be proved how citizens' behaviour could indeed weaken the performance of national security services and institutions, and, in turn, how this case was facilitated by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Covid-19 – the spark of distrust

Complementary to the before-described perspective, the impact Covid-19 has had over national security systems worldwide is beyond doubt. When assessing the damage produced by the pandemic in the United States, for instance, it is explained how the Government acted in ways similar to the 9/11 catastrophe and charged a specialized Commission to investigate the damages done by the pandemic to national security. This is indicative of the gravity the Covid-19 crisis (Gronvall, 2020, p. 79-84) and the footprint it has on national security. This aspect is especially important since the pandemic increased telework quota, used as a containment measure to the spread of the virus (Minkin, Horowitz, and Parker, 2020, p. 4), and, implicitly, the frequency of cyber threats increased as well and an additional pressure was placed on national security experts' agenda.

The individuals play an indispensable role in national security strategy as they are the benefactors of the security product in the end, but also the promoters in the beginning. But to be able to benefit from it, first, they have to trust the process, especially since they are also directly targeted by various threats on the security agenda, for instance, cyber-attacks as mentioned above, but also the pandemic. The US Administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama chose to label pandemics as global threats; however, this trend was abandoned in favour of the rather realist perspective on security adopted by the Trump Administration (Hamilton, 2020). Considering the enormous amount of lives Covid-19 has taken in the past two years, the latest approach proved

not so valid. The pandemic is an active threat to national and human security alike.

How the pandemic has shaped public opinion is what concerns us exactly. Restrictive measures imposed by the governments in the first stages of the pandemic caused a general wave of frustration especially among Central and Eastern European countries as it resembled the excessive control communist rulers exerted over the population. The *infodemic*⁷ – a consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic – fuelled such feelings, and caused not only low trust in the authorities but fostered hate speech and dissent towards the government's strategy of containing the spread of the virus. The population did not encourage the work carried by the national security agencies to prevent, analyse and eventually diminish the threat to national security since a part of them did not believe in the existence of the virus at all, and another part labelled the government as a dictator limiting civil liberties.

Romania's *National Defence Strategy 2020-2024* is constructed around the extended-security definition, going beyond the traditional military lens to security. Irrespective of the perspective chosen, the Covid-19 pandemic is most definitely a concern from all points of view. Pandemics are one urgent national security matter (Coldea, 2021, p. 50),

⁷ The concept of "infodemic" was formally introduced and explained by WHO in the context of the Covid-19 crisis. Detailed information is available here: https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic#tab=tab_1. More precisely, the term was used for the first time in WHO's Report conducted on February 2, 2020 in which it was suggested that there is an informational pandemic occurring at the same time. Hence there is a need for an effective communication management by doubling the measures imposed since the outbreak of the pandemic. The infodemic situation was problematic in the first wave of the pandemic as it created the gaps instrumental to boosting low trust: "What is concerning in the case of the infodemic is that, despite the informational fluxes rightly managed by authorities, the excess of information coming from unauthorized sources are blocking any possibility of accurate, fast, efficient and transparent institutional communication, and control over the security crisis. Among the abundance of rumors and myths suffocating the informational flux managed by institutions, the panic sentiment inserted in various social categories leads to irrational actions, justifying rather a decline in mental capabilities and contagious emotional reactions, such as creating food stocks for several months, long enough to survive the 'COVID-19 apocalypse'." (Lesenciuc, 2019)

especially as they mobilize the crisis-management function of the state and security agencies.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a right-wing hard-line security promoter admitted that, for the moment, the common enemy for the entire population is SARS-CoV-2. He focused the last months of his mandate, before the 2021 Israeli general elections, on constructing the most efficient national strategy of combating the pandemic (Kershner, 2021).

The European Union adopted a new path towards achieving a common perspective on defence and security, the *Strategic Compass*, aimed at fostering a common, integrated view on the crisis-management, resilience, and capability development of the union. The Covid-19 crisis impeded the operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (Pietz, 2021), and proved the need for the security and defence policy to evolve and adapt to the current situations. Furthermore, European Parliament's Subcommittee on Security and Defence demanded a report establishing exactly how the pandemic impacted the EU's CSDP. The analysis exposed the extensive damage the Covid-19 crisis has had over both hard and soft security aspects, the most severe being the weakening of Member States' trust system, biosecurity threats, and exposure of infrastructures' loopholes, namely the lack of resilience of national healthcare systems⁸. Moreover, the Covid-19 endangered regional peace and stability, fostered mass movements and triggered an *infodemic*. The infodemic succeeded in inserting itself into a weakened social body which allowed the informal means of communication to substitute the formal ones, leading through "cognitive consistency" to the claim of rationality, and giving "rational logic even to the irrational" (Lesenciuc, 2017, p. 82).

NATO also has an active role in ensuring the prosperity of the Alliance throughout the Covid-19 crisis. Assistant Secretary-General for Operations John Manza explains the engagement of NATO with the pandemic as a security crisis, by crafting the Pandemic Response Trust Fund in 2020 and also investing in tight inter-organizational and civil-military cooperation to ensure an efficient and prompt reaction to the

⁸ The complete report can be found here: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2021/653623/EXPO_IDA%282021%296_53623_EN.pdf.

pandemic⁹. The resilient element of the entire alliance was tested by the spread of the virus. The vision of threats in the current society has to move beyond military and violent means, and include also a much more inconsistent, deceiving, and challenging dimension – the globalized dimension. The Covid-19 crisis makes a perfect example in this sense as Professor and Researcher Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørsv explains. And the most dangerous aspect about it was the element of surprise. Virtually no one, no individual, state, system, international organization, or Alliance was indeed prepared for the global pandemic unleashed in 2020. Such a realization provokes panic and legitimizes the behaviour of the population – distrust, suspicion, fear.

Such ground does not encourage or favour a prosperous governance process and implicitly the security goals of national security agencies. Bluntly put, it is tiresome to provide security for those who do not want it nor believe in it. The Covid-19 pandemic led to solid obstacles to ensuring the defence goals established in the *National Defence Strategy 2020-2024*.

The very need to rebuild the Romanian society in a post-pandemic era, ensured by the financial instrument of the European Union – *Recovery and Resilience Facility* – was translated into national initiatives. Romania's National Recovery and Resilience Plan was officially approved by the European Commission in September, through a formal visit to Bucharest by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The financial instrument is divided into six policy pillars, including education, health system resilience, a transition towards a green economy. The reforms stipulated by the Recovery and Resilience National Plan (PNRR), in Romanian – are to be translated in concrete projects until 2026, the latest. Otherwise, Romania could not benefit from the financial opportunity. Given that Romania ranks the second-to-last when it comes to absorbing EU funds, that is a unique opportunity to rebuild the society, but also the external image within the Union. However, for these to happen, there is a profound need for the Romanian population to trust and support the Government amidst such a crisis. Security culture is one

⁹ Detailed information on NATO's response to the pandemic is available here: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_183632.htm

means to achieve this optimistic scenario, as will be explained in the following sections.

Why security culture is necessary?

Monica Gariup defines security culture as a resilient and sustainable mosaic of common beliefs and perceptions towards threats. This uniformization of beliefs ensures the ideal circumstances for national security agencies to properly apply the security agenda. Security in itself has to be understood as a modern inclusive phenomenon that extends far beyond traditional security perceptions of military conflict. Nowadays, in a highly interconnected world, security reaches all societal levels, economic, cyber, food security, human rights, and individual liberties. Hence the task of specialized security institutions is more difficult than ever. For them to be able to fully exercise their competencies, citizens have to be completely aware, educated and involved in the process (Albescu & Perețeanu, 2019, p. 76).

Both NATO and the EU argued for the value of security culture for the well-functioning of the organizations as it directly involves building a consensus on the magnitude of threats, a clear desideratum that all members can work towards. The resilience of the Euro-Atlantic and European security depends on the formation and sustainable character of the security culture.

There are two central reasons why Romanian security culture could be a reliable instrument in reversing the low voter turnout phenomenon and the wave of distrust when it comes to the Covid-19 pandemic: **gap-closing effect** and the **security risk management potential**.

First of all, as it was established in the previous sections of this article, there is a gap between the Romanian citizens and their elected politicians, inherited from the Communist years, and fuelled today by destabilizing factors such as distrust, misinformation, and suspicion. Beyond the inoffensive suspicion, the Romanian society is fragmented by superstitions and pseudo beliefs. Regarding the current crisis encompassed by the pandemic and the anti-COVID vaccines, the society is divided in three categories. All of them are fuelled by irrational distinct fears: *the progressives*, who fear the pandemic's consequences, *the*

superstitious, who are relating to fears hard to explain, but easily empowered by the anti-vaccine voices, and *the cynics*, who would rather wait a period of time to see the effects of the vaccines on the other people (see the study conducted in September-October 2020 on the Romanians' intention to get vaccinated, by the LARICS Sociological Studies Centre, and the ISPRI Political Studies and International Relations Institute, under the patronage of the Romanian Academy which prove such statements) (Roman, 2020). This phenomenon has the perilous effect of low voter turnout which in turn only ends up harming democracy, and the citizens' well-being. A common vision is detrimental to the well-functioning of a country or alliance and security culture has all the coordinates for bridging this gap. We argue that a *positive security culture* responds exactly to Romania's needs as it gives a central role to the population in the decision-making process. Citizens' opinions become visible tools employed by the authorities to craft a resilient and transparent security strategy. Positive security culture aims to ensure a safe space for the people to be honest and upfront about their needs and wishes and also collaborate with the involved parties (the state, national security, and intelligence agencies, and governmental institutions, as well as NGOs and private actors) to achieve the security objectives (Dekker, 2016).

Such an approach is especially suitable for a low trust society, which experiences low voter turnout caused by voter fatigue and depression. The very focus on the societal dimension security culture deems fuels numerous healthy patterns of behaviour. Security culture encourages solidarity and cohesion among the population and instils patriotic sentiments (Mantea, 2019, p. 200) otherwise wrongfully exploited by populist parties. Alliance for the Union of Romanians' leaders actively benefited from such nationalistic rhetoric. This time, the feelings of belonging could be invested into achieving national security goals and determining the Romanian population to collaborate and engage with their elected political dissidents instead of opposing and protesting against them. Various sociological studies conducted prove the link between the level of political trust and voter turnout. Security culture can inextricably be an active instrument to the ultimate functionality of representative democracy.

Secondly, strong security culture is one reliable instrument that could be used to generate valuable security risk management skills (McEvoy & Kovellaniwalski, 2018, p. 80-81) essential in any governance process, considering the present-day context of the global pandemic. The most preeminent vulnerability of the national and international system exploited by the pandemic was the inability to prevent and the inconsistency of the response mechanism confronted with an external threat. This scenario has been especially visible in the first months of 2020 when the European Union's initial response came with a delay. Even after the WHO established that the pandemic will actively affect the world for multiple months to come, the national authorities encountered difficulties in convincing their population of the authenticity of the health crisis. Such struggle rationally diverted the authorities' efforts otherwise directed to implementing the human and national security goals. In lieu of resources being invested properly in preventing, managing, and counteracting cybersecurity breaches or attacks, the double-threat character migration waves pose (both from a security and now health perspective) and the ensuring of unhindered exercise of human rights and liberties, political leaders had to reduce the trust gap between them and the population. An extensive awareness campaign, various press briefings, and public rhetoric were aimed at convincing Covid-19-skeptics of respecting and supporting the sanitary measures. Among the major threats the Romanian security environment will be confronted with by 2024, populism and the peril of trust in the government's competencies are the most important. The radicalization of the public discourse, a method widely used by populist and nationalist actors has the potential of destabilizing the domestic environment. The phenomenon of rising populism and its effects on the decision-making process has been thoroughly documented, especially in light of the recent events and the pandemic context (Niessen, 1995; Bieber, 2020; Vieten, 2020; Soare & Tufiş, 2018).

Security culture involves above all obtaining a common perspective on the variety, intensity, and duration of security threats. Risk management (the desired product in this case) implies that threats be so well known that a plan could be developed to prevent them. This objective is not feasible in a low-trust society. The Covid-19 crisis

embodies perfectly the new security environment worldwide governments have to adapt to, a mixture of health and administration crises, cybersecurity threats, fake news, economic threats, bioterrorism, and more, but also, human security dangers. Globalization and technological advances nurtured such a volatile security environment that governments have to manage. Maslow's hierarchy of needs-physiological, safety, love, self-esteem, and self-actualization is entirely menaced by the global pandemic. Therefore, states have to rapidly adapt and develop a sustainable and resilient security culture to be able to achieve security risk management skills so as to control the crisis and prevent it from getting out of control (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 1-14). Citizens' trust in such sensitive moments is crucial to the survival and prospering of the state. To be able to meet the needs of the citizens, the governments have to be effective, prepared, and definitely have an account of how to manage security risks, and limit the nation's exposure to threats.

The first action towards security risk management is risk assessment, which I argue that Romania had trouble with from the beginning of the pandemic. Denying the existence of a deadly virus virtually undermined the government's security risk management efforts and directly defied the state authorities' strategy. Anticipating and acknowledging a risk implies also identifying the vulnerabilities of the organization, in this case, the state, so as to be able to find countermeasures to reduce those risks and design cost-effective solutions (Vellani, 2006). Risk mitigation follows as the second step in the production process of security risk management skills. The approach of European and NATO states was to reduce the risks by adopting social distancing and sanitary measures in order to limit the spread of the virus and contain the risk of destabilizing the economy, aggravating poverty, and damaging social security.

For instance, a National Institute of Statistics survey enlisted the economic evolution trends in Romania in March and April 2020, the incipient stage of the pandemic. In one month, the level of uncertainty about the evolution of economic activity had increased up to 48%, according to managers of companies. Also, the Romanian labour force market was seriously harmed according to a 2021 research on labour

market sustainability conducted by Radulescu, Ladaru, and others. These facts could have aggravated to the level of paralyzing Romania's economy, but, they could have also been reduced if the risk was assessed properly from the very beginning.

The status-quo granted national leaders the tasks of crisis managers, which have pressing duties to fulfil (Borodzicz, 2005, p. 165). Every threat needs a personalized strategy, but for the security and political decision-makers to have the flexibility to design such strategies, the support, and trust of Romanian citizens, who benefit from but also contribute to security risk management is of utmost importance. Even before the Covid-19 crisis, the debate of how citizens expect state leaders to respond to a crisis was ongoing. This issue becomes especially delicate when the citizens do not recognize the crisis or have extremely contrasting expectations from their leaders, social behaviour which harms the logic of representative democracy.

Security culture dismisses the obstacle of distrust of the Romanian population in their government, enabling all efforts to be directed to one single purpose: managing the security risks. To achieve it, two activities shall be employed by the state and national security agencies: security awareness and education when it comes to the civilian population.

Path towards a resilient security culture

To achieve a resilient security culture, establishing and maintaining an appropriate level of awareness and education are of utmost importance.

Security awareness as a process involves shaping the citizen's perception of the environment one lives in from a security perspective. New lenses of perceiving the society emerge hence the citizen will judge the events using new indicators such as vulnerabilities, risks, threats, etc., involuntarily contributing to the process of security management. The final goal of security awareness is to build a solid pro-security attitude, a goal of national leaders as well. The solidarity element will be founded on pragmatic and valid information about external threats which have the potential to harm the unity of the state. Security awareness goes beyond the mere initial assimilation of basic knowledge

and involves a constant reminder of the stage of development of a threat and the strategy adopted by the security agencies towards it (Roper & Grau, Fischer, 2006, p. 22-23). By creating a continuous information-based foundation, a new social contract has the real potential to emerge, one based on trust and cooperation. There would not be a gap between the political dissidents and the electorate anymore since all efforts available to combat a threat ought to be directed in a single direction. The weak point of the Romanian society – lack of trust in public authorities – will become impossible to exploit by de-stabilizing influences such as the populist movements. Romania has the responsibility to provide awareness to its citizens as a member of NATO and the EU. *Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (2013/488/EU)* underlines the importance of security awareness and education as obligations for the personnel having access to classified information.

An impressive percentage of citizens have to be well informed and aware of the security situation in Romania to achieve security awareness. There would have to be constant communication between the citizens-political leaders-experts in the field in order to achieve consensus on the status-quo of Romania and then work towards designing solutions. Obtaining security awareness would lead to the development of two sets of skills among the citizens. First, threat and vulnerabilities assessment capabilities would be internalized by each citizen, leading also to an enhanced sense of responsibility. Therefore, there is a real chance the people would better understand the necessity of sanitary measures in order to combat the pandemic instead of perceiving them as a cap on rights and liberties. The wave of anti-restrictive measures which occurred in Europe could have been drastically diminished if not eliminated. Second, the individual (in this case, the citizen) would recognize the importance of security agencies in the current society (PCI DSS, 2014). Such a revelation has the potential of alienating the perspective inherited from the communist years on the intrusiveness of the state in private affairs.

Security education, the next step towards achieving a resilient security culture demands additional efforts from political leaders. They would have to direct their efforts towards a more laborious goal,

collaborate with the Academia to provide curricula on security studies. Fortunately, there are various institutions and educational programs active in Romania, specialized in security studies, both military and civic, which we could engage more with, especially in the context of the previously mentioned network of communication between citizens-political leaders- experts in the security domain: “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy in Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, “Henri Coandă” Air Forces Academy in Braşov, Faculty of History and Philosophy, Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, “Carol I” National Defence University in Bucharest and more. Two main activities could be linked with security education – *influence communications* (trying to shift public opinion in a certain direction by enriching citizens with valuable and accurate information), and *public and strategic communication* (constant exchange of messages).

The main feature of security education is to be detected in the post-crisis behaviour of security actors (the Romanian population as well). Were states to have invested in security education, the society would acquire a sustainable character as soon as the crisis passes. That means a fast recovery and restructuring to have a better response to future threats (Wysokinska-Senkus, 2020). The importance of security education is frequently highlighted by private actors as well as it is an exhaustive term targeting economic, social, and political threats and vulnerabilities alike.

Although separate concepts, in the absence of security awareness, and education, security culture has no prospect of becoming a norm in the Romanian society, a fact which would only perpetuate the unsteady status quo which deepens the poor conducts of political and security affairs.

Conclusion

The first section of this article focused on a more sociological approach by analysing the causes and effects of low voter turnout not only in Romania but also worldwide. Both national and international actors suffer because of the low trust phenomena as no process of governance is legitimate without the support of the population. Domestic

protests and dissatisfaction with the political class in times of crisis damage any initiatives of crisis and security risk management.

The second section continued the argument constructed in the beginning but addressed it alongside the Covid-19 pandemic. The global crisis proved that the current approach the Romanian state has adopted so far is neither ideal nor desirable. Low voter turnout and voter fatigue and depression are factors that weaken the democratic character of the state. The application of the *National Defence Strategy 2020-2024*, the construction of a resilient and sustainable society by fully exploiting the *National Resilience Mechanism* made available by the European Union and the safety and well-being of the population demand a strong security culture, especially in times of crisis due to its gap-closing effect and the security risk management potential it has.

The third section elaborates on the need for security culture as the mechanism of overcoming the economic, social, and political crisis embodied by the global pandemic, while the last part expanded on the two pre-required steps for achieving security culture: awareness and education.

The global discourse is seized by low levels of trust, suspicion, and fury, a behaviour most dangerous for any democracy. Through its special status, Romania needs to focus its efforts on obtaining a security culture to overcome certain vices and gain long-awaited stability. Security culture enables the process of governance to function at its full capacity hence national and human security would be safe even in times of uncertainty.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

BIG DATA AND ITS SECRETS: TYPES OF BIG DATA*

Alexandra ANGHEL*

Elena NOVĂCESCU*

Mădălina CUC*

Abstract:

The technological boom that characterized the last decades changes the rules in all societal domains, generating large volumes of data to be both processed and stored. The industry of communications developed new innovative communication channels and instruments (such as social media platforms and online applications that allow people to communicate across borders) that even though facilitated the communication process as a whole, generated several challenges for both network/platform administrators and cyber security agencies (the online environment becoming a new battlefield of the next generation wars, where data are the main weapons). In this context, one can conclude that mastering the art of managing large volumes of data it is a vital asset in understanding the architecture of the digital society – a reality of the 21st century. Therefore, the article aims to define, based on a process of literature review, the main characteristics of Big Data, a concept used to define the large quantity of data produced by any society nowadays. It will present the evolution of the data concept from small data to big data, the main types of big data and a common analysis framework for Big Data, all

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* Junior researcher, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy THESEUS Project member. Email address: anghel.alexandra@animv.eu

* Junior researcher, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, THESEUS Project member. Email address: elena.novacescu@animv.eu

* Lecturer, PhD, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, THESEUS project member. Email address: cuc.madalina@animv.eu

in order to provide a better understanding of the Big Data concept and its application in current societies.

Keywords: *data, Big Data, analysis framework, small data, structured and unstructured data.*

Introduction

Given the emergence of new communication technologies and channels, such as social networks and platforms, mobile computing and online services, the data generated do not possess anymore a standard format or structure, and requires new specific models and instruments in order to be processed. Data now take different forms – from traditional text, images, videos to XML, weblogs, json, posts and so on – resulting in an increased number of new data types (Eberendu, 2016, p. 46), challenging the traditional analysis and process models and patterns.

As a consequence, the concept of Big Data became a common, extensively used term in the last years, with applicability in all vital domains of a society. However, in order to be able to analyse the relevance of Big Data or Small Data in an ecosystem based on the analysis of Big Data with Artificial Intelligence elements, we must start from the definition of the concept of “data”.

In general, data are the representation of a phenomenon/event that occurs in reality in the form of information. The process of data production is based on the production of an event or phenomenon in the real world, is focused on information and uses the representation of the phenomenon modelled by the observer in various forms that define the notion of data. The need for representation arose from the need to make better decisions in the real environment where the impact of external and internal factors was decisive in the evolution of human society in its infancy (Bokulich & Parker, 2021).

In this context, this article aims to present the evolution of the Big Data concept, analysing the path from data to information, and then to digital data/information throughout an extensive literature review process. In addition, this paper will also focus on defining the different types of data that are characteristic for the Big Data domain, as well as identifying the key variables to be considered when analysing them.

Data versus information

Today, any organization, of any size, can have access to scalability, transparency, security compliance and reliability for computing and data systems, that in the past were accessible only to the largest companies. Starting with the industrial revolution, the business domain understood that technology can become a leverage when efficiently implemented and exploited so as to maximize the impact on the companies and their customers. Today, the success of businesses is defined by their speed in serving any customer, therefore it is essential to implement within their companies and equip their employees with state-of-the-art technology to ensure a better collaboration, a smarter communication channel, an efficient customer relations service, prolific human resources and so on (Cloud Backup Techniques & Tips, 2015). All these essential services made with the help of computing are “modern computing bulbs” and Big Data are the power plants that will start the “bulbs of tomorrow” (Johnson & Gueutal, 2011).

As we have already mentioned, data are **the representation in the form of information of a phenomenon that occurs in reality**. In comparison, the concept of information refers to a representation of reality, and at the same time to the result of the processes of reflection and projection, aspect that usually applies only for human intellect – throughout the medium of a structured set of symbols – not difficult to access by human senses and reason, but, in some situations also accessible for some devices, such as automatic calculation (computers). Information cannot be considered, therefore, neither as a specific content, nor as an agent, instruction, property, method or process, but information can rather be categorized as an independent category, characterized by an abstract and subtle immaterial existence, a category that is considered vital in the process of knowledge (Cimil & Plotnic, 2021). In this case, the information is the reflection after observing the phenomena in the real world around (Madden, 2000).

Therefore, when trying to differentiate between data and information, one should follow the following flow (as also described in the figure below):

1. Production of the phenomenon in the real world (followed by one or more observers);

2. Reflection (modelling) of the phenomenon in their consciousness (production of information; more observers, more representations, resulting in different types of information associated with each observer);
3. Symbolic representation of the record in the consciousness of each observer (production of the data associated with each observer) (Marchetti, 2018).

It is obvious that there can be several modelling models of the same phenomenon in the real world with several modes of representations generated by the existence of several observers with the consequence of generating more data types that will be the modelled representation of the same real phenomenon viewed from several perspectives (Marchetti, 2018).




Figure 1: Genesis of the concept of data
(developed by the authors based on the conclusions of Marchetti, 2018)

The complexity of the relationship reality – information – data increases when the data are constituted in collections that must have material support. Thus, the event of storing data on material support becomes a reality, therefore information will now be generated about how to store previous information and these are called metainformation. Representing this as data defines metadata. Obviously, there can be several perspectives on the representation of metainformation, therefore metadata can be information about the location of data on the storage medium, and how it can be retrieved, how it can be updated or deleted (Sivarajah, Kamal, Irani, & Weerakkody, 2017).

After the appearance of writing and language, as well as the evolution of the medium on which the data were recorded, a biunivocal correspondence was found between the evolution of data and

information and the consumption of data support, respectively the storage capacity of these supports (stones, stone tablets, papyri, books, magnetic tapes, HDD etc.). The transition from information to data has been made since the beginning of their appearance, being transmitted along with data representing numbers (dimensions, days, months, years) and their reference and dependence (metadata) with reference to calendars, crop recipes agricultural, reserve management of ancient communities (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2007).

To resume, the concept of information can be defined in several ways, but whatever the meaning of the term, information will have a semantic character, contributing to the amount of knowledge of the recipient. Information always refers to objects, people, processes, phenomena, places, situations, conditions etc., so it has a very varied nature (economic, statistical, technical, scientific, administrative etc.). In contrast, data are the materialization, symbolic representation of information (through signs, letters, numbers, words etc.) in a conventional form (written, spoken, bright, graphic signs, drawings etc.), convenient for communication. Data have a (semantic) interpretation and is processed by humans directly through automated means.

Data are primary aspects of the surrounding reality, which are perceived through receivers, in various forms. For example, the data collected in a meteorological station come from various sources: measurements of atmospheric factors (temperature, humidity, atmospheric pressure) performed with specific instruments by the station staff, data collected by meteorological probes and satellites, etc. These data represent “raw material”, unprocessed, without meaning and without obvious utility.

Types of data

In terms of types of data, the International standard ISO/IEC 11404: 2007 (E) presents three notions of types of data (International Organization for Standardization, 2007):

- the conceptual or abstract notion of a type of data, defined by its nominal values and properties;

- the structural notion of a type of data, characterized by the conceptual organization of the components and functionalities specific to some data types; and
- the notion of implementing a type of data, which identifies the type of data by defining the rules for representing the data type in a predefined environment.

This international standard includes an inventory of all data types, as well as a partial terminology for the different notions of implementation of data types, showing the use of this terminology in the definition process of data types, identifying thus common terms of implementation associated with data types and distinguishing them from conceptual notions. From the point of view of the physical representation of data in a computing system, at the processor level, a data is associated with one or more locations intended to store its current value and any information on its structure. Therefore, the list below comprises the main types of data that shape reality and are used in the Big Data ecosystem (International Organization for Standardization, 2007):

- Alphanumeric data – non-numeric data with values representing alphanumeric characters or strings. At the computer level, a character is represented by the code associated with it. The operations that can be performed with alphanumeric data are compaction, concatenation, comparison etc.
- Arithmetic data – numeric data with integer or real values. Due to the limited ability to represent numbers in the computer and due to the binary form of representation, the values of the arithmetic data correspond to a subset of real numbers, the axiomatic of real numbers is no longer fully observed and the calculations are approximate. In the computer the values of the arithmetic data are represented in fixed point or floating point. In programming languages, an arithmetic data with a constant value is presented in the form of a series of numbers and symbols, which indicate the sign, comma, exponent, etc. with a language syntax function.

- Data complex (time complex) – if falling on whose values are complex numbers ($a + ib$, $i = \sqrt{-1}$). Every time the complex can be regarded as being made up of a structured imaginary part and the real one. There are programming languages that allow the direct performance of arithmetic operations with complex data.

Another classification model of data defines three main categories of data, as follows:

1. Structured data

Structured data is the type of data that is comprised by any database, defined as a collection of data that shapes a universe. This universe consists of several interacting objects, objects of the same type constituting an entity. An entity is an element of the real world. In addition, a model is an abstraction of a real-world system or process, a mathematical, formal description of the system. The model consists of a set of notations and terminology necessary to express ideas about the system or process described. The model is used either to study an existing system or to build a new system and it is obtained through a modelling process. If the purpose of the model is to study the modelled system, one can say that he/she performs an analysis process. The analysis process consists in studying the real-world system, identifying the representative features and retaining those characteristics relevant to the final goal. The rest of the features are ignored, only the relevant ones are included in the model (Castagna, 2021).

Structured data is, to summarize, data that adheres to a predefined data model where each record is constantly structured being efficiently described in a relational model. Structured data is easy to analyse because each data entry is conceptualized in a tabular format (as rows in a table), with each data item introduced in a singular cell (which form the columns and rows of a table). The most known examples of structured data are Excel files or SQL databases, built on a tabular format sortable rows and columns (Rambsy & Ossom-Williamson, 2021).

The collection of structured data can take the form of a dataset (records), multiple dataset (set of data organized according to certain criteria), data warehouse (a collection of multiple datasets between

which a series of links have been established that lead to a certain way of identifying and selecting the components) or metadata (the data about the previous data). The collection of data structured in the form of metadata is called “schema on write” and it assumes that the data (article values) are collected in the “schema” or structure developed before collection (Pickell, 2018).

2. Unstructured data

Unstructured data can be defined as information that does not follow a predefined data model or is not organized in a predefined way. The term unstructured data may seem to imply a complete randomization of the data collection without having an inherent form (Enterprise Big Data Framework, 2019). In fact, unstructured data incorporates a type of structure to a certain extent, in three ways:

- implicit but formally undefined structure;
- their structure is not useful for the targeted process;
- structure, called “semi-structured or even structured, but in unexpected or unforeseen ways” (Fritzner, 2017).

Unstructured information is usually text from web pages, but may also contain data such as general data, numbers, or events where the use of classic DBMS is no longer applicable (IBM Cloud Education, 2021). The Big Data analysis focused on extracting valuable information from unstructured data or from relationships between them but also on different methods that can more efficiently manage these types of data sets. Most eloquent examples of unstructured data include audio, video, or No-SQL databases (Rambsy & Ossom-Williamson, 2021).

For unstructured data, data collection is often followed by raw data storage. Unstructured data storage is done in “data lakes”, which is an efficient way to store “all data” of an organization for further processing. The analyst will be able to focus on finding meaningful patterns in the data and not on the data itself. Unlike a hierarchical database in which data is stored in files and folders, Data Lake has a flat architecture. Each data element in a Data Lake receives a unique identifier and is labelled with a set of information stored in metadata. The data preparation processes then appear after storage and are managed by specific applications. This technique of storing raw data first and applying

a schema after interacting with the data is commonly referred to as a “read schema”, as shown in the figure below (Pickell, 2018).




Figure 2: Structured vs. unstructured data (Pickell, 2018)

3. Semi-structured data

Semi-Structured Data is a “form of structured data that does not conform to the formal structure of data models associated with relational databases or other forms of data tables” (Kraus & Drass, 2020, p. 250-251), but still contains tags or other markers to separate semantic elements and to allow the hierarchy of records and fields in the data, known as the self-description structure. Semi-structured data are

composed of XML¹, JSON² or CSV³ formats (Enterprise Big Data Framework, 2019).

Big data versus small data

With the emergence of the consumer society, companies and complex organizations appeared their information system, based on the analysis and interpretation of data and information from the internal and external environment. Initially these data were analogue (written tables, registers, nomenclatures, regulations, procedures for their use), and then with the advent of the first computers in the 1950s, the data appeared in digital format.

The first digital data was produced in 1937 at the International Telephone and Telegraph Co. in France by Alec H. Reeves (patent 1938) making possible the digital encryption of analogue voice transmission. The principle is used by Bell Labs (SIGSALY encryption) during WW2 in Winston Churchill's conversations with Franklin Roosevelt.

In comparison, the first digital storage medium was produced in 1939 by John V. Atanasoff and Clifford Berry, the first electronic computer with a drum storage device that used capacitors on its surface. The Atanasoff-Berry (ABC) computer had two drums to store 30 numbers on each drum, each number stored in 50 bits. As storage size on a current 16 GB USB flash fits the information of 85.3 million on such drums. In May 1955, IBM announced the first commercial magnetic disk (HDD), called RAMAC with a capacity of 5 million bytes⁴ on 50 aluminium discs, each with a diameter of 61 cm, covered on both sides with magnetic iron oxide that weighed a ton. An ordinary 16 GB USB flash contained as

¹ XML (eXtensible Markup Language) XML is a model for storing unstructured and semi-structured data in native XML databases.

² JavaScript Object Notation or JSON is a format for representing and exchanging data between computer applications. It is a text format, intelligible to humans, used to represent objects and other data structures and is mainly used to transmit structured data over the network, the process being called serialization. It is used in GIS databases.

³ Comma-separated values or CSV is the data format transmitted by most sensors and IoTs and lists comma-separated values.

⁴ Virtual Storage: 1Byte = 8bits, 1Kbyte (KB) = 1024bytes, 1MB = 1024KB, 1GB = 1024MB, 1TB = 1024GB, 1PB = 1024TB.

much information as 3200 such disks (weighing 3200 tons means 80 train cars loaded with 40t each or 4 trains with 20 cars each).

The Digital Revolution marked the beginning of the information age (Tucci, 2014). At the heart of this revolution is the mass production and widespread use of digital logic, transistors, integrated circuits and their derivative technologies, such as computers, microprocessors, digital cell phones and last but not least, the Internet (Dejani, 2014). These technological innovations have transformed traditional production and business techniques (Bojanova, 2014).




Figure 3: Evolution over time of digital data volume
(Reinsel, Gantz, & Rydning, 2018, p. 13)

The latest definitions (2021) of the concept of “Big Data presents the term as the field of knowledge that explores techniques, skills and technology to deduce valuable information from massive amounts of data. Big Data is considered information asset defined by a high level of volume, variety and velocity that require specific technological means and analytical methods to identify its value” (De Mauro, Greco, & Grimaldi, 2016). All in all, one can say that the concept of big data refers to massive data sets characterized by a varied and complex structure, which generate difficulties for companies and organizations in terms of storage, analysis and visualization (Sagiroglu & Sinanc, 2013, p. 42).

As far as small data is concerned, there are two approaches to this concept: (1) the first one refers not to the small size of the data (as the name would suggest), but to the inability of analysts to correctly assess the results if the data are too large and complex and there are not enough correlations leading to the intended purpose. Small data here defines the limits of the maximum size of data sets that analysts can directly evaluate and understand, beyond which the correctness of results and convergence towards the proposed goal can no longer be ensured (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2015); (2) the second approach defines Small Data as data that is “small” enough for human understanding, available in a format and volume that makes them accessible, informative and actionable (Sathyabama Institute of Science and Technology). Another definition enshrines Small DATA as small data sets capable enough to influence decisions today by allowing concrete action. In contrast to Big Data, the speed of ingestion of small data that reaches processing is constant and controlled, and the data flow is relatively slow, increasing both accessibility and processing speed. Usually Small Data is structured and located in the Data Base Management Systems (DBMS) and is easy to view (GeeksforGeeks, 2021).

Both types of data are relevant and vital for the processes of analysis and decision making, but in order to evaluate efficiently the efforts needed for the corroboration, correlation and analysis of different data sets it is important to acknowledge the difference between big data and small data. Therefore, there are a series of features that allow the differentiation between these two types of data, as follows (GeeksforGeeks, 2021):

Feature	Small Data	Big Data
Technology	Based on traditional technology	Based on modern technology
Collection	Generally, collection is conducted in an organized format, all the obtained data being inserted into a database	Comparatively, the collection of big data is conducted through pipelines that use queues such as AWS Kinesis or Google Pub/Sub in order to balance high-speed data
Volume	Comprises data contained between tens or hundreds of Gigabytes	The volume of this type of data registers more than Terabytes
Analysis Areas	Data marts (for analysts)	Clusters (for data scientists) and data marts (for analysts)
Quality	Given the fact that data is less collected in a controlled format, small data contains less noise	In general, the quality of data cannot be guaranteed
Processing	For processing small data it requires batch-oriented processing pipelines	For processing big data, it can be used both stream and batch processing pipelines
Database	Format: SQL	Format: NoSQL
Velocity	Data aggregation is slow, determining a regulated, constant flow of data	Data is produced at extremely high speeds, determining large volumes of data aggregation in short time intervals
Structure	Small data is structured in a tabular format, following a fixed schema (relational structure)	Big data consists of a variety of data sets, including tabular data, text, media files (audio, images, video), logs, JSON etc. (non relational structure)
Scalability	Small data are, in general, vertically scaled	Big data are mostly horizontally scaled, generating more versatility at a lower cost
Query Language	only SQL	Python, R, Java, SQL
Hardware	One single server	Requires more than one server

Feature	Small Data	Big Data
Value	Analysis and reporting, Business Intelligence	Complex data mining techniques and methods for pattern finding, recommendation, prediction and so on
Optimization	Manually optimization of data (human powered)	Data optimization based on machine learning techniques
Storage	Small data requires storage systems within different companies/enterprises, local servers etc.	Usually, big data requires distributed storage systems available on cloud or uses external file systems
People	Categories: data analyst, database administrator and data engineer	Categories: data analyst, data scientist, database administrator and data engineer
Security	Security protocols for small data include, but is not limited to: user privileges, data encryption, hashing etc.	Securing protocols for big data systems are complex and include, without being limited to: data encryption, strong access control protocols, cluster network isolation etc.
Nomenclature	Database, data mart, data warehouse	Data Lake
Infrastructure	Preponderantly vertically scalable hardware and predictable resource allocation	More agile infrastructure with horizontally scalable hardware

Table 1. Big data vs. small data (GeeksforGeeks, 2021)

Having these aspects in mind, one can say that even though the concept of big data known an unprecedented exposure and growth, small data will remain a vital part of the research landscape in the near future. There is not expected a paradigm shift in which studies using small data will replace those employing big data, but small and big data will work together in a complementary manner (Sawyer, 2008).

Big Data and the 10Vs

Most definitions of the concept of big data highlights the size of data in storage, which is an important aspect, but there are also other valuable features specific for big data, such as velocity and variety. Thus, for a better understanding, the term of big data can be analysed through the lenses of the three Vs (volume, variety, and velocity), lenses that can also help building a comprehensive definition, busting the myth that big data refers only to the volume of data (Russom, 2011, p. 6):

- **Volume:** this variable is considered to be the primarily attribute of Big Data, referring to the size of the data sets to be analysed and processed, which are larger than petabytes and exabytes. The large volume of data requires processing technologies that are distinct and different from traditional storage and processing capabilities. In other words, this means that Big Data datasets are too large to be processed with a regular laptop or desktop processor (Russom, 2011, p. 6-7);
- **Velocity:** speed is a measure of the rate of data flow. Traditionally, high-speed data transfer systems have been described as streaming data. The collection of big data in real time is not a process specific for current times, as many companies have been collecting and corroborating clickstream data from Web sites for years, using streaming data in order to adapt their advertising strategies to the expectations and different profiles of Web visitors (Russom, 2011, p. 7-8);
- **Variety:** this variable refers to data from multiple repositories, domains, or types. The variety of data in several domains was addressed by identifying features that would allow the alignment of data sets and their merging into a data warehouse. Although volume and speed allow for faster and more cost-effective analysis, the variety of data allows analytical results that have never been possible before. The Big Data variety consists of storing and correlating data of various types: text, numerical data, time series, video, audio, images, tabular data (databases), hierarchical data,

documents, XMLs, e-mails, blogs, instant messages, click streams, as well as all the different log files produced by any system with an embedded computer (Trnka, 2014, p. 144).

In addition to these three V's there are also other seven variables that can be considered when analysing big data, developing an extended V's framework, as follows:

- **Value:** data value refers to data usefulness in decision making and is one of the most significant factors in Big Data, because it has direct impact on business profits. Data value refers to data usefulness in decision making and is one of the most significant factors in Big Data, because it has direct impact on business profits (Khan, et al., 2018, p. 54);
- **Veracity:** this attribute focuses on the quality and accuracy of data and defines how data can be trusted when important decision needs to be made regarding the collected data. In the context of increasing the volume, speed and variety of data, the veracity (confidence in data) decreases. Accuracy is the characteristic that shows the degree of trust or distrust of the data in the need to store and process the real data, considering deviations as well as the information noise in the stored data (Khan, et al., 2018, p. 54);
- **Visualization:** visualization is an important step in any scientific data application to allow human understanding of data, analysis or results. Present data visualization tools face technical challenges as a consequence of the limitations specific to the current technological developments in terms of memory and reduced scalability, functionality and response time. It is true to say that for traversing a billion data points one cannot rely only on traditional graphs, needing various supplementary ways of representing data, such as data clustering, or tree maps, parallel coordinates, pie charts, cones etc. (Ashfaq Aatqb, 2020, p. 10);
- **Variability:** this variable refers to inconsistent data flow (in terms of data set, and not in the data format/structure and/or volume that affects its processing) and can be shown at times.

Variability in data volumes implies the need to expand or reduce virtualized resources to efficiently manage the additional processing task, one of the advantageous capabilities of cloud computing (Katal, Wazid, & Goudar, 2013);

- **Volatility:** refers to the life duration - for how long-time data is valid and for how long time it should be stored. Volatility answers the question: How old must the data be in order to be considered irrelevant, historical or useless? For how long should the data be stored? Before the apparition of the concept of Big Data, organizations have tended to store data indefinitely, but in the Big Data ecosystem these policies are no longer applicable (Firican, 2017);
- **Viability:** it refers to the capacity of Big Data to be live and active forever, and able for developing, and to produce more data when need. In simple words, viability focuses on identifying those features, as well as the relationship between them, which allow Big Data to remain available and further develop in order to extend its relevance and applicability (Khan, et al., 2018, p. 55);
- **Validity:** although the collected data may have a high degree of veracity (the exact representation of the real-world processes that created them), there are times when the data are no longer valid for the required hypothesis. Similar to veracity, validity also refers to the level of accuracy and correctness of the data in connection with the desired outcome. According to Forbes, an estimated 60% of data researchers spend time cleaning up data before they can do any analysis (Firican, 2017).

Conclusions

Big data represents a matrix of data sets which is constantly growing in volume as a consequence of the technological boom that created new means of communication – as factors continuously generating data and information. There is no common definition unanimously accepted for the concept of Big Data, but one can consider

that this term refers both to the techniques, instruments and methods used to collect and process the multitude of data produced worldwide, as well as to data sets that score high levels of volume, variety and velocity.

Even though the big data technological spectrum created various opportunities in terms of collection and analysis processes, it also brought new challenges and issues for analysts and system administrators, who were forced to adapt their mechanisms and methods to the realities of the 21st century. As a consequence, in order to facilitate the transition from traditional data analysis processes to digital and Big Data ones, researchers and scientists developed a general framework for defining big data, based on ten main features characterizing this type of data: among volume, variety and velocity, the framework also identifies value, veracity, visualization, variability, volatility, viability and validity as key components of the big data ecosystem.

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WIKI, BLOG AND TRANSVERSAL ANALYST – INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS, FROM PAPER TO BLOG*

Ion Lucian PETRAȘ*

Motto: “Intellipedia is Wikipedia on a classified network, with one very important difference: it’s not anonymous. We want people to establish a reputation. If you’re very good, we want people to know you’re good. If you make contributions, we want “If you’re an idiot, we want to know.”

Thomas Finger, former Deputy Director
of the National Intelligence Service

Abstract:

Adapting to the information age, providing #liveintelligence to costumers, PC-mediated interaction and collaborative platforms for collecting, storing, labelling, analysing and capitalizing on national security information are major changes, difficult to implement when resistance to change is very high. The change is so profound that some perceive it as an affront to their education (because their parents did not (mis)educate them). In reality, the new technologies are user friendly, they have a lot of technology based on intuition, meaning you know what to do if you know how the product of your own creation should turn out. Moreover, the introduction of modern concepts of communication and public relations such as the blog and wiki platforms, software dedicated to data analysis, can bring an unsuspected benefit, which we present below.

Keywords: *Intellipedia, blog, wiki, A Space, transversal intelligence analyst.*

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* Colonel (r) Ion Lucian Petraș. Email address: ionlucianpetras@gmail.com.

Introduction

The paradigm shift in intelligence (Intel) is now obvious, represented by the switch to the web 2.0, made up of users and online communities, that we can simply call – communicators. We see nowadays how the virtual environment changes behaviours, from the simplest ones (shopping behaviours) to complex social constructions (the Arab spring); we witness nowadays a dramatic change in the communication theory, induced by the fact that the masses communicate, or, in other words, the public, the traditional target of communication, has become the biggest communicator. In the security field, and especially in intelligence analysis, one cannot avoid these changes.

In recent years, intelligence communities have been searching for solutions to the intelligence analysis systemic problems, from its being defined as art or science to methodological elements, respectively the identification of structured analysis instruments. At the same time, initial steps have been taken to the studying of social networks, wiki and blogging, collaborative platforms, from the perspective of adopting these new technologies and studying their effects on the intelligence analysis.

The collaborative paradigm and the implementation of platforms in intelligence

An unanimously accepted and supported point of view, even imposed in some information communities, is the need to implement the new communication and data processing technologies. The change is a major one, only thinking of the implications in the field of information protection, but things have been transferred when the need to share was proclaimed.



Figure 1: The collaborative paradigm (Source: by Ion Lucian Petraş)

Sharing information is not enough; collaboration and moving to need to collaborate are necessary. What does this new challenge mean? It is the adoption of the collaborative way of working through the implementation of dedicated IT systems that are similar to those used by the wider public on the internet, but adapted to the needs of the intelligence services and transposed to the internal networks (Intranet), secured and classified. The truth is that, traditionally, intelligence analysis is not an activity carried out by a single person; more often than not, there are teams of analysts, which involve a high degree of adaptability to the collaborative model and an easier implementation of the new technologies, these being meant to create only the virtual space that allows and supports the collaborative analytic process.

This discipline of collaborative or collective intelligence is based on the new paradigm of “need to share” and it ensures the passage from the expertise of one individual towards a group of specialists; ideally, this chain should continue to extend beyond the information community, following the principle of outsourcing.

The collaborative platform can be imagined as a virtual space (room) (Wheaton, 2008) which has the advantage that it exceeds the limits of geographical space; an analyst’s office where one can enter anytime and from anywhere, where the guests are interested in certain topics, are familiarised with them and share common values and principles; the common “wall” where they can expose their new ideas, which provoke discussions. These assets have led to the use of the collaborative soft especially in the academia, but also in intelligence analysis.

Another very important characteristic of these platforms is that they stimulate debate and facilitate interaction in real time, bringing together specialists that otherwise cannot be reunited without high costs and by extracting them from their routine activities.

The information communities do not need Wikipedia, but they need similar technologies to:

√ offer the possibility for analysts to express their beliefs and reasoning independently (blog type);

✓ ensure extended relation possibilities at the community level in convergence projects (collaborative platform type intra or inter agencies), including the intelligence customers;

✓ facilitate notification and warning systems (SMS, RSS, subscription and so on);

✓ allow analysts to assume failure and success (sharing lessons learned) and to develop a reputation.

The best-known example of a collaborative platform is the online Wikipedia. In intelligence, the information community in the USA, under the coordination of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, initiated and subjected to public debate, even in the research field, its projects for implementing the new technologies in the intelligence analysis field, these types of software being experienced as far back as 2006. The US intelligence community benefits at present from an entire system that facilitates the sharing of information and cooperation, respectively a collaborative platform suggestively named Intellipedia, a blogging project for analysts called A – Space and a national intelligence library called Library of National Intelligence (LNI); all these instruments were presented at the Symposium “Analytic Transformation – Moving Forward Together” ever since September 2007.

Starting from my practical experience I made an inventory with the advantages and disadvantages of using such online collaborative instruments in the intelligence analysis.

Advantages:

- ✓ Works as a knowledge market and it can raise the quality of the intelligence products by eliminating the vertical chains (*pipes*) and the Concentration on joint targets (target centric approach) (Clark, 2010);
- ✓ Live intelligence (early warning; immediate feedback; direct collaboration);
- ✓ It is adapted to the consumer’s needs;
- ✓ Facilitates team work and the implementation of structured analytical methods;
- ✓ Favours the use of softs dedicated to intelligence analysis;

- ✓ Ensures rapid integration of the intelligence products coming from different agencies;
- ✓ Organises the process, ensures traceability and raises the visibility of the analytical act;
- ✓ Offers direct interaction between the levels of the intelligence cycle: operational, analytical – project manager – costumer;
- ✓ Provides organizational filters.

Disadvantages:

- ✓ A too direct involvement of the consumers in the analytical process;
- ✓ Raises the risk of consumers choosing only the information convenient to them (the online option allows the client to choose what he wants to know);
- ✓ The appearance of some consumer-type effects – they will produce only what the market searches for (demand – offer type functioning) which can lead to neglecting some threats and risks (rejecting some topics while also focusing the interest on appreciated topics);
- ✓ False alerts could spread rapidly which could dramatically reduce receptivity to alerts and erode trust within the analytical community;
- ✓ The use of equipment in other spaces than the secured ones can allow access to some unauthorized people to sensitive information;
- ✓ Information security risks can arise and info can be exposed to cyber-attacks and also to negligence in use (exploitation or transfer to systems other than the secured ones).

Why does the intelligence analyst want a blog and how could his activity be improved?

The truth is that people are not machines, they are not identical, no matter how much we want to identify the analyst's psychological

profile and to select analysts according to these traits favourable to analysis. In my opinion, since there is no perfect analysis, there is no perfect analyst. On the other hand, machines alone cannot make high-quality analyses without being managed by people. In other words, both analysts and intelligence consumers filter information through their own system of values, their own misconceptions and stereotypes that can influence the way in which each of them perceives reality. Therefore, what we can do is to know the analyst's limitations and those of the intelligence analysis and to encourage diversity in our way of thinking. Academia must find itself in the intelligence analysis too; diversity is one of the engines of knowledge, the collaborative model being recommended to fulfil these tasks.

As it comes up from the chosen topic itself, I advocate for blogging in intelligence because the analyst's blog can become the expression of a different way of producing intelligence, offering the possibility to the expert in analysis to express different points of view (original perspectives, interpretations, alternative scenarios, predictions, intuitive constructs) which are exposed for debate to an informed public. The blog can bring new ways to reflect upon security issues and it can become an environment where analysts launch/test ideas and theories, rapidly eliminate invalid hypotheses and identify innovative solutions to the problems they need to deal with.

The blog will also be a useful instrument for the transfer of expertise at the level of a large analytical community, and also a way to reduce the response time to events (through immediate reaction). Moreover, it could also be a way to raise the level of awareness when it comes to the threats and risks we confront with, facilitating debates between experts of different levels and training, raising the level of diversity when it comes to tackling issues of interest. Ever since 2004, Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton proposed using blogs as a platform for intelligence production, claiming that they can be beneficial for debating unfinished products, stimulating the virtual dialogue where both intuitive elements and more formal arguments can be posted so that they can be disputed among those with alternative opinions. Furthermore, US researchers advance the idea of rethinking the concept

of intelligence product proposing the adoption of interactive forms, more consumer friendly, among which is the use of blogs; they offer the consumer the opportunity to enter public debates with the analytical community and to post their own questions.

The intelligence analyst's blog – main characteristics:

Style – the approach of a personal style is typical for the idea of a blog, but it does not have to ignore professional ethics; it also has to allow for presenting different facets of reality perception and an expression which is free of organisational constraints (hierarchy or status), also the forming of a profile, like a brand (as an effect of the gained experience). This method of communication favours introspection and debate because it has two dialogue dimensions, one to self (the diary model) and one with others, where we mainly search for recognition and validation. The former dimension helps us show what we think and how we analytically interpret a certain topic, while the latter dimension allows and encourages the confrontation of ideas and their fertilization.

Originality and creativity: these are two of the characteristics that made blogging be appreciated. Originality makes the difference between the users of this type of communication and the classical ways of mass media, and consumers search for such a product. In what concerns strategic analysis, creative approaches are valued the highest, being useful in the construction of the possible future, the production of predictions and the making of scenarios, respectively eliminating the so-called blind spots. One of the principles of ethics to which the intelligence analyst relates is creativity, together with the innovative spirit and also originality (Răduțu, 2011, p. 45).

Effervescence: if you aroused the interest of the community, the comments will come immediately, they will certify the fact that the chosen topic is of interest and the exchange of ideas can only be beneficial, the session of discussion is saved in time and everybody else can see what was said. The advantages of such an approach are the significant number of ideas, opinions, recommendations, that can be collected in a very short period of time, and the fact that each participant can present his arguments and get an instant feedback. The article can be

modified on the spot, conclusions can be inserted after talks between analysts, leading to consensus or, on the contrary, different point of views be maintained and highlighted. In the online media I have found initiatives of this type, in which press agencies or prestigious publications (*Hotnews*, in Romania, *New York Times* in the USA) invite several personalities of the political or cultural world for sessions of online discussions that are later synthesized in an article. There are also high representatives of the business world or the academia that used to take part in such online chats to interact directly with the public who is interested in the topics on the agenda. I think that such direct interactions with the intelligence consumers are beneficial for both parties, especially because the new generation of decision makers is used to working like this (many political leaders are actively present on social networks and on blogs, they come from a generation that is used to the content generated by the users, they are familiar with the new technologies and use them on a regular basis). Thus, I do not see why the intelligence community could not initiate such discussion sessions following the principle of Q&A (Questions and Answers).

Time: even though at first sight managing a blog could seem a waste of time for analysts, especially if we consider the time constraints they are confronted with, online relations as a whole reduce the reaction time of the community to events and remove a series of redundancies. Moreover, talking about an issue with a team of analysts who are part of a joint project could mean dozens of phone calls, e-mails and videoconferences, while online collaboration has the advantage that it does not require travel costs, it is done on the spot and without long interruptions in the current activities.

Process transparency: the collaborative model allows the identification of all modifications and interventions on an article, from views to different production stages. Retroactive analysis allows the identification and correction of errors because this system ensures viewing the evolution of the article from the first save to the last chosen alternative. The production process of an article can be audited based on the principle how it's made? in each stage of the editing process, until the moment of its dissemination to the authorized ones. This facility raises

the capacity of monitoring the production during its entire intelligence cycle, and even more, it allows the oversight committees to identify possible dysfunctions.

Being up to date: electronic products can generally be more easily updated to be at the same pace with the evolution in this field. The article can be permanently updated with the data flux.

Any theory regarding the relationship between the intelligence services and the decision makers must focus on the intelligence consumer as the aim of intelligence is to offer analytical products that serve the state decision. How can the briefing of decision makers evolve in the online age when it is already advocating for the switch to superior versions of the web 2.0? Irrespective of the will of the intelligence communities, beneficiaries are now consumers of web-based products, the decision makers, even at the highest level, know and use social media including blogs, social networks and they are active participants in online debates, being forced by the technological evolutions to choose between being on-line or off-line. Intelligence consumers are familiar with obtaining information upon request in real-time and the intelligence services come to the information market of the modern Intelligence products with the classical paper-based info; don't you think something new would be welcomed?

Transversal analysts - with a type „T” professional configuration

The interaction between information services and the decision makers is approached from multiple perspectives, and it is normal to raise interest, both in the academia and in the political spectrum. Taking into consideration the fact that the mission of the Intelligence agencies is to provide analytical products that serve the decision in the state and the technology of Intelligence production is lately receiving special attention, this special interest is welcomed.

The decision process in the state is featured by the legislation but the mechanisms and gearing that determine a certain decision are, most of the time, known by a limited number of people. Few are those who have the privilege to work in both systems and thus possess the

advantage of understanding their inner workings; even fewer are those who shared their experiences, as consumer and producer, with the wider public.

National security as a mission is not only the task of the intelligence services, and lately, the need for defining the common mission is felt more acutely, based on a model of a network of experts who manage collaboratively the security issues. The costumers can obtain from the dedicated analytical departments more than processed information, they can get expertise which has at its basis years and years of activity in a certain field or area of interest, which means special training sessions, quality human resources, and, not least, material resources which the state puts at the decision makers' fingertips. The intelligence analyst, as the centre of the intelligence cycle, becomes more and more a component of the organisation with a „T” type professional configuration („T shaped skills/person”) I called it Transversal analyst.

As opposed to an analyst in a single field type I (I-shaped person) or a generalist “jack of all trades, master of none”, a “t-shaped” analyst is an expert in at least one field and somehow able to carry out many other and various activities.

In this format, the vertical line of the letter „T” represents the depth of the expertise in his field of responsibility and the horizontal line stands for the abilities and the capacity to collaborate with experts from other fields of work and to take over knowledge applicable to the Intelligence analysis.

Thus, the longer the horizontal line, i.e. the capacity for collaboration (and for obtaining expertise from different fields), the bigger the depth of knowledge and the abilities in their own domain. The more capable are the intelligence analysts to offer answers to the questions of the day, to make the switch from the old, „puzzle” and „connect the dots” type paradigm, to the new paradigm, the more it means getting out of patterns in order to identify asymmetric threats, with a low degree of predictability.




Figure 2: I-shaped vs generalist vs T-shaped

(Source: <https://jchyip.medium.com/why-t-shaped-people-e8706198e437> originally made by Jason YiP)

The need for interdisciplinarity in intelligence is only natural given the wide range of risks nations have to handle at present. It is also implicitly by the wide range of domains in which the analysts' expertise is needed. From the perspective of the high need for adapting to the new, as the innovative spirit has a special meaning in the field of analysis, interdisciplinarity is very important in developing intelligence products and in implementing the new methods and techniques we need. Intelligence analysis no longer provides pieces of intelligence, but offers integrated intelligence services, which means expertise, resources (human/financial) and products.

Transversal analysts are about adaptation and resilience in an ever-changing world, when there is no time to gather experts for all areas of interest in a short time; it is also a form of rapid adaptation to consumer demand. Intelligence production and analyst teams are receiving increasingly diverse requirements, each requiring a different set of capabilities, talents and abilities. T-shaped analysts also mean that we can do more with fewer people or do the same with fewer employees (although it may be more expensive to pay T-type analysts than generalist or ultra-specialized, type I analysts).

Transversal analysts can discuss more effectively by learning the skills of others (share know how, not only Intel); moreover, speaking a common language to all of them, analysts can communicate much more effectively which helps consumers and managers to understand the various perspectives.

The decision maker comes in a public position with an already formed informational background, most often outside the governmental system, and is not familiar with the previous activity of the institution he will lead, with its politics and strategies that were initiated in the early mandates by the predecessors, but the activities in the field of national security have continuity; they did not appear at the same time with his taking over the mandate and they will not end with it. On the other hand, the analyst has enough expertise to ensure both continuity and receptivity to new missions meant to protect national interests; the quality of the analytical expertise being, many times, more important than new Intel.

Conclusions

The transition to wiki and blogging will soon become a natural process; it will be as easy as the transition from paper-based media to electronic media, for the simple reason that the latter is more efficient, easier to use and live with. We have mentioned here the influences and effects of this change from multiple perspectives: the perspectives of analysts, consumers and that of production. We could say that the change is an important one and that it will generate essential changes for each of the dimensions analysed above. I consider that the benefits of using collaborative software will lead to major changes in the perception of Intelligence experts, but also in the decision-maker's relationship with them. These modern means provide a high degree of flexibility to Intelligence structures, being beneficial for rapid adaptation to unforeseen situations; another advantage is the visibility of the analytical process in all its intermediate stages; also facilitating democratic control, stimulating teamwork, facilitating the management of projects involving different people and institutions, no matter where they are, also increasing interoperability. However, it should not be ignored that these technologies substantially change the behaviour of different actors

interacting institutionally, introducing new, unknown elements that can negatively influence both the analytical and managerial process.

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HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

**A RARELY USED SOURCE FOR THE “PHONEY WAR”.
THE SECRET FRENCH DOCUMENTS FOUND BY GERMAN SOLDIERS
AT LA CHARITÉ-SUR-LOIRE ON JUNE 19TH, 1940**

Lars BAERENTZEN*

Abstract:

Germany justified the April 9, 1940, attack on Norway and Denmark by claiming that Great Britain and France were planning an intervention in Scandinavia. After the defeat of France, German soldiers found on June 19, 1940, by chance, in abandoned railroad cars in La Charité-sur-Loire, many French secret documents which Berlin saw as a confirmation of this claim. The German Foreign Ministry in 1941 published 70 of these documents in Denmark and in other occupied countries including France. These texts were used in press articles and in some official speeches. This paper describes the circumstances of the capture and argues that the documents are genuine and may, with caution, be used as historical evidence, although the 1941 publication was indeed propaganda. A small number of the documents are presented in some detail. The German publication has apparently not been used by Danish historians, but a few post-war historians in Great Britain, the USA, France and Germany have made use of the “captured French documents” and have discussed their historical value. This paper argues that they are important for understanding the course of the war in early 1940, the period known as “The Phoney War”.

Keywords: *1941 German propaganda, captured French documents, La Charité-sur-Loire, British and French 1940 plans, Scandinavia in World War II, The Phoney war.*

Introduction

When German troops occupied Denmark and attacked Norway on April 9, 1940, the German Government justified this action in a “Memorandum to the Danish and Norwegian Governments”. This document stated that England and France *are using all possible means in order to transfer the field of battle to the neutral continent inside and*

* Historian and a former intelligence practitioner for Danish Defence, independent consultant and lecturer. Email address: email: lars.eb@gmail.com.

outside Europe. (...) Quite openly, English and French statesmen have, in the course of recent months, proclaimed an extension of the war to these areas as the main strategic idea in their conduct of the war. The first opportunity to do so was the Russo-Finnish conflict¹.

Less than three months later, after the German victories in the Netherlands, Belgium and France and while the situation in France was still chaotic – and before the armistice was signed in Compiègne, German soldiers found, on June 19, 1940, by pure chance a large number of French diplomatic and military documents which had been left in a French railroad car abandoned in the station at La Charité-sur-Loire. *These documents were part of the archives dealing with “inter-allied affairs” at the headquarters of the French Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin.* Gamelin had been replaced as C-in-C by General Weygand a short time before. His headquarters’ archives were being evacuated, but this particular train, bound for Vichy, found the track blocked at La Charité.

A few days’ study of these captured documents convinced the German Government that they had struck gold: It was a discovery, they believed, of great value – not as “intelligence”, for the German victory over France had made the information value of the documents largely irrelevant – but it seemed to be priceless for propaganda purposes. This was because, in the view of the German leaders, these captured French documents provided precise confirmation that British and French strategy was exactly what the German Government had said it was in their justification for the attacks on Denmark and Norway and elsewhere.

Hitler mentioned the captured documents in his speech to the Reichstag on July 19, 1940, and he gave a detailed (and correct) description of the circumstances of how German soldiers had found them: “A German soldier found at the train station of La Charité on 19th of June 1940 a singular document as he was going through the railroad cars there. He delivered this document – which was marked in a special way – at once to his superior command post. From here this paper was sent on to higher authorities who now realized that they were about to

¹ The Germans made the same claim in leaflets scattered over Copenhagen on April 9, 1940.

discover some important intelligence. The railway station was now subjected to a careful investigation. And so, did the High Command of the Wehrmacht acquire a collection of documents of unique historical importance".²

The following day, the Danish newspaper Politiken, in its report on Hitler's speech, quoted his remark that "all the captured documents include hand-written comments by Gamelin, Daladier, Weygand etc., so these men may at any time confirm or deny them."

German war-time propaganda continued for years to publish articles dealing with these French documents. In 1941 the German Foreign Ministry, the Auswärtiges Amt, published a selection of 70 of the French documents. This book of 400 pages was published in several of the occupied countries, including Denmark.³ The book contained photographic reproductions (facsimiles) of high quality. These "original documents" were accompanied by complete and careful translations into the language of the occupied country (except of course in France where translations were not needed.) The propaganda publication was introduced by a short text in which the Foreign Ministry explained what the captured documents, in their view, "proved about English and French policy in the first year of the war".

This paper is written on the basis of the edition with translations into Danish. This book is relatively rare, but by no means impossible to find. My own copy is one I found by chance in an antiquarian bookseller in a small town in Denmark. Gradually I discovered that no Danish historian of the Second World War has used or even mentioned this book.

² In the original German: "Ein deutscher Soldat fand auf dem Bahnhof in La Charité am 19. Juni 1940 ein eigenartiges Dokument beim Durchstöbern der dortigen Waggons. Er lieferte dieses Dokument – da es eine besondere Bemerkung trug – seiner vorgesetzten Dienststelle sofort ab. Von dort ging dieses Papier an weitere Stellen, die sich nun klar wurden, hier auf der Spur einer wichtigen Aufklärung zu sein. Der Bahnhof wurde nun noch einmal einer gründlichen Untersuchung unterzogen. So kam in die Hand des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht eine Dokumentensammlung von einmaliger historischer Bedeutung. Adolf Hitler: Reichtagsrede 19. Juli 1940. (As found e.g. on <https://justice4germans.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/adolf-hitler-rede>).

³ Auswärtiges Amt 1939/41 Nr. 6. Hemmelige Dokumenter fra den franske Generalstab. Berlin (Foreign Ministry 1939/41 No.6. Secret Documents from the French General Staff. Berlin, 1941).

However, these French documents and the German publication have been discussed by a few important historians of the Second World War, but they don't appear to be widely known. The fact that the Auswärtiges Amt publication is obviously a work of propaganda naturally makes its use as an historical source a matter of particular difficulty. Nevertheless, these French documents do provide information – and contain some valuable perspectives – that deserve to be considered for the history of the first year of the war – **the so-called “Phoney War”**.

How the French documents were found by German soldiers and how they were returned to Paris in May 1945

It was by pure accident that these classified French documents fell into German hands.⁴ The sequence of events is quite well known, but all details need not be told here. In short form, here is what happened:

On about June 10, 1940, it became necessary in great hurry to evacuate the forward French military headquarters used by the Commander-in-Chief, General Gamelin, from its position in North-eastern France because the advancing German forces had come quite close. All equipment and all archival material were loaded on several Lorries or on railroad cars which were to be sent south to Vichy. One part of the archives which dealt with “inter-allied relations” was put on a train which, however, came no further than the town La Charité-sur-Loire where it was forced to halt because the bridge over the Loire had been blocked by bombing. While the train was standing there on a siding, it was attacked by a German patrol who forced the guards to surrender. The wagons were now left alone.

A German soldier from another patrol went into some of the wagons looking for petrol – and perhaps he was also looking for some red wine.⁵ He found three documents stamped “secret” or “très secret”.

⁴ Commandant Pierre Lyet: “Des documents secrets voyagent” (“Some secret documents travel”) *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, no.3, Septembre 1948. This short paper can be found as a PDF. It is an important source for the fate of the captured documents and is quoted hereafter as ‘Lyet’.

⁵ The description of these details is based on a paper by a journalist from Luxembourg, Henri Koch-Kent, who interviewed the German officer, Major Erwin Kaffke, who was responsible for the discovery. This article is introduced with these words: “Le

His chief realized that these documents must be sent to the HQ for the II German Army which was in the town of Clamecy about 60 km away.

A dispatch-rider on a motorcycle brought the documents to the HQ at about two-thirty in the morning and delivered the documents to the duty officer without any explanation. The duty officer alerted the officer in charge of intelligence, who realized that the documents came from the station area in La Charité. As this town was now German-occupied, a telephone call from the HQ ordered guards to be posted by the railroad cars.

At about three-thirty in the morning of June 19, a small group headed by Major Erwin Kaffke (who belonged to the Abwehr) set off with some colleagues from Clamecy for La Charité where they arrived at dawn.

The German soldiers patrolling the area knew nothing about secret documents in the railroad wagons. Major Kaffke and his group then began a systematic search. About one hour later a Captain by name

journaliste luxembourgeois Henri Koch-Kent, ami du Colonel Doudot, nous a fait parvenir un très intéressant article qu'il a pu rédiger récemment, sur la base d'informations recueillies auprès d'un ancien officier de l'Abwehr, à propos des Archives secrètes françaises tombées aux mains des Allemands en gare de La Charite-Sur-Loire en Juin 1940. Cette affaire, amplement exploitée à l'époque par la propagande allemande et les journaux collaborationnistes Français, a parfois été utilisée pour discréditer le 2ème Bureau et les Services Spéciaux. On a prétendu également que grâce aux documents récupérés, les Allemands ont pu identifier certains agents de nos Services, ce qui est inexact. Nous publions ci-dessous l'article de M. Koch-Kent en le remerciant de son obligeance. <http://aassdn.org/xldc10751.htm> ("Le Luxembourg journalist Henri Koch-Kent, a friend of Colonel Doudot, has transmitted to us a very interesting article which he has been able to put together recently, on the basis of information acquired from a former officer of the Abwehr. It concerns some secret French archives which fell into the hands of the Germans at the railway station Charite-Sur-Loire in June 1940. This affair which was widely exploited at the time by German propaganda and by the collaborationist French newspapers, has occasionally been used to discredit the 2ème Bureau and the Special Services. It has also been claimed that due to these captured documents, the Germans have been able to identify certain agents belonging to our Services, which is not correct. We publish below the article by Mr. Koch-Kent, while we thank him for his kindness.")

of Neinhaus (in civilian life he was the Mayor of Heidelberg)⁶ was the first to identify the spot where the first few secret documents had been found.

The secret files from the French General Staff were lying about together with a variety of other things, including bottles of wine, foodstuff, typewriters, teleprinters, telephones, cineprojectors, some secret films and various items of military uniforms.

Major Kaffke and his group brought all the documents back with them to their HQ. Here a group of translators made a preliminary survey. The next day all the documents were transported in two airplanes to the military headquarters in the West of Germany. Major Kaffke spent a week writing his report. News of the discovery was published by the Deutsche Presse Agentur on July 3, 1940. This text emphasized the great importance of the documents.

From now on the documents were stored in Berlin together with other captured documentary information until Allied bombing made the Germans move all this material to safety in Glogau; however, the Russian advance soon made them move it to the castle called Ebersdorf in Thüringen. Here it stayed until the end of the war.

Some French prisoners-of-war had noticed the documents from La Charité at Ebersdorf and seen that these papers were kept apart. On April 14, 1945, American troops reached Ebersdorf. The Americans were told about the special collection of French documents by the French prisoners. Five of the French prisoners were then charged by the Americans with the task of returning the documents to the archives of the French Foreign Office, the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. Here the documents arrived on May 8, 1945. (All five men were awarded with the Ministry's medal of honour). In Paris, officials at the Quai d'Orsay were able to verify that the documents returned from Ebersdorf were in fact the same as the documents which disappeared at La Charité, and that they were the originals of the documents which the Germans had published in facsimile in 1941.⁷

⁶ Carl Neinhaus was Mayor of Heidelberg in the years 1929-1945 and again 1952-1958. A portrait (which is not uncritical) may be found in the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung 9.9.2020.

⁷ This information about the "journey" of the documents after they were found at La Charité is based on Pierre Lyet's article where it is also stated that the documents and their five escorts reached Paris on May 8, 1945 with American help, and that the documents in the French Foreign Ministry (Quai d'Orsay) were compared with those which the Germans had published in facsimile in 1941. The Quai d'Orsay established

The selection of French documents published by the Auswärtiges Amt: the structure and the purpose of the book

The 70 French documents selected are ordered chronologically and not by subject, sender or receiver. The documents are of many different kinds: they span from long reports on various topics, reports (by the French side) of top-level Anglo-French meetings to short telegraphic messages. Many carry hand-written notes. One document is a long autograph letter from General Weygand to General Gamelin. Going through the book rapidly, it produces a somewhat confusing impression because the subject-matter varies from strategic planning at the highest level to documents about detailed matters that for some reason have interested the German editors.

Of the book's 399 pages, the longest part (161-399) are photographic reproductions of the original documents. Pages 19-157 are translations into (in this case) Danish of all the texts in the collection. Pages 5-10 give a list of contents with title and short summary of every document. Finally, the book contains an "overview" (pages 15-18) explaining the purpose of the publication. These 3½ pages make the propaganda purpose of the book quite clear.

The name of the "Auswärtiges Amt" on the title page indicates the "Publisher", but the book does not say who the editor or editors were or how the selection has been made or what have been the editorial principles; nor is the reader informed how big a proportion of the documents captured at La Charité (and elsewhere) have been included in this collection. Have the documents been edited or is each document complete? If not, what has been left out and why?⁸

that they were genuine. I assume that the discovery of the documents in Ebersdorf on April 14, 1945 by American soldiers must be documented somewhere, and that both French and American sources may exist about the transport of the documents back to Paris. Finally, documentary evidence for the award of La Médaille d'Honneur des Affaires Etrangères to the five French former POWs must also exist.

⁸ It is evident here and elsewhere in this paper that I pose questions which I am not able to answer – although it seems likely that sources do exist that might give at least some answers. Possibly some readers of the RISR can help? In that case I would be grateful to be told, for instance via this email: lars.eb@gmail.com.

These questions are not answered directly, but the reader can get a good idea of some answers from the text of the “Overview” which begins with these words: (in my translation from the text in Danish):

“In a manner which is quite sensational, the secret documents from the French General Staff which, by pure coincidence, were found in some railroad cars at the station in the small French town La Charité and in a couple of other places, have confirmed, point by point, the conclusions which could be drawn from the earlier Whitebooks published by the German Auswärtiges Amt, and they have brought the inner secrets of English and French policy and warfare into the light of day. In what follows we now present 70 documents out of this large material to the Public in order to show, in an effectful way, the plans of the Allied war-making. All these plans have one thing in common: The hunt for new areas to wage war and the attempt to exploit the small peoples in Europe in the service of these war-plans.

Note: Some of these have already been published in the daily press.”

The next couple of pages are a sort of “guide” presenting the claims and the interpretations which the editors want to convey to the reader. For each claim one or more of the published documents are quoted to serve as proof.

The documents, then, are intended to show that the German claims about Allied policies have in fact already been expressed – in so many words – by the Allied powers themselves. The reproduction of the documents in good photographic quality is intended to convince the reader that the documents are genuine.

The excellent reproduction has the intended effect: I do not doubt that each individual text is correctly reproduced. I also do not doubt that the collection only includes documents which are in full accordance with the picture that the German Government wanted to paint. In this regard there is perhaps not a very great difference between this publication and other “white books” from this (and other) wars. But it would be very interesting to know what documents the editors have left out.

The French historian, Commandant Lyet, in his 1948 article about the “Documents which travel”, quoted the same passage (from the French-language edition of the book) which I have just quoted, but he added an important comment: “It is unnecessary to say that the published documents, which have since been recognized as genuine, had been carefully selected by the enemy from among a lot of others. Taken out of their context, or quite simply abridged, the plans of the Allied Governments and General Staffs were presented in a tendentious and false way.”⁹

It is important to note the words “*which have since been recognized as genuine*” in Commandant Lyet’s text. But just as important is his remark that the documents present the Allied plans *in a tendentious and false way*.

Unfortunately, Commandant Lyet did not explain how or why the German publication gave a “tendentious and false” picture. To find out whether this is in fact correct will require an analysis of the general history of the war from September 1939 until June 1940, an analysis in which these documents are compared and judged against many other sources. Obviously, this is not possible to do in this paper.

My aim in this paper is to present the German publication in such a way that others may judge whether it deserves their attention.

Put as briefly as possible, the German claims, made in the short “Overview”, about the Allied plans may be summarized as follows:

- First of all, the aim was to find new “auxiliary forces” for the Allies.¹⁰ (Here plans are mentioned concerning Sweden and Norway, a landing in Thessaloniki, a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey.)
- Plans to conduct an English-French offensive against Germany through Dutch and Belgian territory.

⁹ “Inutile de dire que les documents publiés, reconnus postérieurement exacts, avaient été soigneusement triés par l’ennemi parmi la masse des autres. Séparés de l’ensemble ou simplement tronqués, ils présentaient les plans des gouvernements ou des États-Majors allies d’une manière tendancieuse et fausse.”

¹⁰ The expression “auxiliary troops” is not explained, but the context makes it clear that the Allies (as the Germans saw it) were hoping to get military support from Swedish forces as well as from forces several other countries, including Balkan countries.

- In Scandinavia, military assistance to Finland should present the Allies with an opportunity to involve Sweden and Norway in a front hostile to Germany.
- An operation against the iron-ore mines in northern Sweden.
- To cut off Germany from her supplies of iron ore.
- An attack against Batum and Baku in order to destroy Germany's oil-supply.
- Sabotage against shipping in the Black Sea.
- Preparations to block the Danube River.
- Destruction of Romania's oilfields.
- The creation of a new front in the Balkans.
- A unified front from the Arctic Sea in the North to the Caucasus intended to strengthen the blockade against Germany and completely paralyse its economic life.

After presenting this list of claims about Allied policy the book concludes that the "power of the Allies could not match their grand plans" and that the Germans "time and again prevented the plans of their adversaries by lightning actions". Among these "lightning actions", the book no doubt especially refers to the occupation of Denmark and Norway.

The last item in the "Overview" is a claim that the British have "betrayed" Norway by their "insufficient assistance", but "most brutally has France suffered from the faithlessness of the British". This is explained in this way: France has "time after time begged for greater English support in the air" during the battle in France in May and June 1940. The book here refers to a long list of documents: 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 63, 64, 68, and 69.

The last document (no. 70) is "a cry for help" by the chief of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, who concludes his appeal for more British fighter aircraft to be sent to France by writing that "the fulfilment of this demand for both Great Britain and France is a question of life and death".

A few examples among the documents

Denmark is very rarely mentioned in the "secret French documents". Once in the summary from at a meeting on April 9, 1940 in

the “Comité de guerre” of the French Government, in which a number of decisions are listed, made “after a rapid assessment of the general situation which now exists as a consequence of the German attack on Denmark and Norway”. Among these decisions is “the very great interest in carrying out as soon as possible the occupation of the harbour in Narvik and taking control of the mines in Gällivare”.¹¹

Further on (p. 313) in the account of the 9th meeting on April 27 between the French and the British leaders (“Neuvième Reunion du Conseil Suprême”), a description is given of the difficult military situation in Norway which includes this remark: “the only thing the Royal Air Force could do was to bombard every night, with considerable forces, the airports in Stavanger, Oslo or Aalborg, the last-named being, as is well-known, the base from which the transports of the German forces depart.”¹²

In whole or in part, many of the French documents in this (German-made!) selection deal with plans concerning Norway, Sweden and Finland and with the failed Allied operations in Norway. These texts are too many and too complex to be even summarized in this paper. In order to assess their historical importance, one would of course need to compare them with many other sources.

However, in order to give some impression of the range and diversity of the “secret French documents”, a few examples will be presented here:

- (a) Document no. 23: A note (“Acte”) dated March 10, 1940 and signed by the French Commander-in-Chief General Gamelin

¹¹ “Après un rapide examen de la situation générale résultant du déclenchement de l’attaque allemande sur le Danemark et la Norvege ... Il y a le plus grand intérêt à réaliser le plus tôt possible l’occupation du port de Narvick et à mettre la main sur les mines de Gällivare” (After a rapid examination of the general situation which has come about as a result of the German attack on Denmark and Norway ... we have a very great interest in carrying out as soon as possible the occupation of the port of Narvick and in taking control of the mines at Gällivare.)

¹² “Tout ce que pouvait faire la Royal Air Force c’était d’aller chaque nuit bombarder, avec des forces considérables, les aérodromes de Stavanger, d’Oslo ou d’Aalborg, celui-ci étant, comme on le sait, la base de depart des avions-transports de troupes allemandes.” (“The only thing that the Royal Air Force could do was to bombard, each night, with considerable forces, the airfields of Stavanger, Oslo or Aalborg, the last-named being, of course, the base from which the German transport aircraft departed.”)

under the headline: "Note concerning the participation of Franco-British forces in operations in Finland."

It is stated that France and Great Britain from the beginning of the Soviet attack on 30 November 1939 have "shown their willingness to offer Finland efficient and quick assistance", and that the French Headquarters in this connection on December 20 sent an officer to Marshall Mannerheim to inquire as to his views "about the operational support which French forces could give him".

Specific plans began to be made on January 16, 1940, in the French Supreme Command. The long text (of nine pages) ends with a paragraph allegedly by General Gamelin himself ("De la main du Général"): "In conclusion, we must resolutely continue our projects in Scandinavia, in order to save Finland, at least to lay our hands on the Swedish iron and the Norwegian ports. We must say that, viewed as military operations, the Balkans and the Caucasus through which we can also deprive Germany of oil, promise greater returns. But Italy holds the key to the Balkans."¹³

That French military planning was quite detailed is suggested by a remark about the cold Finnish climate: "Our own beasts of burden, except the mules, cannot function in the climate. Finally, the supply of food to our troops, and especially of wine, will pose a problem which will be hard to solve."¹⁴

(b) No. 48 of the documents is a letter dated May 1, 1940, from the French Minister of War, Daladier, to General Gamelin.

The subject of the letter was "Operations in the Mediterranean". The fact that French plans included a landing at Thessaloniki as well as an occupation of other bases in Greece is not surprising. During World War I, Greece was a country of military importance for both sides in the war; by 1918 the Allied front in northern Greece against the Bulgarians

¹³ In the original French: "Il y a donc lieu de poursuivre résolument nos projets en Scandinavie, pour sauver la Finlande, au minimum pour mettre les mains sur le fer suédois et les ports de Norvège. Mais, disons-nous qu'au point de vue des opérations de guerre, les Balkans et le Caucase, par où l'on peut aussi priver l'Allemagne du pétrole, sont à plus grand rendement. Mais l'Italie tient la clef des Balkans."

¹⁴ In the original French: "Les animaux de nos pays, sauf nos mulets, ne peuvent s'acclimater. Enfin, le ravitaillement de nos unités en vivres, et surtout en vin, posera un problème difficile à résoudre."

and Austria-Hungary was even decisive: everyone in 1940 remembered that this front was the spot where the final victory of the Entente Powers began.

In his letter to General Gamelin, Daladier wrote: “In continuation of letter no. 948 FMF* dated April 17, of which you have received a copy, I have the honour to inform you that I completely share the views of Admiral Darlan with regard to the overwhelming interest in those occupations which he intends to make on Greek territory”.¹⁵

Daladier in this letter ordered Gamelin to issue the orders necessary to “prepare the forces needed for the planned occupations”.

(c) No. 51. A technical document issued May 13 by the “3rd bureau” of the French General Staff.

This document, by providing codenames for certain parts of Greece, gives some idea of the areas of interest: “Codenames. In order to avoid indiscretions with regard to the planned actions <in case of operations in the Aegean Sea> it has been decided from now on to make use of the following codenames in communication about this subject.”

The words <in case of operations in the Aegean Sea> are a handwritten correction to the document, but it is still possible to read the original typescript which has been crossed over: “for the purpose of a possible occupation of Thessaloniki and Greek naval bases”¹⁶

(d) Document no. 44: The French report of the meeting on April 27, 1940 between the French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud and the British Prime Minister Chamberlain.

¹⁵ In the original French: “Comme suite à la lettre de l’Amirauté No 948 FMF du 17 Avril dont vous avez reçu copie, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaître que je partage entièrement les vues de l’Amiral Darlan sur l’intérêt primordial des occupations qu’il envisage en territoire Grec.” (FMF: forces maritime francaises)

¹⁶ In the original French: “Pour éviter des indiscretions au sujet des mesures envisages en <cas d’operations en Mer Égee> CORRECTED BY HAND FROM: <vue d’une occupation éventuelle de Salonique et des bases navales grecques>, il a été convenu d’utiliser désormais dans les correspondances relatives à cet objet les mots conventionnels suivants: Pour Salonique=Honduras, Pour la Crete=Guatemala, Pour Milo=Argentine, Pour Salamine=Chili, Pour Navarin=Colombie, Pour Argostoli=Bolivie, Pour Grecs=Equateur, Pour Turcs=Bresil”. (The code words themselves are: For Thessaloniki=Honduras, For Crete=Guatemala, For Milos=Argentine, For Salamis=Chile, For Navarino=Columbia, For Argostoli=Bolivia, For Greeks= Equator, For Turks=Brasil”.)

From this long document I would like to quote a detail: Reynaud and Chamberlain discussed how to make Sweden accept that the Allies took steps to destroy the Swedish iron ore mines. Here Chamberlain, in my view, showed sharp realism, when Reynaud proposed that the Allies might give the Swedish Government an offer comparable to the offer <of monetary compensation> given to the Romanian Government during the previous war as a result of which the Romanian oilfields had been destroyed. To this Chamberlain replied: "... regarding an offer to Sweden in order to make this country destroy her iron ore mines, the Prime Minister believes that it is not a question of money. In effect, the result of a German occupation of Norway will be that Sweden will become completely cut off from the outer world. The country will not be able to communicate with foreign countries except by German intermediation. Germany will supply the goods which the country needs and it is almost a certainty that Germany will want to be paid in iron ore. Can one expect that the Swedes will accept to destroy the one kind of currency which the Germans will accept from them? The Romanian example was quite different."¹⁷

The French documents from La Charité as seen by post-war historians in the USA, France, Great Britain and Germany

After 1945, these "secret French documents" have been used and commented on in a few historical works on The Second World War.

The first (known to me) is a book about the policy of the Roosevelt Administration towards the French Vichy-regime: William L. Langer: *Our Vichy Gamble*, published in 1947. Langer was a highly respected American historian who during World War II was head of the "Research

¹⁷ For the original French: "... en ce qui concerne une offre à la Suède pour amener ce pays à détruire les mines de fer, le Premier Ministre considère qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une question d'argent. En effet, le résultat de l'occupation de la Norvège par les Allemands sera que la Suède va être complètement coupée du monde extérieur. Elle ne pourra plus communiquer avec le dehors que par l'intermédiaire de l'Allemagne. C'est l'Allemagne qui lui fournira les produits dont elle a besoin et il est à peu près certain qu'elle exigera, en paiement, du minerai de fer. Peut-on s'attendre à ce que les Suédois acceptent de détruire le seul instrument d'échange qui leur sera reconnu par les Allemands? Le précédent de Roumanie était tout différent".

and Analysis Branch” of the U.S. Intelligence Service OSS. His book was based in part on reports from – and conversations with – the American Ambassador in Paris, William Bullitt. Langer mentioned the French documents from La Charité at the beginning of his book where he discussed the “Phoney War”: “... the French and British staffs elaborated schemes for opening fronts in Norway, in the Balkans, and against the Russians in the Caucasian oilfields. The details of these plans need not concern us here, for none of them materialized in time.” In a footnote Langer explained: “The Germans published a large number of documents on these plans which were captured at La Charité in 1940. See Auswärtiges Amt 1939-41, No. 6: Die Geheimakten des französischen Generalstabes (Berlin, 1941).”

As Langer’s note shows, he saw the documents as genuine. But his comment on them was, in my view, a wrong assessment. The fact that these plans were not carried out does not reduce their value as an historical source for the first year of the war. The opposite, rather, seems to me to be the case.

The next year, 1948, a short article was published in the French periodical *Revue d’Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale* which has already been quoted here. Commandant Pierre Lyet gave his article an intriguing title: “Some secret documents travel”: “Des documents secrets voyagent”. This work is an important source used in this paper.

A very detailed French book about France’s military defeat in May-June 1940 was published in Paris in 1956: “Soixante jours qui ébranlèrent l’Occident” (Sixty Days which shook the West). Its author, Jacques Benoist-Méchin, was known during the German occupation of France as openly pro-German and as a supporter of the Vichy-regime. After the war he was condemned to death, commuted to prison, and he was released from prison already in 1954. In his large (1029 pages) book it is easy to sense the author’s contempt for the French leadership who lost to the Germans in 1940. Benoist-Méchin wrote (on page 37), that “the thinking heads” in the French General Staff tried to solve this problem: “How would it be possible to provoke a collapse of Germany (“effondrement”) without at the same time risk an offensive attack against France by the German army?”

Benoist-Méchin quoted a string of documents from the German publication, (viz. nos. 9, 11, 19, 22, 25, 26, 31, 42) and listed the following plans:

- A blockade of the sea off Norway combined, if necessary, by an occupation of the country.
- A landing at Thessaloniki and an occupation of Greece.
- Destruction of the Romanian oil-industry.
- Blockade of the Danube.
- Blockade of the Black Sea.
- Entry into the Caucasus, with the connivance of Turkey.
- A bombardment of Batum and Baku, combined if necessary with operations into Iran and Afghanistan.

The author's comment on this list deserves to be quoted: "One thinks that one is dreaming when faced with this array of impossible plans. Why did our General Staff not see that these operations could lead to nothing else than a deadly dissipation of our forces which were already insufficient? Why did they not realise that an attack against Russia would at once transform the German-Russian agreement into a military alliance and make us face all the divisions of the Red Army in addition to the German divisions?"¹⁸ Benoist-Méchin lists the French-language edition of the German publication in his bibliography under "Publications diverses": Documents secrets de l'État-Major général Français (Les). Publications de l'Auswärtiges Amt 1939/41 No 6 (Imprimé au Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1941).

The British historian Basil Liddell Hart made roughly the same assessment of the British and French plans in his chapter on "The Phoney War" in the last book he wrote, a short "History of the Second World War", published in 1970:

"During that autumn and winter the Allied Governments and High Command spent much time in discussing offensive plans against

¹⁸ In the original French: "On croit rêver devant cette amoncellement de plans irréalisables. Comment notre État-Major ne voit-il pas que ces opérations ne peuvent aboutir qu'à une dispersion mortelle de nos forces, déjà insuffisantes? Comment ne pense-t-il pas qu'une agression contre la Russie transformera instantanément l'accord germano-soviétique en alliance militaire, et nous mettra sur les bras toutes les divisions de l'Armée rouge, en plus des divisions allemandes?"

Germany or Germany's flanks – which they had no possibility of achieving with their resources – instead of concentrating on the preparation of an effective defence against Hitler's coming attack.

After the fall of France, the Germans captured the files of the French High Command – and published a collection of sensational documents from them. These showed how the Allied chiefs had spent the winter in contemplating offensive plans all-round the circle – for striking at Germany's rear flank through Norway, Sweden, and Finland; for striking at the Ruhr through Belgium; for striking at her remote eastern flank through Greece and the Balkans; for cutting off her lone source of petrol supply by striking at Russia's great oilfields in the Caucasus. It was a wonderful collection of fantasies – the vain imaginings of Allied leaders, living in a dream-world until the cold douche of Hitler's own offensive awoke them”. (Liddell Hart, 1973, p. 37)

About the German attack on Norway, Liddell Hart (1973, p. 63) wrote in the same book, that “Allied spokesmen promptly denied, and continued to deny” German announcements “to the local authorities that they had come to take Norway under German protection against an Allied invasion that was imminent”.¹⁹ Liddell Hart clearly believed that Great Britain and Germany were “keeping more or less level in their plans and preparations”, < - > “but Germany’s final spurt was faster and more forceful. She won the race by a very short head – it was almost a ‘photo-finish’.”

In direct continuation Liddell Hart made a remarkably blunt remark: “One of the most questionable points of the Nuremberg Trials was that the planning and execution of aggression against Norway was put among the major charges against the Germans. It is hard to understand how the British and French Governments had the face to approve the inclusion of this charge, or how the official prosecutors could press for a conviction on this score. Such a course was one of the most palpable cases of hypocrisy in history.” (Liddell Hart, 1973, p. 37)²⁰

¹⁹ Liddell Hart is referring to the German statement quoted at the beginning of this paper.

²⁰ If this was in fact “one of the most palpable cases of hypocrisy in history” may perhaps be doubted. The list of cases of hypocrisy in History is long.

A thorough study of the Nuremberg trials by Eugene Davidson from 1966 stated that the defence lawyer for Grossadmiral Raeder wanted to quote long passages from the French “documents from La Charité” as proof that while Raeder certainly did plan aggression against neutral Norway, Germany’s enemies had done exactly the same. But the Court did not allow these documents to be quoted during the trial. (Davidson, 1966, p. 377-379)²¹

Much more recently, a German historian, Stefan Scheil, published a study in which the “documents from La Charité” are used extensively: This book is: *Weserübung gegen Operation Stratford, Wie Deutschlands Gegner 1940 den Krieg nach Skandinavien trugen* (2015) (*Weserübung against Operation Stratford. How Germany’s enemies in 1940 brought the war to Scandinavia*). Scheil also made use of these documents in an earlier work. (Scheil 2004)

One might almost say that Stefan Scheil sees and interprets the events in Scandinavia in 1940 in a way that is, in its essence, not very different from the views and interpretations that were put forward by the German Foreign Ministry in their 1941 book. Scheil himself wrote in the preface to his study published in 2015 that he has been attacked for being “too little critical of the reasons put forward by the Nazi Government” and that the German war making during the Second World War in his books is presented as “a series of preventative wars”. (Scheil, 2004)

Some concluding remarks

How much does this German book with captured French documents add to the historical understanding of the Second World War? Perhaps there is a lack of interest among historians for this *Auswärtiges Amt* publication from 1941 because it does not, in fact, add much? (In Denmark, for example, its existence seems to be ignored completely).

²¹ For an early critique of how the Nuremberg Court in general did not accept the principle of “tu quoque”, see the memoirs by Otto Meissner from 1950: “Staatssekretär unter Ebert – Hindenburg – Hitler”, p. 631.

William Langer wrote that historians need not spend time on these plans, since none of them were carried out. Basil Liddell Hart clearly thought otherwise, and I believe he was right: In order to describe and understand what happened during the war until May 10, 1940, the historian needs to take these many futile plans and deliberations into account.

But studies of the “Phoney War” are overwhelmed by the tremendous shift in perceptions and in focus which was caused by the Fall of France in 1940. This event changed everything.

A new colossal “tectonic shift” in the historical perspective happened in 1945. France was now among the victorious powers who occupied Germany. And neither the French nor the British seemed eager to make historical use of the information to be found in the “Documents from La Charité” – as the example from the Nuremberg Court suggests: in 1945 and for many more years the victorious powers had little inclination to look for responsibility beyond the Nazis.

But an historian needs to understand the process: arguments and deliberations are important even when they led to nothing. These secret French documents present the top level of decision-makers, especially the French, but also the British, from a French perspective; the choice of words, the tone used by the writer may tell the historian a lot.

The documents are *contemporary*. Most were written “in the heat of battle” – bureaucratic battle, rather than physical. That makes them different from, for instance, a valuable eye-witness account like Major General Edward Spears’ book “Assignment to Catastrophe”, published ten years after the war, and from Winston Churchill’s “The Second World War”. (See more complex creation of Churchill’s six volumes on the WWII on Reynolds, 2005)

Still, the *Auswärtiges Amt* publication obviously cannot be seen as anything else than a selection of documents produced by the German government in 1941 in order to show that Germany was right and her enemies wrong. In 1941, German leaders still had confidence in victory and hoped to convince others that their enemies were responsible for the continuation of the war and especially for what happened to Scandinavia on April 9, 1940.

I would suggest that these “Documents from La Charité” show that between September 1939 and May 1940, French and British leaders, on the one hand, were determined to carry on with the war and bring an end to Hitler’s regime – but that, on the other hand, they had unclear and unrealistic ideas as to how this could be done.

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PREMISES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE ON ANGLO-SAXON TERRITORY

Adina MIHĂESCU*

Abstract:

The starting point of literature on the role and importance of economic information is not only the product of academic reflections on productivity and business competitiveness, but also a result of the direct observation, by individuals chiefly and practically interested in economic evolutions, of trends or initiatives already in place in different economic segments or markets. Some common traits are shared between fields that are particular to intelligence-related activities and the economic field: a lack of certainty and the vital need for information. The necessity of competitiveness has always been construed as a desideratum, even though the method for gaining a competitive advantage is something of a controversial topic. In time, loyal competition has always given rise to development and progress. The need to gain access to information has always been acute, as it does not pertain only to modern times, although digitalization and globalization seem to facilitate information-gathering activities. Seeing how humans, capitals, wares, information, ideas and methods have gradually started to circulate freely, while time and distances have steadily faded, economic security and development have become objectives that are tackled all the more carefully and elaborately by regimes and governments that have worked to reinforce their own power.

Keywords: *competitive intelligence, business environment, business competition, information-gathering, economic development*

Markers for the establishment of EI as a field of activity

The term *economic intelligence* was first used in large corporations in Great Britain and the United States, which, influenced by military intel models from the Second World War, created intelligence departments specialized in sales in the 1960s and, starting with the

* PhD Student, Doctoral School of International Relations and Security Studies "Babes Bolyai" University, Cluj Napoca, Romania. Email address: adina.mihaescu@yahoo.com

1970s, built the first frameworks that operated with what we know today as *competitive intelligence*. The introduction of economic intelligence systems was seen as a measure of utmost importance for developing countries as well, but expert studies of the time did not generate enough velocity for their application, due to disparities between the countries, different stages of execution and implementation of national development projects, and local information cultures (Clerc 1997, p. 316).

To these factors were also appended technological and informational inequalities, an increasingly keen addiction to knowledge, and a tendency to exclude poverty-stricken countries, where the systems of data collection and processing were unviable, especially with regard to local areas, as well as lacking quality information that would pertain to the economic and technological realities, and thus to the real needs, of the nation.

For this very reason, economic intelligence was deemed an efficient model for hastening the development of poor countries and for counterbalancing their ability to negotiate and network in the context of global power balance (Clerc, 1997, p. 316).

In the second half of the 20th century, this context was marked by several defining moments that had a great influence on the economic field, as well as on the development of economic and financial strategies, and on the study of economy as the basis for a people's safety and well-being.

Founding the United Nations and its bodies. The peace treaties

By and large, the three great Allied powers – Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union – sought to solve the problems engendered by the Second World War even during the conflict. Thus, a body of principles with regard to the future organization of the world was registered in crucial documents such as the *Atlantic Charter* (1941), the *Declaration by United Nations* (1 January 1942), the *Moscow Declarations* (October 1943) and declarations at *Tehran* (November 1943), *Dumbarton Oaks* (1944), *Yalta* (February 1945) and *Potsdam* (July-August 1945).

The decrees and agreements settled at these conferences laid the groundwork for new post-war international relations, including those of economic nature. US President Franklin Roosevelt urged that the League of Nations (founded after the end of the First World War) proceed in a configuration that would be kept after the end of the Second World War, within a new international organization that would guarantee and maintain peace and protection. Additionally, the declaration made by Ministers of External Affairs at Moscow in 1943 raised the issue of establishing such an institution at the end of the war, and in 1944, Anglo-American experts drafted the *UN Charter* and decided on the components of the Security Council, its permanent members, and the voting system within the Council, the tutelage over some colonial territories being settled during the Yalta Conference, where it was also decided to summon an international conference that would approve the *Charter* and found the UN. The conference took place in the great hall of the San Francisco Opera, between 25 April and 26 June 1945, and gathered delegations from 51 countries that had been at war with the Axis or that had severed ties to the Axis powers. The Conference approved the *Charter* and founded the UN.

The Charter defined the key objectives of the new global organization, its main bodies, and each of their goals in up keeping the peace and security of the member-states, in fulfilling international cooperation based on the principles of equality, sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and “the right of all nations to choose a form of government under which they will live.” (See more on <http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/1941-1950.shtml>)

The Cold War

For more than four decades following the Second World War, the world was affected by what entered history books as the “Cold War”. Thus, was named the state of tension, dispute and adversity between the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – alongside their allies, Western countries and Communist countries respectively, from Europe, Asia, and South America. Although this period did have its armed conflicts, these were limited from the standpoint of power, scope,

and implications, as the two superpowers avoided to turn them into “a hot war of unimaginable consequence” (Dumitru, 2009, p. 2).

The exposition of the economic evolutions that characterized the period following the Second World War may focus on analysing the fundamental traits of the two opposing blocks in place at the time, as well as the instruments they created: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and the Warsaw Pact on the one hand, bodies through which the Soviet Union would assert its economic, political, and military dominance, and the “Marshall Plan” and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the other hand, as a response from the Western world to what was deemed to be Communism’s ideological offense (Dumitru, 2009, p. 2).

As L. C. Dumitru observes (2009), what were at first “minute clashes of interest and diverging views, at most becoming intrigues and rivalry between Soviets and Anglo-Saxons” proved to be “a mass of ideological, political, and strategic contradictions that created an uncrossable rift between the East and the West.” As such, the Cold War quickly reflected onto international relations and, gradually, the post-war world was divided in spheres of interest and dominance.

The Western perception of a hostile or even aggressive Soviet Union following the war had sprouted from Moscow’s behaviour in the international relations of the time. The Red Army was in place in Central and South-Eastern Europe, and under its occupation of the countries in the area, “they worked systematically toward changing the fabric of their political and economic system, taking after the Communist Soviet totalitarian model” (Dumitru, 2009, p. 2).

The climate of balance that had come to characterize relations between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union began to crumble, and all resources of historic import were reiterated. Gradually, relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world turned especially strained, which made military hostilities very probable. Despite this, there was never any direct offense, which may be explained by the existence of nuclear weapons that gave rise to the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence.

On 5 March 1946, upon being invited at Westminster College in Fulton, state of Missouri, US, to receive the title of *Doctor Honoris Causa*,

Winston Churchill stated in his speech that “from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent,” and that the Russians do not desire war, but rather “the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines” (Marin, 2006, p. 92).

Many historians consider that Joseph V. Stalin was mainly liable for the outbreak of the Cold War. It is generally believed that Stalin continued the traditional expansionist politics of the tsars, or, worse, that he was determined to spread Communism across the better part of the globe, which was entirely possible at the time, since “socialism in a single country” had been fulfilled. Soviet historians and a few Western historians from the 60s and 70s believed that Stalin’s motives had been purely defensive, as he wanted to build a cushion-zone meant to protect the Soviet Union against potential aggressions from the Western world. The Kremlin leader’s suspicions had sprouted from a memory of the Western intervention against the Bolsheviks in 1918-1920, and had been heightened by the fact that the delay to establish a second European front against Germany seemed deliberately orchestrated so as to exert substantial pressure on the Soviet Union and exhaust its strength.

Moreover, the period in question was characterized, on an international scale, by the many geopolitical and geostrategic mutations that occurred after the Second World War, shifts which materialized into what was titled the Cold War, namely a fierce competition between two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

A moment of maximum impact in international relations was the speech of US President Harry Truman, held on March 12, 1947 in front of members of the United States Congress, which marked the beginning of a large-scale confrontation with the USSR that would be known for four decades as the Cold War (Marin, 2006, p. 93).

In light of the threat that other European countries might switch to Communism, but also in the interest of their own security, the US answered favourably to appeals for help made by Turkey and Greece, and launched the Truman Doctrine (Washington, March 12, 1947) for

economic support for countries threatened by Communism, and for the conservation of democracy¹.

Therefore, the division into two different worlds occurred at the same rate, on an economic scale and then on a military scale, through the formation of the two opposing military alliances (Marin, 2006, p. 92).

Yet, even though the rivalling powers never turned their mutual hostility into an open conflict, the confrontation took different shapes in political, economic, technological, ideological, propagandistic, military fields, and others. In order to gain ground, both superpowers formed various alliances.

Thus, between 1945 and 1948, the Soviet Union included in its area of influence most of the countries in Eastern Europe, as Communism governments were being imposed in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic. A Communist government also came to power in North Korea in 1948, and the Communist block was strengthened in 1949, when Mao Zedong ultimately achieved victory in the aftermath of the lengthy civil war in China.

¹ The American Official emphasized the following: "(...) it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I have declared before Congress that every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. (...) Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply that assistance. (...) The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. (...) Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action. I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948."

Similarly, the United States made Japan into an ally and closely cooperated with Great Britain and other European countries, offering them economic support that would facilitate the creation of an anti-Communist block. During the Cold War, every action, declaration or opinion made by one of the two blocks was perceived by the other as possible evidence of hostility.

On June 5, 1947, at Harvard University, State Secretary George C. Marshall officially launched a foreign aid plan that would benefit Europe, named the *European Recovery Program (ERP)*, stating that “our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States” (Marin, 2006, p. 93).

Voted for by the United States Congress, this law stipulated for the timeframe April 1948 – June 1952 an aid in the form of non-refundable loans of 85% and long-term grants of 15% of their equivalent in US Dollars.

By analysing long-term implications and by drafting the Warsaw Treaty, the Soviet Union gained a powerful tool in promoting the political integration of satellite-states, the military alliance being an important auxiliary for maintaining them under strict control. From this viewpoint, the actions of Warsaw Pact member-states in Czechoslovakia, with the exception of Romania, demonstrated this approach most evidently, the promotion, starting with the year 1968, of the “doctrine of limited sovereignty” by Leonid I. Brezhnev, being a consequence of the same act.

In light of the new configuration of the power ensemble in the US, in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, through which were founded both the CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the attributions held by the CIA, under coordination from the National Security Council (NSC), included “correlation and evaluation of intelligence for national security, ensuring its dissemination to Government by use of appropriate structures and resources.” Thus, the period was characterized by an increased attention which was being paid to the connection between economic stability/vitality and national security, the strategic confrontation during the Cold War having given rise to “the revitalization of traditional mercantilism and of the principle according to which economic power is a fundamental component of a nation’s power” (Gregory, 1997, p. 5).

In fact, the CIA was, within the US, the single most active intelligence agency in collecting and analysing economic intelligence, having the highest concentration of expert analysts in the field of international economics, higher even than the American Government’s, making it possible for the agency to have benefited from as much economic expertise as all the other intelligence services combined. Within the CIA, missions of economic nature occupied a significant proportion, approximately a third of all analytical resources being directed toward issues and activities of economic kind (Gregory, 1997, p. 5).

Work in economic intelligence was carried out, for the most part, within the CIA, by the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). What is more, within the DI also operated the Bureau of Transnational Security and Technology Issues, which was the body responsible with aspects of economic nature, the monitoring of sanctions, support for negotiators, the documenting of external actions against European companies, and external economic practices (Gregory, 1997, p. 5). Economic analysis was also distributed to regional DI offices: The Bureau of Analysis – Africa and Latin America (ALA), the Bureau of Analysis East Asia (OEA), the Bureau of Analysis Europe (EURA), the Bureau of Analysis Middle East and South Asia (NESA), and the Bureau of Analysis Slavic Space and Eurasia (OSE).

The total count of economic analysis within the DI was relatively stable after 1970, namely between 250 and 270 specialists, but it recorded significant fluctuations upon the rise in effervescence in the

private sector, and upon the diversification of tasks and the departure of experts from the CIA toward private organizations for higher pay.

The CIA's main sources of economic intelligence were, in order of importance, open sources and secret reports. Open sources used in economic intelligence included official publications, newspapers, radio stations, publications of commercial nature and studies on the states' economic evolutions (including studies conducted by the IMF).

Within the CIA, the main provider of materials collected from public sources was the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), which was managed by the Directorate of Science and Technology. FBIS monitored, selectively translated, and drafted reports using information extracted from a large amount of data broadcast by radio stations and by television, newspapers, magazines, specialized journals, commercial databases, books, grey and underground literature. Furthermore, FBIS' products were dedicated to a wide group of beneficiaries: analysts within the DI, decision-makers from economic politics, and the academic world (Gregory, 1997, p. 8-9).

Instances of economic espionage against American companies gave rise to the expansion of problematizing economic intelligence in information services' portfolios in the US. Theft, by other countries, of ideas used in the development of products that would compete with those manufactured in the US, met a meteoric rise in the second half of the 80s, as the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) estimated that, beginning with this period, industrial criminality and corruption caused damages of approximately \$260 billion every year, while industrial espionage rose by 260% since the previous timeframe.

From the viewpoint of the competition between the US and Russia, this was brought about by reorienting Russian intelligence from the military field to the industrial sector. The KGB scaled the structures of scientific and technological support of its intelligence and established a new information service, the SVR, whose priorities included economic and commercial intelligence.

The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) repeatedly reported activities of espionage carried out by Russia through an electronic centre of communications interception installed in Cuba, where extremely valuable secret information of economic nature was being collected,

especially coming from US banks and business companies (Gregory, 1997, p. 13).

Economic Intelligence on Anglo-Saxon Territory

The United States of America is a space where Economic Intelligence has turned, on a large scale, into a veritable doctrinal culture. This trajectory has mainly been determined by two factors:

- The chief role of American power in the development of the market economy;
- The systematic way in which knowledge circumscribed to economic intelligence has been integrated with management elements and disseminated within the managerial sector (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 5).

Economic intelligence has also become, in this way, an object of study within instruction programs in the management field, especially in the aftermath of Michael Porter's contributions in the beginning of the 80s.

Even so, American Professor R. E. Freeman proposed, in 1984 (*Strategic Management. A stakeholder approach*), a broader definition and approach to economic intelligence, by assimilating the concept of *stakeholders*, with emphasis on these figures' influence on areas delimited by the market – Government, territorial collectivities, activist groups, mass media, syndicates, etc.) (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

The stakeholders' approach is, thus, directly interconnected with strategy studies in the US, as notions of economic and influence intelligence are presented in official Business Management Master's programs, in some of America's most prestigious universities (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

The need for such knowledge management is strengthened by the global competitive environment in perpetual transformation. Issues regarding the control of economic, technological, political and social information (influences and behaviours) have radicalized along with the narrowing of markets (caused by financial crises), political instability (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Gulf War), and the conversion of traditional Defence sectors into *dual* formats, wherein the military

component is evaluated and scaled based on the civil component (the Defence budgets were adjusted, other resources were redirected) (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

This radicalization led to the emergence of a new kind of knowledge, especially from the viewpoint of its method, that of InfoWar, which represents the protection of a state's own economy through the deployment of informational resources (IT infrastructures, capacity to collect, store, process, and disseminate economic and political information), the development of influence politics linked to the information war, and the dissemination of destabilizing information to major actants (who concentrate informational power) (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

New forms of competition raise the issue of systematically integrating these new dimensions in the analysis of competitive environments, both in terms of research and in terms of shaping future managers (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

The Anglo-Saxon concept of economic intelligence was developed in the US toward the end of the 1960s, particularly in the table of contents of a landmark book: Harold Wilensky's *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry*, which outlines two major problems:

1. Collective strategies and cooperation between governments and companies along the line of generating common knowledge to ensure competitive advantage;
2. The importance of knowledge in economy and industry as a strategic engine for development and transformation (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

In order to introduce the concept of economic intelligence, Wilensky identifies four decisive factors in the allotment of power, money and time for intelligence (defined as the collection, interpretation, and systematic use of information to meet multiple strategic goals) in an organization:

- (1) the level/degree of conflict or competition in a field distinctly tied to the degree of involvement or dependence on a government;

- (2) the degree of dependence of the organization on internal support and unity;
- (3) the degree to which internal operations and external surroundings become the object of orientation in management, by means of the possibility to be approached rationally, through predictable elements which can be the targets of influence;
- (4) the size and structure of the organization, the heterogeneity of its members, the diversity of its goals, as well as its centralized authority system.

In this definition one can identify references to various domains of management research, including the contingency theory (item 4), the possibility to analyse the competitive environment (item 3), and competitive intensity (item 1) (Harbulot and Baumard, 1997, p. 6).

Wilenski highlights, especially with the book's title, the fact that economic intelligence is not a process of information accumulation, but rather of knowledge production, done by the Government and the main industrial organizations, as well as within collective strategies, as needed (Harbulot and Baumar, 1997, p. 7).

The dependence of every aspect of strategic planning on economic elements has been recognized without a doubt. Complex strategic issues linked to testing, unfolding, limiting or verifying conventional and unconventional forces have entailed analyses where establishing an influence exerted by the economic element (international trade and internal economy) required detailed structural modelling and empirical investigations with the purpose of gauging certain evolutions.

Circumscribed, the importance of the academic sphere as regards the research and investigation potential of certain segments of interest has also been recognized (Shubik and Verkerke, 1989, p. 481).

While economy in the field of defence implies any form of economic analysis for national security, the study of economic warfare focused more on the use of economic weaponry in conflicts during the Cold War. These weapons included sanctions, embargoes, and attacks of economic nature with the purpose of diminishing the enemy's economic potential.

The difference between “defence economics” and “economic warfare” may be relevant for delineating economic intelligence as a domain of activity, and it stems from the two notions’ definitions.

- “Defence economics” implies the implementation of economic analysis for purposes linked to national defence. Just as economy is a science in itself, “defence economics” represents the systematic study of options in the case of competing alternatives, in issues bearing on expenses, production, effects of the measures adopted onto macroeconomy in the defence industry, etc.
- “Economic warfare” constitutes the use of weaponry for strategic purposes, associated with issues hinging on oligopoly, monopolistic competition, negotiations, and other aspects of competitiveness. In the case of economic warfare, analysts take into consideration the enemy’s every reaction, and the analysis itself represents a sum total of considerations of political, military, and economic nature that are not encompassed by the field of “defence economics” (Shubik and Verkerke, 1989, p. 482 - 483).

Formalizing and consolidating economic intelligence

The United States’ focused diplomatic interest in Europe and Asia marked the repudiation of the Truman Doctrine’s political trajectory from March 1947. The overview of General Marshall’s report on China emphasized the imperative to avoid the United States’ intervention in the Asian country, taking after their intervention in Greece. The trajectory of Marshall’s politics sought to reduce American undertakings in Asia, to abandon the efforts to control the evolution of the Chinese state, an endeavour for which Washington had “neither the power, nor the means, nor the influence, nor the knowledge required” (Lippmann, 1987, p. 879).

Similarly, George Marshall supported the settlement of Europe’s issues by European countries, stating that the United States’ aid program had actually been an intervention, approved by the American people, to support a European strategy to resolve its own crisis.

The difference from the Truman Doctrine was fundamental, as the endeavour supported by the former American President regarded the

countries that required American aid as “outbuildings” of the US, as Washington’s instruments of narrowing down Russia’s influence (Lippmann, 1987, p. 880).

The notion behind Marshall’s politics was that Moscow’s project to divide Europe would yield precisely before the interests of the states under Russian dominance, before the economic interdependence between Western European countries and countries on the Eastern side of the continent. In addition, the relevance of the Marshall program was granted by initiating sectors respective to the launch of elaborate scientific studies, whose purpose was the detailed analysis of European economic facts and realities, based on which the United States’ economic and diplomatic measures toward Europe would be determined. Complemented by the initiative to demilitarize Europe, and by the retreat of Russian and Anglo-American armies from this territory, the Marshall plan is eloquent from the angle of granting a higher status to political and military intelligence than to military intervention as a sole means of stabilizing Europe (Lippmann, 1987, p. 881).

Indeed, Marshall Studies have shown that, for the economic stabilization of industrialized countries from Western Europe, it was vital that they resume commercial ties with Eastern European countries, where agriculture was one of the fundamental economic branches, including Russia. Otherwise, the costs associated with maintaining a tolerable quality of life in Western Europe would have been impossible to incur by their respective governments.

Similarly, studies conducted in Warsaw, Prague, and Moscow have shown that the issues at work in Eastern Europe could not have been settled in the absence of solid connections, first of all of economic nature, and they legitimized the hypothesis that pressures toward establishing economic freedom would only rise, even toward creating “a tighter unity that there has ever been” (Lippmann, 1987, p. 882).

Since 1975, applied economic intelligence has crystallized as a domain of activity and a field of study, including in emerging and developing countries.

In this respect, a significant contribution has been an initiative by Stevan Dedijer, Professor at Lund University in Sweden, who introduced the study of economic and social intelligence as the body of a society’s

activities driven by intelligence, as well as by the ability to adapt and to communicate with ever-changing circumstances, with the purpose of meeting intended goals.

The efficiency of this kind of intelligence has been perceived as the outcome of the magnitude and dynamism of activities that produce and develop knowledge, as well as the quality of information and expertise networks (Duffau, 2010, p. 14).

Later on, in the beginning of the 90s, Philippe Baumard configured the model/evolution of studies which have determined the identity of that time's economic intelligence, already immersed in the era of *business intelligence*.

Conclusions

Strategically evaluating the economic field has become the main axis for the evolution of economic intelligence forms, and information is the raw, useful, and relevant material only in the context of safety and fair exploitation.

The future has started to be regarded in close relation to leaders' ability to develop the skills relevant to the creation and employment of economic intelligence, to manifest behaviours that adapt to environmental requirements, aggression, and competitive density focused on the client.

The main objective has been an integrated approach (including angles from experts in the private and the academic field) to economic intelligence, in light of its implementation in national systems characterized by different cultures and varying degrees of technological and organizational development.

Focusing exclusively on garnering information does not suffice, as there is a need for the skills to analyse and understand the evolution of economic fields and to pose the appropriate questions to the suitable sources. The functional models of the intelligence process, the approach to open sources, and the unbridled dissemination of information entail exceptional rigour, but also honesty and scrupulousness. It is precisely because of this complexity that the CI field is hard to grasp and even harder to implement. Surveilling the fluctuations of the markets, emerging technologies, and the legislation entail a ceaseless preoccupation.

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**INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY
AND INTERDISCIPLINARITY**

A SYSTEMATISED REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGNS AND METHODS FOR STUDYING CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES*

Luca Guido VALLA*

Abstract:

This work aims at reviewing the research designs and methods used to date to investigate citizens' perceptions of issues related to national security. The advantages and limitations of such designs and methods are highlighted and, where appropriate, indications for further research are suggested. This review considers research from different disciplines. It aims at providing a structured systematisation of the current knowledge and, most importantly, methodological approaches used to investigate the topic.

Keywords: *citizens, perceptions, national security, intelligence, methods.*

Introduction

What we observe is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning (Heisenberg, 1958). With this famous sentence, Heisenberg highlighted a crucial aspect of science that transcends quantum mechanics, of which he was a pioneer: research does not lead us to the truth of things. Instead, we acquire a glimpse of reality based on

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*Early Stage Researcher on the European Joint Doctorate grant "Evolving Security Science through Networked Technologies, Information policy And Law" (ESSENTIAL), Department of Cognitive Science, University of Malta, and "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, Bucharest, Romania. Email address: luca.valla91@gmail.com

the instruments through which we decide to carry out research. For at least three reasons, the investigation of a topic cannot be divorced from the tools used to facilitate the investigation (Aromataris & Pearson, 2014). One, the choice of tools dictates the type of data available for investigation (e.g., qualitative or quantitative) and consequently the type of data generated. Two, the limitations of the instruments restrict the investigative horizon of the subject examined. Three, the methods and techniques unveil the philosophical positions adopted by the researchers. Indeed, this explains why a topic is studied from a certain angle and not others and why a particular research method is used (Hart, 2018). For all these reasons, the need for a rigorous review of research designs and methods is necessary.

The primary aim of this review, first of its kind, is to systematise the current sparse knowledge on citizens' perceptions of security issues. Indeed, the empirical works carried out so far have utilised a wide range of methods and techniques that reflect the wide heterogeneity of research topics and theoretical approaches. In a relatively new discipline like security science, it is essential to define a clear pattern of research aims, theoretical foundation and modalities of enquiry. In doing so, the main points of strength and limitations proper of each research design, method, and technique are pointed out in this research. Since, as highlighted later, most of our knowledge on this topic is based on one specific type of research method, pointing out its drawbacks makes it easier for researchers to treat the results and interpretations cautiously. Consequently, another important objective of this review is to stimulate a greater integration of disciplines, research designs and methods to – at least partially – overcome the limitations affecting the current body of work on the topic.

Theories in security studies are diverse and specifically relate to the discipline within which the investigation is carried out. For example, the investigation of security issues in international relations often relates to classical theories such as constructivism (Huysmans, 2002), liberalism (Williams, 2001), and realism (Booth, 1991). Nevertheless, as security studies are an interdisciplinary conglomerate (Walt, 1991), it is not infrequent for works in the security studies' literature to adopt or attempt to confute theoretical positions traditionally attributed to other

disciplinary fields. For example, several classical theories have been adapted to information security, such as grounded theory (Glaser, Strauss, & Strutzel, 1968) and social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1989).

Current knowledge of security studies is based mostly on the results of academic studies from the application of the two main types of research methodologies, that is, quantitative and qualitative. As mentioned, the type of investigation conducted is not merely a choice of what data are collected but reveals the epistemological position of the researcher, how the data should be analysed and how results are interpreted. If not chosen simply based on convenience, the method selected reflects the way the topic is conceived by the researcher and highlights which aspects are considered more relevant. In the context of the present research, if some scholars decided to carry out interviews with the survivors of a terrorist attack, we may infer that they want to give weight to the narrative dimension of the individual experiences. That is, the researchers value the verbal component more than other dimensions and are interested in giving voice to the participants in the study without imposing constraints that inevitably affect other methods of investigation. As an alternative, if some researchers decide to administer questionnaires to a sample of respondents who could have been involved in a terrorist attack, then we may infer that they value the quantity of data more than specific details of individual experiences. Quantitative approaches imply that researchers wish to codify participants' responses to more readily compare data with other studies. These are but two examples of how the type of available knowledge on a given topic may convey not just raw information but insights into how the research was conducted, what the researchers were looking for and which aspects of participants' responses were deemed more relevant.

In the context of the perception of security issues, there is another point to take not account. Precisely because security studies do not occur in a vacuum, the social and political context surrounding a study should be given particular attention. This appreciation of context is motivated by at least two reasons. First, security issues are perceived differently in various parts of the world (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). Moreover, diverse traditions and social norms mean that people perceive the same issues in different ways. Although generalisability is one of the most important

aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research (Noble & Smith, 2015), it is not always possible to use the same paradigm in different contexts. In fact, as presented later in this review, several comparative studies have permitted analysis of differences in the way security issues are perceived in various regions and countries. The second reason is that security studies might touch upon sensitive information or investigate topics of relevance for national security. Regarding this motivation to appreciate context, a political endorsement, for example, via research funding, may be a crucial factor influencing this type of research.

The review proces

Within this framework, an accurate review of the modalities through which this topic has been so far investigated is necessary. This article presents a review of research designs and methods used in the last 20 years to investigate citizens' perceptions of national security issues. Bryman's classical view of research design and methods are employed to accomplish the review (Bryman, 2016). In particular, a research design is conceptualised as the framework within which data are collected and analysed. Other distinguished authors categorised the existing literature based on research designs (e.g., Creswell, 1994; Spector, 1981). However, Bryman's work provided an additional layer of detail, by clearly distinguishing research designs, strategies and methods. This structured framework allowed a more precise categorisation of the current body of work on perceptions of national security issues.

Bryman presented five main types of research design: experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, comparative and case study designs. In the present work, only the first four types are considered. Indeed, even if some papers reviewed for this work were specific country studies, the authors did not present them as case studies but rather stressed the characteristics of either longitudinal (e.g., Metcalfe, Powdthavee, & Dolan, 2011; Silver, Holmun, & McIntosh, 2002) or experimental research (e.g., Halperin, Porat, & Wohl, 2013). These studies are accordingly presented as longitudinal or experimental research in this review. Furthermore, Bryman views a research method as simply a technique used to collect data, for example, questionnaires,

interviews, and more. Research methods are similarly represented in this review (Bryman, 2016).

In his work, Bryman also introduced the dimension of research strategy. With this term, he referred to a general orientation to the conduct of social research, within which the distinction quantitative and qualitative is made. In sum, Bryman discussed quantitative and qualitative research strategy. However, Bryman's distinction is not employed as a yardstick to organise the current review but is rather referred to where relevant. For example, qualitative studies have not been conducted to investigate citizens' perceptions of security issues using an experimental design. The quantitative or qualitative distinction is presented only in the parts of the review where both quantitative and qualitative research methods have been used.

Several criteria have been used to select the studies presented in the current review. First, papers had to be published from the year 2000 onwards. This choice aligns with the recent developments in the literature of security studies, according to which the emergence of a consistent number of studies on citizens' perceptions of national security issues started at the beginning of the 21st century. Second, studies included in the review had to be the first to analyse a specific topic through empirical research, with a specific research method. Third, studies selected for the review must be influential (published in high impact factor journals) or have had enough impact to stimulate further consistent research using a similar research method.

In order to find potential studies to include in this review, three main databases were searched: PsycNet, ScienceDirect and Google Scholar. The terms and phrases of interest were searched among those works that fulfilled the criteria mentioned above. The search was restricted to peer-reviewed empirical works written in English. A similar modality to search for studies to review was adopted by other studies (e.g., Sawka, McCormack, Nettel-Aguirre, Hawe, & Doyle-Baker, 2013). Table 1 presents the final list of studies reviewed, categorised by research design, methods and thematic areas.

Following these methodological choices, this article presents a review of existing studies investigating citizens' perceptions of security issues. This review is organised in accordance with the above-mentioned

classifications of four research designs. In particular, each research design is analysed in relation to the main thematic areas explored and research methods used to collect data.




Figure 1: *Infographic of research designs:* This figure shows the main characteristics of the research designs that have been used in the existing literature to investigate citizens' perceptions of security issues.

Table 1: Reviewed studies. This table shows the final list of studies considered in this review.

	AREA 1 - Threat perception at the personal and collective level	AREA 2 - Psychological and behavioural antecedents and consequences of threat perception	AREA 3 - Attitudes towards security services and security systems	AREA 4 - Influence of the way through which security issues are presented (news media and political rhetoric)
Experimental design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003 - Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005 - Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007 - Reffen Tagas, Federico, & Halperin, 2011 - Garcia-Retamero, Müller, & Rousseau, 2012 - Halperin et al., 2013 - Seate & Mastro, 2015 - Ferwerda, Flynn, & Horvath, 2017 - Clayton, Ferwerda, & Horvath, 2011 • Word memory task: - Zhu, Zhao, Ybarra, Stephan, & Yang, 2015 • Electromyography: - Davis & Stephan, 2011 - Davis, 2015 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structured interview: - Metcalfe, Powdthavee, & Dolan, 2011 • Questionnaire: - Gadrarian, 2010 - Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010 - Chataud et al., 2011 - Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011 - Legewie, 2013 - Gomez & Villar, 2018 - Ardan & Webb, 2018 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Gadrarian, 2010
Cross-sectional design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Dvori, 2008 - Ridout, Grosse, & Appleton, 2008 • Structured interview: - Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002 - Davis, D. W., & Silver, 2004 - Maoz & McCauley, 2009 - Donahue, Eckel, & Wilson, 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus group: - Deiel, 2004 - Borel, 2008 • Qualitative interview: - Lee, Dallaire, & Lemyre, 2009 - Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010 - Yong & Lemyre, 2019 • Semi-structured interview: - Adeboye & Brown, 2018 - Cohen-Louck, 2019 • Questionnaire: - Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley, 2005 - Brookmeyer, Henrich, Cohen, & Shahar, 2011 - Caponecchia, 2012 - Harbach, Fah, & Smith, 2014 - Huber, Van Boven, Park, & Pizzi, 2015 - Yong, Lemyre, Pissent, & Krewski, 2017 - Van Schaik et al., 2017 - Yong & Lemyre, 2019 • Structured interview: - Rubin et al., 2005 - Lee & Lemyre, 2009 - Lee, Lemyre, & Krewski, 2010 - Paranjothy et al., 2011 - Shechory Bitton & Laufer, 2017 - Cohen-Louck & Levy, 2020 • Time-series analysis: - Prager, Beeler Asay, Lee, & von Winterfeldt, 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structured interview: - Davis, D. W., & Silver, 2004 • Questionnaire: - Sarquist, Mahy, & Morris, 2008 - de Waal, 2013 - Baril, Gerhold, & Wählich, 2014 - Degli Esposti & Santiago Gómez, 2015 - Iles et al., 2017 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structured interview: - Donahue, Eckel, & Wilson, 2014 • Content analysis: - De Castella & McGarity, 2011 - Watson, 2012 • Discourse analysis: - Trainen, 2017 • Generalized Structural Equation Modelling: - Rashid & Ohlsson, 2021
Longitudinal design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003 - Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Kaakinen et al., 2021 • Structured interview: - Rubin et al., 2007 - Gelkopf, M., Solomon, Z., & Bleich, A., 2013 - Metcalfe, Powdthavee, & Dolan, 2011 		
Comparative design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structured interview: - Garcia-Retamero, Müller, & Rousseau, 2012 - Schmid & Muldoon, 2015 - Corretti, Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2017 - "Special Eurobarometer 464b Summary Europeans' attitudes towards security," 2017 - "Special Eurobarometer 499 Summary Europeans' attitudes towards cyber security," 2020 • Questionnaire: - Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007 - Garcia-Retamero, Müller, & Rousseau, 2012 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questionnaire: - Legewie, 2013 - Kaakinen et al., 2021 • Qualitative interview: - Seger Guttmann, Gilboa, & Partouche-Sebban, 2021 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structured interview: - "Special Eurobarometer 464b Summary Europeans' attitudes towards security," 2017 • Questionnaire: - Nissen, Hansen, Nielsen, Knardak, & Heir, 2019 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Content analysis: - Nacos, Bloch-Ellon, & Shapiro, 2007

Experimental design

Introduction: Experimental design is one of the main research methods used in academic research. Some characteristics of experimental design make it particularly useful for explaining causal relationships among social phenomena. First, this research design involves the manipulation of so-called independent variables, resulting in effects on the dependent variables that are being tested and measured in the study. Through this analysis, causal relationships can be effectively assessed. In the context of the perception of security issues, causality is particularly important when, for example, trying to demonstrate a link between the way a security issue is perceived and its consequences on future behaviour.

Another characteristic crucially important to make the experimental design the privileged design for generalisability of results is the random assignment of participants to different experimental conditions. In that way, the researcher would be confident enough to ascribe the differences found in the experimental conditions to the manipulation of the independent variables. For this to be the case, researchers need to be absolutely sure to avoid the influence of factors other than the independent variables. This aspect is particularly important for the analysis of the perception of security issues. For example, if the objective of a study were to investigate the effects of different types of security threats on citizens' emotional responses, some respondents in the experimental sample might be more likely to feel sad, angry or worried due to their personality characteristics.

Questionnaires are the most frequently used method to collect data in experimental studies on perceptions of security issues. Surveys have the advantage of producing larger data sets and permitting the comparison of results across different studies using the same data collection method. However, the method reduces the spectrum of dimensions of the phenomena examined to the verbal component only. This constraint could constitute a serious limitation when analysing emotional reactions to security threats because, as some researchers have highlighted (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, & Ito, 2000), the analysis of only the verbal component of emotions fails to capture other informative dimensions, such as somatic responses. This issue and other

attributes of experimental design in the context of the perception of security issues are presented in the following section.

Thematic areas: The experimental design has been used in many influential works to investigate cognitive and emotional processes. Following this stream of research, the experimental research design has been frequently used to investigate the perception of security threats at the individual and collective level. Experimental design has also been utilised to examine the psychological and behavioural antecedents and consequences of the perception of security threats. Within these two thematic areas, the main theoretical concepts explored can be identified as the correlates of intergroup threats, psychological conditions following national security incidents and behavioural changes in responses to national security issues. For example, a seminal study conducted by Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero (Rousseau & Garcia-Retamero, 2007) investigated the roles of a sense of power and intergroup conflicts in the perception of threats and their implications for public policy in the United States and Spain.

Other studies explored intergroup conflict by focusing on the importance of the similarity in cultural and political values between groups (e.g., Garcia-Retamero, Müller, & Rousseau, 2012). In particular, studies have examined anger (Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011), mortality salience, intended as people's awareness of the unavoidability of their own death in times of war (Chatard et al., 2011), and angst (Halperin et al., 2013) in modulating individual and collective consequences of intergroup conflicts. A pioneering study conducted by Zhu and colleagues (Zhu, Zhao, Ybarra, Stephan, & Yang, 2015) explored the cognitive outcomes of intergroup threats using a word memory task, which was a rather unusual method to investigate the perception of security issues.

Another stream of research measured specific emotional responses to security threats. This is the case in a ground-breaking study conducted by Lerner and colleagues (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). In this study the authors investigated the effects of two particular emotions, fear and anger, on the perceived risk of terrorism. This study is particularly relevant for the present research because – to

the best of my knowledge – it was the first to employ an experimental design examining the same emotions involved in the perception of a security issue that are the subject of the experimental part of this research. Other work has explored the emotional components of security threats, such as the role of emotions in intergroup behaviour (Seate & Mastro, 2015), the role of fear in the public perception of terrorism (Avdan & Webb, 2018), and analysis of the cognitive and emotional consequences of terrorism (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005). It is worth mentioning the work conducted by Davis and Stephan (Davis & Stephan, 2011), which was extended in 2015 (Davis, 2015). These studies represent an innovative attempt to assess the somatic correlates of emotions elicited by the perception of security threat at the individual and collective level.

Immigration is an issue that has frequently been found to be related to the perception of security threats, with consequences at the individual and collective level. Different aspects of this phenomenon have been investigated, such as the influence of previous personal experience (Clayton, Ferwerda, & Horiuchi, 2021), opposition to refugee resettlement (Ferwerda, Flynn, & Horiuchi, 2017) and the emotions induced by news coverage on immigration (Seate & Mastro, 2015).

Experimental design has also been used in pioneering work carried out by Huang and colleagues to study another relevant issue: the effects of perception of cybersecurity issues on future behaviour (Huang, Rau, & Salvendy, 2010). This topic has been further explored by other work which analysed – among others – dimensions such as the role of knowledge, controllability and awareness (Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011) and the use of cognitive heuristics in the context of cyber threats (Gomez & Villar, 2018).

A notable issue seldom investigated through the use of experimental design is the influence of the media on citizens' perceptions of security issues. For example, some authors have investigated the role of emotionally powerful news on modulating the audience's perception of threats related to terrorism (Gadarian, 2010). Other studies following Gadarian's work used experimental protocols to investigate the influence of news on the support of anti-Muslim policies (Matthes, Schmuck, & von Sikorski, 2019) and the way images portraying

terrorism influence the public's political attitudes and appraisal of a terrorist event (Iyer, Webster, Hornsey, & Vanman, 2014).

The topics just presented are those most frequently investigated using an experimental design in the context of the perception of security issues. In the next section, the methods used to collect data are presented.

Research methods: An important aspect influencing methodological choices pertains to the set of advantages a particular method offers compared to others. Therefore, it is unsurprising to find that most experimental studies on the perception of security issues have used questionnaires to collect data. Indeed, this research method brings a series of benefits that cannot be ignored. First, questionnaires can be rapidly administered, which may be vital when investigating security issues. For example, if researchers are interested in assessing psychological reactions to a terrorist attack, they might not want to lose part of the information in the immediate aftermath of the event. Consequently, the administration of questionnaires may prove to be useful for this purpose.

Given the specific research procedure generally used in experimental studies, with data collection following the administration of experimental stimuli, structured interviews are seldom used. More frequently, questions have been administered in the form of self-completion questionnaires. This method has a considerable advantage over other types of data collection methods, which is commonly referred to as the "convenience of respondents". Survey respondents can choose the speed at which they answer questions and usually can jump between questions, not following a fixed order. Typically, respondents can take a break from completing the questionnaire, before returning to it later. This aspect is important to consider when studying how people perceive security issues, given the sensitivity of the topic.

By way of example, a study conducted by Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero examined the perception of intergroup threats by studying the effects of elements such as a shared identity and similarity to the outgroup on threat perceptions (2012). Questions were presented in a self-completion, multi-part questionnaire. The effects of perceptions of

intergroup threats have been investigated through self-completion questionnaires by several other researchers (e.g., Halperin et al., 2013; Reifen Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011). This research method has also been widely used to investigate emotions related to threat perception. In Lerner et al., participants received the questionnaire via e-mail and were asked to respond to questions on their emotional experiences of terrorism, as well as policy preferences on the matter of national security (2003). Other studies employing this method investigated specific aspects of the perception of security threats by asking questions on the discrepancy between perceived and actual security threats (e.g., Huang, Patrick Rau, Salvendy, Gao, & Zhou, 2011), dread as a response to cyber-threats (Gomez & Villar, 2018) or the perception of different terrorist organisations (Avdan & Webb, 2018).

The advantages mentioned earlier highlight the usefulness of questionnaires as instruments to collect data; however, the presence of some disadvantages suggests that results should be interpreted with caution. These disadvantages are presented in this section and affect all the data collection methods across all types of research designs which involve respondents expressing their views, subjective experiences, attitudes and behaviours. For this reason, they are not repeated in the presentation of each research design considered in this research.

One of the main problems affecting questionnaires is the so-called social desirability bias (van de Mortel, 2008), according to which respondents tend to answer in a way they perceive to be in line with the researchers' views and beliefs. This issue is significant when investigating perceptions of security issues, such as political preferences following a major national security incident. In this case, some respondents might not want to reveal support for extreme parties. Another issue, in part related to social desirability bias, is the so-called intrusiveness bias (Choi & Pak, 2005). Respondents might feel reluctant to supply sensitive personal information. For example, participants in studies exploring psychological consequences of terrorism might be unwilling to report psychological symptoms elicited by a security incident, such as anxiety or sleep deprivation.

These examples demonstrate only some of the advantages and issues affecting self-completion questionnaires and structured

interviews. Another crucial characteristic of the instruments is that they are necessarily dependent on explicit and subjective experiences reported by participants. However, when investigating psychological processes, dimensions exist that cannot be assessed with this type of method. Therefore, experimental tasks have been designed to tap into implicit memory. In particular, according to the automatic vigilance approach, which is one of the main theories on the automatic allocation of attentional resources, a threatening stimulus is evaluated by an automatic attentional process without the person being aware of it (Pratto & John, 1991). In line with this approach, this automatic attentional process suggests a link between automatic vigilance and a series of other constructs, such as social judgement and – importantly for the present review – memory processes. In particular, it is expected that the recollection of threat-related stimuli is more effective than neutral information.

Another approach to explain automatic vigilance processes involved in threat perception relates to the adaptive memory hypothesis, according to which the human memory system evolved in a way that information relevant for survival is remembered more vividly (Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007). In the case of threatening situations, this would imply that individuals who have experienced threats would better remember threat-related information. One such task that has been used to assess the effect of perceived security threats is the word memory task (Zhu et al., 2015), which consists of three phases: encoding, filler and recognition. In the first phase, the participants were presented with 40 words (20 threat-related words and 20 neutral words), one at a time, which appeared at the centre of a computer screen. After the encoding phase, they were asked to complete a mathematical task for three minutes. Afterwards, they completed the recognition phase, in which they had to indicate, among the words previously shown and a new set of 40 new words (20 threat-related words and 20 neutral words), which ones they had seen before. This task came after reading articles chosen with the objective of inducing realistic intergroup threats. Although this method is highly effective for studying the effects of security threats on cognitive processes such as memory, as the authors pointed out, it has been rarely used. The scarcity of this method is

probably due to the relative complexity of the research design compared to other types of studies.

A major aspect regarding research on the perceptions of security issues concerns the relationship between decisions, emotions and their physiological correlates. Indeed, the behavioural and decisional changes originating from perception of security issues could be greatly affected by underlying emotional states and emotional elaboration of the situation. These emotional dimensions have an important non-verbal, physiological dimension which has been rarely considered in the academic literature on this topic. Nevertheless, some seminal theories on decision-making processes and emotions included an analysis of these aspects. For example, according to the somatic marker hypothesis, “marker” signals characterise the responses to particular stimuli (Damasio, 1996). This process may occur consciously or non-consciously. This activity takes the form of physiological activity, such as an increased heart rate, electrodermal activity or muscular activity. These physiological states are associated with particular conditions and influence the decision-making processes. This theory rejects the idea that behaviour is exclusively the result of either conditioning or cognition.

Another important stream of research highlighted the importance of emotions as both influencing the decision-making processes and also biasing judgements (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). The authors highlighted that behaviour cannot be treated simply as the outcome of cognition, since emotions play an important role as well. Moreover, according to the authors, no simple dichotomy of good and bad influences of emotions can be drawn. Starting from these theoretical contributions, it is possible to state that the analysis of the effects of specific emotions – and not generalised emotional activation – and their physiological correlates may provide insightful information for the study of perceptions of security issues. In this regard, an element that is highly informative of psychological processes – especially affective processes – but is often overlooked consists of the somatic-physiological dimension. As mentioned earlier, limiting the investigation of emotions to the analysis of what is said or written by participants might result in an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon being investigated. This is

particularly relevant when assessing the emotional experience related to the perception of security issues.

As shown earlier, some authors have investigated emotions through self-completion questionnaires (e.g., Garcia-Retamero et al., 2012; Halperin et al., 2013; Reifen Tagar et al., 2011). Seminal work conducted by Davis and Stephan enriched this stream of research through the analysis of somatic correlates of emotions elicited by threat perception (2011). The authors presented participants with videotape footage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and instructed them that while watching the videos they were to think about how they personally felt or how Americans felt during the attacks. Concurrently, through the use of electromyographic recording they registered the activity of two facial muscles: the frontalis muscle – activity of which is generally associated with fear; and the corrugator muscle – activity of which is associated with anger. These two emotions are generally associated with threat perception at the individual and collective level respectively. A similar research procedure that also examined physiological correlates of perception of security threats was used in a later study by Davis (Davis, 2015).

Notably, no study was identified covering perceptions of security issues that used a qualitative research strategy for data collection within an experimental design. This is in line with Bryman's assertion that qualitative studies are scarcely used in experimental research (2016).

A final consideration is due before moving to the presentation of other research designs. Although influential researchers have highlighted the importance of studying psychophysiological correlates of emotions for a better understanding of emotional processes (e.g., Cacioppo et al., 2000), in few cases have these dimensions been studied in research on the perception of security issues. It is worth noting that more research is needed to understand implicit and somatic correlates of the perception of threats to security, as it might provide additional information or even suggest that researchers reinterpret results of previous studies on the topic.

Cross-sectional design

Introduction: In addition to experimental design, one of the most frequently used research designs to study the perceptions of security issues has been cross-sectional design which refers to research that analyses data of variables collected at one given point in time. This method is often referred to as a survey design, though this custom is imprecise. Indeed, the term “cross-sectional design” comprises research designs employing a variety of research methods, such as content analysis, interviews, focus groups, questionnaires, and more, while the term “survey design” generally refers to research conducted principally through the self-completion of questionnaires and structured interviews (Bryman, 2016).

In fact, cross-sectional design does not impose constraints on the research methods used to collect data, but has specific characteristics that make it one of the most effective ways to gather information to study perceptions of security issues. First, more than one case is needed. This poses the biggest difference between cross-sectional and case-study designs where the focus of the research is one case, whether a single person, social group, or other. This distinction is particularly important when studying perception of security issues since, in most cases, researchers are interested in assessing the reactions of large groups or even citizens of different countries. Therefore, the investigation of responses from only one person or even one community might not be highly informative for the purposes of the research.

Another important aspect of cross-sectional design is that data collection takes place at a single point in time. This element makes this type of research design different from others, such as longitudinal design or even experimental design, when data are collected in different moments. This is particularly important when researchers need data in a brief period, for example, following a natural disaster because they intend to study the psychological consequences in the immediate aftermath of the event.

In addition to these characteristics, cross-sectional design’s advantages of not being bound to quantitative or qualitative research methods nor to specific research procedures allows researchers to adapt it to the purpose of their study.

Thematic areas: In this section, the main thematic areas investigated through cross-sectional design are reviewed. Two of the main thematic areas investigated in numerous papers include attitudes towards security systems (e.g., Bartl, Gerhold, & Wählisch, 2014; de Waal, 2013; Degli Esposti & Santiago Gómez, 2015) and the influence of media and political rhetoric on the perception of security issues. One of the underlying reasons for the popularity of the method is that this research design, as mentioned earlier, does not limit the research methods to use or procedures to be conducted. Therefore, some theoretical concepts that are difficult to assess with other research designs can be effectively assessed through a cross-sectional study.

It was unsurprising to find that one of the main topics investigated through cross-sectional design in the current literature on the perception of security issues is terrorism. It is not unexpected because most studies on the perception of security issues emerged after the major terrorist attacks in the early years of the 21st century. However, it is worth noting that the current literature has explored several aspects associated with the perception of terrorism. For example, an influential work conducted by Huddy and colleagues (Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002) explored the perception of terrorism at the personal and national level. The study represents one of the first works to disentangle the perception of security threats at different levels, paving the way for subsequent research on the topic. By way of example, Maoz and McCauley (Maoz & McCauley, 2009) investigated the effects of perceptions of individual and collective fear on the intentions of Jewish Israelis to support or oppose a compromise with Palestinians.

Another important study on the perception of terrorism was conducted by Lee and colleagues (2009), who not only explored the individual characteristics affecting threat perception but also investigated the health risks posed by terrorism. The authors chose to conduct qualitative interviews, which allowed for the exploration of in-depth, subjective experiences. Following this stream of research, other studies explored subjective experiences of terrorism and behavioural changes (Borell, 2008), the effects on social life and the importance of risk communication (Caponecchia, 2012; Yong, Lemyre, Pinsent, & Krewski, 2017), the effects of violence exposure and adolescent

behaviour (Brookmeyer, Henrich, Cohen, & Shahar, 2011), clinical conditions such as PTSD following major security incidents (Shechory Bitton & Laufer, 2017) and changes in travel intentions following perceptions of threats to national security (Prager, Beeler Asay, Lee, & von Winterfeldt, 2011). The large number of this type of studies indicates that this research design is particularly suitable for investigating this topic.

Another recurring and relevant topic analysed through cross-sectional design has been the perception of issues related to cybersecurity. For instance, Van Schaik and colleagues (2017) studied how different cybersecurity-related hazards are perceived and the possible precautionary security practices. Similarly, Harbach and colleagues (2014) explored risk awareness of specific cybersecurity threats and users' awareness of potential risks. Other researchers were interested in exploring the psychological consequences of being involved in natural disasters. For instance, Huber and colleagues (2015) conducted a study where they considered emotional responses to natural calamities, among other factors. Similarly, Paranjothy and colleagues (2011) investigated the impact of floods on mental health.

The study of issues such as cybersecurity and natural tragedies confirms the validity of the new conception of national security introduced by the Copenhagen School of security studies, according to which a set of different sectors is included in the analysis and not exclusively related to military security, unlike the old tradition of security studies. Another important aspect to note is that several studies have investigated the role of fear and anger in the perception of issues related to security. This testifies to the importance of studying these two specific emotions. By way of example, Huber and colleagues (2015) investigated the effects of anger as a response to security issues and the processes of political polarisation. In another interesting study, researchers studied the effects of fear and anger in political rhetoric about terrorism (de Castella & McGarty, 2011). This stream of research on the role of political rhetoric on the perception of security issues has been enriched by other works aimed to explore, among other themes, the symbolic meaning of terrorism targets conveyed by journalism (Watson, 2012), the news coverage of revelations of intelligence-related issues

(Tiainen, 2017) and the media coverage of terror-related feelings (Rashid & Olofsson, 2021). Overall, a great number of topics have been covered by studies using a cross-sectional design. This large assortment of thematic concepts reflects the large number of research methods used to collect data, which are presented in the next section.

Research methods: The significant number of topics covered by studies adopting a cross-sectional design are reflected by the large set of research methods used to collect data. By analysing existing research using this type of design, a pattern similar to that previously presented for experimental design emerged: the majority of the studies used surveys in the form of self-completion questionnaires or structured interviews. The advantages of this type of method have been presented above, but what is interesting to note is that these advantages hold for the investigation of diverse topics. For example, Goodwin and colleagues administered a self-completion questionnaire to investigate variables such as values, normative influences, and more (Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley, 2005). Other researchers used self-completion questionnaires to collect data for their study, even if the modality through which they have were administered varied. For instance, some scholars decided to use a “paper-and-pencil” questionnaire (e.g., Brookmeyer, Henrich, Cohen, & Shahar, 2011), while others chose to administer the survey online (e.g., Caponecchia, 2012; Harbach, Fahl, & Smith, 2014). An interesting modality of questionnaire administration was chosen by Huber and colleagues (Huber et al., 2015), who decided to let participants complete responses by providing them with laptop computers while they were wearing noise-cancelling headphones.

Another way to administer questionnaires is through structured interviews. For instance, in the study conducted by Huddy and colleagues (2002), questions were administered by the means of telephone interviews. Intriguingly, the main novelty brought by this study, the differentiation of perceived security threats at the personal and national level, was assessed by two sets of questions, all starting with “How worried are you ...?” or “How concerned are you ...?” Therefore, it was implied that fear was the main emotion underlying the perception of both types of threat, while subsequent research demonstrated that anger

also plays a crucial role in this context (Lerner et al., 2003). Other researchers used telephone interviews as the method to collect data for their studies (e.g., Donahue, Eckel, & Wilson, 2014; B. D. Silver & Davis, 2004; Yong, Lemyre, Pinsent, & Krewski, 2017). In particular, Maoz and McCauley used telephone interviews to investigate, among other factors, Israelis' beliefs toward Palestinians, attitudes towards a binational Jewish-Arab state and attitudes toward a compromise solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2009). Curiously, this conflict was the object of investigation in other studies but conducted with other research methods. For example, as previously mentioned, Dekel conducted focus groups with Israeli mothers to investigate the difficulties of motherhood in a time of terror (Dekel, 2004). The choice of this research method was appropriate to study the subjective experiences and psychological symptoms related to terrorism. In fact, other researchers have explored the psychological conditions caused by living in times or terror. For example, Shecory Bitton and Laufer studied the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and post-traumatic growth (PTG) (2017). Overall, it seems that the investigation of subjective experiences related to the emergence of psychological conditions has been more frequently studied through qualitative research.

Notably, an alternative method to examine views of factors influencing the perception of security issues is news coverage of security issues and political rhetoric on the topic. For example, De Castella and McGarty conducted an interesting study on the use of emotional content in political rhetoric about terrorism (2011). In particular, they aimed at investigating the possible emotional manipulation of political stakeholders when addressing citizens on the matter of national security. Interestingly, the authors paid particular attention to the effect of fear and anger politicians tried to elicit in the audience. De Castella and McGarty chose to conduct a content analysis of a selection of messages addressed to the nation on the topic of terrorism between September 11, 2001 and May 1, 2003. Other researchers investigated the role of journalism in modulating citizens' perception of issues related to national security. This is the case in Watson (Watson, 2012), who analysed messages on the topic sent to the BBC using qualitative media analysis. Another unusual method of investigating the perception of

terrorism involves the use of generalised structural equation modelling. Rashid and Olofsson used this method to analyse the relationship between citizens' worry about terrorism and actual terrorist attacks in Western Europe in the period 2002–2016 (2021). Lastly, an innovative method to explore behavioural changes following major attacks was used by Prager and colleagues, who conducted a multivariate time-series analysis of travel intentions of Londoners following the July 2005 bombings (Prager et al., 2011).

Overall, it is possible to state that the cross-sectional design can be modelled around the needs of each researcher to best explore the topics under investigation. For this reason, a large set of research methods can be found by reviewing the current literature in this area and, in some instances, more than one method, whether qualitative or quantitative, has been used in the context of a single research project (Yong & Lemyre, 2019).

Longitudinal design

Introduction: Longitudinal design is a particularly interesting type of research, which can be considered as an extension of cross-sectional design with a crucial difference: data are collected more than once. In particular, in its classical form, the longitudinal design provides that the same sample is tested with the same research method in two different moments. This would allow researchers to assess the evolution of the phenomenon under investigation.

An interesting characteristic of longitudinal design, compared to cross-sectional design, is that it is better at disentangling the direction of causal inference. Indeed, assuming the presence of a certain independent variable at time 1 ($t1$) of the data collection process, the researcher can be more confident in assuming its effect on the data collected at time 2 ($t2$) (Bryman, 2016).

Along with advantages, there are limitations that make longitudinal design not as common as other types of research design in the literature of perception of security issues. In addition to the length of the entire data collection process and the resources needed to carry out, a serious problem is represented by the churn rate. Indeed, in all the studies presented here, the sample at $t2$ or $t3$ has always been smaller

than *t1*. This may be caused by a series of reasons, among which voluntary withdrawal from the study is the most plausible. This aspect is particularly relevant when analysing perceptions of security issues and, in particular, their psychological and behavioural correlates. Indeed, people may be not entirely comfortable sharing the evolution of their mental well-being in relation to a traumatic event they had experienced. This would lead, as shown in a later section, to samples in *t2* equal – in some cases – to half of the number of participants in *t1*. These and other methodological aspects of longitudinal design are addressed in the following sections.

Thematic areas: The longitudinal design has been adopted mainly to explore the antecedents and consequences of security issues. This is because the characteristics of longitudinal design make it particularly effective in investigating the evolution of consequences of security issues over time. Interestingly, no study in the existing literature that fulfils the criteria set for the present review used this design to investigate citizens' attitudes towards security services and security systems and the influences of the news media and political rhetoric on citizens' perceptions of security issues. This occurrence is indicative of the relatively scarce use of this research design, compared to others, in the literature of security studies. Future research might address this shortcoming, considering the fact that this design would provide useful information for the investigation of these thematic areas.

Another thematic area that has not been extensively investigated with longitudinal studies is threat perceptions at the individual and collective level. In fact, only two studies which have been already presented as experimental studies are considered here, given the particular research procedure adopted. These two studies are highly influential in the literature of perception of security issues. The first one, conducted by Lerner and colleagues (2003), was aimed at analysing two particular emotions, fear and anger, on the perceived risk of terrorism. According to the authors, these two emotions not only originated from but also elicited cognitive appraisals, with direct consequences on risk estimates and behavioural changes. The authors collected data from the participants at two different moments in time. In particular, the

respondents were informed of the possibility to complete the study on two dates: September 10, 2001 and November 10, 2001. The second study, conducted by the same authors, aimed at comparing the data collected at t2 of the first study with new data, collected one year later, in November-December 2002 (Fischhoff et al., 2005). The aim was the same: assessing the influence of fear and anger as antecedents and consequences of cognitive appraisals in relation to perception of terrorism.

Although these two examples constitute an exceptional case of usage of the experimental and longitudinal design to study emotions involved in threat perception, most of the existing longitudinal studies, as mentioned earlier, had the intent to investigate the psychological and behavioural antecedents and consequences of security issues. For example, in an important work conducted by Rubin and colleagues, the authors wanted to assess the medium-term psychological impact of the 2005 London bombings on the population, in terms of level of substantial stress and changes in travel intentions (2007). This study took the form of a 7-month longitudinal study.

Another case of longitudinal research investigating this thematic area consists of the seminal work conducted by Silver and colleagues (2002). This work is particularly relevant because it was the first pure longitudinal study investigating the mental health effects of terrorism, as well as the influence of previous exposure to traumatic events and the coping strategies that the people affected put in place. Other studies aimed at exploring specific psychological conditions, such as PTSD, in responses to terrorism (Gelkopf, Solomon, & Bleich, 2013) and fear of terrorism in the light of some of the most recent terrorist attacks that took place in Europe (Kaakinen et al., 2021).

Overall, it is fair to state that the longitudinal design has been effectively used to investigate mostly mental-health states affected by exposure to national security issues, as well as the influence of previous experience, coping strategies and behavioural changes. Although this type of research design could provide additional information to the existing literature on other thematic areas, it has been only seldom used to explore them. The next section will deal in more detail with the methodological aspects of the above-mentioned research.

Research methods: Differently from the cross-sectional design, the set of research methods used in the selected longitudinal studies in this review is not large. In fact, only two types of research methods have been utilised in these studies: self-completion questionnaire and structured interviews. If structured interviews are considered only questionnaires administered by an interviewer, we can reduce the number of research methods to only one. It is worth mentioning that no qualitative method has been used in this selection of studies. This is line with what Bryman stated, that is longitudinal design is in general exclusively associated with quantitative research (2016).

Among the studies that used self-completion questionnaires, special mention is due to the work of Silver and colleagues (Silver et al., 2002). They used a web-based data collection method which, at the time when the study was conducted, represented a relatively new instrument. The authors pointed out that this method, compared to face-to-face and telephone interviews, had a greater accuracy in reporting sensitive topics and a better anonymity. The variables assessed through this web-based method were, among others, demographic characteristics, mental health status and prior exposure to stressful events. Interesting to note is the fact that, although the authors paid participants \$5 for participation in the second and third data collection, the sample at t_2 was less than half of the sample at t_1 . At t_3 the sample was less than a third than the sample at t_1 .

The same problem affected another study conducted through self-completion questionnaires (Kaakinen et al., 2021). In this research, the sample of participants in the second data collection equalled less than a third of the participants at t_1 . In this case, another source of concern comes from the fact that data were collected from different countries and the churn rate varied greatly from one country to another. The questionnaire, which was administered online, aimed at assessing two main factors: exposure to online hate and fear of terrorism on a multipoint scale. The questionnaire was designed in English and then translated into French, Spanish, Finnish, and Norwegian, considering that it was administered in France, Spain, Finland, Norway and the United States.

Even the research conducted by Fischhoff and colleagues used a self-completion questionnaire (2005). In this case, it comprises questions on the perceived probability of terror-related risks, as well as self-reported emotions, on a multi-point scale. The sample at t_2 was, even in this case, considerably lower than the sample when data were collected for the first time (532 vs. 973). The authors stated that there could be the possibility that the two samples differed in some way.

Other researchers chose to administer the questions via structured interviews. For example, Rubin and colleagues conducted two sets of telephone interviews to investigate the impact of the 2005 London bombings on the level of stress experienced by Londoners (2007). In this case, the sample at t_2 was around half the sample at t_1 . Similarly, Gelkopf and colleagues conducted telephone interviews in their study, aimed at assessing the evolution of psychological responses to terrorism in the Jewish adult population via multi-point scales. For this study, the authors asked participants if they were willing to be contacted again for the second data collection. Data from 153 people were analysed at t_1 and t_2 .

An aspect particularly important in longitudinal design is the interval between the different moments of data collection. The choice of a particular time interval could be indicative of the scope of a study. For example, a long-time interval – as in the case of the study conducted by Gelkopf and colleagues – indicates the intent to study long-term effects of a given phenomenon (2013). Similarly, Kaakinen and colleagues chose a long-time interval between t_1 and t_2 to explore fear of terrorism through their longitudinal study (2021). In other cases, the interval was shorter with only a few months separating the different data collection exercises (e.g., Rubin et al., 2007; Silver et al., 2002). In these cases, the aim was to investigate the medium-term, rather than long-term, effects of national security incidents.

Overall, it is possible to state that, although the methods to collect data in longitudinal studies do not differ from cross-sectional studies, the former has specific properties due in large part to the fact that the data collection takes place in different moments in time. Therefore, aspects such as the difference in sample sizes and the time between these moments play a crucial role in the interpretation of the results.

Comparative design

Introduction: The comparative design is another type of research design, along with the longitudinal, which can be considered a cross-sectional design in which the data collection takes place in different moments, instead of once. Differing from longitudinal design, data are not collected from the sample in separate moments. In fact, data are usually collected at the same moment from two different samples. For this reason, a comparative study can be considered as two or more cross-sectional studies conducted concurrently (Bryman, 2016).

Thanks to this special characteristic, data collection from different samples, this research design can be used to accomplish one of the most challenging objectives in the literature of security studies: comparing results from different regions, countries or social groups. One of the most common types of comparative design takes the form of cross-national research. This trend is confirmed even in the literature of perceptions of security issues, in which many works aimed at studying the topic in different nations (e.g., Kaakinen et al., 2021; Legewie, 2013). Interestingly, some works which have been previously presented as experimental, cross-sectional or longitudinal design were conducted in different countries. For this reason, they are considered in this section regarding the comparisons made possible among countries. The fact that these studies were conducted in different countries, sometimes in several different countries (Legewie, 2013), indicates the interest of researchers in this sector to find similarities and differences in the way citizens perceive issues related to national security. The importance of this aspect is remarked by the fact that, probably even more than in longitudinal studies, the amount of economic and professional resources required to conduct such types of research are considerably high. Indeed, it is no coincidence that what is possibly the most famous example of comparative study, the Eurobarometer, has been financed by none other than the European Commission.

As highlighted for the longitudinal studies, a source of limitation could be represented by the differences of the samples chosen to conduct the study. Sometimes the sample sizes of a single comparative study differ greatly. This problem is only seldom addressed in detail and the interpretation of results might suffer from this problem. Despite some

drawbacks, the comparative design represents an effective way to compare perceptions of security issues in different contexts.

Thematic areas: The comparative design, along with the cross-sectional, is the only type of research design in which the studies selected covered all the four thematic areas considered for this review. Although the number of comparative studies is substantially lower than cross-sectional, and even experimental studies, the wide range of topics investigated proves the potential of this research design to investigate perceptions of security issues.

One of the thematic areas most widely covered by comparative design is the perception of security threats at the personal and collective level. In particular, a work conducted by Schmid and Muldoon (2015) had the objective of investigating the effects of political conflict exposure on citizens' perceptions of security threats, as well as the influence of intergroup threats on psychological well-being. The authors carried out computer-assisted telephone interviews with a sample of Northern Ireland adults. The sub-samples consisted of Catholics and Protestants. The study represents a rather unusual type of comparative study as it did not involve different countries or regions, but religious groups. Another example of research aimed at investigating the role of intergroup conflict on perception of security issues is the work carried out by Canetti and colleagues (2017). The authors intended to analyse the factors which influence the support or opposition to a political compromise, as well as the effects of the exposure of political violence on the mental well-being. The novelty brought by this study does not reside in the topics analysed, which were assessed by other studies presented earlier in this review (e.g., Halperin, Bar-Tal, Nets-Zehngut, & Drori, 2008; Shechory Bitton & Laufer, 2017). The originality of this work consists in conducting the research with two samples, consisting of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians.

Two prime examples of comparative design used to study perceptions of security issues are the two Eurobarometers, which were designed to investigate European citizens' attitudes towards security (Special Eurobarometer 464b Summary Europeans' attitudes towards security, 2017) and towards cybersecurity (Special Eurobarometer 499

Summary Europeans' attitudes towards cyber security, 2020). Through these works, topics such as the perception of security threats within the EU and the awareness of the risks posed by cybercrime were assessed in different countries in what can be considered the greatest attempt, in security studies, to compare data collected from different territories and populations. In the above-mentioned versions of the Eurobarometer, the topics of security and cybersecurity were investigated considering citizens' perceptions of individual and national security. In addition, the Special Eurobarometer 464b (Special Eurobarometer 464b Summary Europeans' attitudes towards security, 2017) dedicated a specific section to European citizens' attitudes towards operations aimed at tackling security issues and the perception of cooperation among national and international law enforcement agencies. This topic has not been frequently investigated through empirical research. The same applies to the investigation of the effects of political rhetoric and news media on the modulation of citizens' perceptions of security issues. In this context, the seminal work conducted by Nacos and colleagues (2007) aimed at analysing, among other factors, the influence of media coverage on the perception of the work done by the US government to tackle terrorism. This research is particularly important for the literature of citizens' perceptions of security issues because it was one of the first empirical works to analyse this specific topic. In addition, the study used a research method not frequently utilised in security studies, that is, content analysis.

Another thematic area covered by comparative studies consists of the psychological and behavioural consequences of security issues. In this regard, once more, the psychological and behavioural effects of terrorism have frequently been at the centre of the investigation. For example, Seger Guttman and colleagues (2021) assessed, through semi-structured in-depth interviews, the psychological consequences and coping strategies in response to terrorism with participants in Israel and France. This study represents one of the rare cases in which the topic has been investigated by the means of qualitative research. Other researchers used structured interviews in short-term and potentially long-term effects of perception of security issues in the context of terrorism. This is the case of the research conducted by Legewie (2013),

who explicitly addressed one of the main problems affecting comparative research, namely sampling bias.

Research methods: The choice of research method in a comparative design dictates not only the type of data that will be later analysed but also the way these data will be compared. For this reason, as quantitative research permits a better comparison of data from different samples, the majority of comparative studies considered here were conducted as quantitative research. Nevertheless, there have been cases in which qualitative research was carried out. In these cases, the authors chose to explore the variables under investigation through an in-depth assessment of subjective experiences. This is the case of the study conducted by Seger Guttman and colleagues (2021). The authors provided details on how they chose the countries from which participants were selected. In particular, they referred to France and Israel as countries that had consistently faced the threat of terrorism. The authors highlighted the fact that the semi-structured, in-depth interviews were carried out by experienced interviewers, lasting an average of 45 minutes. The data were collected over a period of six months. This information reveals the significant amount of resources needed to conduct a qualitative and comparative study and may be indicative that this type of research is rare when considering literature on the analysis of perception of security issues.

Regarding quantitative research, the cross-national analysis of the perception of security issues was at the centre of the Special Eurobarometer 464b (2017). The sample, composed of 28,093 European citizens, was drawn from 28 Member States of the EU from various social categories. The study was conducted by means of a survey administered through a face-to-face interview at home and in the native language of the participants. Eurobarometer perhaps represents the most comprehensive work on this topic and, given the number of countries considered, the amount of data collected and the rigorousness through which the research procedure has been presented, can be considered a yardstick against which future comparative studies on the perception of security issues would be developed. Moreover, the range of topics investigated provided a thorough analysis of dimensions such as perceptions of overall security, perceptions of specific security issues

and perceptions of the operations undertaken by law enforcement authorities to combat security threats.

The Special Eurobarometer 464b Summary of Europeans' attitudes towards security was not the only version of the Eurobarometer concerning citizens' perceptions of security issues. Indeed, through the Special Eurobarometer 499, Europeans' perceptions of issues related to cybersecurity were also analysed (2020). In particular, the data collection was carried out in October 2019 by the data analytics firm Kantar. The sample consisted of 27,607 EU citizens from 28 EU member states. The participants came from different social and demographic categories. As it had happened in other versions of the Eurobarometer, the study was conducted through a survey administered through a face-to-face interview at home, in the native language of the participants. Among the topics analysed, it is worth mentioning the internet use by respondents, the participants' awareness and experience of cyber-crimes, the personal experience of cyber-crime and the perceptions of the responsibility of institutions to provide assistance related to cyber-crime. Overall, such a comprehensive investigation of citizens' perceptions of cybersecurity confirms the importance given by security studies to cyber-threats potentially undermining national security.

Regarding the research methods used to collect data in this selection of comparative studies, the work conducted by Nacos and colleagues is noteworthy (2007). In the study, the authors considered news media coverage of political statements made by the US government on the matter of terrorism and the messages or statements made by Osama Bin Laden or al Qaeda. The authors conducted a content analysis of early evening TV newscasts of ABC News, CBS News and NBC News. The authors examined segments containing the following terms: threat(s), alert(s), or warning(s) in the period October 1, 2001 – December 31, 2004. Moreover, they retrieved surveys and polls investigating citizens' perception of security threats and their level of approval for then US President George W. Bush's administration. Nacos and colleagues' study is significant because it represents the most detailed investigation of the relationship between citizens' attitudes towards the government and the news coverage of political and terror statements in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks.

In summary, the choice of research methods used to conduct comparative studies on perceptions of security issues reflected the topics under investigation and ranged from self-completion questionnaires to semi-structured in-depth interviews and content analysis. In the next few sections, as was done for the other types of research design, two more aspects of the studies considered in this review are presented.

Conclusions

This article was conceived as a review of the modalities through which past research has investigated citizens' perceptions of security issues. Particularly, it started with the presentation of the review process carried out to analyse the current literature on the topic. The central part of the article involved a review of existing studies investigating citizens' perceptions of security issues. For the sake of clarity, Bryman's categorisation of research designs has been employed to present these studies in a coherent manner (2016). Following this pattern, the principal experimental, cross-sectional, longitudinal, and comparative studies have been reviewed, considering the research methods used. The main advantages and limitations of research designs and methods were indicated. Overall, it emerged that a significant part of the current literature on the topic is formed by experimental and cross-sectional studies, with fewer longitudinal and comparative studies. Another remarkable outcome of this review is the finding that only a limited number of studies analysed dimensions other than verbal. Future research may address this limitation and provide further evidence to the study of citizens' perceptions of security issues.

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ARABIC IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT*

Alexandra-Gabriela STAVRE*

Abstract:

We are human beings that live in "spheres". These could be found in a wide variety and could take different forms. They are either narrow, more common to us, or wide, so wide that we could never imagine. However, we tend to be too preoccupied with ourselves, and thus with the narrow spheres. In the end, our field of view gets smaller and smaller and we eventually lose sight of what matters the most: the wide sphere. This story may sound too childish, too insignificant for us to take into consideration, but this is actually the vivid image of the present world. As individuals, we live in specific communities, thus in continuous interaction with other members of society, hence with the Arabs as well. This social phenomenon appeared in ancient times. Their culture has always fascinated us, especially since their influences in various fields have intertwined with the European civilization. But, in order to come to understand and, therefore, accept this culture, it was and still is necessary for the Arabic language to be studied. Thus, this process should become a priority for us as there is the need for removing certain cultural and communication barriers. The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of the importance of studying Arabic. This goal would not lead to the decrease or elimination of the "spheres" that each one of us lives in, but to their union so as to create strong bonds based on mutual understanding and cooperation.

Keywords: *Arabic, social phenomenon, acceptance, understanding, cooperation.*

Introduction

"Who are «they», who are «we», how and to what extent could and can those "they" and this "we" be closer?" (Vainovski-Mihai, 2008, p. X).

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* Student "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" Police Academy of Bucharest, Romania. Email address: alexgabriela2k@yahoo.com

The migration of Arabs to Europe, an issue that generates discussions at the highest levels, urges us, as European citizens and, in particular, of the European Union, to ask ourselves this question.

In the countries of origin, Arabs face unprecedented situations, which lead them to emigrate and come to European countries, where they seek not only a better life, but especially a certain sense of security. Here, they are subjected to acculturation, which is “a process of social, psychological and cultural change, which comes from balancing two cultures, while individuals adapt to the dominant culture of society” (See more on <https://ro.qaz.wiki/wiki/Acculturation#Culture>). Thus, they integrate into the new culture, while preserving their own values and traditions. It is our duty to accept them, to understand them, but especially to help them integrate into a different world compared to the one they knew. This is possible by knowing their language in order to give them that feeling of familiarity, even protection.

The entire European Community is currently trying to find ways to do this. There are relatively few people who know this language and culture, as a result of which we still do not know how to manage the situation. That is why I wrote this article in order to promote the study, knowledge and understanding of both the Arabic language and culture among European citizens.

Through this paper, I set out to familiarize the readers with Arabic, which tends to occupy an important place in today's European society. It is no coincidence that I chose to talk about this topic, because regarding the evolution of study offers in the European Union, we notice that the top 10 most common languages studied include: 5 main EU languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Italian), 3 from outside EU (Russian, Chinese, Arabic), as well as Latin and ancient Greek (Eurydice Report, 2017, p. 46).

Moreover, in Malta, in addition to English, for all students in middle school and high school, the offer also includes Arabic. Why? This is the reason why the article will also include a short historical presentation of the evolution of the Arabs, as well as the imprint left by them on the European territory – the conquest of Malta being closely linked to that of Sicily (Eurydice Report, 2017, p. 47).

The aim of this paper is to acquaint the reader with elements of the Arab civilization, culture and language.

The objectives I set myself to achieve through this study are the following:

- to present specific aspects of the Arab culture that we find in different forms in the European world;
- to promote the study of Arabic language in the current European context as a language of international circulation;
- to exemplify elementary linguistic structures;
- to identify social and cultural problems in order to prevent them;
- to highlight distinctive situations through which we could succeed in integrating immigrants of Arabic origin who are on the territory of the European Union.

To achieve these goals, it is important to start with intercultural communication, using both the knowledge of the values and beliefs of these social groups from certain regions, and the links between knowledge and communication skills.

The methodology used in writing this study is that of historical research, used in order to gather information and study the cultural and linguistic evolution of the Arab people. The research tool used for this purpose refers to the study of documents as to know the social life of Arab civilization in different historical periods, based on the study of the past correlated with the present.

Expected results of the research:

- highlighting specific aspects of the Arab culture;
- identifying distinctive elements of the Arabic language;
- correlating the elements of culture and language in the Arab civilization;
- observing the historical and cultural advantages of Arab influence in the European world.

Possible impact of research in the field:

- spark the curiosity of European citizens and their desire to know the Arab culture, civilization and language;
- increase the number of European countries that implement the study of Arabic in schools;

- better integration of immigrants into the labour market in order to avoid social and economic problems;
- achieve social cohesion beyond cultural and religious differences.

The foundations of Islam from Muhammad's perspective

Muhammad was an Arab politician and the founder of Islam. He was the prophet who received several revelations, which later outlined the Qur'an, the holy book of Muslims.

Born in Mecca in 570 AD, Muhammad gained the trust of the people around him in both his personal and professional life. Following the preaching of his revelations, he was persecuted and emigrated to Medina. After a series of wars, he conquered the city of Mecca and turned it into the centre of Islam. His vision led to the birth of this new civilization, using jihad as a means of accomplishment, which represented the effort towards a worthy goal (Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammad>).

“Muhammad's life, in both its important and minor aspects, has established rules that millions of people respect and conscientiously imitate even today. No other personality in human history, considered the Perfect Man, has been so scrupulously imitated” (Hogarth, 2008, p.79).

During his lifetime, Muhammad managed to build a nation that had not been united until then, creating a true state, laying the foundations of a religion practiced by a very large number of people, building an empire that included the main territories of the civilized world in that period. From him comes the book that is the foundation of an entire religious community which is spread today in almost every corner of the world (Hitti, 2008, p. 80).

Islam is a Universalist religion. The Qur'an is a true-life guide for all Muslims, modelling their behaviour considerably, and emphasizing the fundamental unity of people – they are all identical by nature. A Muslim tradition clearly states that “All men are equal, like the teeth in a weaver's comb; there is no difference between a white man and a black man, between an Arab and a non-Arab, except to the extent that they fear God” (Drimba, 1987, p. 208).

The Qur'an urges contempt for wealth, generosity, moderation, but does not recommend their exaggeration: "Eat and drink, but be not drunk" (Qur'an, VII, 29). The Qur'an is a text to which many references are often made, as it represents not only a basis for theology, but also for education, jurisprudence, morals, science.

It includes, in addition to religious dogmas, norms of civil and criminal law (among which we can mention regulations regarding marriage, divorce, murder, theft), as well as social and political precepts (Hitti, 2008, p. 81-82).

Regarding the Islamic religion, Ovidiu Drîmba (1987), a well-known literary historian, quoted W. Montgomery Watt:

"In the Islamic religious institution, the central role belongs to law, jurisprudence, and not to theology or liturgy. In Islam, the evolution of law has been led with great spiritual tension, comparable to that which Christianity has dedicated to theology (...) because from the beginning Islam was associated with a political community, and not just a purely religious community. (...) It is true that in Islam heresy was punished; but it was primarily a legal issue, which often had a political reference. In a sense, theology has been directly subordinated to jurisprudence (p. 280)."

The Qur'an was used for both worship and education, being used as a textbook from which Muslims learn to read and write in Arabic. As it represents the "spelling book" of this language, Arabic dialects could not be considered distinct, official languages. Thus, Muslims can understand each other in writing, because they use the same language, namely the classical language of the Qur'an. In speech, precisely because of the existence of these dialects, understanding and communication are very difficult to achieve (Hitti, 2008, p. 83).

This text exerts a great influence as the foundation of Islam, proving to be a strong stimulus for knowledge. The ideas and themes addressed by this text in various spiritual, ethical and scientific fields are considered by all Muslims as aspects that are part of one and the same "truth" of the world (Drîmba, 1987, p. 285).

A peculiarity of the Qur'an is that it urges believers to investigate the reality of things and phenomena, thus promoting direct observation and discovery of the surrounding reality:

"The whole scientific culture of the Arabs is a practical, concrete wisdom, based on the necessities of life, acquired through observation and experience. It has nothing theoretical or bookish" (Arnaldez, 1987, p.296).

Elements of culture

During the geographical expansion of Muslims, the behaviour of the communities they subjugated played a key role. For example, Jews and Christians, being persecuted by the Byzantines, welcomed the Arabs openly, with joy. As conquerors, the latter were right, as Muhammad told them to "treat the people of other countries with kindness" (Essa, Ali, 2019).

Muslims were open to other cultures, clearly expressing their desire to learn specific elements. In any conquered region, Islam laid the foundations of an evolved lifestyle. The imprint left by this civilization is visible even today in a large number of cities around the world. The conquests of the Arabs differed from those of other peoples in that they were more lenient with the nations discovered in the occupied regions. In these areas, Islam has improved life and helped to develop many fields of activity, such as economics, trade, and education.

The Muslims built cities, military garrisons, which over time became independent settlements, thus Cairo being born. The main capital, from a cultural point of view, was Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasids, created with the aim of expanding learning and knowledge. Moreover, during this dynasty led by the caliphs, Arabic became the official language and legal, administrative and military institutions were established. However, in 1258 AD, the Mongols destroyed Baghdad and its libraries, its intellectual base.

Although the Islamic people conquered many countries and imposed their own governmental system, they remained a minority ethnic group. This has been the case in countries such as India (they conquered the Indus Valley in the 8th century), Spain (the Umayyad Caliphate conquered Spain between 711 and 718) and Sicily (827-902).

In all these regions, the Arabs brought economic and social reforms, while maintaining the existing administrative structures. This expansion was based on the warrior spirit and religious support of the Muslims.

After the conquest of Spain, Sicily and Malta, the territorial expansion of the Arabs ceased, leaving behind cultural elements in the field of arts and knowledge regarding agriculture. As a result of these Islamic influences, the three regions have reached a higher level of development than the rest of Europe. The city of Cordoba became an important intellectual centre throughout the world. During this period, Sicily was a link between Europe and Islam. In Palermo, Arabic-style buildings that remain today have been constructed.

Muslim influence was also strong in the field of geography, as sailors introduced to the European world maps of Europe, Asia and Africa, as well as knowledge of travel diaries. They also managed to help traders travel easily and safely through the Mediterranean Sea, between China and Spain.

As we have seen before, they made a significant contribution to agriculture, which is an essential way in which they managed to expand their dominance. Thus, Muslims have contributed to the development of this field by spreading products with high agricultural potential and by introducing practices of useful exploitation of fertile land, as well as innovative irrigation systems. All this led to economic developments in the conquered countries, especially Spain, and to increased trade between European regions and Asia.

In all areas under Islamic domination, philosophy has left its mark mainly due to its distinct features. Despite their theological character, Arab philosophy focused mainly on science, on reason, the two being of great interest. This sphere presents elements specific to Greek philosophy, as the intellectuals of Arab origin, who were, for the most part, also scientists, were inspired by the themes and ideas of Plato and Aristotle.

Islamic art has an original character due to the rigor imposed by religion. Any creation, regardless of the period, geographical space or artistic style (architecture, painting, sculpture) in which it falls, renders certain general elements: lack of a clear distinction between sacred and profane, the pre-eminence of religious architecture, the ban on

representing human and animal figures, an enormous production of artistic crafts.

As specific architectural elements of the Islamic world, present in Europe since the middle Ages, we distinguish: domes, arches, polychrome decoration with enamelled ceramics.

Cultural exchanges in the artistic field between Westerners and Muslims are due, on the one hand, to trade and the transmission of works of art from one civilization to another, and on the other hand, to the Crusades, which allowed Europeans to come into contact with the Arabic art.

When we talk about literature, the Arab world has been a channel for the transmission to the West of stories and legends taken from Persia and India. Although the Qur'an is a text that includes both religious teachings and jurisprudence, it is the starting point of Islamic prose, as it renders valuable passages from a literary point of view. Therefore, in the current geopolitical context, we must not minimize the influence of the culture of the Arab world throughout history in the European territory.

Arabic language

General Aspects

“Language is, as it is known, a historical product – born from the need for communication – of a society: examining it, we cannot ignore the society that gave birth to it and that it serves” (Anghelescu, 1986, p. 9).

Arabic (اللغة العربية) is an official language in several African and Asian countries. Both the literary, official Arabic, and various Arabic dialects are used. In some states, namely the ones Islam left its mark on after the conquests, Arabic is used as a language of cult and worship (e.g. Western China, Indonesia and Pakistan). Currently, as a result of the migration phenomenon, there are Islamic communities all over the world, so in Europe as well. Thus, in 1974, the United Nations adopted Arabic as one of the working languages.

Like any other language, Arabic undergoes transformations because it is subject to modern influences of other languages (e.g. borrowed terms – سكرتير “secretary”; راديو “radio”) and creates new words derived from an existing lexical basis (for example, I will use the one that all connoisseurs know and that is also in the virtual space: قطار “train” –

the basic meaning was that of a “string of camels”, “caravan” that looks similar to a train). Thus, we can talk about classical Arabic, including the Qur’anic form, specific to the pre-Islamic period and the Abbasid era, literary Arabic or standard modern Arabic, used today, but not in everyday communication, but only in formal context, and dialectal Arabic, colloquial.

In the study of Arabic, the phenomenon of diglossia appears, a socio-linguistic situation of the language that involves the use of two distinct forms of the same language in different situations. Charles Albert Ferguson, an American linguist, studied this phenomenon and explained the two variants of the Arabic language. The upper one is a standard one, studied at school at any level and then used in official contexts (books, magazines, documents), while the lower one is the one learnt in the family environment, being used in everyday life.

While the first variant of this language is a general one, which helps individuals with higher education in all Arab countries understand each other, the second is closely related to dialectal forms, which differ from one state to another and come as a communication barrier. For example, an Egyptian and a Lebanese will only be able to have a coherent discussion if they both use literary Arabic, so the upper version.

Arabic not only borrowed words from other languages, but also gave a large number of terms to other languages. This was due, on the one hand, to religion in Islamized countries, and on the other hand, to direct contact with different civilizations (Spain, Sicily – here we find words in the field of agriculture). The Romanian language also came into contact with the Arabic language, but indirectly, through Greek and Turkish.

The influences of the Arabic language are found throughout Europe in various fields as a result of the vast culture of this people. Examples: “algebra”, “number”, “coffee”, “assassin”, “caravan”, “sugar”, “sherbet”, “lemon”.

The Arabic writing system

With the writing of the text of the Qur’an, the Arabic alphabet developed. At first, it was written using only consonants, the short vowels not being noted. Over time, they also appeared, thus making the

difference, in writing, between consonants. Today, these differentiations can be made using a system that includes the following signs:

- three for short vowels: (a) = َ; (u) = ُ; (i) = ِ, (these are either above or below the consonants)
- one to indicate the absence of the vowel after a consonant (◌ْ);
- one to indicate a double consonant (◌ّ);
- one to indicate the extension of the vowel “a” (◌ِ).

Short vowels are used in books designed for the study of the Arabic language, but also in the Qur'an, in order to facilitate the understanding of texts. Therefore, in this paper, I will use, in some examples, short vowels.

Unlike the Latin alphabet, in the Arabic alphabet the writing is done from right to left. Here we do not talk about capital letters, print writing or handwriting, but we identify different writing styles and various shapes that the letters have depending on the place they occupy in a word.




Photo 1: Writing the letter ي isolated, at the beginning of the word, in the middle of it and at its end (Source: the own contribution of the author)

When we talk about the Arabic language, a special place is occupied by calligraphy, being considered an art form. It is used to transcribe verses from the Qur'an, but also proverbs.

Communication skills

When discussing about learning and using a language, we refer to individuals who participate in this act and who use certain skills that allow them to perform actions. The context in which the communication takes place is very important. This aspect must be seen from a double perspective: both the internal one, of the individual involved in the communication act, and the external one, his relationship with the other social actors.

The verbal interaction done face to face implies a common situational framework for the interlocutors that allows a certain exchange of information that would lead to the achievement of the objectives, overcoming the social and cultural differences of those involved. Communication is done in different areas: personal, public and professional. This involves choosing a strategy that will lead individuals to achieve the proposed goal, performing various tasks such as: buying an object, establishing new interpersonal relationships, obtaining an employment contract.

Communication involves three types of skills: linguistic, sociolinguistic and pragmatic competence. Linguistic competence refers to the lexical, phonetic and syntactic knowledge of the language, which an individual acquires through various learning experiences. Sociolinguistic competence influences communication between people belonging to different cultures and refers to their sociocultural area. Here we can talk about addressing, politeness, presentation formulas that facilitate interpersonal communication. Pragmatic competence involves the use of linguistic resources and sends us to the coherent realization of a discourse in different cultural situations and environments.

Starting from these general notions, I will refer to some possible topics of communication with an interlocutor of Arab origin. The topics I propose are from different fields so that the interaction is as familiar as possible:

1. general characterization (أَنَا سَلِيمٌ. أَنَا مِصْرِيٌّ. أَنَا مِنَ الْقَاهِرَةِ. أَنَا طَالِبٌ فِي (جَامِعَةِ بُخَارَسْتِ)) I am Salim. I am Egyptian. I am from Cairo. I am a student at the University of Bucharest;

2. house, environment (حَدِيقَةٌ - “garden”; شَجَرَةٌ - “tree”);
 3. travel (بَحْرٌ - “sea”; مَسْرَحٌ - “theatre”);

When studying any foreign language, particularly important are the addressing formulas: 1. Greetings: مَرْحَبًا! - “Hello!”; 2. Goodbye formulas: مَعَ السَّلَامَةِ! - “Goodbye!”; 3. Official addressing forms in current language: كَيْفَ حَالُكَ يَا سَيِّدَةَ نَبِيلَةَ؟ - “How are you, Mrs Nabila?”; 4. Formulas of thanks: شُكْرًا! - “Thank you!”; عُفْوًا! - “With pleasure!”.

The study of a language is achieved by performing work tasks through learning strategies: it starts, as we have seen, from greeting formulas, to words and grammatical structures, and then to short cohesive texts.

In order to fully understand the applicability of Arabic, I will use a short text and some exercises, based on which I will come with solutions and explanations regarding some Arabic grammar rules. The text, as well as the exercises are inspired from courses taught by the professors at the University of Bucharest – Faculty of Foreign Languages.

أحمد طالب في جامعة بوخارست. درس أحمد في كلية الهندسة في جامعة عراقية. عائلته في بغداد وبيته الكبير في بغداد أيضا. بيته في العراق جميل جدا. في ذلك البيت عائلته. أبوه مدرس في مدرسة ثانوية قريبة من بيته وأمه طبيبة في المُسْتَشْفَى من مدينة بعيدة جدا من بغداد. أمام بيت أحمد مكتبة وطنية. كتب أحمد هناك كتابا صغيرا عن تاريخ الحاسوب. انتقل أحمد من بغداد إلى عاصمة رومانيا لمتابعة الدراسة في جامعة بوخارست. الآن هو في مسكن الطلاب في غرفة صغيرة. تسلم الأمس رسالة إلكترونية من صديقه محمد وفي هذه الرسالة وجد صورا كثيرة مع عائلته. محمد في بغداد وهو تلميذ في المدرسة الثانوية.

Ahmad is a student at the University of Bucharest. He studied at the Faculty of Engineering at a university in Iraq. His family is in Baghdad, and his big house is also in Baghdad. His house in Iraq is very beautiful. In that house lives his family. His father is a teacher at a high school near his home, and his mother is a doctor at a hospital in a city far from Baghdad. In front of Ahmad's house is the National Library. There, Ahmad wrote a small book about the history of the computer. Ahmad moved from Baghdad to the Romanian capital city to continue his studies at the University of Bucharest. Now he is in a dormitory for students in a small room. Yesterday he received

an e-mail from his friend Muhammad, and in this e-mail he found many pictures with his family. Muhammad is in Baghdad and he is a high school student.

Comments based on text:

1. All verbs are in the past tense, third person, singular, masculine, as this coincides with the infinitive variant of the verb. For example, *دَرَسَ* means, at the same time, “to study”, but also “he studied”.

2. Verbs are found at the beginning of sentences.

3. In constructions of the type *أَحْمَدُ طَالِبٌ* (Ahmad is a student), the copulative verb “to be” is absent, being thus composed only of the subject and predicative noun. These constructions are called “nominal sentences”.

4. In Arabic, when we speak of articulated and unarticulated nouns, we actually use the expression “definite or indefinite noun”. If a definite common noun appears, the article *ال* will appear before it, and at the end, one of the short vowels (, ,) depending on the case of the noun. If the term is indefinite, the article in front of it disappears, and at the end one of the signs “َ”, “ِ”, “ِ” also appears depending on the case. As an example, I will give the vocalized forms of some words found in the text: *طَالِبٌ* – “student” (nominative case); *فِي ذَلِكَ الْبَيْتِ* – “in that house” (the genitive). Also, with regard to the latter example, it should be noted that prepositions preceding nouns always require the genitive case, rendered by “ِ” to defined nouns and “ِ” to indefinite nouns.

5. In order to render possession, we can observe, in the text, two ways: by the affix pronoun, which refers to the personal and possessive pronouns in Romanian, and by the phenomenon of *status constructus*.

6. If an affix pronoun is used (example: *عَائِلَتُهُ* – “his family”), the article *ال*, which reproduces the definition (articulation) of a term, disappears. Therefore, we can say that the affix pronoun plays both the role of showing possession and the definition of a noun.

7. If a *status constructus* is used to render possession, an unexpected phenomenon occurs. *عَنِ تَارِيخِ الْحَاسُوبِ* means “about the history of the computer”. Thus, if in Romanian, both nouns are articulated, in Arabic it appears totally at the second term (both the article at the beginning of the word and the short vowel at the end can be

observed) and partially at the first (the lack of the article is observed, but the presence of the short vowel determined by the preposition “about” - عَنْ). Moreover, the second noun will be in the genitive case, the first being in any of the three cases (nominative, accusative, genitive).

8. In the case of nouns that render objects, their plural form is accompanied by an adjective in the feminine gender, in the singular: صُورًا كَثِيرَةً - “many pictures”. Here we have the plural form of the word “picture” accompanied by the feminine form, singular number of the term “much”.

Exercises:

1. Translate:

A. into English

- a. كل الطلاب موجودون هنا الآن. = All students are now present here.
 b. هل شاهدتم كل الفيلم؟ = Have you seen all the movie?
 c. هل كل موظف في المكتب؟ = Is every employee at the office?
 d. قرأ صديقي كل الكتاب أمس. = My friend read all the book yesterday.
 e. ذهب كل الأصدقاء إلى المسرح أمس. = All my friends went to the theatre yesterday.
 f. هل شاهدت كل امرأة هذا الفيلم؟ = Has every girl seen this movie?
 g. قرأت كل الجملة. = I have read all the sentence.
 h. كل الأساتذة في هذه الجامعة مصريون. = All the professors of this university are Egyptian.
 i. ذهبنا إلى فرنسا كل سنة. = We have been to France every year.

Through this exercise, we can observe the use of the word كل in different situations. For it to have the meaning of “each”, it is followed by an indefinite noun in the singular: كُلُّ مُوظَّفٍ - “each employee”. To have the meaning of “whole/all”, كل must be followed by a definite noun or an affix pronoun in the singular: كُلُّ الفِيلمِ - “the whole movie”. To render the meaning of “all”, كل is followed by a definite noun or an affix pronoun in the plural: كُلُّ الطُّلابِ - “all student”. It could also be seen that كل is the first term in the *status constructus*, which means that the second one will be in the genitive case. Of course, in all these examples, كل could be found in

any of the three cases (nominative, accusative, genitive) depending on the context.

B. into Arabic

- a. Arabic is an easy language. Romanian is a difficult language.
اللغة العربية لغة سهلة. اللغة الرومانية لغة صعبة.
- b. This doctor is famous. The famous doctor has written a book.
هذا الطبيب مشهور. كتب الطبيب المشهور كتاباً.
- c. That is the new professor. That new professor is at the University of Bucharest.
تلك هي المدرسة الجديدة. تلك المدرسة الجديدة في جامعة بخارست.
- d. The Christmas tree is in our house.
شجرة عيد الميلاد في بيتنا.
- e. This lesson is very important. Today's lesson is beautiful.
هذا الدرس مهم جداً. درس اليوم جميل.

2. Deny the following sentences by using the correct form of ليس:

- a. هم من السعودية. – ليسوا من السعودية.
- b. أنتنّ في مدرسة خاصة. – لستنّ في مدرسة خاصة.
- c. نحن أساتذة في جامعة الأزهر. – لسنا أساتذة في جامعة الأزهر.
- d. هنّ في مكتب الرئيس. – لسن في مكتب الرئيس.
- e. هم من فرنسا. – ليسوا من فرنسا.
- f. أنا طالبة لبنانية. – لست طالبة لبنانية.
- g. أنت السيدة فريدة. – لست السيدة فريدة.
- h. هي مديرة المكتب. – ليست مديرة المكتب.
- i. هو أستاذ زائر. – ليس أستاذ زائر.

Through this exercise, we could observe the use of the verb ليس. Regarding its use, certain peculiarities could be found:

1. It represents the negative form of the verb "to be".
2. Although it is conjugated in past tense, it has present tense meaning. For example, لَيْسُوا مِنْ فَرَنْسَا is translated into "He is not from France", not into "He was not from France".

3. In the case of nominal predicates, the predicative name will be in the accusative case: *لَيْسَتْ مُدِيرَةَ الْمَكْتَبِ* - "She is not the director of the office".

4. Conjugation:

Translation (plural)	Plural		Translation (singular)	Singular	
We are not	لَسْنَا	نَحْنُ	I am not	لَسْتُ	أَنَا
You are not (masculine)	لَسْتُمْ	أَنْتُمْ	You are not (masculine)	لَسْتَ	أَنْتَ
You are not (feminine)	لَسْتُنَّ	أَنْتُنَّ	You are not (feminine)	لَسْتِ	أَنْتِ
They are not (masculine)	لَيْسُوا	هُمْ	He is not	لَيْسَ	هُوَ
They are not (feminine)	لَسْنَ	هُنَّ	She is not	لَيْسَتْ	هِيَ

Conclusions

Given the current socio-political context in the European Union, here referring to the migration of Arab citizens, I consider it necessary for more and more Europeans to know elements of culture and civilization of these ancient people, so implicitly to study the Arabic language.

Through the examples provided and the explanations given, I wanted to arouse interest and demonstrate that Arabic, beyond the specific alphabet, is a light, beautiful and, last but not least, mysterious language. Studying it must be seen as a personal and interpersonal development.

By studying and understanding the language, we are no longer afraid of the new and unknown, we can unravel this mysterious people, we can prevent social and cultural misunderstandings and we can prevent possible antisocial acts that may occur at the confluence of several cultures.

This paper considers social and cultural situations in several areas:

- the public domain aimed at social exchanges (trade relations, public services, cultural activities);
- the personal field includes individual family and social ties;
- the professional field includes the activities of an individual and his relations at work;
- the educational field is that in which the person acquires specific knowledge and skills in various contexts in order to be trained.

A person is a set of moral and intellectual traits, attitudes with a certain character that manifest differently in social interaction. Everyone's attitudes, behaviour, temperament must be considered when talking about acceptance and integration. The existential competence of a European citizen, an integral part of a cultural context, must be expressed cordially and openly to another culture, namely the Arab one.

People are able to understand and be aware of the cultural and social diversity of peoples, as well as the contribution of different nations to the enrichment of the universal heritage. They have the ability to establish a close link between European and Arab culture, to discover strategies for establishing relations with Arab citizens, to manage possible linguistic, socio-economic and political misunderstandings.

Results obtained after carrying out the study:

Following the historical research, we highlighted relevant aspects of the Arab culture, starting with the Qur'an and Muhammad, the foundations of Islamic society, and then continuing with a brief historical presentation. Thus, we noticed that the Arabs have always had a rich, vast culture, which they shared with the Europeans.

In the article we identified elements characteristic of Arabic: writing from right to left, calligraphy, writing only with consonants and differentiating between them in various ways and, last but not least, the existence of several variants of this language, variants that pose problems even between native interlocutors. Through the study of documents, we noticed and managed to correlate various elements of culture with the linguistic ones. For example, calligraphy, a specific aspect of the Arabic language, is of particular importance among the arts.

We have also highlighted the influences that Islamic domination has left behind, in various fields, on the conquered European peoples. These fingerprints have endured over time, being visible even today.

The knowledge of a people implies the accumulation through education, information, experience of some elements regarding geography, historical transformations, economy, politics, social relations developed over a longer period of time. It is beneficial to all individuals involved in the evolution of European society in the contemporary era.

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**GOING DIGITAL: TARGETING MILLENNIALS
IN THE MILITARY SECTOR.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DIGITAL PRESENCE OF EUROPEAN
MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS**

Alexandra POPESCU (ANGHEL)*

Abstract:

Technology became the new reality in the 21st century, changing the rules of the game in terms of education, employment, social engagement and other vital aspects of the society – from new instruments of production, new communication tools, medical innovations to new generations that were born in a technological era, craving for more digital content, making it difficult for the labor market to cope with all their requirements and needs. In this context, one can conclude that there is a need for education institutions (especially military ones, which tend to be more conservative) to rethink their strategies and methods used for recruiting the younger generations, so as to be able to meet their expectations, as well as to adapt to the fast changes generated by future technological developments. Therefore, the article aims to define, based on a process of literature review, the main characteristics of the Millennials generation, especially in terms of job expectations and labor market opportunities. Based on their portrait, the article will analyze the digital presence of military higher education institutions across Europe, by conducting a case study based on open source information on the most used social platforms by Millennials.

Keywords: Millennials, technology, military higher education, job expectations, digital profile.

Introduction

In the past years, the worldwide society went through several transforming processes, outlined by the various changes and developments experienced. Probably one of the most important factors

* PhD student, University of Bucharest, Doctoral School of Sociology, Email address: alexandra.popescu@drd.unibuc.ro.

that determined important social challenges was (and continues to be) technology – the social reality of the 21st century. In comparison with the previous decades, technology has become nowadays part of each daily activity, starting from online shopping, online doctor appointment to online finances, online education and so on, generating a real struggle for the older generations to adapt to its functionalities and creating new expectations for the new generations (the digital ones) in terms of labor market and future careers.

Technology has, thus, influenced the personal development processes of the younger generations, creating the so-called *digital natives*, a term used to describe a group of people that have been born in the Internet era, who speak the language of the digital world (Prensky, 2001, p. 1). This aspect has allowed practitioners and academics to focus on and further develop the study of generations, from both theoretical and applied research, trying to (1) increase the existing theoretical knowledge on generational theories (either by continuing the work of their predecessors – demonstrating the applicability of their theories, or by developing new generational theories, based on current social contexts) and (2) define the profile of the representatives of new generations (developing applied studies on various domains, based on the generational theories).

Judging by the above-mentioned aspects, one can say that each private and public company has faced in the last years different challenges in term of recruitment processes, considering the entrance of new generations (such as Millennials) on the labor market. A key component to better calibrate the strategies used to attract, hire and then retain their employees is, therefore, to acknowledge and permanently analyze the profile of the new generation employee profile. And since technology dominates all societal branches, this will be the main factor to be considered when building a recruitment strategy.

In this context, this article would follow two main directions: (1) one that will focus on creating an overall image on the initiatives taken in order to define the main characteristics of the Millennial generation, by conducting a literature review analysis of the relevant papers that tackle this topic and (2) one that will focus on determining the level of technology-oriented vision of military higher education institutions

across Europe, by conducting desk research based on open access information. In the end, the article will try to identify new steps to be taken in order to answer to the following research question: *Can military higher education institutions manage the new generations of students?*

This article represents the first step in answering the above question, by extracting lessons learnt from the analysis of Millennials, starting from the premises that if this generation is considered digital native, then the following generations will definitely take technology as granted and be a more avid consumer of technology, integrating it further in their daily lives. Therefore, establishing the main traits of millennial generation and identifying their behavior in terms of career achievement and recruitment expectation on the labor market can help at developing the main directions in studying the expectations and needs of the following generations (e.g. generation Z) for further development of the recruitment and advertising strategies for vacancies. The second section of the article, which will focus on the digital presence of military higher education institutions in Europe will measure the level of the organizational awareness of military higher education institutions towards the importance of a strong digital presence (especially on social media) in targeting new generations of students/future employees. Given the fact that social media became in the last years the main source of information for younger generations, it is important for higher education institutions (especially the military one, which tend to be more conservative and less transparent) to adapt to the trends determined by new generations and extend their presence on the digital environment to make sure that their messages and information reach the target group in a timely manner.

Millennials – the struggle for a generational profile

The story of generational theories is not recent, the study of the German sociologist Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations” (published in 1927/1928), being considered “the canonical reference point in the field” of the sociology of generations, (Purhonen, 2016, p. 95), the primary analysis lenses for the generations to come (Connolly, 2019, p. 2). However, even though the concept of generation is widely used nowadays, becoming one of the main topics on the research agenda,

academics and researchers have not managed to reach a common definition of the term, facing the same challenge when it comes to generational research: the interdependency between the sociological terms of period, age and generation (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 45).

The same challenge is also encountered when analyzing the Millennials generation (considered the grandchildren of Baby Boomers – born between 1946-1964 and the children of Generation X – born between 1965 to 1985), practitioners, academics and researchers using various time spans in order to define the birth year boundaries of this particular generation: 1980-1995 for the Canadian authors David K. Foot and Daniel Stoffman (Foot & Stoffman, 1998), after 1982 for the American Psychologist Jean M. Twenge (Twenge, 2010, p. 201) or 1984-2007 for the American authors Neil Howe and William Strauss (Howe & Strauss, 2000), whose work is probably one of the most influential in the study of the Millennials generation. In the same manner, this particular generation has benefited from various names that were trying to comprise the description of the lifestyle of the representatives of this generation: starting from Generation Y to Generation Tech, Next Generation, Generation 2000, Boomer Babies (Howe & Strauss, 2000), Generation Me (Twenge, 2006) or Digital Natives (Prensky, 2001).

However, for this paper it will be used as a reference the time span of 1985-2004 in order to define the representatives of the millennial generation. Moreover, in order to avoid any confusions, this particular generation will be referred during this article as Millennials, generation Y or digital natives.

Therefore, when analyzing the existing literature on this topic, one can observe that while the popular press proves to be an important source of information, the academic literature regarding this generation is more limited (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 45). As a consequence, taking into account the three main variables that influence the study of generation (period, age and generation/cohort), the literature on Millennials can be divided into two main categories, based on the different angles used by researchers to tackle the generational differences: (1) cross-sectional designs papers – which focus on studying how different generations interact and develop during the same point in time (transforming period into a constant, and maintaining age and

cohort as dependent variables) and (2) panel studies – which focus on studying how a group of individuals of a particular age develops during different periods of time (transforming age into a constant and maintaining period and cohort as dependent variables) (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 48).

In addition, even though the study of the concept of *generation* has been initiated by European academics (taking into account the *Problem of Generations* paper and the subsequent works that have been published by European authors on the same subject, trying to develop and further apply the theory of Karl Mannheim), in the last years the interest to use this concept in applied studies to further analyze and define the various already-identified and next generations was expressed by American authors, fact demonstrated by the increased number of studies published by different American researchers, practitioners and academics from different domains on this topic. Moreover, when analyzing the existing literature on this topic, one can notice that the business and economic actors were the most interested to describe and explain the *Millennial phenomenon* (see the studies conducted by Pew Research Center in 2007 (Pew Research Center, A Portrait of “Generation Next”. How Young People View Their Lives, Futures and Politics, 2007), 2010 (Pew Research Center, Millennials. A Portrait of Generation Next, 2010), 2014 (Pew Research Center, Millennials in Adulthood. Detached from Institutions, Networked with Friends, 2014), and 2020 (Fry, 2020); by Deloitte in 2008 (Smith, 2008); by Price Waterhouse Coopers in 2008 (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2008) or by Spectrem Group in 2015 (Spectrem Group, 2015). The main reason behind this increased interest is that this generation was preparing for entering on the workforce, becoming one of the main work powers (thus forcing public and private companies and institutions to adapt to their requirements and expectations when building their recruitment and retainment strategies).

Given these aspects, the first part of the article aims to provide a brief presentation of the definitions and portraits developed by different authors for the representatives of the Millennials generation, synthetizing the main characteristics of this generation. And since the majority of the papers on the Millennials generation selected in the

literature review process focuses on the American and Canadian population, the following conclusions will be specific for this cohort, considering the fact that for the general objective of this article these conclusions and findings are culturally bound (Anderson, Buchko, & Buchko, 2016, p. 693).

Starting with popular press and practitioners' journals papers, one of the most cited work on Millennials characteristics is the book published by the American authors Neil Howe and William Strauss, *Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation*, which defines eight main traits of the representatives of this generation (Howe & Strauss, 2000), traits that were also further developed and investigated by other authors, as follows:

- (1) Millennial children were strongly desired by their parents, being vital for their family, community and the society at large – in support of this statement, one can notice the fact that the first wave of Millennials marked the beginning of the decrease in abortion rates within the United States (Strauss & Howe, 1992, p. 342);
- (2) Millennials are one of the most protected American generations (Howe & Strauss, 2000), racially and ethnically diverse, being an active part of the child safety and security phenomenon, as well as of the so-called “decade of the child”, defined by several cultural wars, such as the equal rights for homosexuals' movement and the debate on abortion (Anderson, Buchko, & Buchko, 2016, p. 693);
- (3) Born and raised in a world characterized by a large number of opportunities (Howe & Strauss, 2000) (mainly generated by the technological development that marked the end of the first millennium), Millennials tend to develop a strong sense of confidence and a high level of optimism, appreciating the power and the potential of their generation (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 51);
- (4) Millennials are perceived as spoiled and entitled (Howe & Strauss, 2000), due to their lifestyle – they have been raised in a middle-class environment, as their Baby Boomers parents are proven to be more prosperous than their own parents (the

- Millennials grandparents) (Ng & McGinnis Johnson, 2015, p. 123);
- (5) Millennials prefer working in teams, rather than solving tasks individually (Howe & Strauss, 2000), as a consequence of their parents' choices to encourage them to practice team sports and opt for group learning (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 51);
 - (6) Millennials prove to have higher levels of post-secondary education (Leete, 2006) than previous generations, living in an era with multiple opportunities in terms of education (Howe & Strauss, 2000);
 - (7) Millennials feel the pressure to excel in their personal lives and professional careers, expressing the need to balance these two main aspects of their lives (Howe & Strauss, 2000);
 - (8) Millennials are characterized as conventional, rather than rebellious (Howe & Strauss, 2000), considering that social rules do play an important part in the architecture of the society (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 51).

Howe and Strauss' findings are complemented by the work of practitioners who tried to identify the leading characteristics of this generation, briefly described by the American professors Andrea Hershatter and Molly Epstein in their paper, "Millennials and the World of Work: An Organization and Management Perspective": "To some, Millennials are considered the next 'Greatest Generation', that have the necessary instruments and inclination to construct a better future in a world that witnesses multiple geo-political, economic and environmental crises. To others, they represent the 'Generation Whine', young people that have been so protected and over-indulged that now do not developed the necessary abilities to manage simple routine tasks without guidance or external support. And others question the existence of any differences between Millennials and other generations, while wondering whether the generational moniker and its generated media hype have created a self-fulfilling prophecy" (Hershatter & Epstein, 2010, p. 211).

Two main works (*Generation Me* and *The Narcissism Epidemic*), belonging to the American Psychology professor Jean Twenge, seem to add an archival data perspective on the popular press literature, the

author analyzing a large volume of data from different psychological scales over time in order to define the main traits of the Millennials generation by comparison with previous generations. Therefore, the comparison showed that the Generation Y members (1) tend to be narcissistic, (2) developed a high level of self-confidence and self-esteem, and (3) suffer from anxiety and depression, while being highly extroverted (Twenge, 2006), supporting the already-obtained results from the press. However, even though Twenge's findings have contributed to the development of the Millennials research field, critics expressed concerns with regards to the generational nature of studies and the evidence used to build the conclusions in the *Generation Me* study, as well as with regards to the conclusions draw in *The Narcissistic Epidemic* study (Twenge & Campbell, 2009), because neither author do not have the necessary knowledge and experience in analyzing data regarding psychodynamic treatment of narcissistic disorders, basing their conclusions only on survey data (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 52).

In comparison with the popular press discussion on this topic, the few empirical academic studies that were identified and taken into account for the present article do not present strong evidence for generational differences, highlighting the idea that generations are similar, being influenced only by the social context that characterizes their appearance and development. One of the studies that support this idea belongs to the authors Lucy Cennamo and Diane Gardner, who investigated the differences between three generations (Baby Boomers, Generation X and Millennials) in terms of work values, job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment and intentions to leave on a 504 Auckland employees' sample. The authors identified differences between the generations under scrutiny with regards to the *status* and *freedom* work values (the younger groups placing more importance on these aspects than the older groups) (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008, p. 891), determining the compatibility between a person and his/her employer (organization) as a key component for all of the subjects interviewed. Based on these results, Cennamo and Gardner highlight the fact that the cross-sectional design of the study failed to (1) allow them to determine whether difference between groups were related to life-stage, career-

stage or genuine generational differences (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 53) and (2) to generalize their findings (Cennamo & Gardner, 2008, p. 891).

In addition, the study of the American economist and senior research scientist Alec Levenson, who uses an economic approach to study the particularities of the Millennial generation in comparison with previous generations, demonstrates that simple stereotypes about this generation having more privileges than previous generations are simplistic and not significant for defining the Millennial representative. In his study, the author focuses on the normal life cycle stages through which all generations pass, as well as on the significant differences in economic opportunities each generation experienced, opportunities that have increased for more recent generations as a consequence of the technological boom and globalization process (Levenson, 2010, p. 257). Considering the results of his study, Levenson concludes that popular and business press portrays the transition process from one generation to another as sudden and dramatic, but true changes that considerably impact the interaction of each generation with the labor market proved to be more incremental and gradual from one generation to another. The main problem identified by the author is identifying a way of establishing what changes occur during the lifetime of a generation that can be considered a defining characteristic for that generation (Levenson, 2010, p. 263).

Most of the empirical studies that tried to analyze and create the profile of Millennials were conducted in fields related to economy, marketing and business, since companies, facing the massive retirement of the older employees, felt the urge to better adapt their recruitment and retaining strategies to the needs and expectations of the younger talents. The study conducted by the American professors Jean M. Twenge, Stacy M. Campbell, Brian J. Hoffman and Charles E. Lance on the work values of three generations tries to meet to some extent the need of the companies to better know their new generations of employees (Twenge, Campbell & Lance, 2010, p. 1117). Therefore, the study, which used a time-lagged, nationally representative sample of young people, measured their values at the same age at different points in time, avoiding the confusion between age and generation, by examining the results of questionnaires given to graduating high school seniors in 1976, 1991 and 2006

(representing Baby Boomers, Generation X and Millennials), addressing questions about work centrality, job stability and job characteristics (Twenge, Campbell & Lance, 2010, p. 1133). The data set was organized by the authors into five categories – (1) work centrality, (2) extrinsic values (money, status etc.), (3) intrinsic values (results-oriented job), (4) altruistic values (societal worth, making a difference, helping others etc.) and (5) social values (making friend and acquaintances) – and demonstrated that from a generation to another the importance of leisure values increased and work centrality declined. Extrinsic values scored the highest percentage amongst Generation X representatives, followed by Millennials respondents, Boomers taking the last place in this ranking. On the other hand, intrinsic and social values were more appreciated by the Boomers representatives, in comparison with Millennials that gave these values a lower score (Mastroia & Willits, 2014, p. 55). As a result, authors concluded that there are small to moderate generational differences in work values among the three generations analyzed, Millennials holding stronger values for leisure time and placing more value on work that provides extrinsic rewards, valuing intrinsic and social rewards less than Baby Boomers. An important aspect to be taken into account is that this research should not be interpreted as representative of every worker from a given generation, the study reporting averages (Twenge, Campbell & Lance, 2010, pp. 1133-1138).

Along the same lines, authors Eddy S. W. Ng, Linda Schweitzer and Sean T. Lyons conducted a study that focused on analyzing the career expectations and priorities for the Millennial generation (people born in 1980 or after) and tried to explore differences within this cohort related to a series of factors such as gender, race, year of study and academic performance. The analysis data was collected from a Canadian survey of 23.413 millennial undergraduate university students, assessing the impact of demographic variables and academic achievement on career expectations and priorities, the study representing one of the few studies to examine the demographic heterogeneity within this generation (Ng, Schweitzer & Lyons, 2010, p. 281).

Setting as the main objective of the study the investigation of whether the millennial generation conforms to the popular stereotypes

with respect to their career goals, expectations, and priorities, the authors drew the following conclusions, admitting that these results are subject to limitations taking into consideration the fact that they based their study on self-reported data, which may give rise to social desirability and response-set biases (Ng, Schweitzer & Lyons, 2010, pp. 288-290):

1. Millennials wish for career advancement, and while they chase opportunities for rapid promotions and large pay increases soon after being employed, they also express realistic expectations with regards to their first job (Ng, Schweitzer & Lyons, New, 2010, pp. 288-290);
2. Millennials wish for a nurturing working environment and a good and supportive colleague collective, as a result of the parenting style experience at home and their educational style (predominantly based on team work) (Ng, Schweitzer & Lyons, 2010, p. 290);
3. Millennials are strong promoters of the work-life balance - which, at the moment of the study, meant benefits such as tuition reimbursement, flexible program, onsite meals and friendly environment (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 58).

Complementary to all the above-mentioned traits, one of the most common characteristics of the Millennials generation identified by both popular press and academic researchers is the dependence on technology. Millennials have been born in an era dominated by technology, never knowing a time prior to cell phones, computers and the Internet (Anderson, Buchko & Buchko, 2016, p. 697). They have integrated technology in all aspects of their lifestyle and, therefore, for technology-enabled knowledge workers, work represents now a thing to do, not a place to go to, as Millennials express the tendency to opt for jobs that allow them to work remotely or that promote less formal work environments (Thompson & Brodie Gregory, 2012, p. 242).

Social networks like Facebook, Instagram and most recently, Tik Tok, enabled Millennials to interact in a more facile and effective manner, keeping in touch with many more people that older generations managed to do in the past, aspect which is considered by Millennials as a defining characteristic of their generation, as reported by a research

conducted by Pew Research Center on this topic since 2010, when social networks were still at their beginning (Pew Research Center, 2010). The Millennials inclination towards technology might, as a consequence, translate into their expectations towards their future career and might play an important role in choosing their future workplace (Thompson & Brodie, 2012, p. 242).

In conclusion, the existing literature on the Millennials generation, judging by both categories identified, is based on two main assumptions: (1) each age cohort possesses attitudes and preferences that are considerably different in comparison with other generations and (2) the members of each cohort are homogenous in values, attitudes and preferences. The practitioner and popular press takes the existence of the Millennials generation for granted, attributing to them a series of characteristics such as sheltered, team-oriented, possessing a high level of self-esteem and optimistic, wishing for a career that allows them to maintain a strong balance between work and personal life, while the academic literature strongly questions the existence of any generational delimitations, encountering difficulties in their attempt to analyze first-hand the actual nature of the Millennial phenomenon (Mastrolia & Willits, 2014, p. 64). Therefore, the Millennials are a generation that still needs to be defined, with strong evidence to support and demonstrate their general characteristics.

Analysis of digital profiles – case study of European military higher education institutions

This section of the article will focus on analyzing the digital presence of military higher education institutions across Europe, as a first step in evaluating the level of reform undertaken by this type of institutions in order to adapt to the social realities of the new generations. Creating a profile on the social media platforms most used by the younger generations (such as Millennials or Generation Z) represents a first phase in becoming a relevant actor for the representatives of these generations and in managing to disseminate specific messages and promote educational offers to the certain target groups. Given the fact that social media platforms and new media, in general, have become the main source of information for teenagers, it is

important for all organizations and institutions (especially those with a military profile, which are considered less transparent and more conservative) to have a voice in the online environment that capacitates them to interact with future students/employees and send right messages that can reach the desired target group.

As already mentioned, all private and public institutions are facing challenges in targeting and reaching the new generations of employees, as a consequence of the technological realities the member of the new generations were born and raised to. And since research has proven that Millennials tend to change with ease their jobs and careers so as to better fit their needs (in a study of the Pew Research Center the authors highlighted the fact that almost 60% of employed Millennials have already changed their jobs since the beginning of their professional career) (Pew Research Center, 2010), I consider that is highly important for all companies to invest in studies prospecting the traits of new generations that have recently/now enters the labor market, in order to use efficient instrument to recruit and properly motivate them to keep them in their companies.

One sector that also faces the challenges of recruiting and retaining the new generations of youths is the military sector. Even though states had to adapt to new types of threats and risks to their national security (such as hybrid threats, including disinformation, cyber-attack and so on), military institutions seem to still function on traditionalist principles, expressing reluctance towards integrating new technological instruments in their portfolio of tools in terms of recruitment and training processes. Therefore, the present article tries to explore the extent to which European military institutions adapted to the current technological realities, considering the specificities of the new generations when targeting their future employees.

Methodology

This second part of the article will present the results of a desk research, conducted on a set of Open Source data on the social media profiles of military higher education institutions. Starting from the premises that European military higher education institutions do not use technological instruments to promote their educational offers among the

new generations of students, I have created a database of existing military BA and MA educational programs in European countries, analyzing the social media profiles of those institutions which presented such training programs.

Data was obtained from a desk research on the existing military higher education institutions within Europe, using the Military School Directory as a starting point (the MSD is a global directory of military academies and schools, that covers more than 500 institutions in 133 countries around the world) and Google search engine to complete the information obtained. The database compiled is exclusively based on open source information, analyzing a total of 120 military higher education institutions from 35 countries¹ in terms of educational programs addressed to civil secondary education graduates. The study aimed to identify how many of these institutions have a social profile on the social network platforms most used by Millennials representatives (using as analysis variables the existence of a website and a profile on the following social media platforms - Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and YouTube), creating the premises for a future study focusing on analyzing how institutions use their social media profiles to promote their educational offer and to keep an open communication channel with their possible future students.

Limitations


The conclusions of this study cannot be generalized, taking into consideration the following limitations: (1) the data collected was based on information retrieved from the Internet, some of the webpages identified displaying errors that prevented the access to their information; (2) there is no evidence to support the fact that the list compiled includes all existing higher military institutions; (3) for some institutions, there was not a clear and transparent description of their training programs, thus influencing the resulted statistics; (4) for some

¹ Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom.

countries, the information has been translated into English from their national language, therefore there might have been registered some misinterpretations.


Results

The study concluded that there are 120 military higher education institutions across 35 European countries (as described in Annex 1), out of which only 77 offer BA and MA educational programs addressed to civil secondary education graduates, while the other 34 focus on delivering training programs for military personnel and for 9 of them there was no available information to allow the analysis.



Graphic 1: Military higher education institutions across Europe

With regards to the first variable (website), from these 77 military higher education institutions, only 54 have their own website and 23 of them have a webpage on the official website of the relevant ministry (5 of those who have a website could not be accessed in order to check whether the website belongs to the educational institution or to the relevant ministry).




Graphic 2: Website analysis

The analysis of the social media profiles of these institutions retrieved the following conclusions:

(1) the most popular social media platform amongst military higher education institutions is Facebook (with 58 institutions having a Facebook profile 4 of which do not display any posts);

(2) the other three social media platforms scored approximate similar values, lower than the ones scored by Facebook, but demonstrating the fact that military higher education institutions have embraced technology, improving their presence on the digital “market”.



Graphic 3: Social media presence analysis

Conclusions

Even if the millennial generation has been studied on different levels and in different domains, this generation still needs to be discovered and further efforts must be made in order to identify and construct a generational profile that can be generally applied when analyzing a cohort belonging to this particular generation. Millennials are, indeed, digital natives, the result of the technological boom that characterized the 21st century, but their particularities seem to differ from one culture to another, depending on the geographical region under analysis. However, when talking about the job expectations of the generation Y, the academic literature was able to identify a set of requirements and needs, as follows: less formal work environments, possibility to work remotely, wish for career advancement and chase opportunities for rapid salary increase and promotions and value more their leisure and family time than their career.

The study conducted on the digital profile of the European military higher education institutions showed that social platforms have been integrated within the portfolio of instruments of the military higher education institutions across Europe. Therefore, the study can represent

the premises for a future research on social-media oriented recruitment strategies used by military institutions in order to attract new generations' representatives that better fit their desired professional profile. Therefore, considering the results of this study, a further research can be conducted to analyze (1) the extent to which European military higher education institutions use their social media profiles to promote their educational offers and (2) the content of their educational offers promoted on social media profiles (with a focus on disseminated messages and targeted groups). Another potential topic of research generated by the results of this study is to investigate the willingness of Millennials representatives to opt for a military educational program, based on the awareness raised by the promotion of educational offers in social media, a question that still needs an answer in this regard being *how transparent a military institution should be when promoting its educational offer in order to ensure a high rate of success, while also not violating its internal regulations on classified information and need-to-know principle?* Last but not least, starting from the results presented above, one can also develop a country profile with regards to the digital presence of military institutions in the cyber-world of a country's citizens, making comparisons between different European countries in order to identify the reasons for their choice to focus on a specific social platform or another.

Annex: Military higher education institutions per country

State	Number of military institutions	Number of military institutions that have BA/MA programs	Number of military institutions targeting military officers	Number of military institutions whose websites were not working
Albania	1	0	0	1
Austria	3	1	1	1
Belarus	1	1	0	0
Belgium	1	1	0	0
Bulgaria	3	3	0	0
Croatia	1	1	0	0
Cyprus	0 (trains abroad)	0	0	0
Czech Republic	2	1	1	0
Denmark	1	1	0	0
Estonia	2	1	1	0
Finland	4	4	0	0
France	13	6	5	2
Germany	8	5	3	0
Greece	3	2	0	1
Hungary	1	1	0	0
Ireland	3	2	1	0
Italy	14	4	9	1
Latvia	2	2	0	0
Lithuania	2	2	0	0
Luxembourg	0 (trains abroad)	0	0	0
Macedonia	1	1	0	0
Malta	0 (trains abroad)	0	0	0
Moldova	1	0	0	1
Norway	5	4	0	1
Netherlands	3	3	0	0
Poland	4	4	0	0
Portugal	5	3	2	0
Romania	7	7	0	0
Serbia	2	1	1	0
Slovakia	2	2	0	0
Slovenia	1	0	1	0
Spain	3	2	1	0
Sweden	4	3	1	0
Switzerland	4	1	3	0
Ukraine	8	6	2	0
United Kingdom	5	2	3	0

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GAMES, EXERCISES AND SIMULATIONS

FIRE AT SEA: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN CRISIS SITUATIONS SCENARIO

Ruxandra BULUC*

Purpose:

The purpose of the Fire at Sea scenario is to provide a starting point for a discussion on the various aspects of strategic communication in a crisis situation. The exercise focuses on the following: problem analysis, information analysis, crisis communication and decision-makers' actions in a complex political environment.

Format, role and assignment:

The participants are divided into groups of approximately 5 persons. Each group will act as a high-level, interinstitutional advisory committee in a country called Merania. The committee has been formed to counsel the prime-minister and the cabinet. The assignment is to monitor the developing situation and to provide analyses and recommendations. During the first hours of the crisis, information is scarce. The most important tasks of the committee are:

- To suggest to the government ways to clarify the current situation, to inform the public without causing a panic;
- To anticipate possible complications and to evaluate potential costs and benefits for alternative courses of action.

All groups will receive the same information. New information will be gradually distributed to each group. After a series of reports and messages regarding the situation, each group has to prepare recommendations for the prime minister, on the basis of the questions

* Researcher PhD National Institute for Intelligence Studies, "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy. Email address: buluc.ruxandra@animv.eu

they will be given. The groups will have approximately 30 minutes for each round of discussions. After each round, each group will make a short presentation of the recommendations. The presentation will be delivered by a member of the group, who is designated as a spokesperson. After the presentation, the other groups can ask questions or make comments.

Bear in mind that, as members of the advisory committee, you are responsible to maintain a strategic national perspective as you develop your answers. You do not have specific functions and you can use your own expertise to contribute to the discussions. Remember, you are acting in an advisory, not in a decision-making capacity.

Good luck!

The context

The situation takes place in a fictitious country called Merania. Merania is a medium-sized, quite prosperous country. It is a member of the Defence Allegiance, an international alliance whose goal is to protect member states from foreign aggressions and interferences. The Prime Minister belongs to the centre party Peace and Progress and has made a name for himself in politics by:

- Trying to promote Merania's strategic interests internationally;
- Promoting the country's neutrality in the context in which one of the countries in the area, Urbaen, is a former global power, led by a totalitarian regime which wants to regain its former glory;
- Taking measures meant to ensure the country's energy independence from its neighbours.

Merania is also close to Algesia. Algesia was part of the former Gornian Empire together with Urbaen, but it declared its independence at the beginning of the 1990s and it has been trying ever since to leave Urbaen's sphere of influence and to consolidate a democratic regime. Merania, Algesia and Urbaen have access to the Kutian Sea and military fleets stationed in national harbours.


At the beginning of 2022, the totalitarian regime in Urbaen started a military invasion against Algesia to reconstitute the former Gornian

Empire. The Algesian military forces are fighting against the invading military mostly on the ground and in the air, but there are unconfirmed reports that the two countries' military fleets are also engaged in confrontations in the Kutian Sea. As Algesia is not a member of the Defence Allegiance, neither Merania, nor the other members of the Allegiance can send military forces on the ground in Algesia, but they have supported it with military equipment and supplies, including medical supplies.

In an attempt to ensure Merania's energy independence, which, until the current government came to power in 2018, relied for 50% of its energy resources on imports from Urbaen, the Prime Minister initiated the exploitation of the oil reserves in the country's marine belt in the Kutian Sea. In 2020 was opened the first deep-water drilling platform, Razac, which is two nautical miles inside the Meranian marine belt.

On the 25 June 2022 a fire breaks out at the Razac platform. You are the members of the high-level, interinstitutional advisory committee which support the Meranian government. The group has been tasked with counselling the Prime Minister and the cabinet. Therefore, you have to monitor the evolution of the situation and to offer analyses and recommendations, using the questions you will be given during the exercise as a starting point. Each group will select a spokesperson who will periodically present the recommendations of the advisory group.

Maps 1 and 2: The two maps have been developed using the app Azgaar Fantasy Map Generator and they show the geographical position of the main three actors in the exercise: Algesia, Urbaen and Merania around the Kutian Sea, as well as the location of the Razac deep-water drilling platform. The two maps are at two different scales which are indicated in the bottom right corner.





ADVISORY OCCASION 1**Confidential briefing****From: Merania Coast Guard****To: Prime Minister****Time: 03:55**

We report that at 03:45 local time there was an explosion at the deep-water drilling platform Razac. The fire and the smoke released are visible from the coastline. A patrol ship left for the platform at 03:50 and will send us information as soon as it becomes available. At the moment, it is unclear what caused the explosion and whether there are victims among the personnel on the platform. Attempts to contact the personnel by radio have failed.

We will relay more information as it becomes available.

	<p>Breaking News Time 04:00</p> <p>A massive fire broke out at the deep-water drilling platform Razac, off the coast of the Kutian Sea. The flames are over 20 meters high and are visible from Sprad Harbor.</p> <p>At present, the cause of the fire is unknown, but an anonymous source declares that the platform may have been hit by a supersonic anti-ship missile launched by a ship belonging to either Algesia or Urbaen.</p> <p>As you are aware, military specialists have declared that the two warring states' naval forces could also become directly engaged in the conflict at any time. It appears that this has already happened.</p>
	<p>User273: Did u hear?!?! The Urbaens dropped a bomb, did u see!!! What are we gonna do now? They blew up our platform!!!! The ones</p>

	<p>in charge tell us we are energy independent, but look what that got us when we upset the Urbaens ... we're back where we left from, and if they attack us as well ... 300k likes 100k shares</p> <p>User 898: yeah, yeah, they say the Allegiance will protect us. Suuuuure they give a damn about us. We can see how much they are helping the Algesians, as in not at all. And our leaders don't wanna admit they've got it all wrong 250k likes 4000 shares</p> <p>User 456: Take it easy, we don't know what's happened. Maybe they didn't bomb the platform. We build things so well, that the platform may've broken down by itself 200k likes 1500 shares</p>
	<p>News Time 04:15 Half an hour ago there was a massive explosion at the deep-water drilling platform Razac, located approximately 10 nautical miles off the coast of Merania. The causes of the explosion are still unknown, but there seem to be victims among the crew on the platform. We will present updates as soon as they become available.</p>
	<p>User 1075: We don't know what happened to our husbands!!! Does anyone know? They working on Razac platform and we hear there</p>

	<p>was an accident, but we can't reach anyone. Can somebody tell us?!?! 500k likes 100k shares</p>
	<p>Breaking news Time 04:20</p> <p>Desperate messages from the platform crew's family members are appearing on social media. They are trying to find out what happened to the workers on the platform. We have tried to contact the Oil Company Spartak, but as of yet nobody has replied to our enquiries.</p>

Confidential Briefing

From: Merania Coast Guard

To: Prime Minister

Time: 04:15

The patrol reached the drilling platform and reports that a massive fire has broken out. 10 workers have been saved from a lifeboat near the platform and they report that at least 5 crew members died in the explosion, and nothing is known about another 5. The patrol also reports that an oil spill is starting to extend around the platform, and the fire is fuelled by the gas released from the deep-water drill. We cannot say for sure what caused the fire. It seems that during the night, a fire exchange was visible between the ships belonging to the Algesian and Urbaen navies, but it is unclear if the explosion at the platform was caused by a missile fired by one of the ships.

Confidential Briefing

From: The National Intelligence Agency

To: Prime Minister

Time: 04:15

Sources report that tonight there was a battle at sea between the two Urbaen ships and an Algesian one. The confrontation took place a few nautical miles off Meranian coastal waters and supersonic anti-ship long-range missiles were fired¹.

Summary of the phone conversation between the Secretary General of the Defence Allegiance and the Prime Minister of Merania

Time: 04:20

The Secretary General informed the Prime Minister of Merania that there are satellite recordings of a battle at sea between Algesian and Urbaen ships and it is visible that supersonic anti-ship missiles were fired. It is unclear from the recordings if such a missile went off course and hit the drilling platform.

	<p>Internal confidential report of Spartak Company which operates the deep-water drilling platform Razac</p> <p>Time: 04:30</p> <p>As a result of an inspection last week, it became apparent that the blowout preventer (safety valve) which ensured the ventilation of the gas in the shaft was not working properly, and its immediate replacement was required. But it would take two weeks for a new one to be ordered, delivered and installed.</p> <p>The report indicates that the repairs must be conducted immediately because, if the preventer blows, an explosion can occur on the platform which can endanger the integrity of the platform and the lives of the workers.</p>
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¹ Similar to P-1000 Vulkan.

	It is unclear what, if any, measures were taken by the oil company as a result of this report, and the company representative declined to comment.
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Advisory occasion 1

Day 1

Time: 04:45

The Prime Minister is concerned about the situation and requests the high-level, interinstitutional advisory committee to present an evaluation of the situation. In approximately 30 minutes, you will present your opinions and recommendations to the prime minister. More precisely, the Prime Minister wants answers to the following questions:

- What should the Prime Minister take into account with respect to possible short-term (hours, days, weeks) and long-term (months, years) developments of the situation?
- If the platform was hit by a supersonic anti-ship long-range missile launched by Urbaen, what would be the consequences and what measures should the cabinet take?
- If the platform was hit by a supersonic anti-ship long-range missile launched by Algesia, what would be the consequences and what measures should the cabinet take?
- If the platform exploded because of an equipment malfunction, what measures should the cabinet take?
- What measures are required as a result of the loss of human lives?
- What measures are required from the perspective of an ecological disaster?
- What public statements should the government make? Who should make the statements?

In 30 minutes, the Prime Minister and representatives of the cabinet are expecting the advisory committee recommendations, delivered by the spokesperson.

ADVISORY OCCASION II

	<p>Exclusive statement Time: 06:00</p> <p>Daily News reporters have spoken to a former engineer with the Oil Company Spartak, who, under the protection of anonymity, declared that the company manager had known about the problems with the blowout preventer from the moment it was installed a year ago. But he chose to ignore the problems because the temporary shutdown of the platform to replace the preventer would have cost a lot, and the losses in revenue from the extracted oil would have led to a decrease in the share prices for the company that was at the beginning of its activity.</p> <p>Moreover, several engineers had told the manager that there were only 30% chances for the preventer to break down within the next two years. Therefore, the manager chose to postpone replacing the blowout preventer for two years, during which time the company could prove it is lucrative so that they could afford shutting production down for the period needed to replace the valve (approximately two weeks).</p>
	<p>Emergency Services Report Time: 06:20</p> <p>The coast guard sent a fire extinguishing ship to the area. They are battling the flames that are currently rising 20m into the air and are visible from the coast town Sprad. Search and rescue teams (including divers) have also</p>

	<p>been sent looking for the 5 missing workers. They haven't been found yet.</p> <p>The crews on the ships present in the area report that the oil spill is extending rapidly towards the Meranian shore which it will reach in less than 24 hours unless protective measures are put into place.</p>
	<p>Press release Oil Company Spartak Time: 06:30</p> <p>On the 25th of June 2022, at 03:45, there was an explosion at the deep-water drilling platform Razac, in the Meranian marine belt. As a result of the explosion, 5 workers have lost their lives and 5 are still missing. 10 workers were rescued by the coast guard and are in hospital in Sprad. We offer our heartfelt condolences to the families of the deceased workers and we will continue to support the search and rescue operations for the missing workers.</p> <p>At this moment, the platform is no longer operational, and we are evaluating the oil spill situation in the area. To the extent that the fire is kept under control, we will send a team of engineers to the site to investigate the causes of the fire and to determine the best measures to clean the polluted waters.</p>
	<p>The Independent Ecologists Forum (IEF) Time: 07:30</p> <p>The ecologists warn that the effects of the explosion on Razac platform could have devastating effects on the environment. Firstly, the fire releases large quantities of carbon monoxide into the atmosphere, which</p>

	<p>could adversely affect the flora and fauna on the Meranian coastline. Secondly, the oil spill in the Kutian Sea will reach the coastline in less than 24 hours and will affect the beaches along the shoreline. Fishing must be banned until the water is cleaned so as not to endanger the health of the population.</p>
	<p>User 231: They've done us in, we have nothing left, we were barely recovering from the pandemic and now?!?!?! The tourist season is dead, who's gonna come get covered in oil?!?!? These bastards from the government don't do anything for us!!! They let the oil goons work as they want, do what they want and ofc everything turn out bad and we are the ones who suffer!!!! 200k likes 1500 shares</p> <p>User 8767: Where are the authorities when you need them??? They want to ban fishing?!?!? What are we gonna eat? What are we gonna feed our children?!?!? They're taking measures at our expense, again!!!! And we can do nothing about it!!! 250k likes 1000 shares</p> <p>User 09089: I can file for bankruptcy, that's it, I'm done!!! All the corrupt \ in one place... the government, the company, you'll see, they'll pass the blame around and leave us to starve 100k likes 2500 shares</p> <p>User 748: Who does what?!?! Nobody does nothing!!!! They dangle measures in front of</p>

	<p>our eyes, how they're gonna fix everything, and it will be great again, but let's be serious. We can barely breathe here, the smoke is everywhere.</p> <p>50k likes 100 shares</p>
	<p>Weather report Time: 07:45</p> <p>The weather station informs that in the coastal area the wind isn't blowing at present, but it will pick up speed tomorrow, from the west, which means that both the spilled oil and the smoke from the fire will move towards the shore.</p>
	<p>News Time: 08:00</p> <p>Ecologists explain the dangers to the human population, the flora, the fauna and the difficulties to clean the waters.</p> <p>The coastal area will be affected by the oil spill. How quickly the oil spill cleanup operation will start will determine how much of the coastline will be affected and how badly. At this moment, it can be anticipated that the oil spill will extend to Sprad and will affect the surrounding beaches. The population will suffer because fishing has to be forbidden and tourism will be restricted on the affected beaches. The local flora and fauna will also suffer as a result of the oil spill.</p> <p>The cleanup operation needs to be started immediately along the coastline to prevent a massive ecological disaster.</p> <p>Not lastly, the oil spill is extending along the entire coastline, including the south tip of the</p>

	<p>Meranian peninsula where there is a nature reserve, which protects many endangered flora and fauna species. The cleanup operations will be more difficult in this area due to the swampy terrain.</p>
	<p>Emergency Services Report Time: 08:10</p> <p>The coast guard has the fire at the oil platform under control and anticipates that it will be put out within the next hour.</p>

Confidential Briefing

From: The National Intelligence Agency

To: Prime Minister

Time: 09:00

The oil spill is extending outside the Meranian marine belt. This could pose a great danger due to the conflict in the international waters between Algesia and Urbaen which could ignite the oil. The emergency services cannot enter the international waters to search for the survivors because they could become targets in the conflict. Satellite images indicate the presence of two Urbaen ships approximately 5 nautical miles from the Meranian marine belt. The Algesian ship is not visible, which could mean that it was sunk during the night.

Information received from the coast guard ships in the area indicates that a lifeboat is floating adrift 2 nautical miles outside the Meranian marine belt. It could be the lifeboat with the 5 missing platform workers or an Algesian lifeboat from the missing ship. It is difficult to identify it precisely from a distance. We recommend sending drones for a clear identification before determining a course of action in case it is the workers that need to be saved.

Summary of the phone conversation between the Secretary General of the Defence Allegiance and the Prime Minister of Merania

Time: 09:10

The Secretary General has informed the Prime Minister of Merania that his country will be given aid through the Mutual Assistance fund in order to clean the oil spill in its territorial waters. Chemical solutions and ships that could assist in the controlled burning process will be delivered to Merania.

The problem remains with the international waters. Military ships cannot enter the area without raising suspicions from Urbaen that they are joining the conflict which could lead to its escalation. Therefore, a civilian company should be in charge of the clean-up process in international waters, if one could be found willing to enter a conflict area.

Ministry of the Environment

Time: 09:15



Ministry of the Environment

The oil spill is monitored constantly. Several private companies and NGOs have been contacted and efforts are being made to obtain the means necessary for the clean-up operation. Spartak Company will be responsible for the clean-up expenses.

The controlled burning procedure should be initiated as soon as possible at sea so that as little oil as possible makes it to the shore. It could be eliminated using chemicals and manual labour. Experts in neighbouring countries have been contacted and they have promised to send logistics and personnel as soon as possible.

Confidential briefing

From: Defence minister

To: Prime Minister

Time: 09:20

We have official confirmation both from the Defence Allegiance and from Urbaen and Algesia that the fire was not caused by a missile gone off course. But we must stress that if the conflict at sea continues, a missile could ignite the oil spill which is spreading in international waters at present. This could lead to uncontrolled burning and an ecological disaster. We will undertake the rescue operation of the persons in the lifeboat adrift in international waters, in accordance with international legislation regarding search and rescue missions at sea.

We emphasize the fact that the clean-up attempts in international waters undertaken by a private company could be affected by the ongoing conflict. The appeal to our partners in the Defence Allegiance and their ships entering the Kutian Sea could be considered a declaration of war, signalling the Allegiance's intentions to join the war on the Algesian side, even if they were only clean-up ships with no military capabilities.

Institute for Medicine**Long, medium- and short-term consequences for people****Time: 10:00**

Doctors warn that the pollution levels registered as a result of the initial fire, but also of the controlled burns to eliminate the oil spill will release massive amounts of carbon monoxide into the atmosphere which will affect people suffering from respiratory conditions and allergies. Doctors recommend avoiding the coastline areas for a period of a few months until the carbon monoxide clears.

As far as food is concerned, it is not recommended to consume fish products because they may contain substances harmful to the human body. A ban on fishing in the area is recommended until the waters are

cleaned to prevent the marketing and consumption of fish products with oil residues or other harmful chemicals. This could take 2-3 months, depending on the efficiency of the cleaning.

Advisory occasion II

The Prime Minister has followed the evolution of events and asks the advisory committee for an estimate of the situation created. In about 30 minutes, you will present the prime minister's views and recommendations. More specifically, the Prime Minister of Merania wants answers to the following questions:

- What courses of action should the government consider?
- How does the government communicate with the public about these courses of action? Who ensures communication for each course? How messages are kept consistent?
- What messages can be sent to the population about each course of action? Write these messages. Pay close attention to the fact that the population will be directly affected, so clear, encouraging and constructive messages are needed.

In 30 minutes, the Prime Minister and representatives of the cabinet are waiting for the councillors' recommendations, through the spokesperson.

REVIEWS AND NOTES

**Mircea Stan, *PROGRAMUL DE MĂSURI ACTIVE AL KGB-GRU ÎMPOTRIVA ROMÂNIEI (1964-1989)*, [THE ACTIVE MEASURES PROGRAM OF KGB-GRU AGAINST ROMANIA]
Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2021, 532p**

review by **Florin BUȘTIUC***

This is the principle which perfectly correlates with the need to develop critical thinking and security awareness: “Security risks are a threat to society as a whole, and any member can become a vulnerability in the absence of a security culture”.

It is against this backdrop that Mircea Stan’s volume achieves an essential objective, i.e. it provides *an integrated and correlated projection* on security, intelligence and active measures. This is accomplished due to the fact that, from practical experience, for a non-expert, a diverse approach demotivates individual study as it creates a feeling of indefinite effort and unfinished successive conceptual completion.

Therefore, in the first part of the book, the author provides an in-depth analysis of the concept of security by approaching it from the standpoint of a temporal axis: *Peace of Westphalia – present*. Insertions of some significant moments from the following periods are also added: *The Age of Empires* (1500-1600, the Habsburgs and the desire to unify Europe; 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia; 1660-1760, Louis XIV and Richelieu; the French Revolution, the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon III and Otto von Bismarck); *The period of the two World Wars* (World War I,

* PhD “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy. Email address: bustiuc.florin@animv.eu

Interwar period I – collective security, The League of Nations, World War II, Interwar period II – erosion of security); *The Cold War and the subsequent crisis of the power system* (the Bipolar World, NATO and WTO, the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, the Hungarian Revolution, the Vietnam War, the collapse of communism etc.). This chronological analysis offers the hypothesis that “the interdependence between national-state sovereignty and the system of international relations has determined several stages of security, and the stage of resilience is the result of the pace and radicalism of changes taking place globally.”

Mircea Stan points out that one of Romania's current objectives is to become a **resilient state**, through the ability of individuals, communities, and that of the state to resist and adapt progressively to negative events. The state would thus, be able to return to normal conditions, with an impact on capacity building and strengthening the current and future generations to meet their needs. A strategy to develop effective tools for strengthening societal resilience (adjusted to the new types of **threats – subtle and subversive**) includes (1) optimizing awareness of hostile/influential actions, (2) defining accessible and transparent public tools to expose the sources of disinformation, (3) developing critical thinking and the ability to identify and combat false information, *with effects in reducing the vulnerability of the young generation to hybrid challenges* (Romanian National Defence Strategy for 2020-2024).

In the second part of the book, Mircea Stan explains *the active measures*, calling for a timely incursion into Russian history (the Age of the tsars, Russian messianism, the Crimean War, the Russian Revolution, Stalin and the security of the USSR, Putin's Russia). The author lists what has remained constant in terms of action influence – the feeling of insecurity, the Russians' obsession with their own borders and the ebb

of expansion (sensitivity to space) – finally translated as a ***predisposition to active measures***.

In order to outline some concepts related to the idea of resilience, we underscore the following significant elements, which have been taken from the various definitions of active measures: prevention of (possible) hostile actions of some (potential) informative opponents (KGB Lexicon); systematic (political) tool used to discredit, isolate and make vulnerable, targeted at states, organizations, individuals (The Congress of the USA, July 13 and 14, 1982, p. 1); open or covert techniques to influence the events or behavior of some states and their actions (from influencing government policies to undermining trust in decision makers and institutions) (Shultz and Godson, 1984, p. 193).

If resistance/resilience (individual, social) is initiated by knowing the specific activities of an adverse entity, the author strives and manages to present a taxonomy of the means and methods of the active measures program, respectively: agents (of influence), official and informal contacts, secret contacts for the purpose of influence; exposure, discredit, compromise, challenge, penetration; persuasion, influence, manipulation, disinformation, propaganda, diversion, subversion, sabotage, rumors, falsehoods, intoxication/deception/maskirovka, reflexive control. Through active measures, strategic events are generated in order to create short, medium and long-term advantages in the social, political, military, economic, and intelligence fields. The author considers that they currently overlap with the meanings of the terms irregular war/ unconventional/asymmetric/fourth generation.

Consequently, it can be seen that a program of active measures is a veritable “Russian matryoshka” with evasions of perception, space and time, with the strategic reversibility of micro-macro dimensions, with expertise in anticipation and projections (“teachers of the future”), with the decomposition and recomposition of operations, resources and

techniques according to the opponent, in terms of the continuity of a unifying perspective.

In terms of resilience, the analysis of adverse activities – in this case, also applicable to active measures – is reflected in the decoding of their goals and plans, and Kevin P. Riehle (2015, p. 55-58) proposes a grid based on:

(1) *Risk assessment*, which answers the question “Where and how does a foreign adversary operate?”

(2) *Analysis of the activities of the opposing entities* which answers the question “For what purposes are resources allocated?” and “What are the state’s priorities?”

(3) *Analytical advice and targeting*, to answer the question “Where and how does an opponent try to neutralize operations?”

(4) *Analysis of business efficiency options*, which answers the question: “How can our efforts neutralize external threats?”

Given that, “Those who cannot remember the past are doomed to repeat it” (George Santayana), the author groups the general framework that shaped the Romanian-Soviet relations into two historical stages: 1948-1964 – corresponding to the bilateral policy, and 1964-1989 – when the escalation of political tensions determined the growth of the informative/counter-informative activities between the two states.

Generally, until 1958 Bucharest was a loyal ally of Moscow. However, against the backdrop of the Hungarian Revolution (1956), the framework to discuss the opportunity of Soviet troops on Romanian territory was created. The troops would eventually withdraw in 1958, and in the aftermath different attitudes emerged, from challenging Moscow's decisions in the CMEA to the political ones, such as the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the separate movement on the Cuban crisis.

Romania's "uncomfortable" attitude in the sphere of Soviet influence, along with its distinct positions in the Warsaw Pact meetings – an "autonomy" within the Soviet bloc – led to a fall-out between the Socialist Republic of Romania and other WTO member states. As a result, the KGB decided to coordinate programs of active anti-Romanian measures (for instance, the Hungarian ÁVO/ÁVH and STASI were involved through HVA, amid the use of their representativeness by the Hungarian and German communities as a screen for operations). Against this background, in the late 1970s, the USSR decided that the PGU should transfer Romania from Department XI – "Relations with Socialist Countries" to Department V, which had jurisdiction over some NATO member countries, Switzerland and the other two "rebel" states of the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and Albania. Moreover, in the early 1980s, **KGB defined Romania as an enemy state.**

Mircea Stan follows chronologically the main stages of the Soviet program of active measures against Romania, showing that it materialized, in many respects, from erroneous coverage in the Soviet media of Romanian political-diplomatic actions and disinformation (the elimination of positive aspects) regarding the latter's economic and social situation, up to the isolation of Romania internationally. The resizing by the USSR of subversive activities against Romania was determined by the distinct attitude within the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), respectively by the establishment of diplomatic, military, economic relations (uncontaminated) with Western and Eastern states. In fact, a 1984 KGB document states that Moscow initiated a series of bilateral and multilateral cooperation within the WTO intelligence community to which Romania was not invited, the "quarantine" imposed on the Romanian state being a consequence of KGB-GRU plans for active measures.

In association with the dynamics of the Romanian political and intelligence realities, the book also presents the management of the intelligence/counterintelligence activity between 1964 and 1989. Some significant moments are highlighted: the role and place of the Soviet advisers in the activity of the Department of State Security (DSS), the legislative framework of DSS, the briefing process for decision-makers (and distortions of information flow), mechanisms for responding to the program of active measures coordinated by the KGB-GRU (establishment of UM 0110 and the “D”, disinformation service), the events of December 1989.

The author considers that Romania’s inter-institutional collaboration had the following landmarks: a) the stage in which in each socialist country the intelligence /counter-intelligence activity was led by Soviet advisers, in close collaboration with the KGB-GRU headquarters; b) the second stage of relaxation, after the declaration of the “Brezhnev Doctrine” which aimed at resetting the system of inter-institutional cooperation, the Kremlin hoping for the “return” of Romania; c) the stage when it becomes clear that Romanian had not returned/would not return to the initial position of cooperation with the Soviets, and the security of the Romanian state enters a total isolation being labeled an enemy.

In fact, the author also provides the pieces of a complex puzzle:

- The Soviet advisers were seconded by carefully selected and trained people in elite institutions of the USSR;
- The Soviet advisers represented, along with the Romanian-Soviet joint ventures grouped in the giant Sovrom project, a compact and efficient intelligence structure;
- The Soviet advisers were representative in all fields of activity in Romania (they remained as a single structure and acted without limitations as long as the Soviet troops were on the territory);

- The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania did not remove the Soviet influence (the Kremlin still had a large number of clandestine agents – the first generation of Soviet spy networks had its roots in the former members of the Comintern, the veterans of the Spanish Civil War, former Soviet concentration camp prisoners recruited by the NKVD; similarly, the second generation of “pro-Soviets” had its roots, especially, in those who had been sent to Moscow to study);
- In 1962, on the occasion of a visit by Khrushchev, the issue of recruitment by PGU and GRU in Romania was addressed. Khrushchev later ordered that other security and intelligence services in the Soviet Bloc limit their cooperation with similar structures in RPR (non-detailed information which was not for the benefit of the Romanian state).
- Why did the Soviets so easily choose to discontinue the activity of their advisers in Romania (the withdrawal of Soviet advisers on security and intelligence issues began in 1958 and ended in 1964)? One answer would be that, prior to the withdrawal, vast espionage networks had been set up to provide “underground” channels of communication with Moscow (the phrase “I left only to stay”).

One of the author's assessments is that the Soviet-coordinated program of active measures focused on disinformation and intoxication (the KGB had become formidable in HUMINT operations, given the number of Soviet bloc citizens who had emigrated to the West), and **the Socialist Republic of Romania was the target of the active measures about which the public opinion, both in the country and abroad, knew nothing.**

In terms of training and strengthening the security culture in addressing a potential program of active measures (covert/clandestine

operations) of an intelligence adversary, with specific means and methods such as disinformation, subversion, rumors, fake-news, intoxication/deception etc., it is desirable to present hypothetical-theoretical answers to the following questions: *Who are the actual opponents (state or non-state actors)?; What would the analysis of the operational situation related to the program be?; What is the purpose of the program?; Are there any sub-programs and what do they consist of?; Are there any intermediate goals? If so, what are they?; What are the timeframes?; What effects are being pursued and what periods are they related to?; What are the opponent's specific abilities that can be directed to a certain goal/target?; What are the resources and targets?; Where and against which targets does it act?; What is the intelligence perspective? (e. g. recruiting human resources); What are the critical points of the program/subprograms/operations?*

Likewise, the concept of *administrative intelligence* (state competitive intelligence?) should be tackled as it is linked to the idea of institutional security culture. This would represent an openness of secret intelligence specific to specialized structures. *Administrative intelligence* would be a process of collecting and analyzing, at the institutional level, open and official information, which would facilitate the preservation of legislative and regulatory elements, mechanisms and structures, and a level of competence in "key points", to ensure intra and inter-institutional resilience and functional efficiency, both internally and externally.

Administrative intelligence would also increase accountability and institutional initiative, increasing the likelihood of features such as flexibility, adaptability, responsiveness, anticipation and planning, with positive effects on inter-agency cooperation and the ability to combat asymmetric and hybrid threats. But the first step is to become aware of the reality of the threats, and an effective pre-setting is made by

endorsing simple principles – “Plans to harm the enemy are not determined by special methods. Entice away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.” (Sun Tzu)

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ACADEMIC FOCUS

**THESEUS**Connect the Disconnections -
from Disparate Data to Insightful Analysis

**Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships
and Youth Entrepreneurship
Programme in Romania, funded by the EEA Grants -
Financial Mechanism 2014-2021**

Agreement no.: 18-COP-0017

(October 1st, 2019 – August 31st, 2022)

THESEUS Project aims at Connecting the Disconnections between Disparate Data, in order to provide knowledge for building Insightful Analysis. The broad availability of data has led to increasing interest in methods for extracting useful information and knowledge from data, determining the emergence of new fields of science (e.g. data science). At the same time, big data algorithms have been signaled as a potential leverage that can lead to digital dictatorship if insufficiently understood, poorly handled and unethically regulated. Companies in every industry focused on ways to structure, process and analyze the growing volume and diversity of data so as to streamline decisions and gain a competitive edge. State institutions, regular citizens, social and political science practitioners on the other hand, are not yet properly equipped to properly mitigate the economic, social and political impact of the information technology revolution that awaits us in the decades to come. Therefore, in the process of understanding and mitigating risks and opportunities of Big Data, complex workloads, new skills and competences have to be acquired.

Following these emerging needs, the **objective of the project** is to enhance human capital and knowledge base by tackling directly skills and competences required and providing an understanding of the

processes guiding big data analytics. This objective will be met by **building and delivering a course**, consisting of four modules, capitalizing on big data methodologies: introductory module, data collection module, data processing module and data analysis module.

The course will not be designed as a technologically focused course, but rather knowledge, awareness and understanding focused course. The course avoids an algorithm-centered approach. It focuses on how options are understood and choices and tradeoffs are designed. Thus, it enhances, through learning by doing, key-competences and skills required in collecting, understanding, correlating and processing big data, helping them streamline problem-solving processes in a data-driven ecosystem.

The project addresses **two professional categories**: *governance and social scientists* and *national security practitioners*, whose complementary work is of paramount importance in insuring the sustainable development of democracy. Both categories carry out great responsibility at social level. Ill-informed decisional processes in national security and policy-making, based on incomplete, inaccurate or incorrectly correlated data generate negative impact, affecting society at large. Although practitioners targeted by the project work with large amounts of data, their background is mostly in social science or security studies, lacking a very specific technical training. Such (future) professionals need to better understand what and how big data can be capitalized so as to ethically and lawfully improve the overall efficiency of their organization.

Participating organisations are: “Mihai Viteazul” National Information Academy (ANIMV) – Romania; University of Malta (UoM) – Malta; Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) – Norway; National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) – Romania. THESEUS Project is part of the Education, Scholarships, Apprenticeships and Youth Entrepreneurship Programme in Romania, being funded by the EEA Grants – Financial Mechanism 2014-2021.



**Empowering a Pan-European
Network to Counter Hybrid
Threats (EU-HYBNET)
H2020 Grant agreement
no: 883054
(May 2020 – April 2025)**

EU-HYBNET is a 60-month project (2020-2025), financed through the Horizon 2020, which will start in May 2020. The project is being developed and implemented by a consortium of 25 partners, coordinated by LAUREA University of Applied Sciences from Finland. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and the Joint Research Centre are leading partners of the EU-HYBNET project.

EU-HYBNET will bring together practitioners and stakeholders to identify and define their most urgent requirements for countering hybrid threats, by undertaking an in-depth analysis of gaps and needs and prioritizing those that are crucial to address through effective research and innovation initiatives, including arranging training and exercise events to test the most promising innovations (technical and social) which will lead to the creation of a roadmap for success and solid recommendations for uptake, industrialization and standardization across the European Union.

The project aims to build an empowered, sustainable network, which will:

- define common requirements that can fill knowledge gaps, deal with performance needs, and enhance capabilities of innovation endeavors;
- monitor significant developments in research and innovation;
- deliver recommendations for uptake and industrialization of the most promising innovations that address the needs of

practitioners, and determine associated priorities for standardization;

- establish conditions for enhanced interaction among its members;
- persistently strive to increase its membership and continually build network capacity through knowledge exchange.

EU-HYBNET will address four core themes to ensure coherence in the project's results: 1) Future Trends of Hybrid Threats, 2) Cyber and Future Technologies, 3) Resilient Civilians, Local Level and National Administration and 4) Information and Strategic Communication.

Romania represents the consortium through "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA). MVNIA will incorporate the project's research findings and information into its MA & PhD research programs. As students come from diverse areas (security practitioners, legal, media, private business), the impact of exploitation of the information will reach a wide audience, and the EU-HYBNET training documents will also be employed to enhance capabilities of experts and practitioners in the fight against hybrid threats.

EU-HYBNET is a Pan-European network of security practitioners, stakeholders, academia, industry players, and SME actors across EU, collaborating with each other to counter hybrid threats.



With the support of the
Erasmus+ Programme
of the European Union

Jean Monnet Module
EUSEGOV (2020-2023)
621227-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE



Jean Monnet Module EUSEGOV

*A common understanding of EU Security Governance
Teaching and researching the EU security policies and institutions
for a better academic and professional approach in the security
and intelligence field
(October 21st, 2020 – October 20th, 2023)**

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA) implements a three-year Jean Monnet Module grant: **EUSEGOV** – *A common understanding of EU Security Governance. Teaching and researching the EU security policies and institutions for a better academic and professional approach in the security and intelligence field.* The EUSEGOV module focuses on EU Governance, a subfield of EU studies that has received less attention comparatively with the study of other EU related issues. The module aims at educating students and at equipping them with the knowledge and necessary skills to become EU citizens and better security providers. The academic value of the EUSEGOV module is to deliver courses on EU Security Governance for security and intelligence studies students. The courses tackle specific aspects of EU integration studies: *Introduction to EU Security Governance and Strategic communication in EU Security Governance.*

* This Project has been carried out with the support of the Erasmus+ programme of the European Union. The content of this Project does not necessarily reflect the position of the European Union, nor does it involve any responsibility on the part of the European Union.

The **specific objectives** of the Module are:

- Providing a coordinated series of MA compulsory and PhD summer courses aiming to familiarize students with the main trends and approaches in the field of communication and security governance in the European Union.
- Updating the teaching contents on the topic by research activities.
- Making aware students who do not automatically come into contact with EU studies of the importance of security governance by training them in using both the specialized language and methodology specific to subjects that pertain to the area of international relations, political sciences, as well as security studies.

The module's objectives will be achieved through the **teaching, researching and promoting** activities. To this respect, the EUSEGOV module includes a **two completely new courses**, one compulsory for MA students and one optional for PhD students, covering a major gap in the curricula i.e. the developments in the idea of European Security Governance. By bringing together academics and experts from various fields of knowledge, from civil society organizations and institutions, the interdisciplinary teaching and research approach of this Module provides the students with an in-depth and systematic understanding of key EU Security Governance topic. The EUSEGOV includes also research activities on the **Strategic communication in EU Security Governance thematic**. The research report will contain an extensive analysis of three aspects: *Strategic communication in EU – practices and official documents; EU Security strategic communication institutions; EU Security Governance future: alternative scenarios*.

A general dissemination campaign will be implemented to create a broad understanding of the importance and the particularities of EU Security Governance: two conferences, opening and closing conferences; a MA and a PhD round-table debates. The main output is represented by the training of a target group formed by master students and PhD candidates in security and intelligence studies that must better understand the direct and indirect implications of EU's security governance impact on the member states.



DOMINOES

Digital cOMpetences InformatiOn EcoSystem¹

ID: 2021-1-RO01-KA220-HED-000031158

The DOMINOES project aims to reduce societal polarization through combating the rapid spread of online disinformation among young people. In order to do achieve this result, the project aims to increase the capabilities of partner organizations to develop new and interactive online educational content, which is adapted to the specificities of the current and future, digitally skilled, generations of students. The project begins from two inter-related premises: that the digital ecosystem is undergoing a significant transformation, due to the emergence of new communication platforms and that higher education institutions need to develop curricula that teach critical thinking and digital skills holistically rather than in a disparate fashion.

The project targets two groups: current teaching staff and students of partner institutions, who will be future professionals in the

¹ This work was possible with the financial support of the ERASMUS + financial mechanism, through the project DOMINOES – Digital Competences Information Ecosystem, Contract Number – 2021-1-RO01-KA220-HED-000031158. The European Commission's support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsement of the contents, which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

field of security and intelligence. Selected participants from the two target groups will be helped, through several on-site classes, to acquire digital teaching skills, to produce innovative educational material and to use advanced digital skills for the detection and countering of online propaganda, fake news and information manipulation.

The project will elaborate a handbook on the topic of digital disinformation and fake news. This will include the most relevant and up-to-date information on the evolution of the phenomenon of fake news, the psychology of disinformation, the social factors supporting or arresting the dissemination of fake news, skills relevant to avoid online disinformation and policies and legal approaches employed to deter the phenomenon. Then, three on-site courses, each including 30 participants, will take place in the three participating countries. A mix of professors and students will be taught how to avoid online disinformation and how to teach others to do so, in an interactive and inclusive fashion. Finally, the information gathered for the handbook and validated through the face-to-face interactions will be used for the creation of an online course which will be accessible to a wide audience and will represent a sustainable product of the project. This course will include not only the theoretical material gathered for the elaboration of the handbook, but also a wide set of interactive exercises aimed at facilitating student engagement with the material.

The main outcome of the project will be an increase in the advanced digital skills and ability to spot fake news of the representatives of the target group. Participants in the on-site and online courses will improve their teaching abilities and their competences in addressing a young generation of digital natives.

At the end of the project, the partners will organize three simultaneous multiplier events, which will be addressed to persons from the wider target group, but who were not part of the initial on-site training activities. The main results of the project will be presented, with a particular focus on the online training course. This will allow participants to access the same information as those that were included in the on-site activities and further help achieve the project's objectives of reducing societal polarization and combating online disinformation.

Erasmus+ Mobility Projects at „Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy

Between June 2020 and May 2022, two Erasmus+ KA103 mobility projects were implemented within „Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA). The projects were funded by the European Commission, through the National Agency.

The objectives pursued by MVNIA within the the two mobility projects were in line with the specific objectives of Key-Action 1. Therefore, the Academy sought to:

- Support students in order to improve their knowledge, skills and competences;
- Favour quality improvement, excellence in innovation and internationalization by intensifying transnational cooperation with other higher education institutions and training centers;
- Improve the international dimension of education and professional training by promoting mobility and cooperation between higher education institutions;
- Increase the capacity to offer study programmes that better meet the needs of the students.

The mobility of staff and students sets the premises for improving professional knowledge and experience, developing linguistic and intercultural skills, as well as strenghtening European identity through the promotion of common values. Collectively, the 2 projects encompassed a number of 8 beneficiaries, students and professors alike, who took part in different tyes mobilities, as follows:

- 4 training mobilities
- 2 traineeships
- 1 teaching mobility
- 1 study mobility

MVNIA embraces cooperation and recognizes the importance of belonging to university networks for the development of competitiveness and institutional modernization. For this reason, strengthening existing partnerships and starting new projects are objectives of utmost importance in the process of institutional internationalization. Fortunately, the Erasmus programme has put at MVNIA's disposal all the mechanism needed to achieve this goal. As a result, throughout the implementation period, the Academy has signed three new inter-institutional agreements with the following institutions: University of Malta, the Jagiellonian University in Krakow and Matej Bel University in Banska Bystryca.

Even though the two projects have been completed, the Academy will continue to disseminate and exploit their results in new projects, scientific publications, and by developing new study programmes.

CALL FOR PAPERS *ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW*

“Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy, via its National Institute for Intelligence Studies, publishes the *Romanian Intelligence Studies Review* (RISR), a high-quality peer reviewed and indexed research journal, edited in English and Romanian twice a year.

The aim of the journal is to create a framework for debate and to provide a platform accessible to researchers, academicians, professional, practitioners and PhD students to share knowledge in the form of high quality empirical and theoretical original research papers, case studies, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, literature reviews and book review within security and intelligence studies and convergent scientific areas.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

- Intelligence in the 21st century
- Intelligence Analysis
- Cyber Intelligence
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- History and memory in Intelligence
- Security paradigms in the 21st century
- International security environment
- Security strategies and policies
- Security Culture and public diplomacy

Review Process: RISR shall not accept or publish manuscripts without prior peer review. Material which has been previously copyrighted, published, or accepted for publication will not be considered for publication in the journal. There shall be a review process of manuscripts by one or more independent referees who are conversant in the pertinent subject area. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to the journal’s theme, originality and scientific correctness, as well as observance of the publication’s norms. The editor evaluates the recommendation and notifies the author of the manuscript status.

The review process takes maximum three weeks, the acceptance or rejects notification being transmitted via email within 5 weeks from the date of manuscript submission.

Date of Publishing: RISR is inviting papers for No. 27 and 28 and which is scheduled to be published on June and December, 2022.

Submission deadlines: February 1st and July 1st

Author Guidelines: Author(s) should follow the latest edition of APA style in referencing. Please visit www.apastyle.org to learn more about APA style, and <http://www.animv.ro> for author guidelines. For more details please access the official website: **rrsi.ro**

Contact: Authors interested in publishing their paper in RISR are kindly invited to submit their **proposals electronically in .doc/.docx format at our e-mail address rrsi@sri.ro, with the subject title: article proposal.**

Appearing twice a year, the review aims to place debates in intelligence in an institutional framework and thus facilitating a common understanding and approach of the intelligence field at national level.

The target audience ranges from students to professionals, from the general public to those directly involved in intelligence research and practice.

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“MIHAI VITEAZUL”
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY

20, Odăi Str.
Bucharest 1 - ROMANIA
Tel: 00 4037 772 1140
Fax: 00 4037 772 1125
e-mail: rrsi@sri.ro

www.animv.ro