

TRANSLATING THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL: A VIEW FROM ROMANIA

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Abstract

Transferring ideas, either from one country to another or between different professional environments, can lead, many times, to the erroneous reception of the theoretical and empirical implications of not only certain premises, but of entire schools of thought. Unfortunately, this is the case of the way the Copenhagen school was adapted and internalized in the Romanian military-academic environment.

The article aims to lay the groundwork for the rectification of errors generated by the way the Copenhagen school was adopted in Romania. It plans to overcome the simple idea that the Copenhagen school represented just an expansion of the concept of "security" and to unearth the ontological premises, the evolution of theoretical thought, as well as the implicit and explicit normative implications of the Copenhagen school. The article's main aim is to show that the initial theories of the founders of the Copenhagen school, as well as their further developments, are not adequate to being used in a military-academic environment and that the attempts to use them rely on a fragmentary and disparate adoption of some ideas. The central ideas of this school are more relevant for the civilian academic environment, especially political science, which treats the idea of "democracy" as a fundamental concept and explores the way to reach the desirable political regime.

Keywords: *Copenhagen school, Romanian military-academic environment, theoretical thought.*

Introduction

Transferring ideas, either from one country to another or between different professional environments, can lead, many times, to the erroneous reception of the theoretical and empirical implications of

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not only certain premises, but of entire schools of thought. Unfortunately, this is the case of the way the Copenhagen school was adapted and internalized in the Romanian military-academic environment.

In both military-academic milieus and in the public space, the term "Copenhagen School" has been employed. However, on these occasions, a number of mistaken uses of the fundamental principles as well as of the empirical results generated by the research associated with this program could be observed. The way this school of thought has been understood in the Romanian military-academic environment should be open to rectification.

The article aims to lay the groundwork for the rectification of errors generated by the way the Copenhagen school was adopted in Romania. It plans to overcome the simple idea that the Copenhagen school represented just an expansion of the concept of "security" and to unearth the ontological premises, the evolution of theoretical thought, as well as the implicit and explicit normative implications of the Copenhagen school. The article's main aim is to show that the initial theories of the founders of the Copenhagen school, as well as their further developments, are not adequate to being used in a military-academic environment and that the attempts to use them rely on a fragmentary and disparate adoption of some ideas. The central ideas of this school are more relevant for the civilian academic environment, especially political science, which treats the idea of "democracy" as a fundamental concept and explores the way to reach the desirable political regime.

From a conceptual point of view, the development of constructivist and critical-constructivist security studies generated a vast enough material to make a single, even synthesis article, impossible. This is the reason for which the article will distinguish between the conceptual elements of the Copenhagen School, which it will rely on. According to Ole Waever (2003), the theoretical elements that define one's belonging to this school are "1. the theory of securitization 2. the idea of security sectors 3. the concept of a regional security complex". The article's main focus is the theory of securitization and the way it has evolved in the literature. Therefore,

the selection will be done on the basis of the topic approached and less on the work of a certain specific author. The article will canvass a wide number of authors and will describe the development of the theory of securitization, which represents the main axis of the thought of the Copenhagen school. The development of this theory will be traced and two "generations" of theoreticians will be identified.

The first part of the article will discuss the ontological aspects of the Copenhagen school. The main claim of this section will be that the theoretical innovation of the Copenhagen school is the switch from a positivist ontology to a critical-constructivist one, which is implicitly presented in the early works of the Copenhagen school and explicitly elaborated in their further work.

The second section of the article will discuss the conceptual differences between the different generations of the Copenhagen School. The first generation was criticized because it only focused on speech acts and did not include aspects such as public policies, images or popular movies as tools of securitization. Moreover, another relevant criticism addressed to the first generation of securitization researchers was that they did not consider the role of the audience and the reasons for which an attempted securitization succeeds or fails. This argument shifts the focus from the securitizing agent to the audience which accepts or rejects a securitization move.

The last section will focus on the normative implications of securitization theory. These are explicitly accepted by the initial developers of the theory in their late work. By this point of the development of the literature, a general consensus was reached that the main aim of constructivist analysis is the de-securitization of certain issues. Thus, as Waever (2011) mentions, the Copenhagen school's main aim is to "exit security" and to solve political problems through deliberative means, integrating a wide deliberation of citizens. This section will critically discuss a contemporary attempt to employ critical constructivism and to integrate it into intelligence analysis. The main argument of this analysis is that this attempt relies on the taking out of context of the ontological premises of the Copenhagen School and on the selective use of its theoretical premises.

The ontological premises of the Copenhagen School

The following section will describe the two relevant directions of the Copenhagen School: the theory of securitization and the theory of the sectors of security. As this section will show, although in the initial works, such as *Peoples, states and fear* (Buzan, 1991[1983]), the theorists of the Copenhagen school suggested a simple extension of the idea of security (thus arguing that the problems of the individual are "security problems") and operated with a relatively classical idea of security, this conception was consistently modified as the theoretical thought of the authors of the Copenhagen school evolved. Thus, already at the end of the previous century, Ole Waever and Barry Buzan stopped using the framework of "security in different sectors" and employed the concept of "securitizing sectors" (Waever, 1999).

People, States and Fear is a work written during the Cold War and revised after the end of this conflict. Although it is generally, though incorrectly, considered the fundamental work of the Copenhagen School, in itself it represents a major contribution to the field of security studies. However, across this work, "security" remains something objective, either a state of fact or an opinion of the individual about that state of fact. On the other hand, in this work, Barry Buzan asks the question "The security of whom?", and replies that the security of the individual is at least as important as the security of the state. Furthermore, the idea that the nature of the threat can be different according to the sector from which it arises is also formulated in *People, States and Fear*. Thus, the theoretical groundwork which will later define the reception of the Copenhagen School was laid in 1983, leading many authors to "forget" about the parallel evolution of the theory of securitization.

Regarding individual security, Barry Buzan argues that: "*Security for individuals, however, cannot be defined so easily. The factors involved – life, health, status, wealth, freedom – are far more complicated, not infrequently contradictory, and plagued by the distinction between objective and subjective evaluation. Many of them cannot be replaced if lost (life, limbs, silitus), and cause-effect relationships with regard to threats are often obscure.*" (Buzan 1991[1983], p. 18)

Moreover, in his 1983 work, Buzan accepts the idea that individual security can be threatened, among others, by its own state: *"The individual citizen faces many threats which emanate either directly or indirectly from the state and which not uncommonly may occupy an important place in the person's life. Such threats can be grouped into four four general categories: those arising from domestic law-making and enforcement; those arising from direct political action by the state against individuals or groups; those arising from struggles over control of the state machinery; and those arising from the state's external security policies."* (Buzan 1991[1983], p. 20-25)

Concerning the nature of the threat, Buzan argued that there can be multiple threats, both to the individual and to the state and that these can come from different sectors of life. Thus, in the military sector, the main threat is the possibility of an invasion but also the negative consequences this might have on the citizens. In the political sector, the threats to a state are political ideas fundamentally opposite to its principle of organization but also political terrorism that affects the individual. With regard to economic security, the main threats are the economic weakening of the state, the threat of economic sanctions from another state as well as the threat of restricting vital resources. On the other hand, these can affect the individual, who can lose his standard of living, can suffer different forms of deprivation and can be forced to undertake humiliating activities for it. The environment represents, according to Buzan's 1983 view, another relevant sector of security, given that it generates threats to the individual (through environmental pollution) but also to the state (which needs to cover the consequences of this pollution. (Buzan 1991[1983], p. 73-80)

The third "referent object" of security emerges in a later work of the theoreticians of the Copenhagen School, entitled *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, published by Barry Buzan and Pierre Lemaitre in 1993. Thus, if in Buzan's original work societal security was only a part of state security, in 1993, society became itself a referent object of security. Society is transformed into a referent object of security by taking into consideration the possibility that identity, seen as the social "glue" binding a community together, is threatened by another religious, ethnic or supra-national identity

(McSweeney 1996). Thus, in the first years after the publication of the works of the theorists of the Copenhagen school, both its representatives and its commentators argued that its main contribution to the debate on security studies is that it asked the question "security for who?" (Baldwin 1997).

Buzan's and Waever's decision to approach society as a "referent object of security" led to a heated exchange between Bill McSweeney, on the one hand, and Ole Waever and Barry Buzan, on the other (McSweeney, 1996; 1998, Buzan and Waever, 1997). The first (the one who invented the concept of the "Copenhagen School"), accused the latter two of employing a far too "objectivist" approach to identity and argued that it had to be treated as a social construct, as the literature did. On the other hand, Buzan and Waever, denied the accusations and stated that they treated identity as socially constructed but that security phenomena emerged when different attempts to construct security clashed. Further, McSweeney's answer was that these forms of theorizing (where identity is treated as a "referent object" similarly to the state), exposed the authors of the Copenhagen School to the accusation of "methodological holism", which, if they accepted, they had to justify the supra-individual entities they considered relevant (McSweeney, 1998, p. 139).

The importance of these debates during the first generation of the Copenhagen school, as well as the parallel development of securitization theory, determined David Baldwin to state, in 1997, that: *"In sum, to the extent that the new thinking about security focuses on conceptual issues rather than empirical or normative issues, not much is new. Most of the 'new ideas' about security can be accommodated by the conceptual framework elucidated by Wolfers in 1952. The United Nations Secretary-General recently called for a 'conceptual breakthrough' which goes 'beyond armed territorial security' to include 'the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities.'*" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 23)

The main argument of this article is that the central innovation of the Copenhagen School, which was later taken over by other constructivist or critical schools of thought is the *intersubjective nature of security* (Waever, 2003). Both Waever (1995, 2003, 2011), Waever, Buzan and de Wilde (1998), as well as other authors such as Stritzel

(2007), McDonald (2008), or Meszaros (2017) argue that security represents an inter-subjective construction between the securitizing actor and the audience which receives the securitizing message. Thus, in contrast to the classical constructivist (Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1999) or neo-realist (Diesen, 2015) conception, in the view of the Copenhagen School, identity is not only a factor that explains security phenomena, but also the content of threats is a process subjected to social construction through a dialectical relation between a securitizing actor and an accepting audience.

Throughout his work, Waever's central argument is that, if under different theories, the content of "security" does not vary, but the factors that explain security phenomena do (constructivists offer a privileged status to identity while realists to determinants of power), in his theory, the very content of "security" is variable. Waever claims that he is the first author who fully rejects Arnold Wolfer's (1952) vision that security amounts to lack of threats and a subjective opinion that these are absent (Wolfer, 1952 apud Waever, 2003). Moreover, Waever argues that previous debates on security have begun from an erroneous premise: that the relevant debate concerns the existence and causality of threat, the correct or erroneous perception of it and, at most, the relevant referent object of security (either the state or the individual). Waever (2003, p. 32) looks to distinguish his own theory from the previous ones and to reject the idea that his view only focuses on the "subjective side of security". In Waever's view, there is no such thing as an "objective side" or a "subjective side" of security – there is no such thing as a "real" threat unless it has been "spoken" by a relevant actor and "accepted" by the relevant audience. That is why, in Waever's view, this threat is not "real" except for the two relevant groups.

A central element of securitization theory (at least in its initial version) is the claim that language plays a performative role (Waever, 2003; Stritzel, 2007; McDonald, 2008a). This idea, taken up from the British philosopher J. Austin argues that some statements, when spoken by certain actors (speech acts), under relevant conditions, have the effect of creating a certain reality rather than describing a reality outside the speech act. The examples in the literature are those of

pronouncing marriage or apologizing, which produce effects only through the utterance of the speech by a relevant authority.

The following section will exemplify definitions of security by the theorists of the Copenhagen School, as well as some relevant criticisms, which all show that these conceive threats in an inter-subjective fashion. Both in 1989 (Waever, 1989) when Waever, for the first time, defended the idea of securitization, and in 1995 when Waever defined security as a speech act through which a certain actor lifts a problem from the sphere of "normal politics" and takes it to the sphere of "extraordinary politics", security is defined as "inter-subjective": *"What is then security? One can view 'security' as that which, is in language theory called a speech act: it is not mainly interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance in itself that is the act: by saying it, something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By saying 'security' a state-representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development, but paying the price of some loss of prestige by needing to use this special resort."* (Waever, 1989, p. 4; 1995, p. 7)

Furthermore, Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argue that: *"It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to handle/existential threats. Traditionally, by saying "security," a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development."* (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998, p. 21)

and that: *"Security" is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics"* (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, p. 21)

Furthermore, in 2003, Waever claims that: *"The designation of the threat as existential justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle it. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimising the*

use of force, and more generally opening the way for the state to mobilise or to take special power – e.g. using conscription, secrecy, and other means only legitimate when dealing with ‘security matters’. (Waever, 2003, p. 9)

In a later article, Waever (2011, p. 470) distinguishes his own theory from previous ones. Firstly, he claims that previous theories have attempted to "widen" the concept of security, either through the expansion of the reference object or through the introduction of new "sectors", where phenomena were described as "security phenomena". However, *“it was how securitization theory ‘solved’ the widening impasse. Until the invention of the concept of securitization, ‘widening security’ had to specify either the actor (the state) or the sector (military), or else risk the ‘everything becomes security’ trap. Securitization theory handled this problem by fixing form: whenever something took the form of the particular speech act of securitization, with a securitizing actor claiming an existential threat to a valued referent object in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that otherwise would not have been acceptable, this was a case of securitization; in this way, one could ‘throw the net’ across all sectors and all actors and still not drag in everything with the catch, only the security part.”* (Waever, 2011, p. 469)

The intersection between securitization theory and sectorial security is already visible in 1998. If *People, States and Fear* employs the idea of sectors of security and does not use securitization theory, already in *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, the way security sectors are conceived is radically different. Thus, when presenting the theoretical framework of inter-subjective security, certain authors claim that there is relevant difference between the military sectors, where "securitization is institutionalized" through the existence of a military and intelligence bureaucracy, which is, many times, "separated from normal politics" (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 28) and the environment sector, which calls for securitization. The differences between the two are significant, considering that the idea that these are "security issues" emerged far later. Thus, the authors of *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* conceive sectorial security very differently in 1998 as opposed to 1983, by introducing the idea of inter-subjective security within these sectors.

In 1999, Waever replied to the critique of Johann Eriksson (1999), who argued that, through the simple fact that it addresses sectorial security; the Copenhagen school is an integral part of the securitization processes. In his reply, Waever argued that the central claim of the Copenhagen School theory was that it represented the combination between securitization theory (which allowed for ascertaining whether security phenomena existed or not) and the conception of sectorial security. According to Waever, "the presentation of a sector does not mean that economic security exists, or that it is widespread and legitimate. The set-up with five sectors is an analytical net to trawl through existing security discourses to register what is going on. Whether we find that there is a lot of securitization in the environmental sector, is not a product of the sectorial approach, but of the actors' practices" (Waever, 1999, p. 335).

The second generation of securitization theorists

If the first generation of securitization theorists aimed to define the central direction of the process, the authors of the second generation offered several criticisms to the thinking of the previous one. The first set of criticism was that the authors of the first generation emphasized the receiving audience too little and did not focus enough on the enabling conditions of securitization. Further, the second generation authors stated that it was not necessary for securitization to occur through speech acts, but could take place through different forms of representation.

The first and most important criticism addressed to the first generation securitization theorists was that they did not take into consideration the audience when discussing securitization. Thus, it was claimed that a successful speech act was not only the act which designated a certain situation as being exceptional, but it was necessary for this statement to be accepted by a relevant audience. This audience legitimized the political actor when "exiting" "normal politics". The success of this statement depends on whether the securitizing actor fulfills several enabling conditions. According to Balzacq (2011, p. 1), the view according to which securitization is a process of accepting a certain speech act is called the "sociological view of security", while

those that subscribe to the idea that only the speech act is relevant are called the supporters of the "philosophical conception of security".

Generally, the supporters of the sociological view of security look at both the speech act and the accepting audience (McDonald 2008). The conditions under which a securitization act is successful are examined. These conditions pertain to both the author of the securitizing act as well as to the accepting audience. The relevant condition is that the securitizing speech act accesses already existent representations of the threat and only slightly modifies realities that are already "known" by the audience to whom the securitizing act is addressed.

A relatively simple form of the concept of facilitating conditions can be found in *Security: a new framework for analysis*

1) *the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security,*

2) *the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor – that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and*

3) *features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization* (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 33).

Thierry Balzacq, one of the main theorists of the second wave of securitization, argues that it is not enough for the speech act to be considered by itself, but that an analysis of the context is required to understand if a certain speech act was successful or not. According to Balzacq (2005), a securitizing act can be analyzed according to a framework composed of five variables, two of them pertaining to the actor analyzed and three pertaining to the securitizing act and how it is deployed. According to Balzacq, the relevant aspects regarding the agent are: the power position and his personal identity, the social identity of the actor and the nature of the target audience, especially if opposing or contesting discourses exist. Regarding the securitization act itself, Balzacq identifies two relevant variables which can lead to the success of securitization – if the speech act is done according to the correct grammatical rules and if it employs relevant "heuristic artifacts"

such as metaphors, stereotypes and relevant analogies (Balzacq, 2005, p. 179-180).

Thus, according to Balzacq *“This means that the success of securitization is contingent upon a perceptive environment. Therefore, the positive outcome of securitization, whether it be strong or weak, lies with the securitizing actor’s choice of determining the appropriate times within which the recognition, including the integration of the ‘imprinting’ object – a threat – by the masses is facilitated.”* (Balzacq, 2005, p. 182)

A more extended and more relativistic version of securitization theory is defended by Holger Stritzel. He criticizes Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, and argues that, although they take a step ahead by accepting the idea that context is relevant for securitization, they do not analyze context by taking into consideration discourses present in society and the interaction between each securitizing act and already existent power relations. According to Stritzel, the relevant conditions for the analysis of securitization are:

These dimensions correspond with a structurationist understanding of power as the relatedness of

(1) the existing discourse, constituting the performative power and the meanings of security articulations, and

(2) the positional power of actors, influencing the process of defining meaning by enacting particular threat texts and/or shaping the existing discursive context. Conversely, the performative force of a threat text can help constitute or change existing discourse coalitions and/or change an existing discourse, thereby reconfiguring existing relations of power. Influencing the process of defining meaning is always marked by acts of translation of a certain threat text into an existing discourse. The better the compatibility of the articulated text/textual structure and the existing discourse (i.e. its ‘resonance’) and the better the positional power of securitizing actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective (Stritzel, 2007, p. 370).

Balzacq (2011, p. 2) employs concepts inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault to describe the role of context in the process of securitization. According to him, the same act of

securitization differently influences audiences with different *habitudes*. The concept of *habitus* is derived from the theorizing of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who defines it as a set of practices and attitudes specific to a professional group, which are practiced consciously or unconsciously. Furthermore, in Balzacq's view, securitization is the work of the "dispositif", a Foucauldian concept which designates power practices and mechanisms, as well as actors and practices that support them. According to Balzacq "*securitization amounts to practices that instantiate inter-subjective understanding through the habitus inherited from different social groups. The dispositive joins these practices together*". (Balzacq, 2010; 2011, p. 2)

Paul Roe (2008) analyses the role of audience in the acceptance of a securitization act. He shows that the former British Prime minister, Tony Blair identified Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a threat before two audiences: the British Parliament and the British Public. Although both audiences accepted the identification, Blair was only able to obtain the agreement of Parliament in order to intervene in Iraq. This securitization was only "half successful" because Blair achieved the mobilization of Parliament through the invocation of threatening images, but did not do the same for the general public, who had a negative opinion on American military intervention (Roe 2008).

Adam Cote's (2016) synthesis article analyses 32 other articles on securitization practices. Cote argues that, although the classical formulation of securitization theory only focuses on the securitizing agent and treats the audience as passive, empirical studies offer a different view. According to Cote, the audience of the securitizing speech act has been treated, in empirical studies, as an active actor, being the "person/persons or group(s) that can authorize the securitizing actor's view and to legitimate the treatment of a particular problem as a security practice (Cote 2016, 8). According to Cote, empirical studies present: *For example, the empirical literature contains instances in which audiences actively challenged, questioned, and/or supported claims made by the securitizing actor (Bright, 2012; Lupovici, 2014b; Salter, 2008; McInnes and Rushton, 2013), or undertook independent actions to modify, bolster, or destabilize security meanings, prompting engagement by securitizing actors (Bright, 2012; Wishnick,*

2010; Salter, 2008) and creating important effects on securitization outcomes and legitimized security policies. (Cote, 2016, p. 10)

Cote's conclusion, based on analysing 32 articles, is that although theoretical works treat practitioners as a passive actor, which does not influence the securitizing process, empirical works have a very different approach, showing that the audience can accept or reject a securitizing speech act.

Another criticism addressed to the first generation of Copenhagen School theorists concerns how securitization takes place. If, traditionally, the argument was that securitization takes place through a speech act, which could be accepted by the relevant audience, this was contested and an argument was put forward that images or public policies, that treat some issues as "security issues", also represent "tools of securitization".

For example, Michael Williams (2003) argued that the communication space radically changed, especially after the 9/11 attacks. He claims that images of terrorism (the repeated presentation of the 9/11 attacks) and migration (the representation of migrants as people who want to illegally enter the London-Paris Eurostar trains) generated a context in which securitizing speech acts were more easily accepted by the audience. Unlike Lene Hansen (2006), Williams remains faithful to the ideas of the first generation of the Copenhagen School, according to which securitization happens through a speech act, but adds that its effect is influenced by the context created by certain images.

Lene Hansen (2006) understands securitization through images far more strongly. According to her, images do not have the simple role to create the context in which securitization happens, but are, themselves, an act of securitization. Hansen is inspired by the post-structuralist idea according to which discursive speech acts articulate the Self through the definition of the Other, and thus amount to a form of othering. Given that positive connotations are attached to some referent objects and negative associations are given to others, the latter are denied legitimacy and are considered "security issues". Hansen analyses the Danish cartoon crisis of 2006 (when a wide circulation newspaper published cartoons showing Mohammed as a terrorist), and shows how these cartoons, as well as the comments that followed,

amounted to an act of "othering" of Muslims, through the association of Islamic culture with authoritarianism, patriarchy and medieval forms of behaviour while associating Danish values to democracy, gender equality and freedom of expression (Hansen, 2006, p. 10). In Hansen's view, this contributed to the extent of the cultural conflict that followed the Danish cartoon crisis through limiting the potential replies to the Muslim criticism against the cartoons.

Thierry Balzacq (2007) argues that the European Union's internal security policies, especially the creation of the three databases: SIS, VIS and Eurodac represent a form of securitization through public policies. According to it, some contexts do not require a speech act from a securitizing actor or the acceptance by the audience. In some cases, the securitizing actor does not need to perform a speech act due to having legislative power which allows him to adopt policies through which certain issues are taken outside "normal" politics and are "assigned" to security practitioners. Balzacq discusses the case of securitization of migration from outside the European Union, showing how the three databases allow an extended surveillance of this phenomenon and how European elites adopted this policy without consulting or receiving the agreement of the European public.

The normative implications of the Copenhagen school

Although the theory of securitization is seen as an explicative theory (describing how certain social phenomena take place), a set of authors argued that it amounts to a normative theory (includes value judgments on what is morally right and politically desirable). The literature argues that a correct understanding of securitization theory is that it implies the desirability of de-securitization, that is the removal of as many aspects from the sphere of the "exceptional" and bringing them back to "the political", which is defined as a part of social life governed by slow procedures and extended debates. This trail of thought can be found in a series of works by Ole Waever, but also of other interpreters of securitization theory.

The first mention of the idea that de-securitization is preferable to securitization can be observed in *Security: a New Framework of Analysis*. According to the book's three authors, a securitized situation is

seen as undesirable, unlike normal politics, which relies on rules and procedures and does not treat some aspects as exceptional. Thus, “de-securitization is the optimal long-range option, since it means not to have issues phrased as threats against which we have countermeasures but to move them out of this threat-defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere” (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde 1998, p. 29).

Waever expands this argument in a 2011 article and claims that securitization theory can reject both meta-theoretical criticisms and explain its own normative commitment. From a meta-theoretical point of view, securitization theory was criticized by those that argue that the focus on the speech act tends to ignore other ways of “instantiating security”. Waever (2011, p. 469) argues that securitization theory has the necessary resources to integrate other forms of securitization than that done through speech acts. Furthermore, from the point of view of the normative implications of the theory, Waever claims that the theory “prefers” de-securitization, but that some concrete situations can “demand securitization”. Furthermore, Waever shows that, from the way the theory is built, the negative effects of securitization are highlighted such as the “logic of necessity, the restriction of choice, the transfer of power to a restricted elite”, but also the fact that the act of securitization can “help society solve important problems through the mobilization of attention and resources” (Waever, 2011, p. 469).

Within the same article, Waever comments on the main premises of securitization theory and argues that it has a “Schmittian concept of security and an Arendtian concept of politics” (Waever 2011, p. 470). This explains in a simple, but concise fashion, the fact that securitization theory contrasts an exceptional situation, associated with the views of Carl Schmitt, who believed that politics is a permanent conflict between friends and enemies, that universal laws cannot be applied and that the only real political act is the suspension of universal laws by the sovereign and the “exit” from the realm of law into the realm of pure will, with the normal situation where politics is undertaken according to traditional procedures. According to Arendt, who supports a classical liberal view, “politics” can only take place between equal individuals who deliberate in the public space, by using reason and attempting to persuade other through arguments.

Paul Roe (2012) synthesizes the available literature and shows the main arguments in favour of de-securitization. Roe argues that the literature can be divided in two: authors who support the claim that de-securitization is good by itself, as it removes aspects from the "empire of the exceptional" rely on the premise that deliberation is intrinsically superior to "decisionism". On the other hand, there are a series of supporters of the claim that the morality of de-securitization has to be evaluated according to its result (authors that have a utilitarian view on securitization): if, for example, a problem is extremely urgent and approaching it as exceptional can lead to finding a solution and this involves only minor individual rights violations, then securitization is morally desirable. On the other hand, as Roe shows, a series of authors such as Claudia Aradau and Columba Peoples argued that any securitization of a problem can lead to insecurity for other groups. According to those who share this view, only the radical "politicization" of problems is acceptable. (Roe, 2011, p. 261)

The greatest supporter of the utilitarian approach to de-securitization is Rita Floyd. Across several works (2007, 2008, 2011, 2015) she argues that the theories of the Copenhagen school are clearly normative but that the morality of a securitization depends on its degree of usefulness and on the intensity of a "real" threat which a speech act securitizes. Furthermore, Floyd argued that the securitizing speech act has to be judged by itself and rejects the claim according to which its acceptance by an audience is necessary in order to have a successful securitization. Floyd outlines a theory of "just" securitization and suggests a set of criteria according to which the justice of a securitization act can be appraised.

Floyd proposes the first version of the principles of just securitization in 2011 and expands and clarifies them in 2015. Thus, according to her, in order for securitization to be just:

1. *There must be an objective existential threat to a referent object, which is to say a danger that threatens the survival of either a political or social order, an ecosystem, a non-human species or a group of human beings.*

2. *Referent objects are entitled to defend themselves or are eligible for defensive assistance if they are morally justifiable [...] Political and*

social orders need to meet a minimum level of basic human needs satisfaction. Ecosystems and non-human species, in turn, need to make a contribution to the human needs of a large group of people.

3. The right intention for securitization is the just cause. The securitizing actor must be sincere in his or her intentions to protect the referent object they themselves identified and declared

4. The good gained from securitization must be judged greater than the harm securitization is expected to entail and the only relevant good for proportionality is the good contained in the just cause.

5. Securitization should not lead to more insecurity than it aims to solve, and of the options available the one that causes, or is expected to cause, the least insecurity should be chosen (Floyd 2015, 3)

Thus, it can be easily argued that the central idea of the Copenhagen school is that democratization is better than securitization, that widening the debate is more relevant than its quick resolution and that the involvement of a large number of actors is desirable, as opposed to the limiting of those who have access to a decision.

Claudia Aradau (2004, 2008, 2010, and 2015) argues in favour of a stronger concept of securitization. She claims that securitization theory is a truly normative one, in the sense that the use of the term "securitization", even with the aim of de-securitization, leads to the securitization of something. According to Aradau, the correct way of thinking about de-securitization is the "politicization" of decision spaces that have been "bureaucratized" or "securitized" until now, as well as the expansion of Universalist politics to include all people in a single political community. Aradau analyzes three cases which achieved this desideratum: the protests against the Iraq war, undertaken under the slogan of "not in my name" (Aradau, 2004), the statements by Brussels sex workers who claimed that European leaders do not speak in their name and that they do not need to be "protected" (Aradau, 2008) and the actions of a nomadic Roma group in France, who cleaned their own camp and, thus, defied the discourse on the "dirtiness" of this ethnic group. Aradau's main argument is that de-securitization does not necessarily take a discursive form, but that some actions, usually by marginalized groups aim to contest the securitizing speech of elites.

In his 2018 work, Peter de Werd undertakes an interesting attempt to combine the intuitions of the second generation Copenhagen School theorists with the practice of the military-academic environment. He employs the idea of securitization and of discursive threat construction to elaborate a new method of intelligence analysis, called Analysis by Contrasting Narratives. It represents a de-constructivist discourse analysis, which uses, as its empirical material the strategic and planning documents and the public discourse of an "enemy" in order to identify its central narratives and to understand the way that enemy defines the "threat" and the permissible limits to combat it. De Werd employs the work of Thierry Balzacq, according to whom securitization can occur not only through speech acts, but also through images, strategic documents or public policies.

De Werd's conclusion is that universities and security institutions can employ the insights of the Copenhagen school to discover the enemies' "aim" through the use of interpretative discourse analysis methods. Thus, by de-constructing the enemies' narratives, one can observe the aspects which he considers "relevant for security" and for his/her own identity.

The main criticism that can be addressed to de Werd's work is that, once we adopt an interpretative methodology and a post-positivist ontology, we can understand that both the "enemy", as well as "our team" are engaged in securitizing practices and identity narratives. These determine the very choice of the enemy and the way its reactions are understood. For example, applying this framework of analysis to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in order to understand how and what Russia "securitizes", leads one to analyse the securitization of Russia by the West and to attempt to understand the "othering" and "orientalist" discourses that Western countries employed about Russia.

Conclusions

The article aimed to show that the erroneous understanding of the Copenhagen School in the Romanian military-academic environment relies on the simplistic and partial reading of the first book of its theorists – Buzan's *People, States and Fear*. The theory of securitization, which represents the main axis of this school of thought,

is thus excluded. It proposes a very different understanding of the ontology of security, showing that this is produced inter-subjectively through a "securitizing move" (a speech act) followed by its acceptance by the audience. Thus, the relevant difference between the theorists of the Copenhagen school and other authors is the rejection of positivist ontology and the adoption of a critical-constructivist one.

Furthermore, the article argued the second generation securitization theorists expanded the initial theory to include the concept of the audience, the idea of context and the possibility of securitization through images and public policies, without audience agreement. Finally, the article showed that the insights of the Copenhagen school are of relatively little use in the academic-military environment given that their main policy implication is that a wide debate is necessary which involves enlarging, as much as possible, the number of actors contributing to the debate. Conversely, the Copenhagen school is much more easily translatable to and useful for policy-makers. The paper also analysed an attempt to include the intuitions of the Copenhagen school in intelligence analysis. Although it does have its merits, its chances of success are limited, given the subversive nature of this framework of analysis.

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