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CONTENT

SECURITY PARADIGMS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

SOCIETAL SECURITY ELEMENTS IN
THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

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Abstract:

The paper analyses the threats that affect the societal dimension of modern security that are a product of the regionalization and integration movements present in the European Union. Knowing the fact that modern security cannot look at the international arena strictly using state centered lenses and in terms of military threats, the Copenhagen School redesigned (has made was called the broadening and deepening of) the security agenda. The most influential of their ideas was that of the societal dimension of security that refers to, „communities that carry an identity" – called societies. Under the effects of globalization what takes place is a complex process to redefine identities and transform its traditional carriers – the nation states. Looking at Europe, this process also implies regionalization inside the member states. Both of them – integration and regionalization – can generate a series of risks and threats for the member states, risks that are the object of this paper.

Keywords: *societal security, identity, Copenhagen school*

The concept of societal security

Societal security represents, in Ole Waever's opinion, „*the society's ability to subsist in its essential characteristics in fluctuating circumstances and in the fac of possible or present threats*" (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 23). If the State was subject of the military, political, economic or environmental dimensions of modern security, in the case of the societal dimension, it is the society itself whose organizing concept is its identity that is the main subject (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 26). Its security is threatened when societies *perceive a threat in terms of identity* (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup & Lemaitre, 1993, p. 23), i.e. when the "*different types of communities, define a trend or a possible threat to their survival as a community*" (Buzan, Waever & Wilde, 1998, p. 119). The imperfect state of the overlap between state and

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society made it possible and necessary to secure identity as a value that must be defended, and allowed the development of the concept of identity security. The need for this security approach is visible in particular in cases in which the State and the societal boundaries do not coincide, for example in the case of threats posed by the State to national minorities or "*social mobilization carried out by State or other political actors to face internal and external threats*" (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 213). In many places around the globe, and particularly in the countries of the third world, there isn't an overlap between the interests of the State and the needs of incorporated communities. For the first time it was taken into account an entirely different category of threats, namely those that states can generate towards their own citizens.

In the Copenhagen school's understanding (also in that of Samuel Huntington) there are two types of societies involved in configuring the specific identity of people: ethnic-national communities and religious ones.

Of course this approach raises the question of identifying the specific actors who have the power to ensure security. If, in the case of the other sectors of security, the security provider is the state or other similar institutional-political bodies, in what pertains to societal security, those institutions can experience difficulties. State actions can cause societal insecurity and attempts to influence identity in one sense or another – especially in terms of societal homogenization – are not always effective, and they can lead to strong counter current manifestations.

Traditionally the institutions that ensured the security of the society were of the religious kind. In medieval Transylvania being Catholic was a condition to ascend to nobility (Smith, 2000, p. 59). Converting amounted to the very passage from one ethnic group to another. In the same sense orthodoxy was the axis around which Romanians' resistance towards assimilation was centered. Societal functional actors are the ones who are credited with spreading and promoting of nationalism: intellectual elites (academies, institutes), the media, and last, but not least the Church.

The communities are, argues Buzan following in the footsteps of Benedict Anderson, imagined communities, self-built (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 120), even though objective factors such as language or territory may be involved, the construction itself is ultimately a political or personal choice. Only through defining what constitutes a value which coagulates a community, the nation in this specific case, we can identify threats to its identity, and analyze the point after which a nation ceases to be itself. Buzan (et al., 1998, p. 121) identifies three major types of societal security threats:

a) Migration – X people is invaded or diluted by a recent influx of Y which will cause it to no longer be what it was, the identity is affected by altering the very composition of the population;

b) Horizontal competition – cultural and linguistic influence of the X neighboring culture will affect the identity of Y people;

c) Vertical competition – people will stop to identify as pertaining to the X people thanks to an integrationist project (e.g. Ex-Yugoslavia, or the European Union), or because of a regionalist even secessionist one (e.g. Catalonia, Kurdistan). Although one project is of a centripetal nature and the other of a centrifugal one, both of which are forms of vertical competition authors argue, because both question how broad or narrow the identity circles should be. (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121)

A fourth threat, however of an ambivalent character and, because of this, mentioned separately is depopulation. The causes of this phenomenon may be disease, war, famine, natural disasters or policies of extermination to which one could add the causes of an economic nature whether we speak of opportunities or low living standards and, of course, declining rates in natural increase. Depopulation is ambivalent because it does not represent a threat to the identity of a society but primarily to individuals themselves, the carriers of identity – *threat within society* (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 121). It becomes a threat to societal security when it threatens to destroy the very existence of the given society.

In the context of European integration, the issue of preserving societies becomes especially noticeable. Identity becomes increasingly important in a Europe where borders are disappearing: "*In a United Europe those national societies which manage to preserve their moral and identity foundations will enjoy security*" (Sava, 2005, p. 252). In the analysis grid provided by the Copenhagen school, we can affirm that the integration in supranational structures like the EU may be interpreted as implying renunciation of national sovereignty and identity, leading to vertical competition related phenomena.

Not only waiving national identity in favor of a prospective supranational one falls into these dynamics, but also the unchecked enhancement of some sub-national ones/identities of minorities (in this sense we can look towards the myriad autonomist discourses appearing in some of the EU States. The *issue of minorities, nation and Europe*, said Buzan, *produced a complex constellation of multi stratified identities* (Buzan, 2000, p. 132).

Horizontal competition is also favored by globalization, communication flows that allow sharing of cultural assets and information.

Cultures that were once separated and between which the interactions went at low rates, are put in permanent connection via new technologies. In time, one can begin to imitate the model offered by the other, without the latter being able to perform the securitizing functions of the original model and so destabilizing the societal architecture.

European integration from societal perspective

The need for a collective European identity was acknowledged since the very inception of the Union, a shared identity being vital *"in order to avoid fragmentation, chaos and conflict of any kind and to ensure cohesion, subsidiarity and cooperation"* (Pescaru, 2002, p. 212).

The first mention of European identity into a European document can be found in the *Document on the European identity published by Foreign Ministers of the nine Member States*, in December 1973, and adopted at Copenhagen. In the prologue it says: "*The Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe. Defining the European Identity involves:*

— reviewing the common heritage, interests and special obligations of the Nine, as well as the degree of unity so far achieved within the Community;

— assessing the extent to which the Nine are already acting together in relation to the rest of the world and the responsibilities which result from this;

— taking into consideration the dynamic nature of European unification ..." (*Document on the European identity*, 1973)

The document speaks extensively of the need for unity within the European Union (the phrase *United Europe* appears 12 times in the 22 articles), whose member states had previously "*been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests*" (*Document on the European identity*, 1973). Unity is "*a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common*" (*Document on the European identity*, 1973, art. 1). It also speaks of keeping the wealth that comes with the variety of national cultures, and shows which are the fundamental elements of European identity: the attitude towards life, based on its determination to build a society that meets the needs of the individual,

safeguarding the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law and social justice and respect for human rights.

This first institutional step, stipulated in a treaty which aimed to create a shared identity for the inhabitants of the European Union was considered sufficient by many of the European elites. Now all the people of the Union, were "*under the same institutional, civic and political umbrella*" (Pescaru, 2002, p. 202). What followed was that an identity – in the official documents seen as a citizenship – would be born out of the effects of the common law. This attitude was based on the idea that the cultural dimension was subordinate to the economic or political ones. The development of a legal and institutional framework was believed to be enough to drag along cultural integration generating, through various processes of spill-over, a common identity. The institutional toolkit to generate common identity has been enriched with the single currency, which was set up as an important socio-psychological factor suggesting the existence of an area with common responsibilities and privileges. European citizenship has not given birth through itself to common identity across the Union as predicted. Even with the expansion, new member States appeared to be entering a second hand citizenship area, as opposed to the community of rights and obligations initially designed. A pervasive identity able to justify sacrifices and yielding national sovereignty on behalf of the European Community has yet to appear and even the most euro-optimist eurocrats had to admit that, in order to really exist, citizens have to belong to a pre-existent community. As was shown in various cases, the determinants of citizenship are the ability of individuals to feel that they belong to and identify with a certain community (Pescaru, 2002, p. 203-204), so that common identity becomes essential for the emergence of a citizenship that reflects a palpable reality.

Started as an organization with a strong economic profile, the EU has developed also a specific human one, giving birth to the so-called "*European economic man*". For the moment this model has yet to be surpassed, the so called European citizen still having a strong political and economic profile while lacking the common identity direly needed to support a growing solidarity.

European identity can be built only in relation to the other identities, be they national or cultural. Ole Waever (1995) said that European integration is not a matter of *raison d'état* but *raison de nation*. The success of the European project is closely tied to the ability of nations to ensure their own survival. A nation will "*allow integration only insofar as it is confident that its national identity is not in danger, or even that it is reinforced by contact with*

other identities" (Waever, 1995). Based on the theory of Anthony D. Smith, he sees European identity as a compulsory synthesis between civil and ethnic nations. The European Union will adopt the civil type identification, while European Nations will go towards an ethnic identification that will center on language (Waever, 1995). *"The United Europe will be able to truly become real only if it can be imagined, in different ways and in different historical and cultural circumstances of a number of increasingly important people"* (Bădescu, Mihăilescu & Zamfir, 2002, p. 83)

European identity dynamics

A)   Migration as a societal threat

When considering the threats to society, Barry Buzan places migration first and foremost. It may constitute a source of tension more direct and visible than the competition of their identities, as it is proven by recent developments at the European level. In what concerns the European common space we can see that it is largely affected by this phenomenon, in that we can distinguish the existence of a binomial-immigration in the West vs. depopulation in the East.

Migration is a complex phenomenon that involves the movement of people from one area to another area, followed by a change of residence and/or employment in some form of activity in the arrival area (Zamfir & Vlăsceanu, 1998, pp.351-353). On the international stage it is not a new phenomenon. It can be asserted that migration has led to the emergence of ancient world Empires and migration also ended them. From a security focused point of view, however, migration is a new concern, and as we saw, one of the societal threats.

Ionel Nicu Sava (2005, p. 259), defines international migration as "*a collective phenomenon of temporary or permanent transfer, of a broad mass of population from one country to another*". Although the causes that determine migratory movements are numerous, they are generally attributed to the broader process of overpopulation. This term actually designates, "*the rupture which may occur in one country between the figure of the population and resources available*" (Roman, 2012, p. 16).

Regardless of the favored theoretical approach, migration is basically the expression of social imbalances between developed areas and less developed areas. But you don't have to consider that this imbalance reflects a real economic necessity of the receiving society. Giovani Sartori believed that the main cause of immigration in Europe is not of economic nature but is

actually generated by the overcrowding existent in surrounding areas, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Europe is not in so dire an economic necessity but moreover it has a very high standard of living so that even its poor do not accept just any kind of job. This explains the apparent paradox between the high rates of unemployment existing in European States at the same time as the immigrants' number increases (Dănişor, 2010, p. 144).

Between 1945 and 2000, more than 50 million people have migrated into Western Europe, approximately 15% of the current population of the Union not being autochthonous. Until 1990 the percentage of non-nationals residing in the Union with legal forms was put at a modest 4.5 percent (Sava, 2005, p. 259). The collapse of the Communist bloc (although there were no 25 million Russian invaders into Western Europe as predicted by some) combined with the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia and the influx of immigrants from North Africa, have brought about 500,000 immigrants per year. In 2010 per total, in the European Union the percentage of immigrants was about 9.4% but in the next 20 years the percentage could reach 30%, a citizen out of three in the EU having no European origin, what is equivalent, says Ionel Nicu Sava, *"with changing the very societal composition of European countries"* (Sava, 2005, p. 259).

Migration is a challenge to European society aimed at two levels:

➢ *Towards the welfare state* – which is based on the integration of all citizens to provide them with extensive protection and support, starting from free access to the educational system, health insurance, social aid and going all the way up to various political and economic rights. This system has helped homogenize and level the social cleavages present in Western societies regarding the standards of living, unemployment or minorities. Of course the growing number of migrants has put some pressure on this system, giving rise to a general tendency of blaming immigrants for various problems, tendency that has only been amplified by the worsening economic environment, in general, and especially by the euro-zone crisis.

➢ *Towards identity* – as Ionel Nicu Sava (2005) noticed, a good proportion of immigrants, especially those who are visibly different from the autochthonous population, skin color or various racial traits, are considered and sometimes consider themselves as different. Of course the existence of a perceived threat towards common identity doesn't produce effects just on a symbolical plane, but it is reflected directly in the internal cohesion and unity of nations, as they rely on a specific form of ethnic-based national identity.

Buzan (Sava, 2005, p. 258) shows that "*the danger posed by migration is mainly dependent upon the manner in which the relative number of*

immigrants interact with the absorption and adaptation capacities of the society". A given society's capacity to absorb and adapt is related to both the financial and the logistical resources at its disposal intended to facilitate the adaptation of foreigners without sacrificing the well-being of the indigenous population, but also depends to a large extent upon the public mentality and attitude towards immigrants. In this sense, there are significant differences in terms of availability and in the attitude towards immigrants if we compare Spain to Finland.

The presence of a large number of immigrants may have a major impact on the European security environment. Migration affects the right to decide who can enter, work and settle in the territory of a State or group of States. Also, in the medium and long term, migration affects racial and ethnic composition of the population, public culture, social security, jobs and public policy (Sava, 2005, p. 259).

Migration in Europe has resulted in what Castells (2010, p. 358) designates as *"the schizophrenia between the self-image and the new demographic reality"*. Although the percentages of immigrants in the European Union are growing and there is an emerging reality of multiethnic societies, most Europeans continue to yearn after ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies. According to an IPSOS survey (2011) approximately 53% of Europeans consider immigration to have a very/fairly negative impact on their country while only 18% consider its impact as very/fairly positive. Also according to another poll 76% of Europeans see in the increasing number of immigrants an important or very important threat to their States (*Report*, 2006). With regard to the moment when this number becomes a serious threat, it varies depending on the society, and is determined mainly by *"the share of immigrants in the total population and spatial distribution of receivers of immigrants"* (Stoica, 2011, p. 132).

B)   Identity-competition the new security profile of Romania; construction of a European identity as described by the national security strategy of 2007

Our country has expressed and internalized in official documents, beginning with the very Constitution, its Euro-Atlantic profile and its adhesion to the democratic values required by it. The National Security Strategy of Romania (SSNR, 2007) still allows us to identify the way the Romanian national security is envisioned by the political decision makers directly involved in the accession of Romania to the NATO/European Union.

Primarily what we can notice is the subtitle with a programmatic tint of the document: "*European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a more democratic, secure and prosperous country*" (SSRN, 2007, p.1). So the premises to ensure Romania's prosperity are seen as lying in the affirmation of its European and Euro-Atlantic profile, which "*offers our country the favorable conditions to accelerated economic and social development*" (SSRN, 2007).

The previous National Security Strategy (2001), published in Official Journal of Romania in December 2001, did not mention this dimension. On the other side if we take into account both the geographical positioning and the historical turmoil that characterize our country, we can notice that these identity profiles are more of projects than realities. This character of identity project also results from the title of Chapter 3 "*Building a new European and Euro-Atlantic identity for Romania*" (2001).

However SSNR does not neglect the national dimension, the construction of a new identity is carried out within the framework of a national, realistic, pragmatic and bold project. Unlike the previous Strategy, SSRN mentions national identity and the associated terms 14 times, whether it is the need to preserve an identity (both the national and those of the various ethnic groups) or the one needed to build a new European/Euro-Atlantic one. In the first chapter, titled "*Premises of a national, realistic, pragmatic and bold project*", a distinction is being made between the nation and the State. National security, it said to be "*the fundamental condition of the existence for both the nation and the Romanian State; (...) it has as reference the national values, interests and objectives*" (SSRN, 2007, p.7). This distinction is useful and comes in line with contemporary visions of the State/nation relationship.

What this formulation implies however, is that we can build a regional identity to include the national one but that this is also influenced by it. "*The national security strategy of Romania aims at promoting, protecting and defending the national values and interests. They constitute the premises upon which the democratic system of organization and functioning of the society is built and developed, both through governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations and also through civic action*" (SSRN, 2007). In the Strategy's understanding, the national values are elements of a spiritual, cultural and material nature defining Romanian identity and, through their protection and defense, there the conditions for the existence and dignity for both Romanian citizens and the state can be ensured. If the value element is suitable to be defended and is a fundamental condition of the existence and survival of the State and of the Romanian nation, we can deduce that if the

value system declines, its destabilization constitutes a grave threat to the existence of these bases. Vulnerabilities should then be seen as also related to a decrease in the value system but this system is part of a broader cultural pattern (Ciocea, 2009, p. 85). Securing the basic value system will lead, as a consequence, to securing the entire cultural construction.

To be able to observe the consequences of a destabilization of the value system we must investigate which is the effect of the interaction between a supranational value system (e.g. European, and a national one). The result of this operation should be identifying the cases in which there is or there isn't a threat ascribed by vertical competition. As we could notice when we analyzed the emergence of the European identity, there isn't yet a coagulated official position on the manner in which the European citizen is defined. One can talk about a *sui generis* European value system only as a potential. The impact on the national system should then be analyzed from the point of view of how being European is constructed. We may distinguish for analytic purposes two situations in which a European value system may find itself, each with specific implications:

a. *A hybrid construction*, resulting out of globalization, an unarticulated model with weak ties incorporating a wide range of different values. Such a model is characterized by a wide freedom of movement and the ability to incorporate the most diverse and different values. The universal fundamental values (e.g. love, freedom) which can be applied to any communities, but are invested with a different meaning by each of them, are favored. The model is therefore essentially abstract and its values are not grounded in the history experienced by the society. These traits make it attractive and accessible, but not stable. Such a model is not rooted in the lived experience of the society and does not offer it the same points of reference and analytical grids as an authentic culture. Hybrid culture is a poor substitute that fails in providing the cohesion necessary to build a functioning society. More than this, being extremely versatile and easily communicable by the media it can infiltrate and cause insecurity for a previous value system. But such an option is deeply desecuritising on the long-term for all nations which would consent to it. It cannot replace national culture, does not generate a real European culture and lacks the depth needed to support deeper integration. Also we should take into consideration that it has an increased potential to generate nationalist and anti-European movements.

b. *An authentic, well-articulated value system* – such a system is still under construction and, as we have previously seen, there are live debates regarding its composition. More than this, throughout history, the European

states have been in conflict with each other the moments of unity being brief. Such examples of unity could be considered, not indisputably, the crusades or the defense against the Ottoman threat. However, such historical examples cannot be used to sustain from a discursive point of view the endeavor to create a common identity. Another factor to be taken into account is that the states still have conflicting versions of some historical events. However an authentic European construction is possible even in the absence of concrete action under the very impact of the passage of time.

About the hybrid the threats it can cause are easier to distinguish in the second case, that of an articulated model. Mălina Ciocea (2009, p. 98) distinguishes two possible sources of threats: incorrect decoding of it or the conflict between it, and national system. The first case represents basically the implementation of inconsistent measures mostly of legal or foreign policy. Against this kind of dysfunctions the organization itself can take action through designated bodies. The latter case requires on the part of countries willing to accede a profound analysis aimed at highlighting the consistency or inconsistency of the two cultural models. If such an inconsistency is found then the society has to decide whether or not it is willing to relinquish non-matching values.

C)   Between identity and conflict

As the third aspect of Romanian societal security dimensions we address the competition of identities within our country. Inside the EU, the dynamics that can be ascribed to horizontal competition are much more limited and so less visible than the vertical European vs. national. A notable exception to this is the resurgence of ethnic minorities and the affirmation of their separate identities. Of course, any strategy that seeks to secure ones identity, be it minority or majority, creates insecurity for the other one. This is a manifestation of the societal security dilemma.

Societal security dilemma has been announced by Barry Buzan but hasn't been properly addressed until recently, a very interesting study being that of Paul Roe (2005). He identifies three types of the security dilemma:

➢   A tight security dilemma "*when actors with compatible security requirements misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures*";

➢   A regular security dilemma when both actors are security seekers, but there is a real incompatibility between their purposes;

➢   A loose security dilemma when actors are not only security but also power seekers and "*are compelled or deterred in employing aggressive*

policies depending on whether offence or defense has the advantage" (Roe, 2005, pp.2-3).

Beyond the existence of a certain type of dilemma, Roe states that, in order to have a dilemma that can grow into a full-fledged ethnic conflict there have to be some underlining factors. In this aspect, J Kaufman identifies four conditions that make powerful sources of intergroup hostility, which we are going to analyze in respect to the Romanian-Hungarian interethnic relations:

a.   **An external affinity problem**

Interethnic relations all across Eastern Europe are at the least problematic. Many of these communities are the result of dramatic border change (our case) or massive population relocations (the case of the Russian minority in the Baltic States), actions that have left both the states and the communities in difficult situations. The states have internal responsibilities, having to abstain from any form of discrimination, but also external responsibilities towards kinship groups that live in neighboring states. If the states choose to assert their protection in an aggressive or inconsiderate way in relation to the other it can cause serious problems in the interethnic climate. Such an assertive attitude is the one that Hungary has chosen whether we analyze the Hungarian law on citizenship[1], the active support for some political parties by the Hungarian authorities (The Hungarian Civic Party) or the rehabilitation of controversial historical figures. More than this, during the 2013 "war of the flags", the Hungarian officials recommended major changes in Romanian state organization, a position that could be interpreted as intervention into another state's internal affairs. The recommendation to allow self-governing of Transcarpathia concomitant to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, could be similarly interpreted.

b.   **The historical dominance of one group by another**

Subsequent rapid changes in control over territories inhabited by representatives of another ethnic group are a historical reality for our country. The Romanians that lived in Transylvania had, for a large extent of time, a subordinate position in relation to the other nationalities, a fact that has changed for the first time after the end of World War I, and then again at the beginning of the Second World War, only to be restored to the Post WWI agreement at the end of the conflagration. Of course no change has been smooth and the changes have been quite scaring for the populations. The

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[1] Which states that the person or its descendants that have had Hungarian citizenship before 1920 or in the period between 1939 and 1945, can apply for getting it again in emergency procedure, the only requirement being a good knowledge of the language.

abuses and extremism that has often accompanied these changes has offered both sides a strong basis for extremist, xenophobic speech.

c.   The presence of negative ethnic stereotypes

Every inhabitant of Romania can come up with a bunch of slurs that portray negatively the other, whether minority or majority. Stereotypes like the Romanians are "*lazy*", "*uncivilized peasants*" or the Hungarians want "*to steal Transylvania*" or they "*refuse to speak Romanian*" but also "*the common Romanian and the common Hungarian, get along, it is the politicians that poison their relations*" show a certain public perception of interethnic relations that may or may not be accurate.

A study conducted by IRES institute (2013) in the perception of the population towards other nationalities revealed that 41% of the interviewed considered Hungary to be an enemy of our country. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents said that relations with the Hungarian minority have been good, and nearly three quarter have a good and very good opinion about Romanian Magyars.

The said poll (IRES, 2013) gives a useful insight into many of the underlining factors that shape our interethnic relations, for the sake of this study we can observe that there isn't an insurmountable, visceral hate between the two populations. Also the local population isn't commonly considered as an instrument of a foreign power, the relation with the minority being of a substantially better nature that with the Kin state. Of course, both the relations are not as good as they could be and this is easily identifiable in common speech.

d.   Conflict over ethnic symbols

Ethnic symbols and their use are, in absence of clear legislative stipulations, subject to heated debates. Symbols are, as Anthony D. Smith (1991, p. 77) states, "*the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism*" and so they can embody a wide array of national ideals. The use and abuse of national symbols can facilitate a kind of mobilization of a certain population hard to attain through other means. The most important ethnic symbol, one who has been a constant source of conflict, ever since its creation, is "Székely (Szekler) flag". In 2013, the decision to ban the use of this ethnic flag in the Harghita and Covasna counties has caused a huge stir, suggestively named *"the war of the flags"* this symbolic conflict being heavily sustained by inflammatory declarations of both internal and foreign origin.

This kind of conflict is characterized by being especially convenient to generate if it finds the necessary underlying societal conditions that can be ascribed to a security dilemma. The Romanian-Hungarian societal security

dilemma is, I argue, a tight one, the security requirements being compatible. A regional identity doesn't fundamentally subvert the existence of the national one, but the task of negotiating the nature and boundaries should be left to the given community. Foreign intervention, using ethnic symbols for political purposes and inflammatory discourse can manipulate societies into viewing their interest as incompatible and or even into disregarding the security requirements of others. This security dilemma is of a regular kind, much more difficult to manage and more so to settle.

Conclusions

At the end of the 19th century Ernest Renan (1992) foretold the disappearance of Nations: "*Nations are not eternal*, he said, *had a beginning and will have an end, will likely be replaced by a European Confederation*". From then, the cessation of Nations has been prophesized countless times but up to the moment we have yet to bear witness to such an event. So far all integrationist, supranational projects have disintegrated. The European Union must be designed within the framework and with the instrumentation available or proper to the cause and not by following a certain ideology and pan-nationalism is certainly an ideology. Europe cannot be a super-nation, it cannot recreate the United States because it hasn't got deterritorialized ethnic groups, nor can we afford that it recreates that of the Soviet Union. History teaches that ideology is an ill social binder.

The nation today remains topical, even if its traditional support - the state – is facing great changes. Modern nation can no longer be the support and motivation for xenophobia or for violations of human rights in virtue of supreme authority over a territory, or to preserve some features considered as national, as a certain side of the political spectrum is still trying. Ethno-symbolism has the merit of showing that the Nations have pre-modern roots which we must take into account, especially when we are dealing with demiurgic zeal that promote the deletion of nations in favor of a other form of social organization. Also what Anthony D. Smith (1991) affirms is that Nations have been forms of organization adapted to the needs of citizens and a modern creation of the eras in which they made their appearance, and to a large extent, still are. They are not static bodies, frozen in tradition and resistant to any kind of change, even for the better, but instead take something of the dynamism of the age inhabited. As they, in the moment of occurrence, were an instrument of affirmation and safeguarding of human rights, an advanced ideology for the era, likewise in post modernity nation is called upon

to adjust and to find its place. The present research determines me to say that the nation has all the tools needed to achieve this aim, and that the nation will remain a fundamental source of identification, at least for the European area, and, moreover, another identity architecture can develop only by taking into account national characteristics.

Globalization and European integration do not lead to the disappearance of the nation, but rather allow the creation of communities of Nations drawn together through shared values and joined together by trust. Closing up and knowing each other allows the articulation of a European identity without loss of the original. A Europe designed as a melting pot in which the 28 national identities are turned into an amorphous mass loosely linked together through shared respect towards abstract values is not grounded in reality, and cannot be successful. Moreover, it becomes a real threat to the security of the component societies, which are forced, and will take measures of self-protection. Deeper integration remains largely an issue relating to the ability to communicate and transmit, make accessible and attractive the project of the Union, but also one simply related to historical accumulation. Cohabitation leaves, even in the event of further nefarious disintegration, close communities, which share experiences and culture. In this respect we can refer to the existence of a so-called Yugo-sphere and Yugo-nostalgia that appeared following the dismantling of Yugoslavia.

In regard to the modern paradigm of security, the present article was meant to be more of a justification of the need for further study focused on the societal dimension of security. It is arguably the sector that faces the biggest changes and it is necessary, now more than ever, to understand what are the inner organizing mechanics of the society up to where changes are positive, and where insecurity starts. A society's answers to real or perceived threats vary and are extremely difficult to anticipate. Once stimulated, the societal security dilemma becomes nearly impossible to be truly stopped, the effects extending for a long period of time after. The parties which clash in a conflict of identity, tend to treat it as a threat to their very existence and survival, and so the wounds that result are very hard to close. The approaches towards studying this sector of security are not easy to develop, especially in view of the inherent multidisciplinary character as well as the necessity for development of appropriate analysis tools. It is very difficult to speak, on the subject of securing identity, about a unifying theory that is applicable to all forms of societies in the same terms, hence the difficulty of finding a balance between Nations and the European Union, at least in this segment. However an effort to articulate a unified security structure to accommodate these

specifics is of the utmost importance to enable the deepening of the Union and the forging a Union more stable and more adapted to the needs of its citizens. Focusing on societal sector dynamics, including threats, are constant concerns, even if their approach is done on other levels. Migration, population ageing and the emerging of a common identity or, on the contrary, the resurgence of secessionism, all of them have an impact and must be managed on a long-term, integrated at European level. These issues cannot find a solution except through cooperation between Member States and they require serious debates about what it means to be European, and how far are we prepared to go to defend common values.

For our country we can only observe the complexity of this dimension of national security, the existence of all the threats and their inherent particularities. It goes without saying that is we should focus on developments happening within this sector we should have in mind that they do not appear and cannot be resolved in short intervals of time. The fact that the specter of nationalism and secessionism is being drawn out of the box, especially on the eve of elections (not constant) is not a justification of any kind. The particularity of identity conflicts is that securitizing actor, the one who decides what is threatened, is not necessarily invested formally with political power, but is the purest exponent of the group. Bearing this in mind, the fact that political actors make use of this conflictuality only before various elections does not mean that periodic stimulation cannot potentially give rise to third persons that will have a continued activity. Some would say that such a trend can already be identified. Also we should not ignore the spill-over potential, the possibility of shifting the conflict of the societal to other dimensions where it can escalate, and also the broad possibilities of generating tension that social networks offer. Management of identity threats is only possible at the strategic level, and it would be especially useful in this regard for documents of a programmatic nature to be developed, aimed at resolving the issues pertaining to the societal sector of modern security.

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NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

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Abstract:

National security can be built only on strong national organizations with a highly specialized human resource, an organizational culture based on information and a managerial conception capable of ensuring and using adequate, verified and processed information (intelligence information) according to organizational competences. The establishment within the main public institutions of Research, Analysis and Prognosis Departments (DCAP) aimed at sustaining decision making process and with roles comparable with private CI&EW structures might prove to be (if they are not already) a necessity for the near future. The third millennium leaders have to understand that the modern/postmodern management surpassed the information era, reaching now an intelligence era. Therefore, we must prepare for such an "arms race".

Keywords: *competitive intelligence (CI), business intelligence (BI), early warning (EW), knowledge management (KM), benchmarking, intelligence culture, smart nation*

Introduction

In Western consolidated democracies, it is organizations that ultimately lead society: they possess the most important financial and logistical resources; they are endowed with long-term interests, plans and strategies which, for the most part, do not change from an electoral cycle to another; they make decisions based on exhaustive information about the political-diplomatic milieu, the market and the consumers, the environment and society; they have the power to influence political decision-making and, last but not least, they employ the best specialists, no matter their field of activity.

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Therefore, the state's margin of action is limited, as it is controlled or modelled by the interests and actions of great organizations, including state bureaucracy.

In states where democracy is less consolidated, where private organizations are weakly developed, societal performance depends, to a greater degree, on the performance of political power, on its capacity to organize and plan strategically for the long term, to set objectives and directions of strategic development which do not change, no matter how parties or leaders in power change. To reach this desideratum or strategic objective, professional bureaucratic organizations are needed.

Without this, in a world of global competition and dynamic and permanent change, neither progress nor security can be generated, even in its most basic and concise definition: **liberty in front of threat,** both for the individual and for organizations making up the state.

Freedom is an extremely vast and generous philosophical concept, yet, in the parlance of security we could reduce it to: **having one's own minimal capacities to react and act when faced with any type of threat**. This kind of capabilities can offer one, depending on their efficiency and state of development, a certain degree of freedom, the ability to defend oneself alone, but also time to better organize, to allocate new resources and/or to receive support from allied states or organizations.

No matter the level of development and democracy, eventually, the state, through its organizations, bears the main responsibility for national security, for protecting the citizens and society in general through ensuring environmental and economic security, through securing healthcare and through preserving capacity to act in crisis situations (be they of military, economic, health, ecological, pandemic, cybernetic or terrorist nature). As a consequence, the state needs to create its own intelligent mechanisms and to adapt to current and future challenges, becoming what the literature calls a „smart nation", through better employing its own and its partners' information and know-how.

Management of change *versus* information management

The managers of modern organizations are aware that, currently, leadership becomes more and more the management of change, and change is a permanent process relying on a constant flux of information, on the developments of the internal and external environment, which need to be known and carefully evaluated. Therefore, *an efficient management of change*

implies a *high-quality information management and an adequate information strategy*. This is also valid if we speak of *crisis management, the management of risk* and, even more so, of *strategic management.*

To believe that you can successfully achieve these types of management without projecting and operationalizing intelligence processes which ensure the necessary information and, implicitly, the respective analyses and evaluations, adapted to the specificities of each managerial decision, is utopic.

Among all, maybe the most misunderstood and wrongly applied concept is that of management of change, as many managers, especially from public organizations provoke change without adequately understanding the **direction of changes** that occur outside the organization and to which their organization needs to adapt. Many times they achieve a *primary benchmarking*, based on which different external successful "solutions" are copied, without truly understanding *why, in what context and to what purpose* these have been adopted, hoping to achieve the same results as the organizations they are copying. We are faced, therefore, with a type of *management through imitation*, a contemporary perpetuation of *forms without substance*. This is incapable of reaching the organizational goal, that is to produce "results for the outside" or to „obtain performance on the market", according to the definition given by Peter F. Drucker (Drucker, 2000, p. 14).

The capacity to obtain and make use of all relevant information to reach a managerial goal, both inside and outside the organization, eventually determines the difference between successful and weak management. Excessive concentration on internal problems makes one lose sight or distance oneself from the organization's goals.

"Management through imitation" is different from "intuitive management", which always relies on unmediated experience in a certain field, on specialized and permanently up to date information and knowledge.

Simple imitating other organizations' or states' behavior rarely has the desired results. Military specialists know that they cannot strike a moving „target" except by anticipating its position and calculating an "interception course". As one cannot intercept a target by simply following its course (except if, maybe, one possesses a vastly superior level of technological development), one cannot catch up with a top organization if one makes the same decisions. No organization has the time, same organizational history and culture, the same experiences and objectives and is not similarly situated regarding time and place, starting point or development level as another. *Imitation makes one always get there too late.*

To prevent such a development, strategic information and early-warning is required, to indicate market tendencies and the directions followed by those who are ahead, so that one ca place his own organization on *an interception course.*

Intelligence in public organizations

To be competitive, public interest organizations/institutions, especially executive ones, need, similarly to private ones, their own structure to fulfill functions of *competitive intelligence* and *early warning,* aiming to support the process of decision-making and following their consequences after implementation.

Such a structure has to be, by necessity, *bureaucratic, professional, permanent (not subject to political and leadership changes) and must have the right to work with classified information.* It could be organized as a Department for Research, Analysis and Prognosis (DRAP), aimed at supporting a coherent and long-term strategic information management.

To reach its goal, such a department should be subordinated directly to executive management, similarly to Competitive Intelligence (CI) or Business Intelligence (BI) or marketing and public relations (PR) departments. The DRAP's tasks should be permanent market research in the field of the institution's responsibilities; collecting and analyzing relevant information on the market and inside one's own organization, monitoring the results and the effects of important management decisions; elaborating evaluations, prognoses, recommendations and action strategies, according to projected organizational goals.

Permanent contact with the main decision-maker(s) (top management), with other functional structures, but also access to the organizational culture/sub-culture specific to them, to information related to the stage of development of current projects or on the decision-maker's agenda, would allow such an organism to quickly evaluate any new data and to generate the newest and most relevant information, analyses and proposals to support the decision-making process, according to the daily needs, goals and strategic objectives of the institutions which it is part of.

The DRAP would need to be conceived in such a way as to constitute the main "information interface" with other institutions that handle data and knowledge of interest for its field of competence, such as: other governmental structures (ministries, agencies, prefectures), National Bank, banks and private companies, academia, specialized mass-media, professional

associations, NGOs, international organizations, and, last but not least, national intelligence services.

Thus, all resources and knowledge reserved **in the system (knowledge management) on a certain topic would be employed to its best use**.

Through the creation of such departments by the main consumers of state information, any interested institution and, especially, intelligence services would benefit from a permanent interlocutor and from a better and faster feedback, from a superior use of one's own activities resulting in a more efficient way to employ resources, including public funds, by all institutions involved in the act of governing. Thus, the final assembly of information directly at the beneficiary, one of the desiderata proposed by the American analyst, John L. Peterson for the American national intelligence community would be reached (Toffler & Toffler, 1995, p. 185). This would correspond to a greater degree to the beneficiary's specific interests and needs.

Exact and real-time knowledge of these "needs" by the DRAP would orient and optimize the activity of the "information providers" (including intelligence agencies) and would make products delivered to the final beneficiary immediately useful for the evaluations that ground a decision. The decision-making process would become more efficient through the faster generation of information, solutions or action plans, which are close and adequate to managerial requests and the desired objectives.

A professional structure of this kind would allow, in crisis situations, the shortening of the information cycle in the case of intelligence agencies, as these would be able to directly deliver brute information, and have them analyzed and disseminated to the legal beneficiary directly by the DRAP.

Through such a mechanism, a giant lead would be achieved to overcome one of the most perverse effects of the information age: "analytical block" caused by information overflow to the modern-day decision-maker, who, although he can rely on more information and sources, does not possess the time and the necessary capabilities for collection, selection, verification, processing and analysis of relevant data for decision-making. The creation of a DRAP would eliminate this block. Referring to government institutions, it becomes obvious that the quality of the decision-making act eventually depends on ensuring one of the European Union's main desiderata: *good governance* and, eventually, national security.

Therefore, the development of information collection and processing, anticipation and early warning capabilities, as well as of abilities to adapt to a new course of events, becomes vital for those who wish to be protected from

surprising, but predictable developments and/or those who intend to quickly reduce the gaps in order to be competitive on a certain market, either local, regional or global.

To be able to influence events in a certain sector of activity, knowledge of the rules of the game and of, at least, the main important actors (*market and competitor intelligence)* is required. The tipping of the balance in a direction or another is always preceded by „emergent patterns" which can be detected ahead of time. Nothing, at the human or global scale, happens overnight, and, therefore, events cannot be handled unless one has the managerial and organizational structures ready and able to detect (early-warning), to learn, to adapt and to respond to quick and successive changes.

All this can only be realized on the basis of intelligence that is opportune and immediately useful for decision-making (*actionable intelligence*). The creation, in public institutions, of competitive intelligence structures similar to those extant in the private environment and which can signal this information could be a solution.

The American competitive intelligence specialist, Larry Kahaner (1997, p. 19), urges all managers to forget the *information age*, warning them that "we are living the intelligence age, and the two are quite different". In the information age, everybody has extended access to information, but few to information that is verified, analyzed and processed according to real decision and action needs, that is intelligence. The management of information becomes the key to time and strategic-decision management. Those who do not have structures and organizations specialized in collecting and real-time processing of information they need, cannot aim for success.

Eventually, national security can only be based on strong national organizations, made up of informed individuals and an organizational culture based on information in general and on intelligence, in particular. A nation which has or can build such organizations can aspire to the title of "smart nation".

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THE MAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AS A REIFICATION OF THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

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Abstract:

The current debates focusing on a deeper and wider understanding of the security concept seem to revolve around theoretical and factual developments starting with 1945 and especially with 1989. The historical approach proposed by this paper attempts to expand the time horizon to an older peace arrangement: the Versailles Treaty. Taking into account empirical evidence and approaching conceptual debates, it argues that the security's conceptual rationale – peace and conflict – was long ago treated from a social perspective. The origins of the social dimension of the security concept may thus be traced back to the International Labor Organization and the process that led to its inclusion in the Versailles Treaty.

Keywords: *social dimension of the security concept, social security, Paris Peace Conference, Versailles Treaty, International Labor Organization, Progressivism, Wilsonianism.*

Introduction

During the past decades, an ever-growing community of scholars, experts, policy-makers and representatives of the civil society developed, shared, agreed and promoted the idea that security is not just about the state, as a referent object, and military, as the overwhelming subject matter. A distinctive set of disciplines emerged: (international) security studies, peace research studies and, with it, new security strategies were drafted, marking a conceptual shift that broadened security's limits both vertically, from national to individual and international security, and horizontally, from defense issues to numerous sectors such as societal, economic, social political, environmental

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and so forth. In fact, the intellectual ferment that led to this outcome was and still is so dynamic that the efforts of redefining security attracted the label of "a cottage industry" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 5).The newly born and spread literature, mainly starting with the 1980s, was indeed inspired and fueled by various works of philosophy, economics, history, sociology, political science and law from the past, but it seldom treated history other than a source of factual evidence. However, as this paper argues, the debate over the conceptualization of security is not a new phenomenon.

The Versailles Treaty and the negotiation process, as well as the conceptual argumentation that led to the creation of the International Labor Organization go beyond the force of exemplification in that they connected social dynamics and economic realities to peacemaking efforts, traditionally built around political and military issues. Social justice and unrest were considered causes of stability and conflict, respectively, at both the national and international levels. Although security was not addressed *per se* as an issue, the simple fact that its main leitmotifs – peace and war – were conceived from a social perspective may be equated to the addition of a social dimension to the security concept. "Freedom from want" and "freedom from fear", in the present UN language (Human Development Report 1994, p. 3), were thus considered two correlated prerequisites of security many decades before. The two idioms were actually first used together by Edward Stettinius, the U.S. Secretary of State, after the San Francisco Conference that led to the creation of the United Nations (1945). Implicitly, national and international security was expanded to include that of the individual, while the military sector was complemented to include basic human social and economic needs.

The hypothesis of this paper is that two conditions were met for this earlier reconceptualization of security and its following stipulation in international law: the existence of an epistemic community that promoted social justice and the presence of an ideological threat – Russian Bolshevism – that impelled a critical (geo) political need and will to address social issues. The latter is quite obvious and does not constitute a research objective for this paper, since there is a vast literature dedicated to the topic. "The Bolshevik revolution helped to work a miraculous change of attitude among the Western ruling classes. The workers, even in the victorious democracies, were restless" (Macmillan, 2003, p. 95) and their demands needed an adequate treatment. Even military leaders, such as Field Admiral Sir Henry Wilson, came to recognize that from 1918 on the enemy would have been "not the Boche but

the Bolshevik" (Read, 2008)[1]. On the other hand, the former condition is a refined, enlarged interpretation of the epistemic community, defined as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1992, p. 3). In specific relation to the topic of this paper and to the historical circumstances, the view on this kind of community has a larger scope, encompassing not just professionals from the governmental and academic circles, but social reformers and activists, entrepreneurs and trade-union leaders, as well as educated journalists and (especially left-wing) political leaders. The special combination of these two factors, namely expert knowledge and common awareness, led not just to what we would presently label as a wider interpretation of the concept of security but to its embedment in a normative framework – the International Labor Organization and the subsequent national and international legislative undertakings – that outlived what was considered to be the much appraised creation of the Paris Peace Conference: the League of Nations.

This paper is a literature-assessing and historical-evaluative research that proposes a deeper, in a historical sense, and richer examination of the security concept, attempting to debunk the general perception that treats the wider understanding of the security concept as a recent development. However, it is limited to the social dimension of security, although the issues at stake pervade the traditional boundaries and touch upon economic and political areas. Furthermore, it aims at delineating the epistemic community across the Atlantic, especially related to American Progressivism, without neglecting the Europeans' contribution, on the contrary. Finally, while it treats progressive ideas since their inception in the late 19th century, it is chronologically confined to the Paris Peace Conference, closing with the inclusion of labor in the Versailles Treaty. The first part of the paper consists in a brief and selective stock-taking of some high-impact works dedicated to the reconceptualization of security, aiming mainly at its social dimension. The second explains the causes of Progressivism and summarizes the main tenets of the Progressives, with a focus on their "social engineering" effort. Before the concluding remarks, the paper explores the making of Versailles Treaty's Part XIII, which ultimately led to the creation of the International Labor Organization.

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[1] "Boche" was an offensive French slang that referred to the Germans.

Modern (re)conceptualizations of security: dimensioning the social sector

In the midst of the debates during the past decades, security has been dubbed as an "ambiguous symbol" (Wolfers, 1952), an "underdeveloped" (Buzan, 1983, p. 3), "contested" (Baylis et al., 2008, p. 230) and even a "neglected concept" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 8). With the advent of a growing number of studies exploring the meaning of security, the scholars dedicating their research to this topic came to form various schools of thought. Buzan *et al* distinguish between the "traditionalists", political realists viewing security from a state-centered and military-oriented perspective, and the others that promote a different perception of security, moving beyond the state and to non-military sectors (Buzan et al., 1988, pp. 2-3) (they may qualify as "non-traditionalists"). Peoples and Vaughan-Williams divide security studies approaches into "traditional" and "critical", based on the same conceptual contradiction (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, pp. 4-6). Interestingly, besides the (neo)realists that naturally lie in the former camp, the same authors also view scholars belonging to the liberal family of international relations theories as "traditionalists" since "they all share a common commitment to thinking security within the context of a military agenda" (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, pp. 4-6). On the other hand, critics to the traditional conception of security are more heterogeneous and may be loosely mapped into several categories: the Welsh School (normative), the Copenhagen School (analytical), and the Paris School (sociological) (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010, pp. 9-10). Furthermore, Baylis identifies constructivism as an alternative for explaining how security is conceived: its meaning is not given by some material structure but it is embedded into the shared knowledge of the actors involved and thus results from a social interaction of subjective understandings (Baylis, 2008, p. 234).

Other critical views on security arise from feminist theories, which bring gender issues into the process of rethinking security, or from post-modernist thought, which attempts to supplement the debate regarding the security concept by considering new issues which have been ignored by the traditionalists (Baylis, 2008, p. 236).

Lately, Buzan and Hansen (2009) divided different interpretations of the security concept into: conventional constructivism, focusing on ideational factors such as culture, beliefs and norms; critical constructivism, adopting narrative and sociological methodologies; the Copenhagen School, promoting the constructivist view of securitization; critical security studies, based on

emancipation as the key concept; feminist security studies, raising the awareness regarding gender issues; human security, placing individuals and their needs as the main referent object of security; peace research studies, a more Liberal approach aiming to reduce the use of force and complementing state security with individual security; post-colonial security studies, offering non-Western insights to security theories; poststructuralist security studies, switching the focus from ideas to discourse; strategic studies, presenting the traditionalist views on security; and (neo)realism, adopting a similar stance towards security as strategic studies, albeit more politically-oriented and rationalist (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 35-38).

Reconceptualizing security brought about various definitions of the term and delineations of its sectors. The latter process led to a compartmentalization of security, taking into account the dimensions to which belonged the values that were to be protected or from which emerged the threats endangering those values. Compartmentalization is not synonymous with fragmentation: most studies agree that security is an organic whole, whose division is necessary for the sake of theory or policy. The social dimension was not always individually considered, either because it was considered an intra-state matter, while security was traditionally confined to the inter-state realm, or because it was engulfed into other dimensions, such as economic and/or political. This benign neglect seems paradoxical, considering the debates at the end of the Great War that pre-date modern developments and the fact that social security/protection programs and policies were generally implemented at the state level due to international and transnational processes, through the work of the International Labor Organization and the sub-state groups that exchanged ideas and plans across territorial boundaries. This is not to say that domestic processes were negligible but that they were greatly stimulated, even altered, due to the Peace Treaties and the epistemic communities forged in Paris and thereafter.

In what is now considered a classical approach, Wolfers proposed a dual perspective on security: objective, when security "measures the absence of threats to acquired values", and subjective, when it relates to the "absence of fear that such values will be attacked" (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485). His emphasis on "acquired values" was significant for the broadening of security's scope, all the more so as shifting the focus on different values and implicitly different threats allows for a multi-dimensional conception of security, not just national and military.

Ullman also argues against envisaging security "merely, or even primarily, in military terms" (Ullman, 1983, p. 129). His correlation of security

to the nature of threats also bears the possibility of imagining security in social terms. His own words are more than eloquent for that matter, since Ullman was considering threats that were degrading strongly and imminently "the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state" (Ullman, 1983, p. 133). It is also worth mentioning the shift to the individual.

Buzan, perhaps one of the most influential researchers in the field of security studies, managed to pin down the security concept to five sectors (military, political, economic, environmental, and societal) while generally defining it as 'freedom from threat" (Buzan, 1991, p. 32). The social dimension can hardly be correlated with the political and economic sectors, but this can be partly explained by pointing at Buzan's preference for the national level of security: "Security is primarily about the fate of human collectivities, and only secondarily about the personal security of individual human beings. In the contemporary international system, the standard unit of security is thus the sovereign territorial state" (Buzan, 1991, p. 32). However, he explicitly pointed at a social sector of security (Buzan, 1983, p. 11) only that he considered it at the level of the individual, breaking it into factors (life, health, status, wealth, freedom) that he appreciates as "far more complicated, not infrequently contradictory, and plagued by the distinction between objective and subjective evaluation" (Buzan, 1831, p. 18).

Departing from Buzan's view mainly centered on the state, hence too Realist, Booth suggests an interesting concept: emancipation, defined as "the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely chose to do" (Booth, 1991, p. 319). The focus is clearly placed on the human being who moves to the core of security studies from this critical perspective. Inherently, the feeling of security is accomplished not just through protection of the individual from military threats but through the enhancement of all economic, social, environmental conditions that make up for his welfare. Being secured equates being emancipated as an individual: "security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin" (Booth, 1991, p. 319).

The concept of human security is probably the most appropriate in discussing the social dimension of security. Human security is not just multidimensional (including social issues) but it puts the individual and the community as the referent object of security: thus, the individual becomes the end of security, while states become primarily the means. This conception of security generally involves three meanings: one that is concerned with the protection and promotion of basic human rights to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"; another humanitarian one, mainly related to the

consequence of conflict on human lives; and a final one, the broadest, with "a strong social justice component", dealing with "economic, environmental, social and other forms of harm to the overall livelihood and well-being of individuals" (Hampson, 2008, pp. 230-231), which is generally promoted by the UN, through its Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP threw the first challenge to the traditionalist view on security in 1993 when it claimed that it "must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security" (Human Development Report 1993, p. 2). A year later, the UNDP elaborated more on the concept, pinning it down to seven areas: economic security (against poverty), food security (access to basic food), health security (health care), environmental security (protection from ecological risks), personal security (against physical violence), community security (protection of cultural values and traditions), political security (protection of civil and political rights) (Human Development Report 1994, p. 22-33).

Human security became the trend for the UN approach for years to come. For example, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, promoted the same idea: "Human security can no longer be understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for human rights and the rule of law" (Annan, 1999, p. 15). Although lacking clarity and being too vast, the human security concept helped nonetheless to the delineation of a branch of security studies (Paris, 2001, pp. 87-102), one that generally understands security in both quantitative terms, as "the satisfaction of basic material needs of all humankind. At the most basic level, food, shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of human beings" (Thomas, 2000, pp. 6-7), and qualitative ones, as "the achievement of human dignity which incorporate personal autonomy, control over one's live and unhindered participation in the life of the community" (Thomas, 2000, pp. 6-7).

This "pull" approach, from the international level, doubled by a "push" one, from the civil society and the academia, managed to reach to the state level: presently, most national security strategies in the democratic world either refer to issues pertaining to the social dimension of security or even explicitly delineate it. Previously, it was neglected because security was imagined at the inter-state level, while intra-state issues were downgraded to the domestic policies realm. In this respect, "social security was generally

defined as internal security. Its essential function was to ensure the political and economic power of a given ruling class or the survival of the social system and an adequate degree of public security" (Balázs, 1985, p. 146). Moreover, social security was increasingly linked to social justice (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 98), as a constituent of social policies (Kaufmann, 2013, p. 108), which usually deal with unemployment, labor conditions, pensions etc.

American Progressivism: a brief outlook

After the Reconstruction Era that followed the Civil War, America was experiencing a series of transformations that came to be known as the "Gilded Age". Under the guise of economic growth, massive immigration, industrialization, technological progress and urbanization, a different picture was unfolding: that of a country whose political and social landscape was dreadfully altered. The big business was dictating the economic and financial life: the so called "captains of industry", Wall Street tycoons or corporate magnates - Rockefeller, Carnegie, Pierpont Morgan, Vanderbilt - were monopolizing the marketplace. By the late 19th century, one percent of American families, the richest, held almost ninety percent of the currency in the whole U.S. economy (McNeese, 2010, p. 48) and "the rich were getting richer – far richer – than most people" (Nugent, 2010, p. 6). In the same time, corruption was engulfing the political and administrative milieu and "much of it was centered on the practice of patronage" (McNeese, 2010, p. 57). In the 1880s, half of the federal, non-elected jobs were awarded as payoff for those who voted for the political parties that were winning the elections (McNeese, 2010, p. 57). Moreover, these political machineries, as they came to be known, and their bosses, were tainted by graft from the business sector, doing almost nothing against the "merger movement" of big corporations; in fact, it was considered normal: "men who were otherwise honorable saw no conflict in accepting financial rewards, gifts, commissions, or retainers from businesses and individuals whom they assisted" (Jaycox, 2005, p. 78). As such, poverty and misery were the traits of the time: living conditions were awful and labor problems were rising. The social and political dimensions of American life were not keeping up the pace with economic dynamics. A deep sense of unfairness was making havoc among the American society (Nugent, 2010, p. 7). Social division was there, too: "capital versus labor, the interests [n.b. of the few privileged] versus the people" (Nugent, 2010, p. 11).

In the midst of the Long Depression (1873-1896) the social conditions worsened and as a result terrible violent strikes mushroomed all over the

cities: the Great Railroad Strike (1877), the Haymarket Riot (1886), the Homestead Strike (1892), the Pullman Strike (1894) to name but a few of the bloodiest ones that required thousands of state or federal troops to quell (McNeese, 2010, p. 49). At the peak of the depression, when the stock market crashed in 1893, 500 banks and 15,000 businesses went bankrupt, heavily contributing to an already rising unemployment figure (Jaycox, 2005, p. 39). Demographics, although rising, were not helping the social milieu: farmers were displaced, because of a deflation of agricultural prices, while millions of migrants continued to come from abroad – between 1871 and 1914, 25 million migrants arrived in the United States (Link & Link, 2012, p. 6). All of them contributed to the overcrowding of cities: housing was provided in poor tenements contributing to growing slums; sanitary facilities were outbalanced since "sewer lines and garbage disposal were sorely lacking", "fire and police protection was outpaced, schools were inundated, and street maintenance was for all practical purposes nonexistent" (Jaycox, 2005, p. 6). Social change was deemed necessary, it was actually critical.

Against the backdrop of this crisis, at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, voices calling for reform started to rally in a heterogeneous but consistent movement. The Progressives, as they would later be called, were eager "to first identify and then to remedy the problems inherent in an industrializing and increasingly urban society" (Pastorello, 2014, p. 7). They were "religious leaders, businessmen, professionals, civic leaders, settlement women, suffragists, African Americans, civil rights advocates, union members, nativists, immigrants, workers, farmers and politicians" (Pastorello, 2014, p. 12) that, despite the lack of a formal organization, shared the belief in some kind of governmental regulation or involvement in order to solve social, economic, and political problems (Pastorello, 2014, p. 8). Moreover, they shared a faith in science, in that expert knowledge was needed as a reform driver, either directly from academic scholars – especially social scientists – or through the education of political and administrative elites (Pastorello, 2014, p. 7). Altogether, the Progressives "were united by a common anxiety about industrialism and what the new economic system meant for the social and political fabric" (Link & Link, 2012, p. 8). Being aware of the social divisions created by the advent of uncontrolled capitalism, they sought to alleviate the "social consequences of industrial society for immigrants, workers, the poor and especially for children" (Link & Link, 2012, p. 8).

As grassroots phenomenon with initiatives that first reached the local executive and legislative circles and then moved on to the state and finally federal level, Progressivism brought a series of "efforts to alleviate the

dysfunction, or the corruption, or the economic injustice, or the human suffering that had accompanied America's explosion of industrial growth, urbanization, and new ways of life" (Jaycox, 2005, p. VIII). Aiming to revitalize democracy and to establish a fair social system, the Progressives brought "wholesale restructuring of social and political institutions [...] and reform became a driving force" (Link & Link, 2012, p. 9). They engineered solutions to the social ills and paid careful attention to "overcrowding and health and safety issues" inherent to industrialization and urbanization processes, addressing labor problems, demanding housing and factory codes, public health and sanitation measures, school reforms and an equitable distribution of taxes (Pastorello, 2014, p. 197). Governmental intervention was rounded by civic activism: a great number of non-governmental organizations that sometimes acted as a quasi-government, the civil society at its best, championed causes such as laborer's and immigrants' rights, civil rights, women's suffrage, child labor, better housing, proper sanitation and even world peace (Pastorello, 2014, p. 200). As opposed to the Europeans, "Americans relied on privatism, volunteerism, and welfare capitalism" to provide social justice (Pastorello, 2014, p. 204).

The spread of the Progressive ideas and actions benefited from the contributions of the muckrakers (investigative journalists) that were raising awareness with regard to issues related to poor living and miserable working conditions, child labor, inequality, corruption and rapacious tycoons; the Social Gospelers that exposed the sins of the urban industrial society and promoted social change following Christian doctrine; social and civic activists that encouraged the spread of reform, through charity or the empowerment of the people; social workers that supported changes in favor of mothers' pensions, health and maternity care, better working conditions, education, citizenship and English classes, housing codes, labor organizing and even sexual hygiene campaigns; experts that demanded and helped the professionalization of fields such as medicine, law, engineering, academia; and finally labor unionists that fought for labor rights or farmers that organized in populist parties demanding agrarian reforms (Pastorello, 2014, p. 57-103). They all wielded a great influence on policy/decision-makers and legislators. In the end, Progressivism arrived in politics, as a bipartisan movement, and many politicians became proponents of the Progressive thought and spirit. A selective, albeit incomplete list, would include: Mayors Hazen Pingree (Detroit), Tom Johnson (Cleveland); Governors Robert LaFollette (Wisconsin), Hiram Johnson (California); Congressmen William Jennings Bryan (Nebraska), Fiorello LaGuardia (New York); statesmen Elihu Root (Secretary of State),

Louis Brandeis (Chief Justice); U.S. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. They all initiated legislative measures which addressed social, economic and political issues that improved the safety, welfare, democracy, and ultimately the security of the Americans, especially the ordinary citizens. To name but a few: establishing commissioner and manager plans, at city level; adopting secret ballot, initiative, referendum, recall and direct primaries, at state level; Pure Food and Drug Act (obligation to label food ingredients), Meat Inspection Act (requirement for inspection of meat processing factories), Hepburn Act (empowerment the Interstate Commerce Commission to set railroad taxes), Underwood-Simmons Act (tariff reduction), Glass-Owen Act (establishment of the Federal Reserve, which placed the banking sector under governmental control), Sherman and later Clayton Antitrust Acts (reducing, then outlawing monopolies, the latter was dubbed "Labor Magna Charta"), at the federal level. Finally, the Progressives even amended the U.S. Constitution: the 16th (granting Congress the power to tax income), the 17th (requiring direct election of U.S. Senators, thus reducing influence of political machineries), the 18th (alcohol prohibition) and the 19th (providing women suffrage) Amendments.

A special note, for the purpose of this paper, goes to Woodrow Wilson, the U.S. President that brought American Progressivism on the international agenda. Wilson's contribution to the field of international relations is so great that it earned the suffix „-ism" for his ideas. However, Wilsonianism is much more than a sort of ideology applicable to foreign policies. Instead, one should place his thought and action in the Progressive environment from which he emerged. For this matter, Scott Berg shows that Wilson's Progressivism was crystal clear both in his behavior as the Governor of New Jersey, when he freed a state labeled as "the mother of corporations" from "the tyranny of private interests" and addressed labor and health conditions, and in the electoral platform that won him his first mandate at the White House – "The New Freedom", oriented towards enhancing democracy, social justice and economic fairness (Scott, 2013). Throughout both his mandates, he fought on the domestic scene against tariff policies that disrespected the just principles of taxations and transformed government into a tool of private interests, against the banking system that discriminated credits in favor of capital, and against the industrial system that restricted labor freedoms and opportunities. On the other hand, he argued for the need of better laws concerning healthcare, food and working conditions that would provide equality and opportunity for ordinary citizens, with a focus on women and child labor (Scott, 2013). Pestritto explicitly places Wilson's work of rethinking and

reshaping America in connection with his evolution and formation as a Progressive, Liberal scholar and politician (Pestritto, 2005). Moreover, Gottfried examines Wilson's legacy and claims he was trying to emulate domestic reforms on the world stage (Gottfried, 1990, pp. 117-126). The bottom line is that Wilson's behavior, as well as the behavior of the Progressives that he chose to accompany him to the Paris Peace Conference may be assessed as a Progressive stance. American Progressives thus greatly contributed to the inclusion of social issues on the agenda of the "Big Four" and of the Europeans in general during the peace talks.

American Progressivism in Paris: social security and the birth of the ILO

The famous "Fourteen Points", which actually became the framework for the peace negotiations in Paris, represented a Wilsonian version of a truly Progressive document. On the political and economic dimension, the promotion of free trade, the emphasis on public opinion, the guarantees for self-determination, as a democratic expression of the will of the people, and the establishment of the League of Nations, a lesser government that was inspired by the Progressive belief in the role of the government, were all inspired by the Progressive spirit and even formulated in a Progressive language. With regard to social issues and more specifically the advancement of a multidimensional security concept, the Progressive influence was visible in the role played by the Americans when addressing capital-labor relations, particularly working conditions. In this regard, besides the other Progressives that Wilson appointed in the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, Samuel Gompers played an important contribution. As the leader of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), an organization that took on a Progressive agenda, Gompers was designated by the U.S. President as a member of the Council of National Defense and tasked to ensure labor support for the war effort. In this position, he closely worked with Wilson for a labor policy which offered governmental support for independent trade unions. Due to this fruitful collaboration, Gompers was nominated to participate as the American delegate to the Commission on International Labor Legislation at the Peace Conference. Moreover, he was elected as the chair of this Commission.

The joint forces of government and trade unions (especially the AFL) led to "the flowering of Progressivism": an unprecedented centralization of industrial production coordination, the modernization of the national

transportation system, an increase of the wages, war bonds were issued and new taxes established so as to provide financial resources for the war effort (Knock, 1992, pp. 130-131). Simultaneously, the federal government recognized for the first time labor's right to organize and collectively bargain (Knock, 1992, pp. 131). Social reforms surpassed even the most optimistic expectations: a minimum wage and the eight-hour day were set in most industries, while labor disputes were habitually settled in favor of the workers (Knock, 1992, pp. 131).

Wilson went even further by supporting the inclusion of a section dedicated to labor in the Covenant of the League of Nations. While in Europe, he maintained that "there are many ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion [...] there will be a very great usefulness in the Bureau of Labor which is contemplated to be set up by the League. Men and women and children who work have been in the background through long ages [...] while the thought of statesmen has been about structural action and the larger transactions of commerce and of finance" (Powell & Hodgins, 1919, p. 165). His personal annotations on the debated text of Covenant, the so called First and Second Paris Drafts, called for an obligation of all signatories "to establish and maintain fair hours and humane conditions of labor" and for the establishment of basic rights for working people around the world (Knock, 1992, pp. 205-207).

On his part, Gompers and the AFL demanded, long before the end of the war and when the U.S. was still neutral (1914), that "the international trade-union movement have an important say in structuring the postwar order" and therefore asked for a parallel conference (Tosstorff, 2005, p. 402). Later on, Gompers admitted that "American labor did not leave the Peace Conference in Paris with all it felt it ought, in justice, to have secured, but it left with all it was possible to get" (Gompers, 1921, p. 319). He laid the charge for this outcome at the door of selfishness of Conservatives or radicalism of Socialists present in the Commission, many of whom were not even representatives of the labor, but of political parties. This was the reason why Gompers considered "the contest against reaction and misunderstanding and willfulness and utopian foolishness" as the most difficult of his life (Gompers, 1921, p. 323). However, he considered the final outcome, the labor section of the treaty, as "guided by the thought of the American labor" and a comparison of the agreed version with the one drafted by the American delegation seems to give him satisfaction (Gompers, 1921, p. 328-329). In the same time, the cables he exchanged with the President, through the Department of State, demonstrate Wilson's commitment to approaching social justice in the text of the Covenant (Gompers, 1921, p. 330-333).

This division among members of the Commission was natural, given their different experiences and labor philosophies. Unlike Gompers, a true trade-unionist, the three European leaders, Vandervelde (Belgium), Thomas (France), and Henderson (United Kingdom), were all politically affiliated to the Socialist, respectively, Labor parties. As such, they represented political interests and wanted to express them in the framework of the Conference, while the American desired a politically-free agenda (Van Daele, 2005, p. 441). The Europeans were also willing to entrust their governments and administrations with the task of improving social welfare, starting from the premise that all decisions at the Conference required implementation by governments (Van Daele, 2005, p. 455). This was again a sharp distinction against Gompers' view and his focus on privatism.

A number of authors attempt to determine the responsibility for the birth of the ILO. Shotwell, a leading member of the U.S. delegation, ascribes it to the leaders of state and/or government (Tosstorff, 2005, p. 400). Van Daele identifies members of political parties and scholars concerned with social issues; he even explicitly mentions the role of epistemic communities, in a narrower Haas' sense, that politicians and social reformists from the academia formed long before the Peace Conference (Van Daele, 2005). Tosstorff (2005) shifts the focus toward the already existing international trade-union movements and their previous work consisting of a plethora of conferences and meetings, including the Berne Conference that was held simultaneously with the Peace Conference. This paper takes a distinct approach in this matter: it focuses on what was actually obtained from a security studies perspective and considers all the above mentioned parties as constituents of the larger epistemic community that made the creation of ILO possible and thus added the social dimension to the security concept. Commonalities do matter more than divergences from this perspective, and the final outcome would not have been possible without this fortunate combination of factors: the already existing knowledge, shared and channeled through the trade-union movements, and the will of the actual decision-makers.

In this respect, the following preamble to the ILO, Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty, was read and adopted in the plenary session of the Peace Conference: "the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice" (ILO Official Bulletin, vol. I, 1923, p. 332). The connection of the two dimensions could not have been expressed clearer: social issues are an integral part of security, since social "injustice, hardship and privation" produce instability that endangers world peace. Even the necessary measures

are specified and they evidently pertain to social security: regulating working hours and labor supply, preventing unemployment, providing adequate wages, healthcare, labor protection and pensions, organizing vocational and technical education, as well as respecting the freedom of association (ILO Official Bulletin, vol. I, 1923, p. 332).

Moreover, the signatories emphasized the importance of the workers' wellbeing, in an all-encompassing sense: intellectual, moral and physical, as well as their status: "not merely commodities of commerce" (ILO Official Bulletin, vol. I, 1923, p. 332). Furthermore, the principles delineating all discussions and potential regulations in the framework of the ILO are stipulated as follows: (1) labor is not a commodity of commerce; (2) both employees and employers have the right of association; (3) wages should allow for reasonable quality of life; (4) the working day is set to eight hours, while the week to 48 hours; (5) a day off is required per week, Sunday whenever possible; (6) child labor is outlawed, while young persons' labor should be framed to allow their continuous educational and physical development; (7) men and women are paid equally for the same work; (8) native and migrant workers benefit from equal treatment; (9) a monitoring system, overseeing the enforcement of social protection plans, is recommended (ILO Official Bulletin, vol. I, 1923, p. 345-347). Listing these principles is eloquent since they constituted the basis and frame for the initiation of social protection and justice policies and legislations among a great number of countries, including Romania. The consequence was thus profound not just conceptually, but also factually.

Final considerations

This paper argued for the role played by the epistemic community, in a broader sense, particularly American Progressivism, in adding a social dimension to individual, national and international security. "Freedom from want" joined to "freedom from fear" in a more comprehensive understanding of the security concept almost a century ago, within the larger framework of the League of Nations, the precursor of the United Nations, through the International Labor Organization. Social needs may have been refined, or indeed changed, in the last decades, but they still play an important part in the security sector, especially when considered in connection with economics and politics. Greece is an eloquent example.

The rallying of politicians, trade-unionists, scholars and activists produced an outcome which induced deep social changes among human

communities. It is almost a truism to acknowledge that history repeats itself, but the similarities are striking. By the late 1800s, economies around the world were shifting from predominantly agrarian to industrial ones – today we are entering a post-industrial era. Migration flows were having the same social impact then and now. The role of the state was rethought back then, in the midst of the depression, and such is the case today, when we are going through times of economic and financial crisis. Unemployment is on the rise once again, as was in late 19th century. Even our political system, within the EU, is scrutinized in terms of its democratic extent and nature. The need for Progressivism is back, a fact that is clearly demonstrated when examining the discourses on the American political scene.

Likewise, we are rethinking the security concept. Needless to say, considering the dangers of securitization, as suggested by the Copenhagen School, there are many challenges to designing effective security strategies but it is a fact that the deepening and broadening of the concept is taking place. However, paying careful attention is a must, in order to avoid them. In an age of globalization and post-modernity, when territoriality gained a different status, social issues cannot be conceived in purely domestic terms. The work left undone or compromised at Versailles should be taken into account once again. We may have a more vibrant civil society and equally educated scholars, but who is going to be the next Wilson or Lloyd George, the next politicians able to integrate all creative and constructive forces in order to think and act across cultural or interest gaps?

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

THE AFGHAN ISSUE IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT. REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract:

We aim to analyze a space relevant from a geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic point of view, where important global actors, in terms of social and security issues, are both in partnership and in competition. Many relevant actors of the international system militate for the establishment of a climate of stability and of a joint agenda for solving any potential issue that may occur. Such an example is the joint action against social and security risks, generated by the uncontrolled movements of Afghans in the region.

Keywords: *Afghanistan, Central Asia, NATO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization*

Introduction

A large number of studies and analyses evoke in a minute and well-articulated manner the evolution of the Afghan society in time, the foreign influences and external interferences, the endless riots and wars and, especially, the strategic importance of Afghanistan[1] in Central Asia ((Frunzulică, 2013)). The essential benchmarks of its modern existence, such as "The Big Game"[2] of the XIXth century; the abolition of monarchy and the

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[1] The term, „the land of Afghans" was first used in 1801, by the English in India. Its oldest inhabitants are ethnic Pashtuns (considered typical Afghans), which make up 42% of the population, and, from a ethno-genetic point of view, are a branch of eastern irasnians, counting 43 million people, which makes them the largest distinct ethnic group of the whole wolrd (14 million in Afghanista, the rest in Pakistan). They are organized in 60 tribes, divided in 400 clans, all of them Sunni Muslims.

[2] This term was used to describe the strategies and the conflict for supremacy in Central Asia between the British and Tsarist Empire. The term was attributed to Albert Connolly (1807-1842), an English intelligence officer in the light cavalry corps in Bengal, in the British East India Company.

communist coup; the Soviet occupation; the Taliban regime and the intervention of the international coalition in 2001 aiming to oust the Talibans from power, reveal once again the geostrategic importance of this space that connects, the Middle East to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

Generally speaking, due to prolonged military actions, Afghanistan is currently – and unfortunately will continue to be – a source of threats and dangers that only highlight the fact that standard military and economic actions are not efficient in order to solve the situation. The Afghan issue can be found on the political agenda of the most important state and non-state actors; viable strategies for intensive reconstruction of the state and for turning it into an independent and powerful state are being drawn up. But it is necessary to elaborate and implement new complex and efficient approaches on a humanitarian, political and social-economic level that would contribute to solving the problem of creating and consolidating the Afghan state. New approaches and development methods are needed in order to allow Afghanistan to gain its independence, reconstruct its state of affairs, and move from an underdeveloped economy and society – influenced by an economy based on drug trafficking that makes up more than half of the country's GDP – to a flourishing and consolidated society.

Developing Afganistan is an option opposed to that suggested by advocates for noninterference in the Afghan situation, for the limitation to individual humanitarian actions, and for developing projects that have a symbolic importance, or for the division of Afghanistan in two states – Northern and Southern – following the borders that confine various ethnical communities.

Influential factors in Afghanistan

The most important factors that have an influence in Afghanistan are the USA and NATO, the EU, the countries that are part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (member states, observers and partners in dialogue), such as Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia, countries in the Central-Asian region (especially its neighbors, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), India. But since October 2001, the main means of influencing the still unstable situation from Afghanistan are held by the Euro-Atlantic community. It seems that peace cannot be established via military means, and the continuation of this process cannot lead to beneficial effects. All of Afghanistan's neighbors need it to be stable and demilitarized in order to

achieve their national interests while a peaceful settlement of the Afghan situation is on their agenda.

In 2001 these states were included in the contact group on the Afghan issue that was functioning within UNO which was later joined by Russia, USA, NATO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), creating the 7+5 format. It is not excluded that within this format the misunderstandings between traditional rivals might find a continuation in Afghanistan; it is also not excluded that precisely in this context the SCO platform might contribute to finding similar positions and to reducing tensions in international relations in the region, with a view to providing regional security. The need to activate regional cooperation is triggered by common interests regarding the fight against terrorist networks, regional criminality, as well as a common interest in Afghanistan's development. This is the case of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, countries that exert a heavy influence in the North of the country and that aim to start large projects (building a railway network, a gas pipeline), that would consistently contribute to Afghanistan's development, and would lead to a consolidation of regional cooperation and would provide security.

Moreover, in the past years outside the Central Asian space, Pakistan and Iran, tightly linked to Afghanistan from a historical and civilization point of view, have intensified their influence, investing considerable sums in restoring the Afghan economy and sending funds for vital areas, such as agriculture and energy. It is clear that in the future any of these factors, independently or in cooperation, may influence the internal and external political processes of the new Afghanistan with respect to economy.

We consider that stability in Afghanistan can be ensured only via negotiations and compromises, but we do not agree with opinions such as "after the withdrawal of the coalition troops, military observers from neighboring countries should be sent." Practically, in a region torn by decades of wars, the presence of military troops - be they observers - may bring about conditions for conflict.

Nevertheless, the attempt to solve the Afghan issue does not properly focus on the complex geopolitical factors that influence the situation of the country. Afghanistan seems to be "torn" in a few directions: in the South, Pakistan is intensifying its influence; Iran is controlling the Western regions; Tajiks and Uzbeks dominate in the North, both of them trying to keep

Pashtuns off the region; the Center of the country is controlled by government forces, and in the North-East, China and India have clashing interests. In this context, powerful states and Northern neighbors support their own clients: Russia and Tajikistan – the Afghan Tajiks, Uzbekistan – the Afghan Uzbeks, Iran-Hazaris, which only deepens the national schism and does not contribute to creating the conditions for a possible integration of the country in a regional community. The cooperation format with the Northern neighbors is limited to economic relations; in politics there are not yet conditions for a possible future integration; and from a psychological and political-ideological point of view, the country is severed by a barrier, since both Afghanistan and the Central-Asian states are under the different and sometimes contradictory influence of great powers – USA and Russia, which puts Afghanistan's relations with these countries under the influence of the balance between power and politics of the two great powers.

As it is well-known, Afghans did not emerge as a unique nation, and the political conflict is not separated from the regional, inter-ethnical, inter-denominational (Sunni vs. Shia) and intra-denominational ones. According to the former Minister-Counselor of ex-President Karzai, Wahidullah Saboun, "the influence of old tribes, traditions of ethnic groups, collaborations with Jihad, brotherhood, the common Islamic and national culture, the religious attachment of the people, are factors that may bring success in establishing peace in the country, if we take them into account. We have to open negotiations on various channels and use the influence of older tribes, of Jihad leaders that hold authority, of tendencies of brotherhood and national unity, of peaceful movements in various areas of the country, where peace is threatened, and we must involve the people in this process. Peace among Afghans, based on a feeling of national revival, would not only open a road to Afghanistan's reconstructions, but would provide national security, would create favorable conditions to develop economic, commercial relations with the Eastern and Northern Neighbors of Afghanistan." (Saboun, 2008, p. 217-219).

Central-Asian states are interested in a stable, independent Afghanistan, one of the key issues of the region being the reconstruction of its geopolitical integrity. If in the 90's integration models included states in the post-Soviet space, presently a tendency to consolidate the territorial integration of Central Asia is visible. A good example in this respect is the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization which includes all states in the region as members or observers.

Afghanistan, as observer within SCO, is the organization's responsibility. In this context, a Russian think tank proposed to create the Afghan Fund of SCO, involving the drawing up and implementation of a Complex Development Plan for Afghanistan, together with other UNO initiatives for the country's development[3]. On the other hand, the SCO's reaction mechanisms to emerging threats and to the current necessities of the regional and national economic development have not yet been created. For instance, the issue of poverty reduction is a stringent one and the SCO can play an important role, but not before mapping the main directions in solving the social issues inside its own members. From this point of view, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the weakest links. This is not only a results of the two countries' profile, but also due to the perspective of their turning into a "corridor for re-export of terrorists, radicals and narcotics from Afghanistan to Kazakhstan and Russia." No wonder that, at the end of 2014, the heads of border police in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan analyzed the consequences of the coalition troops' withdrawal, drawing the attention to the main threats in the region - drug trafficking, but also to the ongoing infiltration threat of religious extremist and terrorist ideologies.

At the same time, CSTO has approved the establishment of an interstate program to consolidate the Tajik-Afghan border by sending technical and military aid and including it in the Russian-Kazakh anti-aerial protection system.

A current issue is also the need to establish the SCO's priorities with a view to solving social problems, since these are most of the times the source of threats to security. It is important for SCO to create modernization projects that would outline main directions for solving all social problems. In the near future, SCO will probably have to adopt a new strategic concept that would make the transition to ensuring general security, including here the fight against poverty. Such a concept would contribute to increasing the development of states where this approach will be employed.

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[3] This group is made up of experts of the Demography, Migration and Regional Development Institute, such as I Krupnov, A. Derenikian, I. Batîrşin, B. Krupnov, S. Melentiev and puts forward the geostrategic conception of the New Middle East, a unique geo-economic and geostrategic region, which has to become the nucleus of the common Central-Asican market and a platform for dialogue for its peoples and civilizations.

Currently, is it hard to render concrete the potential for SCO-CSTO, SCO-NATO, and CSTO and NATO collaboration; firstly, it is vital to coordinate the activities of CSTO, SCO and NATO in order to evaluate interests in the area. Mutual relations will ease the mapping of the areas functionally responsible for maintaining stability and security in Eurasia, and will allow the coordination of its members' interests. This new step in collaboration between SCTO, SCO and NATO members (where the main role belongs to USA and the states forming the base of EU - France, Germany and Great Britain) will lead to global level of ensuring security. Cooperation between these organizations will contribute to consolidating peace in the Eurasian continent due to the fact that there are five permanent members of the Security Council within CSTO, SCO and NATO (Russia, China, USA, Great Britain, and France). Analyzing and counteracting challenges and threats including terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, drug trafficking and proliferation of WMD may be the main concern for cooperation between CSTO, SCO and NATO.

Although during the 13 years ISAF and Afghanistan have faced dramatic loss of life, since January the 1st, 2015 NATO has continued its peace-keeping operations - Resolute Support, based on the agreement signed by both parties in September 2014 regarding the status of the international military contingent on Afghan territory (approximately 12 thousand troops). The purpose of the mission is to train and increase the professionalism of the staff within the Afghan security services, police and army, to provide technology and to develop counter-terrorist actions against Al-Qaeda affiliated cells, all this by the end of 2016.

It is yet to be seen to what extent there will be a consensus with regard to Afghanistan, especially on finding a solution for sustainable internal politics that would internationally and regionally grant a "Great Afghanistan National Reconciliation." (Frunzulică, 2013, p. 154) For the moment, specialists' opinion vary from pessimism - caused by violence, corruption, drug production and non-coherent international presence, to optimism triggered by the new changes in internal politics that will manage to change the course of events. At the same time, it is difficult to identify the proper strategy based on realistic approaches to be implemented after funds are allotted, political will is expressed and external factors exert influence upon a traumatized and divided Afghan population. Moreover, the existence of several strategies reveals certain dissensions between the actors involved.

Forecasts regarding the evolution of the situation in Central Asia after the withdrawal of the coalition troops from Afghanistan

We bring forward three scenarios related to the evolution of the situation in Central Asia, between 2014 and 2024, after the withdrawal of the coalition troops from Afghanistan. These were designed by a team of participants at the Summer School of the Russian Union of the Democratic Youth, "The Situation in Central Asia: security, economy, human development" (Bekebaeva, 2013), which was organized in Ekaterinburg, August 20-27, 2012.

These experts have identified three possible tracks of action on a medium term, starting from the identification and outlining of the main actors and their interests in the Central Asian region, under the circumstances of the foretold retreat. One must mention the fact that, from a political point of view, Central Asia is an unstable area, a fact triggered mainly by the contradictory interests of the states that form it. Central Asia is an assembly of contradictions, bringing together critical issues from various fields: discussions related to water resources, the multitude of latent conflicts, the political unrest, and the ethnical and interstate contradictions. The evident conflictual character can be reduced to the fact that the aggravation of one problem may attract the aggravation of all the others mentioned. Thus, the sources of the present problems are caused by the unequal distribution of the water resources (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are rich in water resources, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on these), the low level of economic interaction among the countries in the area, the rivalry for regional leadership between the two important countries, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while the main threats for the area are drug trafficking, the unstable situation in Afghanistan, the terrorists threats, the ever growing impact of the Islamic factor, the socio-economic instability, and, why not, the lack of a clear policy from the most relevant state actor in the area, namely Russia. From the analysis of the Russian experts we shall depict, synthetically, only the conclusions subsumed to the security dimension, the other dimensions – economic, energy, ecology and the socio-humanitarian – being of less importance for our study.

Scenario I – "The Fire Dragon: the consolidation of China"

It is assumed that, after the withdrawal of the coalition troops from Afghanistan, in 2014, the influence of the U.S.A. and Russia in Central Asia will diminish gradually, being limited to the implementation of the antiterrorist

and antidrug programs, together with the other states in Central Asia, or to the maintenance of the military bases, while China will gradually conquer new positions in the area, consolidating its influence in the economic sphere. On the other hand, China will be sensitive to the security issues in Central Asia and Afghanistan, being interested, as a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, in the regional initiatives against terrorism, religious extremism and separatism.

Scenario II – "The Anaconda Strategy: The West restrains China"

U.S.A. will stop the geopolitical offensive of the Popular Republic of China in Central Asia, establishing alliances with regional countries, or setting military bases that will be not only a factor of its presence in Afghanistan, but also a tool of American indirect politico-military pressure on China and Iran. Equally, U.S.A. will intend to increase their influence in the region in order not to allow the intensification of the Chinese presence, by shaping anti-Chinese orientations among the elite and the consciousness of the masses in Central Asia and, probably, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. One cannot exclude an increase of the fluxes of economic help of the countries in the area, most probably not from the proper budget, but by means of the international financial institutions.

Scenario III –"The Green Crescent over Central Asia"

A possible aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan will allow the consolidation of the position of the Talibans and repressions on the latter's behalf against the persons that have established relations with the structures of the coalition. As a consequence of this, there will be a flux of refugees to the neighboring countries from Central Asia – Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, which will result in pressure on their economies, the increase of the illegal weapon trafficking, the intensification of drug trafficking and the possible escalation of the religious and interethnic conflicts in the Fergana Valley. Also, the formation of pro-Islamic regimes is a possibility.

Conclusions

It is obvious that one cannot ignore the de facto geopolitical realities in Afghanistan; one must consider the real decentralization of Afghanistan, the centralized power in Kabul being rather weak at the periphery. The participants to the cooperation format 7+5 could contribute to the creation of a stable, legitimate, and democratic structure, taking into account the

geographical dimensions of the country, the ethnic variety, the cultural history, as well as the borders artificially delineated and the transformation, in the past, of Afghanistan, in a buffer zone between the spheres of influence of the great powers in the 19th century, namely Russia and England. Taking into account the pluralism of the geopolitical views from the political circles and the circles of experts, one must wait and see whether such a structural change will take place in a more or less remote future.

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THE EVOLUTION AND ENLARGEMENT
OF THE SCHENGEN AREA

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Abstract:

The Schengen acquis was conceived and functions as a coherent ensemble to be fully accepted and applied by all states supporting the principle of the abolition of checks on persons at their common borders. The provisions of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders which concern cross-border surveillance should be amended and their scope broadened with a view to increasing the success of criminal investigations, particularly those concerning offences connected with organized crime. Cross-border movement at external border shall be subject to check by the competent authorities. Checks shall be carried out for the contracting parties' territories, in accordance with uniform principles, within the scope of national powers and national law and taking account of the interests of all contracting parties.

Keywords: *Schengen acquis, external border, principles, the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.*

Brief history of the establishment of the Schengen area

Among the fundamental reasons for its construction, the European Union (EU) is the main prerequisite to ensure the right to free movement. To achieve this goal there have been made efforts that help remove impediments that restrict this seemingly simple guarantees. The EU member states in cooperation with Justice and Home Affairs began in the '70s' the creation of a legal framework to regulate immigration and asylum. Significant in this regard remains the 1984 meeting of former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the then French President, François Mitterand, near Saarbrücken, where they decided to eliminate border controls between Germany and France. This was

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[*] Romanian Intelligence Service

later enshrined to explicitly specify the objective of ensuring European citizens of "a high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice". From this perspective, one of the ambitious projects of crystallization of European construction, is the Schengen Agreement (the Agreement) concluded on 14 June 1985 aboard Astrid, Mosel River, in the Luxembourg village of Schengen.

The agreement initiators (also called Schengen I) were **France, Belgium**, **Germany**, **Luxembourg** and the **Netherlands**. The signing by the five Contracting Parties joined the logic of the European architecture in which one of the pillars is the opening of borders.

Major considerations which led to the Schengen Agreement were:

• The desire of the peoples of the EU Member States to ensure the free passage of inner boundaries for their nationals[1], services and products;

• The need to strengthen solidarity between the peoples of the signatory states by removing obstacles to free movement at the common borders between the Benelux states, the Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic;

• The desire to suppress the control of their common borders.

To give a unitary regulation after 5 years of negotiations (19 June 1990), the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (the Schengen Convention and Schengen II) was signed, in which 6 joint declarations have been made: Declaration on personal control and baggage at airports, Declaration on Preventing and stopping by administrative and Penal measures the illegal export of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc.

Upon entry into force, in 1995, the Convention removed internal border controls of the signatory states, establishing a single external border where control activities are conducted according to a strict set of rules. In this regard, common rules have been put on visas, migration, asylum and measures concerning police cooperation, judiciary and customs.

The Schengen Agreement, the Convention, the decisions and declarations adopted by the EU Council, subsequent accession protocols and agreements constitute the Schengen acquis. When the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997, entered into force in 1999, the Schengen acquis was integrated into the Community acquis, which contains two categories of provisions:

a). provisions that are not related to the lifting of internal border controls in Member States, for states that are in the process of

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[1] Natural and legal persons having the citizenship or nationality of the Member States of the European Union.

preparing for EU membership, must be implemented before accession and candidate countries are not subject to the Schengen evaluation process;

b). provisions directly related to the lifting of internal border controls in Member States, legislative, operational and technical requirement to be met, especially those concerning the Schengen Information System and external border control, and are subject to Schengen evaluation process and decision EU Council.

For reasons of public order and national security, Schengen internal border controls may be introduced for a limited period of time, a decision that is taken in each Schengen Member State. Border control exists not only in the interest of the Member State with an external, but of all Member States which have abolished internal border control.

The enlargement of Schengen area

Currently, there are 31 states covered by the Schengen regulations out of which 27 are EU Member States and four are non-EU countries. Of these 31 countries, only 26 fully apply the Schengen acquis. The 26 Member States full Schengen area are members: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Hungary. There are four signatories of the Schengen Agreement which are not EU members: Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein.

On the other hand, five EU states do not fully apply the Schengen acquis, namely: UK, Ireland, Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria.

Chronology of Schengen Area
- 1985 – France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg;
- 1990 – Italy;
- 1991 – Spain and Portugal;
- 1992 – Greece;
- 1995 – Austria;
- 1996 – Denmark, Sweden and Finland;
- 2001 – Iceland and Norway.

The decision on Schengen enlargement was taken in late 2007 by the EU Council. Thus, on 21 December 2007 controls have been abolished at land and sea borders and at the end of March 2008 controls for domestic flights at airports in 9 Schengen countries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Malta (see Figure 1).

Figure. 1 Schengen enlargement

The latest accessions are represented by the Swiss Confederation (2008) (see Figure 1) and the Principality of Lichtenstein (2011). Iceland and Norway have a particular situation, both having signed cooperation agreements with countries of the Schengen Area.

Along with Sweden, Finland and Denmark, Norway and Iceland take part in the Nordic Passport Union, in which controls have been abolished at internal borders. Iceland and Norway signed an agreement with the EU in May 1999, following which the two countries can participate in the development of new legislative instruments of the Schengen acquis. Decisions are taken only by the Member States, but they apply to Iceland and Norway. In practice, this association takes the form of a joint committee outside the EU framework, composed of representatives of Iceland, Norway, the EU Council and European Commission.

For instance, according to Decision 2009/1023/JHA, Iceland and Norway apply certain provisions of Decision 2008/615/JHA on border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA Council decision on the implementation of the foregoing. Freedom of movement of citizens virtually brought major benefits of joining the Schengen Area without it being understood as an absolute right.

On the other hand, the elimination of border controls can have a negative effect for the internal security of Member States, which triggered a set of compensatory measures in trans-boundary cooperation. The main measures taken by member states of the Schengen area, according to the Schengen Convention are:

- Abolition of controls at internal borders and establishing a set of rules for crossing the external borders;
- Separation of passengers in ports and airports;
- Harmonizing the rules on the conditions for granting visas;
- Establishing rules for asylum seekers;
- Introduction of rules on cross-border surveillance and pursuit for police forces in the Schengen States;
- Strengthening of judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and the implementation of judicial decisions;
- Establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS).

The Executive Committee decision of 16 September 1998 established a standing committee for evaluation and implementation of the Schengen Agreement. The Standing Committee was given the mandate, first, to determine whether a candidate State satisfies all the preconditions for lifting internal border controls and, secondly, to ensure that the Schengen acquis is applied correspondingly by states.

To reinforce mutual trust between Member States in order to better coordinate at EU level and to increase inter pares pressure on their level, the competence of adopting recommendations on any corrective action to address the shortcomings identified in the evaluation report has been conferred to the Council.

Such implementing competence reflects the specific tasks conferred upon it under Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), the mutual evaluation of the implementation of EU policies in the area of freedom, security and justice. This reflects adequately the purpose of an evaluation mechanism based on the lex specialis, namely, in this space alongside specific and general competence of the Commission to oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice of the EU, which is to meet a complementary function to monitor the effectiveness of the implementation of EU policies through peer reviews.

Significant in this regard is Regulation (EU) no. 1053/2013 of the Council of 7 October 2013 which established a monitoring and evaluation

mechanism to verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealed Executive Committee decision of 16 September 1998. The document sets two major goals of this mechanism, namely:

➢ Checking the application of the Schengen acquis in the Member States to which it applies in full and in the Member States which, in accordance with the relevant protocols annexed to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the TFEU, the Schengen acquis applies in part;

➢ Checking the conditions necessary for the implementation of all relevant parts of the Schengen acquis in those Member States for a Council decision declaring the full or partial application of the Schengen acquis, except in Member States where assessment had already been completed upon the entry into force of the Regulation.

Evaluation may concern all aspects of the Schengen acquis, including effective and efficient application by the Member States of accompanying measures in the field of external borders, visa policy, the SIS, data protection, police cooperation, cooperation criminal justice and the absence of internal border controls.

Member States and the Commission are jointly responsible for implementing a monitoring and evaluation mechanism with the support bodies, offices and agencies involved in the implementation of the Schengen acquis.

The main benchmarks for Romania's accession to the Schengen Area

Joining the Schengen area is an obligation assumed by the EU Accession Treaty (art. 4 of the Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU, annexed to the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria), voicing Romania agreement to participate in all forms of cooperation to deepen European integration.

Romania provides de facto external border security to the community area since its accession to the EU in January 2007.

The removal of controls at internal EU borders is one of the most visible and most important effects of the European integration process.

Under the provisions of the Schengen acquis, Schengen accession involves the following steps:

● Transmission of the declaration of readiness to join the Schengen Area;

● Schengen questionnaire completion and submission;

● Schengen evaluation visits (in these missions, the EU assesses the implementation of the Schengen acquis on five areas: police cooperation, personal data protection, visas, maritime borders, air and land and SIS/ Sirene);

● Drafting reports on the results of the evaluation visits (the report includes recommendations to address any issues that are less satisfactory) and approval within the Schengen Evaluation Working Group in Brussels;

● Adoption by the EU Council decision on the elimination of controls at internal borders.

The declaration of the country's readiness for accession to the Schengen Area was presented at the meeting of the Schengen Evaluation on 28 June 2007 for the areas of visas, police cooperation and data protection.

The second statement confirming preparation for starting the Schengen evaluation process and on other areas or land borders, sea, air and SIS/Sirene was submitted on 2 June 2008.

The technical step assessment of Romania ended with positive results, and the assessment mission reports revealed that all the provisions of the Schengen acquis were implemented in a uniform and fair manner.

The assessment missions for Romania were conducted during the period March 2009 – December 2010 and involved the examination by teams of experts from Member States and EU institutions of the implementation of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in areas related to police cooperation, data protection, visas, maritime borders, land, air, the use of SIS/Sirene.

The conclusions of the evaluation revealed that Romania meets all the criteria of the legislation governing accession to the Schengen and its functioning.

Recent developments in the light of the Report on the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and the European Council meeting in Brussels

As with the previous report regarding the Chapter Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), the latest European Commission report, published on 28.01.2015, regarding Romania and Bulgaria's progress under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), highlights the important progress made by Romania, in terms of strengthening judicial independence and the activity of institutions responsible for fighting corruption.

Despite of a succession of positive CVM reports, which is an acknowledgment of internal consolidation efforts in combating corruption plans, functioning institutions, increase transparency and credibility, the reticence of the Netherlands is maintained.

Traditionally contesting the start of the phasing out process of CVM for Romania, the Netherlands continues to oppose the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen area, saying that "Justice expects further progress".

In contrast, the president of the Party of European Socialists (PES) Sergey Stanishev said that Bulgaria's and Romania's absence from the Schengen Area is contrary to European standards and in light of recent terrorist attacks in Europe it is "neither effective nor fair."

Present at the Washington ministerial meeting on countering violent extremism (02/18/2015), the Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Meglena Kuneva underlined the need to strengthen the EU's external border control, reiterating the idea that Schengen enlargement with Bulgaria and Romania will contribute to European security on the whole.

In the same sense, the president of Latvia - the country holding the EU presidency - emphasized that the theme of strengthening European security "must not be used as an excuse not to continue the expansion of the Schengen Area", while Latvia's Ambassador to Romania Ilgvars Klava stressed "its support for Romania's entry into Schengen and committed to working with all Member States to reach consensus on this file".

The "earthquake" produced by Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris and in Denmark was a pretext for resuming the proposals to reintroduce controls at internal borders of the Schengen area. For instance, due to the conduct of the Meeting of Madrid European social democratic leaders, the Spanish Minister of the Interior has proposed the reintroduction of border controls within the Schengen area "to stop dangerous individuals" while French Prime Minister underlined the need to strengthen the capacity to combat terrorism and by protect the "more effective border of Europe", particularly by creating a common register with the European passenger data (Passenger Name Records/PNR).

Significant issues to address in the current Schengen members remain the Declaration of the Brussels European Council of 02.12.2015 which contained the following ideas:

➢ **Use of the current framework to strengthen and modernize the Schengen external border controls;**

➢ **Establishment "without delay" of a systematic and coordinated checks on persons exercising their right to free movement in the relevant databases in the fight against terrorism, using risk indicators;**

➢ **Examining the need to amend the Schengen Borders Code when necessary verifications should be made permanent**, on a proposal from the Commission;

➢ **Punctual change of the rules to allow the systematic checks of EU citizens entering the Schengen Area by external borders.**

In counterpoint, the insurance of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg presidency of the EU Council II semester of 2015, Romania sent its support for Luxembourg's priorities for action at European level, being also agreed an increased coordination on dossiers of common interest.

In this context, Luxembourg said that Romania has completed its entry into the EU, all technical preparations, as required under the acquis, stressing that "all Member States that have land ready 100%, including technical, demonstrating political will in this regard must be able to enter the Schengen area".

Conclusions

The current configuration of the new European institutional architecture could be described succinctly as: a fragmented legislative assembly and a small but highly motivated Eurosceptic group.

The relative rise of anti-European parties of the type UKIP (UK) is a reality. At best, the anti EU group can count on about 20% of the vote in the European Parliament. Basically they can't block the decision, but it may delay the event for some files.

In this context, a legitimate question arises: changing the rules of the game will force the European Union to transform, for example, the Easterners in second class citizens, as otherwise anti – European faction from the West perceives them?. Thus, although Romania's entry into Schengen is endorsed by the European Commission, the technical conditions are met, our country being a provider of security and stability, effective acceptance the timing of still remains uncertain in the absence of a political agreement of the member countries.

Naturally, European policies on the management of external borders, focusing on immigration and their implementation should be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States.

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SECURITY STRATEGIES AND POLICIES

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE ROMANIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON METADATA RETENTION

Valentin STOIAN*

Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to compare and contrast the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Romanian Constitutional Court on the topic of metadata retention. The paper will argue that both Courts, when considering the effect on the right to privacy, essentially see metadata retention and use as on a par with the interception of the content of communication.

Firstly, the paper will commence with a summary of the directive and will discuss its main provisions. Further, the centerpiece of the paper will be the comparison of the Digital Rights Ireland decision and the RCC decisions. The common arguments of the two courts will be drawn out and systematized in a table. This will be presented according to the character of the action of metadata retention and to the type of infringement detected by the Court (essential rights violation or disproportionality).

Keywords: *jurisprudence, European Court of Justice, Romanian Constitutional Court, metadata retention*

Introduction

April 2014 represented a major blow for those advocating the regulation of metadata retention at the European level. In an unprecedented decision (Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of Communications, C-293/12 and C-594/12), the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg) declared Directive 2006/24/EC on electronic communication null and void. Rather than merely annulling the directive *ex nunc* (for the future), the Court extended the temporal applicability of its decision also *ex tunc* (for the past) (Rauhofer & Sithigh, 2014). Thus, the 2006 Directive was treated as though it never existed, outstanding infringement procedures against states that had failed to implement it were withdrawn and Sweden was returned a 3 million Euro fine

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it had had to pay as a penalty for non-implementation (Luxembourg Weekly, 17.05.2014).

Yet, well before the Luxembourg court had handed down its decision, the topic of metadata retention was controversial in many of the EU's member states. Legal challenges against metadata retention took the form of constitutional court cases against laws transposing the directive in national legislation. Thus, in 2008, the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court invalidated the Bulgarian law implementing the directive, in 2010 the German Constitutional Court abrogated the corresponding German law (De Vries et al., 2011) while the same occurred in 2011 in Cyprus and the Czech Republic (Guild & Carrera, 2014; Kosta, 2013, p. 339). Romania proved a particularly interesting case as the Romanian Government attempted to implement the directive not once, but twice and to supplement the legal framework of caller identification yet another time. All three attempts were thwarted by the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC) in three separate decisions (1258/2009, 440/2014, 461/2014). Thus, the „way to Luxembourg" (Kosta, 2013) was littered with several decisions that judged national laws on metadata retention and use as incompatible with human rights.

The aim of the paper is to compare and contrast the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the Romanian Constitutional Court on the topic of metadata retention. The paper will argue that both Courts, when considering the effect on the right to privacy, essentially see metadata retention and use as on a par with the interception of the content of communication.

Firstly, the paper will commence with a summary of the directive and will discuss its main provisions. Further, the centerpiece of the paper will be the comparison of the *Digital Rights Ireland* decision and the RCC decisions. The common arguments of the two courts will be drawn out and systematized in a table. This will be presented according to the character of the action of metadata retention and to the type of infringement detected by the Court (essential rights violation or disproportionality).

The Directive 2006/24/EC on data retention and the „way to Luxemburg"

Adopted in the wake of the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 and 2005, Directive 2006/24/EC represented, from the time of its adoption to April 2014, the key act at the European level regulating communication metadata retention (Brown, 2010). It created an obligation incumbent on the

member states to create a legislative framework that forced telephone and internet services providers to store, for a period of minimum six months and maximum two years "traffic and location data on both legal and natural persons and the related data necessary to identify the subscriber or registered user" (Directive 2006/24/EC).

The specified obligation extended to a wide array of data such as the telephone number and address of both the one making and the one receiving the call (the obligation also extended to unanswered calls as they might be used for triggering explosive devices by terrorist groups (Guarino, 2014, p. 249-255), the user ID, IP address and name and address of both parties engaged in online communication, time and duration of telephone call and time of log-on and log-off of the Internet access service, data necessary to identify the equipment and location of the communication - International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), digital subscriber line (DSL), cell ID, etc. (Guarino, 2014, p. 249-255). Finally, the Directive required member states to ensure that data are protected from unauthorized use and are available only to authorized government personnel and that they are destroyed at the end of the storage period. Yet, it left the regulation of the access to the data at the discretion of the member states, stating only that "The procedures to be followed and the conditions to be fulfilled in order to gain access to retained data in accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements shall be defined by each Member State in its national law, subject to the relevant provisions of European Union law or public international law, and in particular the ECHR [European Convention on Human Rights] as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights" (Guarino, 2014).

In its preamble, the Directive set out two major goals for itself: to harmonize national legislation on metadata retention and to provide tools for the "investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime" (Directive 2006/24/EC). To justify the adoption of this measure, the directive expressly referred to the European Council's statement of 13 July 2005, which condemned terrorist attacks on London and reaffirmed the need to adopt common measures on the retention of telecommunications data as soon as possible. Furthermore, the directive's preamble declared that metadata retention has to take into account the right to privacy as set out by both the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8) and the (at time of the directive's adoption, not binding) Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Articles 7 and 8), but that this right can be limited for reasons such as "national security or public safety, for the prevention of

disorder or crime, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others". Thus, the Directive's preamble proclaimed that "Because retention of data has proved to be such a necessary and effective investigative tool for law enforcement in several Member States, and in particular concerning serious matters such as organized crime and terrorism", its regulation at the European level, while respecting human rights, is a necessary undertaking (Directive 2006/24/EC).

The first challenge to the Directive came from the Government of Ireland and concerned not the substantive provisions of the Directive, but the grounds on which it was adopted. Ireland brought a complaint before the Luxembourg court, expressing the view that the directive should not have been adopted under the first pillar of the EU decision-making procedures[1], but under the third, given that its main aim was combating serious crime and terrorism while "preventing distortions or obstacles to the internal market was only its "incidental" goal (Kosta, 2013). The ECJ rejected this approach, arguing that the directive did not regulate access to the data by national law-enforcement, but only addressed its regulations to private providers of internet and telephony services. This represented, in the view of the Court, evidence enough that the main purpose of the directive was concerned with regulating the internal market (Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union).

Even before the 2014 ECJ decision, national legislation transposing the directive was struck down by several national Courts. The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court focused on the fact that law enforcement agencies could have, within the Bulgarian national legislation, warrantless access to the data from a dedicated computer terminal. This was found by the Bulgarian Court in violation of Article 32(1) of the Bulgarian Constitution and of the Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Kosta, 2013). In its 2010 decision, the German Constitutional Court did not evaluate the Directive *per se*, but found that the obligation to store data indiscriminately (irrespective of whether the person whose communication data is to be stored is suspected of a crime) and the lack of judicial oversight for the access and use of data is a disproportional violation of Article 10(1) of the German Basic Law protecting the secrecy of correspondence. According to the German Constitutional Court, data retention per se is not unconstitutional, but it infringes the right to

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[1] When the directive was adopted and when this initial challenge was brought, the EU was operating under the three-pillar system, distinguishing the European Communities, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Justice and Home Affairs cooperation. This was abolished by the Lisbon Treaty.

privacy and should therefore be subject to a "rigorous proportionality check" (Kosta, 2013). A similar approach was taken by the Czech constitutional Court in 2011, which argued that the duties imposed on telecommunications providers are vague, and that the indiscriminate access to data was unacceptable, as this had to be based on "well-founded suspicions" (Kosta, 2013, p. 355). Also in 2011, the Supreme Court of Cyprus dealt with a civil complaint of persons who had their communications data requested by the police. The Court rejected the applications of the police in three out of four cases arguing that the disclosures violated the right to the secrecy of communication (Kosta, 2013, p. 354).

Digital Rights Ireland v. Ministry of Communications and the Romanian Constitutional Court Decisions.

In its April 2014 decision, the Court began from the premise that the retention of a wide range of metadata is bound to engage the right to privacy (Article 7 of the Charter) and the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 of the Charter). The main reason why these rights are affected is that "Those data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained." (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014). However, the engagement of those rights is not necessarily a reason for invalidating the Directive, given that Article 52(1) of the Charter allows for limiting rights as long as those limitations are „provided for by law, respect their essence and [are] subject to the principle of proportionality" (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014). Thus, according to the Court, a proportionality check has to be undertaken, in order to verify the justifiability of the infringement.

Firstly, the Court proclaimed that the essence of the right to privacy is not violated, as the Directive does not allow for the acquisition of the content of communications. Moreover, the Directive serves a legitimate purpose, being aimed at „the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime." (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014) Further, the Court decided that the crucial test the directive has to pass is that of proportionality of the interference with the right to privacy, which means that „acts of the EU institutions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation at issue and do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve those objectives" (European Court of Justice,

8.04.2014). Given the seriousness of the interference, the Court proclaimed that the discretion allowed to the EU legislature has to be strictly limited.

In the second part of the judgment, the Court goes on to criticize the directive, grounding its arguments in the need to balance the right to privacy and the legitimate (yet not necessarily decisive) goals of the Directive. The ECJ noted the **generality** of the directive, which stipulates that data generated by all means of electronic communication of all the European population can be retained. Thus, the judgment focuses on the fact that the metadata of communications from persons who are not, even indirectly, in a situation "which is liable to give rise to criminal prosecutions" (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014) can be retained under the directive and that no limitation of time, geographical area or personal circumstances is included. Further, the decision focuses on the **lack of limits on use of data**: no procedures (such as prior approval of a judicial or independent administrative body) or objective criterion limiting the access to data by national authorities is specified (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014).

Issues related to **the storage** of the data are addressed by the Court in the following paragraphs. According to the ECJ, **no distinction** is made between useful and useless data is made, when deciding on the period of data retention. Finally, the Court argues that proper safeguards on preventing unauthorized access to the data are not implemented, as providers are allowed to take economic considerations into account when deciding „the level of security which they apply" (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014) and the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the period is not stipulated. Especially serious, in the view of the Court, is the fact that the directive does not impose the storage of data within the EU „with the result that it cannot be held that the control [...] by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of protection and security [...] is fully ensured" (European Court of Justice, 8.04.2014).

The first Romanian law transposing Directive 2006/24/EC into Romanian law came in 2008. Law 298 created an obligation incumbent on providers of telecommunication and internet services to store "traffic and location data for natural and legal persons, as way as connex data, required for identifying the subscriber or the registered user" (Law 298/2008). It enumerated the data stipulated in the directive and chose to impose the obligation of storage for 6 months, the minimum retention period required by the directive. The law also created a distinction between the procedures for accessing the stored data by law enforcement and prosecutors, on the one hand, and that for "state organs entrusted with national security", on the other

(Law 298/2008). While the first had to request, from a competent court, a specific warrant to access the data, the latter were not required to do so.

The first decision rendered by the Romanian Constitutional Court on the matter came in October 2009, when adjudicating the constitutionality of law 298/2008 (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258/October 2009). The Court begins its argumentation from a similar position as that of the later ECJ decision: that fundamental rights can be limited, as long as this limitation is necessary for a legitimate purpose such as national security, public order, the prevention and prosecution of crime, and as long as the limitation is proportional, non-discriminatory and does not eliminate the substance of the right (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258/October 2009). The Court's first argument concerns the extent of the data to be retained under law 298. It stipulated that „the current law applies to traffic and location data, as well as to connex data, required for identifying the subscriber" (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258/October 2009). The RCC found that the formulation „connex data" is too vague and does not specifically identify the data to be retained. This vagueness opens the space to arbitrariness and does not allow the addressees of the law to understand it and to adapt their behavior accordingly.

Moreover, the RCC also criticized the vagueness of the stipulation that "For protecting and combating threats to national security, state institutions in the field, in situations stipulated by the laws on national security, can access the data stored by telecommunications providers" (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258/October 2009). As there is no specification of what constitutes threats to national security, the Court affirmed that this article also opens up the space to arbitrariness, as any action might be considered a threat to national security.

Yet, the more serious criticism of the law provided by the RCC is that the **continuous storage** coupled with the **absence of limits on the use of data** (no court warrant being required) represents an infringement of the very essence of the right to privacy. Furthermore, the Court also undertakes a proportionality test, arguing that a measure infringing on a right can be proportional only if its enforcement ceases once the cause that determined it disappears. However, as data concerning every person's communications is stored, this measure is not applied only when the justified need for it appears and does not cease when the same reason disappears. Further, the RCC also argues that the data of a person receiving a call is stored, exposing this person to unjustified intrusion. The RCC concludes that the **general and continuous** character of data storage is an unacceptable violation of the person's right to

privacy (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision no. 1258/October 2009). Yet, the decision leaves unclear whether the unconstitutionality of the law stems from it voiding the substance of the right altogether or due to the disproportional nature of the measures.

Romania again attempted to transpose the Directive in June 2012, through law 82. Law 82 clarified the expression "connex data" criticized by the RCC in the previous decision, by stipulating that the law applies to "traffic and location data of natural and legal persons, as well as to data necessary to identify a subscriber or registered user" (Law 82/2012). Moreover, the law expanded the scope of the application of the law, allowing the use of metadata for criminal investigations carried out in a wider array of crimes than before. Finally, Law 82 kept the distinction between law enforcement and national security agencies, requiring the former to request a warrant while exempting the latter.

This was again challenged before the Romanian Constitutional Court, and its decision came in June 2014, barely two months after the ECJ ruling. Firstly, the Court argued that the ambiguity present in the previous law was not eliminated, as law 82 stipulated that "the current law applies to traffic and location data of natural and legal person, as well as to the data necessary for user identification" (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision 440/2014). The RCC went on to compare the provisions of law 82/2012 to those of law 298/2008 and to argue that most of the reasons which determined the striking down of the latter are also present in the former. Thus, law 82 goes on to stipulate the **continuous character** of data retention as wells as the lack of any **judicial guarantees for their use by state authorities (**Romanian Constitutional Court Decision 440/2014).

Further, the RCC distinguished between retention and use, arguing that the first procedure, per se is not a violation of the right to privacy. Yet, the way that data is accessed is problematic for the Court. Law 82 establishes an obligation for law enforcement to request a warrant by a judicial authority when accessing metadata, **while creating no corresponding obligation** for "state institutions with responsibilities in the field of national security" (intelligence services) (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision 440/2014). Warrantless access to metadata is, therefore, seen by the Court as an unacceptable interference with the right to privacy. Further, the Court argues that the storage of data is not adequately guaranteed, as no real control on providers who store data is established (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision 440/2014).

An attempt was made to supplement the legislative framework on metadata retention, by requiring the identification of buyers of pre-paid telephony services (as opposed to subscriptions) and of those accessing free Wi-Fi internet services. A legislative initiative was put forward, but it was challenged by the Ombudsman before it could be promulgated. According to this law, those selling pre-paid cards or offering free access to the internet would have had to request personal identification data from their customers. The RCC was extremely critical of this approach, arguing that this expands both the number of people whose personal data would be collected (not only subscribers to telephony services but also buyers of pre-paid cards and those accessing the internet from Wi-Fi hotspots) but also the range of those collecting data (for example dealers of pre-paid cards or coffee shops offering free internet). This **extension did not come together with stricter obligations for confidentiality imposed on those collecting personal data**. This was reason enough, in the eyes of the Court to find the law unconstitutional, as it infringes on the very essence of the right to privacy (Romanian Constitutional Court Decision 461/16th September 2014).

A dissenting opinion signed by three Constitutional Court judges argued that the criticized law only concerns the storage and not the use of metadata. While appropriate guarantees for the use of metadata are indeed required, the three judges argued that since storage of metadata is not itself unconstitutional, expanding or reducing the scope of those who collect personal identification of telephone and internet users is not, *per se*, problematic from a constitutional point of view (Romanian Constiutional Court Decision 461/16th September 2014).

One of the main conclusions to be drawn from the analysis is that there is some confusion in the judgment rendered by the Romanian Constitutional Court. It is not particularly clear in the decision whether metadata retention and subsequent warrantless use infringes on the very existence of the right to privacy or on is a disproportional means employed to achieve a legitimate goal. The RCC seems to argue for both, despite these being logically inconsistent. An action destroying the very essence of the right to privacy cannot be at the same time a legitimate, but maybe disproportionate means towards a limited infringement of the right. Unlike the RCC, the ECJ draws this distinction, arguing that metadata retention is disproportionate but does not destroy the essence of the right.

The second conclusion to be drawn is that both courts do not see much difference between the interception of the content of communication and the retention and use of metadata. Both the RCC and the ECJ argue that because

metadata retention and use generates a legitimate fear of permanent surveillance, it should not be applied generally, but rather for specific persons, in specific situations, under judicial authorization.

Character of metadata storage and use **Reasons for invalidation**	Generality (about all persons)/ Indiscriminate	Continuous (long time limits)	Warrantless access by state authorities	No guarantees against unauthorized access
Destroys the essence of the right	RCC 1289/2009	RCC 440/2014 RCC 1289/2009	RCC 1289/2009 RCC 440/2014	RCC 461/2014
Is a disproportionate means for achieving a legitimate goal	*Digital Rights Ireland*	*Digital Rights Ireland*	*Digital Rights Ireland*	*Digital Rights Ireland*

Conclusions

According to the relevant analyses of both Courts, there are several reasons for which the directive and the laws transposing it have been struck down. Firstly, it has to be mentioned that both Courts distinguish between metadata retention and metadata use. While the first is a technical operation, only the second directly affects the right to privacy. Thus, both Courts found that access to metadata is problematic when it is general and continuous over a long period of time. They argued that the use of this type of data should be restricted to persons about whom there is a reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity. Alternatively, criteria such as limitations of the geographical area over which retention extends or of time periods could be added.

Another crucial reason for rejecting these laws came from the possibility of law enforcement or intelligence services accessing this data without a warrant issued by a judge. Similarly to the interception of the content of communication, the Courts found that metadata retention and use is a significant enough infringement of the right to privacy to require judicial

authorization. Finally, both courts argued, that strict guarantees against unauthorized access should be imposed on those storing the data, including making sure that the storage facilities are located in Europe.

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THE USAGE OF TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE MEASURES
IN COUNTERING THREATS REGARDING NATIONAL SECURITY

Petre UNGUREANU[*]

Abstract:

National security is one of the most important objectives of a state that assures its independence, sovereignty and protection of human and civil rights of its citizens. This duty is fulfilled by intelligence services in accordance with the legal provisions.

In the current international context threats to national security are diversified. Terrorism represents one of the greatest threats of the 21st century to national security for any state. Its forms of manifestation are unpredictable and hard to anticipate. The question is whether Romania's intelligence services are capable of countering threats to national security.

The existing conflicts outside Romania's borders can pose a threat to national security. The current technological progress along with the use of internet has determined the authorities to redefine the strategies and techniques used to counter cybernetic threats. The strategies used must be in accordance with the legal provisions regarding human rights.

The article is focused on analyzing the legal provisions regarding national security and the infringements of human rights that may occur in countering national security threats alongside with a comparison of technical surveillance measures used in criminal proceedings and national security affairs.

Keywords: *national security, intelligence activities, human rights, countering threats to national security, cybernetic security, technical surveillance*

Legal provisions regarding use of technical surveillance in matters of national security

National security is defined by Law no.51/1991 in art. 1 and it consists in the condition of legality, social, economic and political stability necessary

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for the existence of an independent, sovereign and indivisible state. National security is the premise for maintaining the rule of law and unhampered exercise of human rights, in accordance with the Constitution (Law no. 51/1991).

National security is preserved by countering all domestic and foreign threats (Law no.51/1991). The threats to national security are defined in art. 3 as any plans or actions aimed against the state's sovereignty and independence or any other actions aimed at starting or supporting a war/civil war, military occupation, supporting a foreign power or organization, armed actions against the state, espionage, sabotage, actions aimed against human rights, threats to life of officials. Also actions that have a fascist, extremist or terrorist character, theft of munitions, explosives, toxic or biological substances, forming and supporting a terrorist group are considered a threat to national security (Law no.51/1991).

In combating threats to national security intelligence services can use specific methods that require certain violations of human rights. The legislature mentioned certain methods as intercepting and recording of electronic communications, access to certain documents and information, interception of personal correspondence, the interception of any kind of remote communications, access to a computer system, audio and video surveillance in public or private spaces, tracing or localization by use of technical measures, obtaining the financial records of a person (Law no. 51/1991).

Such methods can only be used only in specific situations, as stipulated in Law no. 51/1991 art. 3 and only if 3 conditions are met:
-    threats to national security cannot be investigated otherwise
-    the above mentioned methods are absolutely necessary in a democratic society
-    a legal authorization is issued

In the literature a ranking of these methods was suggested along with a gradual use, given the specific context of each investigation and the interference in the matter of an individual's human rights (Grădinau, 2014, p. 8). Such ranking is achievable, but it cannot generate difficulties in successfully finalizing an investigation.

In intelligence service's practice information is usable if it can be exploited in a timely manner. If threats to national security are being investigated, the intelligence services inform the attorney general. The request

is analyzed and in 24 hours the attorney general requests the authorization of a warrant by the Supreme Court.

Furthermore Law no. 51/1991 art. 15 par. 6 stipulates that if necessary, the judge can request further investigations. This possibility is not stipulated in judicial proceedings. The use of such methods is approved by the judge who issues an authorization that must contain the following data: place, date and time of the issuing of the authorization, the name of the court that issued the authorization, the specific facts and circumstances that pose a threat to national security, the specific methods whose use is authorized, the person whose rights are violated by use of this method, the agents that will carry out the authorization, places where the authorization will be used, the duration for which the authorization can be used (Law no.51/1991).

When the facts and information presented to the judge do not justify the issuing of an authorization, a new solicitation can be made only if new facts and information are obtained, as stipulated in Law no. 51/1991 art.18par.2.

In certain emergency situations, when time is of the essence, the authorization can be issued by the attorney general for a period no longer than 48 h. The authorization can be issued by the general attorney only if any delay in use of specific methods can jeopardize the investigation. In such cases, after the 48h have expired the attorney general presents the evidence obtained to a judge, who can either confirm or infirm the authorization. In case the authorization is infirmed all specific activities are terminated and all the data obtained is destroyed, as stipulated in Law no.51/1991art.18par.2.

These specific methods can be authorized for a maximum period of 3 months at a time; total duration is limited to 2 years. The authorization procedure and the effective use of the specific methods is classified top secret. In the literature it is considered that the government must have legal provisions that allow the performing of state politics, without the interference of the citizens. This is one of the main reasons why methods used by intelligence services are classified top secret. The results obtained by the use of specific methods are communicated to the attorney general. Also the provisions in Law no. 51/1991 art.21 stipulate that intelligence services are required to retain all data and information regarding the commission of a criminal act. Art. 61 of Criminal Procedure Code stipulate that all intercepted communications and video recordings are rendered in writing and are sent to

the competent criminal investigations body in order to start the judicial proceedings.

When the data and information obtained are not relevant in a judicial proceeding and the use of specific methods is no longer required, the director of the intelligence service will notify the person about the investigation performed by use of specific methods (Grădinaru, 2014, p. 89).

In specific cases the investigated person will not be notified about the investigation if future investigations can be jeopardized or if an infringement of another individual's human rights can occur.

Law no. 51/1991 in art.21 doesn't stipulate which state institution must inform the prosecutor when data regarding the commission of a criminal act is obtained. Article 21 only mentions that the provisions in art. 61 of the Criminal procedure code must be followed concomitant with informing the attorney general. By extent, the data regarding the commission of a criminal act is analyzed only by the intelligence services without a prior consultation with the prosecutor. The law should enforce a procedure that should be followed when analyzing if such data is sufficient to start a judicial proceeding and justify the continuation of the investigation.

Such procedure is needed given the thin line between acts that can pose a threat to national security as stipulated in Law no.51/1991 art.3 or represent a criminal act incriminated as crimes against the state in the Penal Code art. 394-412. Crimes as treason – art.394, treason by divulging top secret information – art.395, espionage – art.400, crimes against communities – art.402 can be given as such examples (Lupașcu, 2014).

In the absence of an effective control mechanism for the specific methods used by the intelligence services abuses can be committed that can affect both national security and an individual's human rights. Another weakness is the possibility given to the intelligence services by law no.51/1991 in art.21par.3 to work with authorizations issued by the attorney general in urgent cases and not to notify the investigated person about these methods.

Any individual that has suffered an infringement of its human rights by an intelligence service can notify the competent Parliament committee or judicial bodies, in accordance with the provisions of law No.51/1911 art.22 and law. No.677/2001 protecting personal data.

Comparison between technical surveillance in criminal investigations and national security investigations

Technical surveillance is used both by intelligence services in investigations concerning national security and by judicial bodies in discovering and investigating criminal acts.

The Criminal Procedure Code contains general provisions for the authorization and use of technical surveillance, while Law no.51/1991 and law no.535/2004 contain provisions that apply only for matters of national security and terrorism.

Authorization of technical surveillance in both fields is given by issuing a technical surveillance warrant by a judge. In judicial proceedings the warrant is issued by a freedoms and rights judge from the competent court, but in matters that concern national security the warrant is issued by the president of the Supreme Court. Law no.51/1991 in states a preliminary control (Zamfir, 2007, p. 160), in terms that the attorney general can analyze a technical surveillance request made by intelligence services and based on the data and information provided it can decide whether the request will be presented or not to the president of the Supreme Court. Also the president of the Supreme Court can request further data or investigations to be made prior to authorizing technical surveillance, which is not the case in judicial proceedings.

Regarding the notes resulted by use of technical surveillance, the literature argues that notes created by intelligence services cannot be used as evidence in judicial proceedings but can initiate a criminal investigation (Grădinaru, 2014, p. 89). In such cases based on the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code art. 61 par. 3 these notes can be used as leads in obtaining a provisional ordinance for use of technical surveillance.

In matters of national security the warrant issued by the president of the Supreme Court is classified as top secret, whilst the warrant issued by a freedoms and rights judge is not classified.

Regarding notification of the person investigated by technical surveillance means, in matters of national security this notification can be eliminated if it poses a threat to national security.

In judicial proceedings the warrant authorizing technical surveillance is implemented by the prosecutor or by specialized police officers, whilst in

national security affairs the warrant is implemented by the intelligence services. Also, in judicial proceedings, the use of technical surveillance can be authorized for a period of 6 six months, but for national security this period is increased to 2 years.

Therefore, by use of technical surveillance, in both judicial proceedings and national security investigations interference occurs regarding an individual's human rights, in contrast with the minimum standard of protection stipulated in art. 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights.

In the literature, the use of technical surveillance in investigations concerning national security was considered to have a distinct legal nature, as prior acts for a judicial proceeding. We consider this to be the most accurate opinion.

Analyzing legal provisions stipulated in art. 13 – Law no. 51/1991 regarding national security and art. 20 – Law no. 535/2004 art. 20 regarding counter-terrorism it is clear that technical surveillance is used for gathering intelligence and can be used in future judicial proceedings, but it also generates interference in the private and family life of an individual. The difference consists in that use of such means in national security generates intelligence information, where in judicial proceedings it generates means of evidence.

Another difference in the use of technical surveillance is that in national security matters it is used to counter threats to national security, where in judicial proceeding it is used to discover and punish those responsible for criminal acts and crime prevention.

Protecting the civil rights and freedoms, protecting the stability and well-functioning of the state according to the constitution is the most important task of all law enforcement institutions. Threats to national security require the use of technical surveillance, but the discretionary use of such methods can generate abuses. This is why procedures and control mechanisms must be created to ensure the legal and correct use of technical surveillance for protecting both the state and its citizens.

Conclusions

The rise of criminal acts committed along with the use of the latest technological means combined with the new emerging terrorist threats to national security forces a democratic state to take measures for preventing

and fighting these threats. Such measures consist in use of technical surveillance. Very important data and information can be obtained through these means helping law enforcement agencies in preventing and discovering criminal acts in a reasonable time and in such way that no innocent person be held accountable for committing of criminal acts.

Gathering the necessary evidence in a judicial proceeding must be done in accordance with the civil and human rights instated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The European Convention for Human Rights and the Constitution of Romania.

This requires that the authorities respect and protect the civil rights, right to private life and the inviolability of home and any violation of these rights must be done based only on legal provisions.

Ensuring national security must be done by all citizens. Intelligence services must have access to all legal means, including technical surveillance in order to successfully counter all threats to national security. In some cases this means that an individual's civil rights and rights to private life can be violated. On the other hand a control mechanism must be created to assure that all individual's civil and human rights are protected.

The practice of law enforcement agencies has shown that use of technical surveillance can lead to successful investigations regarding both criminal investigations and national security investigations.

Technical surveillance is used based on the gravity and complexity of the crime or national security threat investigated. This goal can only be accomplished by creating law enforcement agencies endowed with both professional staff and latest technological resources.

As a solution, the national security must be analyzed and updated thus new legal provisions should include corruption, smuggling, corruption in public procurement of goods and services as threats to national security.

Also, new provisions must clearly stipulate if information obtained by use of technical surveillance by intelligence services can be used both in judicial proceedings and proceedings regarding national security.

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SECURITY CULTURE AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TODAY

Cristina IVAN[*]

Abstract:

We believe special attention should be placed on this highly interdisciplinary mechanism and its ability to advance soft power in ways unprecedented and complementary to classical hard power. Therefore, in this particular section of the journal, we will place under microscope traditional and non-traditional public diplomacy initiatives aimed at promoting peace building and conflict resolution.

Keywords: *soft power, public diplomacy, international arena*

In a statement dated as early as 2002, Ulrich Beck, the famous German sociologist, voiced what we would call now a visionary position, according to which the 9/11 terrorist attacks confronted *the world with an existential choice: not only between nationalism and multilateralism but also between regressive multilateralism based on surveillance states and progressive multilateralism based on cosmopolitan states.*

While the first (i.e. regressive multilateralism) would imply the emergence of a dystopian world, in which individual freedom would be sacrificed for the sake of collective security, a rhetoric that today has come to populate so many instances of public discourse, the latter (i.e. the progressive multilateralism), focuses on a notion of security that is generated bottom up by the inviolable preservation of human rights, international law, democracy and hospitality at transnational level.

This global dilemma also invites us to ponder on resources and mechanisms that could be employed to preserve and advance in the 21st century the advantages of civilisation as we know it and the overall ideological position

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of cosmopolitanism. It is no secret to anyone that violence has, post 9/11, become endemic in so many parts of the world; that hard power, governmental discourses and military interventions across the world have, if performed by themselves, have proven ineffectual in terms of peace building. Therefore, if they are to curb the spiral of violence and contribute effectively to the implementation of conflict resolution, not to mention promoting own peace and stability at home, governmental authorities have to look elsewhere for new resources and new mechanisms to be employed. And one of the most promising seems to come these days form a reinterpretation of public diplomacy.

Defined some years ago (2001) by the IR scholar and Harvard professor Joseph Nye as *means of promoting a country's soft power*, that is *its ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment*, public diplomacy has evolved in a spectacular new way of doing business in the international arena. We may yet not be aware of its inner dispositions and interacting mechanisms. However, proof of its influence can now be observed everywhere.

At the turn of the Millennium, public diplomacy could be found in various governments outreach efforts, aimed to expose 'the other' to own national identity, cultural, political and ethical values, in an attempt to identify convergence of interests. Communication Programs aimed at international audiences, cultural programs, granting academic scholarship, performing educational exchanges, and international visitors' programs, all were employed by governments across the world as instruments in a toolkit of conflict resolution. Yet they remained what they were – a leverage to influence and produce change in favor of one own's state national interests.

Today, 15 years onwards into the 21st century, public diplomacy has changed and become a new and powerful narrative of non-state, subnational or supranational actors and global communities of action. This *new* public diplomacy is outsourced by a cosmopolitan global narrative, captures emerging trends in international relations and takes soft power to a whole new level. As it has become increasingly clear, the new public diplomacy has come into existence as a direct consequence of the democratization of information through the new media, is empowered by communication technology and acts in a global, fluid environment.

Therefore, today, it can longer be defined with ease who the actors of public diplomacy are. NGO's, virtual communities of belief and/or action, informal leaders of opinion and change-makers interact in a system of

mutually beneficial relations that is not, at least apparently, state centered or state generated. As individuals and communities make a stand and demand to occupy the public space of political decision, the degree to which public diplomacy interventions are likely to influence political decisions is gradually growing.

This is the reason why we believe special attention should be placed on this highly interdisciplinary mechanism and its ability to advance soft power in ways unprecedented and complementary to classical hard power. Therefore, in this particular section of the journal, we will place under microscope traditional and non-traditional public diplomacy initiatives aimed at promoting peace building and conflict resolution. Piece by piece, we will hopefully manage to assemble a global puzzle in which Thomas Jefferson's once declaration of faith could become the motto of a new generation of diplomats: *I hope our wisdom will grow with our power, and teach us, that the less we use our power, the greater it will be*.

NEW ARCHITECTURE SECRET SERVICES AND LAW AND ORDER INSTITUTIONS –
A PROFILE AND SYSTEMATICS ATTEMPT

Artur JASIŃSKI*

Abstract:

Headquarters of secret services and public security institutions are typically build as suburban office parks, surrounded with parking lots, or as downtown citadels, situated close to government districts. They are huge, inaccessible and strongly secured structures. Formerly their images used to be classified, but now, very often, their contemporary architecture, which resembles university campuses or corporation headquarters, is being used as a marketing tool to create a desirable public image, suggesting that they are open, transparent and democratic institutions.

Keywords: *Architecture, secret services, public security institutions, architecture as a public image creating tool*

Introduction

Special services and law & order institutions value some discretion. Abbreviation of the US - National Security Agency - NSA (known from the infamous Edward Snowden's affair) was usually decrypted as "No Such Agency" (i.e. "There is no such agency"). But in an era of democracy and the Internet one can hide neither the existence of the secret services, nor the buildings they occupy. Some of them, such as the CIA headquarters in Langley in Washington or MI6 headquarters in London have already been shown in cinemas, and their images became a part of popular culture.

These famous objects are now treated almost like monuments. There are websites devoted to them, which were created for PR purposes by the institutions that use them. Other, less democratic services continue to refuse providing information on their premises. For example, no outsider knows where the Mossad's headquarters should be located and how the building should look like.

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In most cases, however, addresses and images of the secret service headquarters are publicly available. They are usually large and well-guarded buildings with an unremarkable decor. But, as it will be demonstrated below, an architectural analysis of the buildings constructed lately for the needs of secret services and law & order institutions changes this concept: the modern architecture is increasingly used as a tool for creating the desired image.

Suburban office parks

Headquarters of the National Security Agency, built in 1957 and subsequently expanded in 1963 and in 1986, were erected in the military base in Fort Meade, located between Washington and Baltimore.

The location was chosen as a compromise: the NSA headquarters are located so far away that it is outside of the explosion range of an atomic bomb aimed at the capital of the USA, but also close enough, so that its employees, researchers, officers and their families could benefit from the capital's attractions and amenities of civilization which are offered by the neighborhood of a big city (NSA, 2012). It resembles a plain, suburban office park surrounded by a large parking area. The only feature that distinguishes it is its size.

Over 20 000 people work in the complex of buildings with an area of 280 000 square meters. The two main buildings of the NSA HQ resemble huge mirror Rubik's Cubes in its form (Bamford, 2002). Their facades are made of dark, reflective glass, which reflects the surroundings, effectively masking the interior. Glass panes are additionally coated with copper, which should prevent any possible electronic eavesdropping. It is difficult to notice anything from the outside, even how many stories these buildings have.

Fig. 1. Suburban National Security Agency headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland, USA.
Source: NSA, http://www.nsa.gov/about/photo_gallery/gallery.shtml.

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Public opinion is hardly informed on the NSA, the information is mainly related to the cost of building the next giant computer centers, like the one opened in 2013. *Utah Data Center*, built for over one and a half billion dollars, or built on the territory of the Fort Meade *High Performance Computing Center*, which cost American taxpayers about a billion dollar. Computer databases, often underground, are among the most guarded and most secure facilities that are currently being built. The cost of technical and electronic security *High Performance Computing Center* is estimated at more than $ 46 million.

Fig. 2. The computer database NSA Utah Data Center.
Source: NSA: http://nsa.gov1.info/utah-data-center/utah-data-center.html.

The system will consist of security fences, guardhouses, entry control points and entrances for vehicles, electronic access control, burglary alarm systems, motion detectors and detectors of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear contamination, CCTV and fencing circles and technical security.

The center should consume 60 megawatts of electricity. In spite of this, the facility was designed with a view to energy efficiency and environmental protection. It is planned to obtain for it the *Silver LEED certification* (Hoover, 2011).

CIA headquarters in Langley, located in the woodland near Washington, also has the nature of a suburban office park. One of its bosses, Admiral Allen W. Dulles, wanted the CIA HQ to resemble a university campus. An isolated location and modern architecture should build prestige and

promote the institutions' effectiveness and safety. The campus' designer was the famous company from New York – Harrison & Abramovitz, who designed among others famous New York buildings: Rockefeller Center, Lincoln Center and the UN HQ. The modernistic, six-storey building with a usable area of 140 000 square meters was completed in 1961. President John Kennedy personally celebrated its completion.

Fig. 3. The entrance gate to the new CIA headquarters in Langley near Washington, proj. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls, 1984. Source: CIA for: Wikimedia Commons.

In 1984 the construction of another part of the campus was initiated, this time it was based on the design of the Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Company from Detroit. As opposed to the first part of the building made of reinforced concrete, prefabricated elevations, the second vault was built of steel and glass. The architecture of the new building is of a simple, utilitarian character. The most striking element is a vaulted entrance gate, which resembles a postmodernist, triumphal arch. The development area is of approximately 100 000 m^2.

Both inside and outside of the buildings there are numerous art works and the wall in the main hall is inscribed with a biblical quote: *And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free* (John 8:32) Also in the capital city of the District of Columbia, a suburb of Washington, DC, the headquarters of the military intelligence agency - Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are

placed. In a sense, it is a university campus, because at the *air- base Anacostia-Bolling*, in addition to office buildings occupied by the DIA, there are also the National Intelligence University run by the Agency and the John T. Hughes academic library.

Fig. 4. The building of a new wing headquarters DIA, Anacostia-Bolling, SmithGroup JJR design, 2005. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

The architecture of the first complex of agency buildings erected in 1987 based on the architectural design of the Smith Group JJR Company also can arise associations with the massive, office citadel. Modern and highly glazed architecture of its southern wing with an area of nearly 45 000 square meters was erected in 2005. On the basis of the design of the same company, it does not resemble a secret, military intelligence base at all – it may be associated more with a scientific laboratory or a rich corporation's seat.

The building designers claim on their website that its "architectural expression" in investor's intention was supposed to be a magnet that should attract "the best and the brightest" and technical solutions should ensure the highest degree of safety and best comfort, which would affect the efficiency and the effectiveness of the institution (SMITHGROUPJRR, projects).

Downtown citadels

The intelligence headquarters are usually located in suburban areas, while internal security institutions are mostly located in the centers of capital

cities. Headquarters of the police and other public safety institutions are characterized by a compact building block, sometimes even the whole district usually located directly in – or near – the government district. For example, the FBI headquarters are located on Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington's main avenue running between the Capitol and the White House. Originally, in the years 1908-1975 the FBI offices were located in the buildings of the Department of Justice.

In 1962 the decision was made, to build FBI own headquarters. Designing a new FBI building was entrusted to the architectural firm Charles F. Murphy and Associates from Chicago. According to the investor's wishes FBI office complex took the form of a "box in a box": the central part of the building, in which there are archives, is surrounded by office wings.

Fig. 5. FBI Headquarters in Washington, Charles F. Murphy and Associates design, 1977. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

In accordance to the planning requirements on the need to preserve a representative character of the Pennsylvania Avenue, along which annual parades are hosted, the building has a courtyard and a two-storey arcades. For safety reasons, however, they are inaccessible to the public. In the FBI complex with an area of about 280 000 square meters over 7 000 are employed. From the Pennsylvania Avenue direction the building height is limited to about 30 meters (seven stories). In the middle of the quarter the building with a height of 11 stories was allowed to be build. Brutalist in its architectural style building has prefabricated, concrete facades, and therefore

strongly contrasts with the tradition of downtown Washington, whose architecture of public buildings consists of historic forms and facades made of natural stone. The construction started in 1967 and lasted about ten years.

Its cost repeatedly exceeded the original budget and came to more than $ 120 million. The building was inhabited gradually in the years 1974-1977. In 1972 it was given the official name - "J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building" (*History of FBI Building*). After a series of terrorist bombings on American targets at the turn of the century, the building was fortified with massive, concrete pots, called *bunker pots* that were positioned densely along the curbs surrounding streets and in the front of the main entrances.

Fig. 6. Headquarters of the Russian military intelligence - GRU, Moscow, 2006.
Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The buildings occupied by the Russian security services are also situated in the center of Moscow. The seat of the military intelligence - GRU – was located in the nine storey, glazed building (known as the famous "Aquarium" described in the novel by Victor Suvorov) in a complex of aviation factories, near to the old Moscow airport *Kubinka*. In 2006, GRU headquarters were moved to a new office complex, built at Grizodubova Street. The modernist architecture of the new headquarters of the service resembles a typical corporate office building, which rises to thousands around the world.

The seat of the State Security Committee - the KGB - for many years was located in a pompous, neo-baroque building on Lubyanka Square, built in the late nineteenth century as the seat of the insurance company and thoroughly modernized in the early 90s.

In the era of "glasnost" (i.e. transparency), a small part of the building which hosted a KGB museum was made available to the public. The design of the new headquarters of the German intelligence service – BND, currently being built in the central district of Berlin - Mitte, in close proximity to the buildings of the parliament and the office of Chancellor of Germany is very interesting.

The idea behind the chosen location was to revitalize a neglected area of the German capital, once belonging to East Berlin. The large building complex (with an area of 260 000 square meters) was located on the site of the former sports stadium (*Stadion der Weltjugend*). Its core is a nine storey office building, which is surrounded by lower, free-standing pavilions: entrance, didactic and logistics. All buildings, with metal, standardized and rhythmic facades, were joined with a massive, obverse plinth.

This monument is supposed to split the main body division, breaking it into a sequence of lateral wings and courtyards formed between them. The building to which the first group of workers moved in March 2014, was based on competition project of the famous, German architectural design studio of Jan Kleihues. The construction which has been carried out since 2006, has already absorbed about one billion *euro*.

The building is supposed to host over 4 000 BND employees (Project presentation on the official web site). Opinions on its architecture are divided: on one hand we are dealing with anonymous, yet elegant and maintained in good proportions, enterprise architecture, on the other hand it is a great, remote and fortified building overwhelming the environment with its scale.

Fig. 7. The new headquarters of the German intelligence service BND in Berlin, Kleihues + Kleihues design, 2014. Source: http://www.bz-berlin.de/multimedia/archive/00431/BND-Baustelle_43119218.jpg.

Fig. 8. The new Europol building in The Hague, Quist Wintermans Architekten BV design, 2011. Source: Europol, https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/page/about-us.

New Europol headquarters look impressive: they were erected in The Hague on the border of the exclusive residential and administrative district, hosting the seats of international institutions.

The designers of the *Quist Wintermans Architekten* BV architectural studio also struggled with the problem of diverse neighborhood and large-scale project, in this case the body of the building was also dissected into the wings (four ones, parallel to each other) that were linked to massive plinth with a height of three stories.

The building – encased in gray bricks- looks like a silver sculpture; its architectural "box" form is neo-modernistic, but the detail was kept to a minimum. Courtyards formed between successive wings of the building were covered with glass roofs, and under them decorated reception halls, recreational and conference facilities were located.

The facility with an area of 32 000 m² was handed over for use in 2011. It is inhabited by about 700 employees. As the new Europol headquarters are in the nearest vicinity of a residential area, its security solutions had be designed discreetly and cleverly built into the building. For this purpose, water reservoirs, level differences, patios and other landscaping elements were used for the construction of the safety zones (Europol design presentation).

Exceptionally original buildings are occupied by the British intelligence services. The above-mentioned MI6 headquarters are located in the heart of London, on the Thames, near London's famous tourist attractions: Tate, the Westminster Palace and the *London Eye* observation carousel.

Fig. 9. British intelligence MI6 Headquarters, London, Terry Farrell's design, 1994.
Source: Jim Bowen, Wikimedia Commons.

The more exposed location for the seat of intelligence agency enhanced by the extravagant architecture of the building, designed by an icon of the British postmodernism, architect Terry Farrell, is hard to be thought of.

Initially, in the years 1926–1964, the headquarters of MI6 were located in an old, unremarkable building at 54 Broadway, close to the downtown park St. James. Then, for the next 30 years, they were placed in a highly modernist, but equally anonymous, building called the Century House, located in Lambeth on the south bank of the Thames.

In 1988 Margaret Thatcher decided to purchase a lot for building a seat for more and more dynamically developing its activities MI6, located nearby, on the banks of the River Thames. The lot's owner was a real estate developer Regalian Properties Plc.

For the previous several years the company had been designing an office building, based on the Farrell's project which won the competition in 1983. The massive seven-storey building was adapted to the needs of MI6. However, its original, post-modernist architectural form, remained largely unchanged.

Some compare it with the Incas pyramids, others see it as "Legoland" or "Babylon on the Thames". Rowin Moore from the "The Independent", describing the new headquarters of MI6 commissioned in 1994, claimed that the George Smiley's discreet spirit had given up to the brute force of Arnold Schwarzenegger, and described it as an "aggressive, mono-functional fortress".

A completely different character is presented by the new headquarters of the British radio intelligence (GCHQ - Government Communications Headquarters), resembling a flying saucer, which settled on the outskirts of Cheltenham, close to Birmingham.

Fig. 10. British intelligence center GCHQ in Cheltenham electronic, design of Gensler, 2004.
Source: UK Ministry of Defence, Wikimedia Commons.

The opening of this remarkable object with futuristic architecture in high-tech style was celebrated by Queen Elizabeth in March 2004. It was built for 337 million pounds, within the framework of public-private partnership (Private Finance Initiative - PFI), on the American (!) Gensler's architectural design studio.

Its aluminum roof and exterior walls were shaped in the form of a circular, providing safety mantle. Beneath it, four parts of the four-storey building open to the common interior – a round courtyard, which is intended to provide users a sense of community.

The glazed walkway around a courtyard connects- within a 5-minute walking range- all parts of the building, which has a diameter of 200 meters and a height of about 23 meters. In its interior there are also a restaurant, cafes, bars, gymnasium and kindergarten.

The modular, easy to change the arrangements office space and clear communication within the organization structures intend to promote the efficiency and operational swiftness - enough to say that before moving to its new headquarters GCHQ dealt with several scattered buildings.

The new facility is designed using the principles of "green" sustainable construction: it consumes 40% less energy than a regular office building, its double elevations act as thermal chimneys to provide it with the natural air conditioning, rooms are lit by daylight, and are built of natural materials: glass, aluminum, wood, granite and limestone from local Cotswold and they can be easily recycled.

In the building the newest IT and safety technologies were deployed. The reflecting, anti-explosion reinforced, glass facade effectively masks the inside of the building, allowing the personnel to see what is outside.

Mail and all the other goods entering the building are x-rayed and inspected at the main switchboard, and from there they are transported to recipients using an electric cable line operating safely in underground corridors. The building has more than one hundred separate computer networks and a large data center. The construction of the facility and the relocation of 4000 staff and computer equipment were among the largest logistics projects that were completed in Europe (Headquarters (GCHQ), United Kingdom).

Concluding this review of the architecture of the security services and law & order institutions buildings, it is worth noting the new NATO headquarters, which were erected in Brussels.

Fig. 11. The new NATO headquarters in Brussels, aerial view, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill design, 2014. Source: Skidmore, Owings and Merrill.

Its designer is a global architectural studio – Skidmore, Owing and Merrill (based in New York) specializing in commercial and corporate architecture. SOM's achievements are, among others, the world's tallest

building - the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the US Embassy in Beijing and the famous building Altitude One World Center in Manhattan Built on the site of the WTC complex which was destroyed during the terrorist attack on 11th September 2001.

The NATO headquarters should have a style and a scale characterizing the architecture of the largest global corporate headquarters: its heart will be monumental, glassed, seven-storey patio. The facility has an area of 245 000 square meters, will be the seat of 28 embassies of NATO countries, and 4,000 people will work there.

Fig. 12. The new NATO headquarters in Brussels, view the hall, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill design, 2014. Source: Skidmore, Owings and Merrill.

On SOM's website there is some information on the building pointing out that is to resemble laced fingers of two hands, and thus it is intended to symbolize the unity and interdependence of the NATO countries (Skidmore, Owings and Merill). The cost of this mega-building is expected to be over one billion euro (New NATO Headquarters, official web site).

In relation to the above-described designs, the buildings occupied by the Polish special services present themselves rather bland and anonymous: the Internal Security Agency (ABW) headquarters are located in the building of socialist realism character at Rakowiecka Street in Warsaw, and the Intelligence Agency (AW) has its headquarters in a modern office building, near the Guard stadium. Against this background, the headquarters of the National Security Office erected a few years ago at Karowa Street in Warsaw stand out in terms of the quality of architecture.

It is a low, two-storey building, with a robust shape and well proportioned, with a helicopter landing pad on the roof. This building cleverly combines traditional and modernist classical architecture – with its modernist, classical colonnade horizontal stripes of windows and massive walls clad with gray-green stone facades.

Architecture as an image-building tool

In democratic countries, a characteristic tendency can be observed: in an effort to gain the public understanding and relevant sums of money from the state budget, secret services gradually "come out of the darkness".

An example would be the story of the mentioned above US National Security Agency, an institution established in 1952. (i.e. During the Cold War), which was so secretive that for many years it was not even acknowledged to exist.

The breakthrough came in the 90-s of the XXth century, when on the motorway leading to the NSA HQ a signpost was set, upon which its name appeared.

In 2012, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the institution, a film crew was allowed to enter NSA gates for the first time and soon on the National Geographic TV channel a documentary about the mission and history of the Agency was presented. A commemorative publication was also published (NSA, 60 Years of Defending the Nation), which described the history of the NSA and showed photos of its subsequent locations. These HQ buildings looked like ordinary suburban office parks surrounded by parking lots. The apparent openness in this case is an obvious camouflage, and modern architecture is used as a tool for creating the proper image.

Like many other institutions' premises - government and public administration buildings, central banks or offices of global corporations – their modern and transparent architecture should suggest the public that it deals with open, transparent and democratic institutions, although it is not always true.

Modern HQ buildings of secret services and law & order institutions resemble rather ordinary civilian office buildings, research laboratories or university campuses than the seats of secret organizations.

The analysis of their seats architecture can be carried out in several categories. Typologically these buildings belong to the most popular and widespread group of administrative offices, where most of the work is performed at identical workstations, and therefore these buildings become similar to each other.

In a bank, project studio, an insurance company, or a seat of intelligence agency – everywhere the work is done at unified and standardized workplaces, equipped with computer terminals, and therefore architectural and functional and spatial solutions of these objects are similar to each other. New secret services and security institutions HQ distinguish themselves by their size. Investment budgets of these mega-projects often reach billions of dollars; they are designed by the biggest architectural studios specializing in commercial and corporate architecture.

The buildings that were referred to, belong to the most important elements of the state critical infrastructure, therefore they are carefully protected against attempts to disrupt their operations, the penetration or interception, as well as against any terrorist attack. The most popular (and effective) weapon, which nowadays are used by terrorists, are "car bombs", i.e. the vehicles filled with explosives (*VBIED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices*).

Their detonation near the building resembles an aerial bombardment effect. The best protection against an attack by a "car bomb" ensures the security zone - a massive barriers around the building, which are positioned in such a way as to prevent it from ramming by a speeding car. It is assumed that a safety zone around the protected buildings should be at least 30 m (the more, the better), because, as security experts say, distance equals safety.

Of course, it is easier, to protect suburban objects, located in the open field. You can set around them several rings of fences and circles of defense zones, freestanding lodges, which will hold control of vehicles, as well as access roads and parking lots away from the buildings.

It is much more difficult to protect buildings downtown, located on small plots of dense development and surrounded by a network of public streets.

Protection zones around the buildings downtown are built of massive walls and fences directly in the lot area, facades are hardened, the number of windows is reduced and sometimes the ground floors are completely closed.

This results in their massive appearance and literal fortification of the foreground: the buildings begin resembling downtown fortresses, citadels and prisons.

To prevent this, the design of modern security facilities increasingly uses the concept of "invisible security": massive walls and bars are replaced with armored glass, the barrier zones are cleverly incorporated into the street landscape (with the use of small architectural elements and so called *street furniture* – benches, finials, bulletin boards, bollards and lampposts

which, when their construction is properly strengthened, can carry out defensive function).

Thanks to such measures, security facilities are hidden from the inexpert eye, and even well-protected objects can present themselves as open and transparent (Jasiński, 2013, pp. 226–230).

In terms of typology of urban structures, headquarters of the secret services and security institutions qualify as either suburban office-parks or edge-cities, or as so-called downtown business citadels. Their architecture is - in terms of style – of quite diverse, mostly utilitarian, modernist or neo-modernist character, although in some cases it can also discern influences of socialist realism, brutalism, post-modernism and high-tech.

Analyzing the symbolic layer of the secret services and law & order institutions' headquarters architecture, one should look for references to the famous *Panoptikon* – a prison building of a cylindrical shape designed so that the guards gathered in the central tower could exercise constant control over prisoners located throughout the radially arranged wings of the building, at the same time being invisible.

In an era of information, an eye contact is no longer necessary – it is effectively replaced with electronic surveillance. The French philosopher Michel Foucault claims that *Panopticon* became a metaphor for relations between the authorities and society, as well as a symbol of the permanent surveillance characterizing it (Foucault, 1998).

There is an unanswered question, whether glassed, transparent architectural features characterizing modern headquarters of the secret services hide only ordinary, filled with computer stations, interiors, where the routine office work is carried out, or they are just a skillful camouflage masking unavailable offices, archives and databases, which are full of the deepest secrets?

Architecture, however, does not give us answers to these questions – the answer is known only to the people working in them.

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INTELLIGENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

INSIGHTS FOR THE CREATION OF A *LIAISON CULTURE* IN INTELLIGENCE:
FROM CO-OPERATION TO COLLABORATION

Daniela BACHEŞ[*]

Abstract:

The paper aims at approaching the concept of liaison culture by analyzing the range of joint operations between Intelligence organizations, generally described as international Intelligence co-operation or collaboration. The two terms are used, in most of the cases, interchangeably, and are meant to suggest the interaction between two or more actors, within a formal or informal context, to enable the exchange of information, know-how or resources for the achievement of a shared or common goal, objective or mission. Thus, it asserts that the various types of exchange, levels of interaction and degrees of integration are part of, and contribute to the development and evolution of the liaison, from a mechanism belonging to the organization's strategy to an organizational culture in itself. In the way just indicated, a short discussion on the meaning of intelligence culture is required and the signification it is given herein. Just as the broad term of Intelligence is subject to multiple definitions, (mis)understandings and interpretations, being referred to as a product, a process or an organization, the concept of Intelligence culture also implies various meanings according to the emphasis on institutional structure, modus operandi or set of values and norms. The meaning I am using here is that of organizational culture in a created environment or the working together in a multinational context; in other words I am interested in the liaison culture as an emerging Intelligence culture characteristic of multilateral collaborative structures, strongly influenced by the agencies' or governments' choice for co-operation/collaboration.

Keywords: *co-operation, liaison culture, collaboration, intelligence*

Introduction

Over the last two years, the subject of interagency working beyond borders has been more and more present within the literature, media, or policy forum investigations and debates. Mostly considered an understudied

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issue, or sensitive practice kept beyond close doors, and information sharing between countries' stakeholders, yet increasingly under scrutiny since 9/11. International networking among security agencies, or foreign liaison between governments have been representing a fact in the world of Intelligence, the passage from a "need to share" to a "need to build" culture becoming an aspiration in the international Intelligence community. This transformation corresponds to the making up of collaborative environments enabling a joint operating culture articulated by common sets of goals and objectives, where partners agree to exploit their "diverse expertise and organizational resources to create higher value intelligence than an agency or officer can do individually to achieve the mission of the Intelligence Community." (Mcintyre, Palmer & Franks, 2009, pp. 9-15)

The paper aims at approaching the concept of *liaison culture* by analyzing the range of joint operations between Intelligence organizations, generally described as international Intelligence co-operation or collaboration. The two terms are used, in most of the cases, interchangeably, and are meant to suggest the interaction between two or more actors, within a formal or informal context, to enable the exchange of information, know-how or resources for the achievement of a shared or common goal, objective or mission. Thus, it asserts that the various types of exchange, levels of interaction and degrees of integration are part of, and contribute to the development and evolution of the liaison, from a mechanism belonging to the organization's strategy to an organizational culture in itself. In the way just indicated, a short discussion on the meaning of intelligence culture is required and the signification it is given herein. Just as the broad term of Intelligence is subject to multiple definitions, (mis)understandings and interpretations, being referred to as a product, a process or an organization, the concept of Intelligence culture also implies various meanings according to the emphasis on institutional structure, *modus operandi* or set of values and norms. The meaning I am using here is that of organizational culture in a created environment or the working together in a multinational context; in other words I am interested in the *liaison culture* as an emerging Intelligence culture characteristic of multilateral collaborative structures, strongly influenced by the agencies' or governments' choice for co-operation/collaboration.

Intelligence culture

Intelligence culture has been discussed about for many decades already, being permanently present in descriptive or explanatory overviews in the Intelligence praxis of countries and organizations, whether failure or

success has been considered; however, all attempts to develop a conceptual approach or theory of it [intelligence culture] had faint outcomes. Some existing attempts tend to subsume it to the broader concept of strategic culture or security culture, making Intelligence appear as an instrument manipulated to serve foreign policy interests or support policy makers decisions regarding national interest and security (Van Reijn, 2013, pp. 1-2). In this sense, liaison and sharing with foreign partners become a part of a comprehensive approach for achieving national interests and countering security threats. Nevertheless, recently, Michael Hayden, former director of CIA and the NSA, made it clear that many times, although related, the values, policies and interests of a country are never identical with the values, policies and interests of a liaison service; this means that in practice Intelligence organizations have their own *modus operandi* autonomous from the foreign and security policy, thus making possible the interaction and exchange with hostile states, or governments embracing different political principles and interests. Moreover, as Stephen Lander suggested, "states can now much more easily be allies on one issue and adversaries on another", as their working together "is not an end in itself. It is utility that drives collaboration" (Lander, 2009, p. 140).

Without denying the place of intelligence within the national strategy of each country, yet not intending to discuss this aspect now, the paper assumes that Intelligence culture draws upon specific elements that are connected to the strategic culture and the culture of national security, but which are rather based on an organizational logic, built on shared assumptions and practices (resulting from collective values, beliefs, and principles achieved over time), as well as the organization's members (leaders and actors at different levels and covering multiple sectors),which is supposed to shape behavior in various situations requiring knowledge. Compared to the strategic or security culture, which is more connected to history, tradition and identity, the Intelligence culture is an organizational one, much influenced by praxis and therefore more dynamic. Thus, the Intelligence culture is embedded in the political background of a country and is linked to its strategic targets, yet, it knows a series of operational incentives that makes it subject to change, without menacing its stability and continuity in terms of philosophy, objectives and praxis, such as the decision of engaging in cooperation networks or collaborative communities.

Although used interchangeably, cooperation and collaboration bear some distinctions that are essential for a better understanding of Intelligence sharing, but also for getting some insights into the various types of

interagency work and the steps needed for developing a multinational "working together" culture in the field. Both concepts are rooted in the study of learning and teaching methods, being also found in the field of management and business studies, and refer to individuals' and organizations' interactions, required to create cooperative environments and work collaboratively within communities of shared interests. Cooperation and collaboration are based on working together, as determined by similar or common needs or goals whose accomplishment appears difficult or impossible with only one party's existing resources, thus making useful and desirable the sharing of information, resources and ideas with partners. Cooperation is rather a protocol designed to facilitate the achievement of a shared goal or the creation of a product, by gathering people entrusted different tasks, who do their assigned tasks separately, and then bring their results to the table, each of them being responsible for a portion of the problem solving. Collaboration implies direct interaction among individuals not only to shape a product, but to share knowledge creation, through the engagement of participants in their mutual effort to solve the problem together by sharing authority and accepting responsibility among group members for the group's actions. Both cooperative and collaborative liaisons are encountered within the national community and at international level, interactions between Intelligence organizations taking various shapes according to factors such as collection methods, existing or lacking resources, agendas, operating techniques, analytical infrastructure, time, trust, etc.

There are five major types of Intelligence liaison containing various degrees of integration and formalism, which suggests certain preferences and levels in the development of Intelligence culture, namely that of interagency co-working ranging from informal cooperation to collaborative environments and leadership.

The most discreet way of establishing a cooperative context is *crypto-diplomacy*, consisting of the infiltration of Intelligence agents in diplomacy, which enables communication and negotiation between parties, while creating the premises of institutional networking between actors and countries. However, this has been rather related to clandestine diplomacy and is used to consciously "engage in secret and deniable discussions with adversaries" (Scott, 2004), intended to influence an adversary (in this case talking about covert action) or exchange information between adversaries that get to share a common threat (as it has been the case between the USA and Syria in fighting terrorism, or the co-operation between American and

Iranian secret services with regards to the Soviet agents' infiltration in the Tudeh party) (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002, p. 90).

This suggests a certain degree of openness, flexibility and adaptability of the Intelligence culture, enabling the rationale of the liaison – "each service making use of its comparative advantage in a given location to advance an agreed-upon goal" (Hitz, 2008, p. 158) –, but in the absence of a formalized framework which means more discretion and minimal costs.

The second type of liaison between agencies concerns the offering of *Intelligence support* which, although not a new practice despite its consistent promotion over the past few years, shows that cooperation in Intelligence develops new ways, different from the theoretical conventional model of secret trading. For instance, in an article written by Warren R. Mulholland for the CIA, released in 2004, liaison training is designated as the "oldest and probably the most consistently productive liaison the CIA maintains with intelligence services of other nations" (Mulholland, 1973, p. 7). Providing training, equipment and funds to other agencies is an ordinary practice both within the national and international Intelligence community, institutions and agencies in one country engaging in joint actions, training and knowledge transfer, just as services in states with tradition and resourcefulness in the field are willing to support smaller partners (such as the cyber-security expertise exchange between Romania and Ukraine, or the provision of logistical and intelligence support by the United States to the GCC-led military operations in Yemen).

Cooperation knows a third way through *operation sharing* (Harrison, 2009, pp. 44-46) as involving acting actors bound together by common values, a common ethos and a common mission, but who continue to maintain their operational independence. This modus operandi falls into three categories: parallel operations (the services are operating against the same target and agree to run independently of each other, but keeping each other informed about their work and progress, as it was the case in the NATO – coordinated "stay-behind" Operation Gladio, aimed at countering a possible Soviet invasion), allocation operations (the services engage in a joint operation against a common target, each partner assuming a certain part and task in the game, such as the Nordic defense cooperation during the Cold War) and joint operations (where agencies are fully integrated, a phenomenon mostly seen at national level, where domestic agencies work together – as in the joint operation of the CIA and FBI agents engaged in the debriefing of Soviet defectors to the USA-, and less present at multilateral level, although

aspirations of globally integrated operations among domains and countries of the Coalition (Joint Force 2020 White Paper, 2014), have been expressed for quite a while). The last sub-category is strongly connected to the forth category of liaison, namely *information sharing* which takes the form of trading information for strategic information, facilities access or influence. The passage from a "need to know" to a "need to share" is meant to create channels of effective communication between information stakeholders, that enable the employment of knowledge efficiently and help users connect quickly with each other. Better known as Intelligence sharing, it provides a type of liaison frequently met, both at bilateral and multilateral, in more or less institutionalized structures, in the form of consultations on security threats or production of joint analysis and common databases required in the fight with organized crime and terrorism (besides the variety of bilateral developments, it is worth mentioning the institutions created since the 90s by the European Union that facilitate intelligence sharing between its members (Walsh, 2006, pp. 625-643): the Berne Group, EUROPOL, the Intelligence Centre or the EU Military Staff, as well as the UK-USA sharing of signals intelligence dating back to the 1940s). In this new culture of sharing, actors accept the responsibility to provide, and articulate active collaborative participation in a shared space (that begins to move in the cyber-world). R. Pherson and F. Bishop identify six key imperatives of a collaborative environment (that can also apply "must" characteristics of a culture of collaboration based on Intelligence sharing), namely: mission criticality, mutual benefit, mutual trust, incentives, access and agility and common understanding (Pherson & Bishop, 2014, pp. 108-109).

The fifth type of interaction and the most integrated one is the *full liaison* or *Intelligence collaboration,* how I'll call it herein, the officially sanctioned activity between and among intelligence agencies, based on shared values and norms, and running through formal structures built on characteristic mechanisms: shared security procedures, each participant country has a designed liaison officer at headquarters, joint communication channels, joint staffing of key facilities, as well as normal contacts and close personal relationships among senior personnel. Scholars writing about collaboration, although not always consciously, approach it as an interaction between agencies and countries in terms of joint action during the entire Intelligence cycle (McGruddy, 2013, pp. 214-220) this appears to be a profound integrated form of co-operation, as it gives the possibility of developing more common vocabularies for thinking about problems with

fewer intercultural and international misunderstandings. This form of Intelligence collaboration bears the premises of institutionalization of collaborative practices and cross-cultural enterprise that develops a common lexicon and transparent rules of engagement.

Each of these five ways of interagency working converge at the establishment of collaborative environments, ranging from strategic joint action to a formal culture-oriented multilateral organization. Two good examples for the experience in time of this phenomenon are the models of the UKUSA Agreement and the European Union Intelligence community. The United Kingdom – United States of America Agreement (UKUSA) is a multilateral agreement for cooperation in signals intelligence between the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, having emerged from an informal agreement enabled by the 1941 Atlantic Charter to a secret treaty confirmed by the 1943 BRUSA Agreement, that was further extended to the other 3 countries, and opened thereafter to special forms of sharing and coordination with "third parties". The Five Eyes Agreement (as it is also known) evolved towards deepened cooperation that allowed the five nations to "carve up the earth into spheres of primary SIGINT collection responsibility" (Richelson & Ball, 1990, p. 143). Born out of the American-British intelligence cooperation in World War II, and strengthened by "the common language, legal system and culture" (Warner, 2013) the UKUSA's members pledged to share intelligence and not to conduct surveillance on each other. Basically, the agreement created a collaborative context for the SIGINT national organizations that "conceded to standardize terminology, code-words, intercept handling procedures and indoctrination oaths." (Bryce, 1995)

The foundation of a European Union's mechanism for Intelligence cooperation goes back to the 1970s when the European Communities, in their attempt to strengthen integration not only through economic mechanisms, but also by enhancing "co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy", decided to go (gradually) from informal consultations between Member States to formal recommendations reduced to treaties that support "The High Contracting Parties undertake to, inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action."[1]

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[1] THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, TITLE III, ARTICLE 30, European Co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy shall be governed by the following provisions: 1. The High Contracting Parties,

The EU intelligence system has known over the last decade a twofold institutional process of integration: on the one hand, the information exchange between national security and intelligence services has developed, strengthening the horizontal cooperation between the 28 member states; on the other hand, the establishment of European security frameworks and Intelligence structures are strengthening a continental vertical assistance and coordination. The European Intelligence community has known various stages of coordination and integration, the European liaison culture being continuously built on an ongoing inter-organizational socialization defined by the stakeholders' (Brussels and member countries) networking. No doubt, the Intelligence Centre (INTCEN) stands as the expression of the most integrated cooperation structure, its role, products and action aiming at facilitating participation, by developing mutual confidence and understanding within the European Union Intelligence community. While national Intelligence and governments remain the first responsible for the strengthening of the state security architecture and are at liberty to explore bilateral cooperation with both European and third-party states, INTCEN, in coordination with the other EU institutions, is concurrently playing the role of sharing catalyzer for the 28-member community, and that of organizational core of an emerging culture of collaboration.

It is interesting to mention a rather recent approach within the EU Intelligence context, where the horizontal and vertical networks of intelligence and security agencies merge in a liaison culture of tailor-made collaboration, enabled by the vision of collective leadership. Thus, in the last year's context of the fight against terrorism, the discourse in Brussels follows two lines of approach: on the one hand, with regard to the 28-state liaison within the EU community, the term mostly used is that of "co-operation", members being given the freedom to shape their level and "lineament" of participation, while in what concerns the joint efforts with third parties, the HR Federica Mogherini constantly calls for direct police and Intelligence collaboration of the EU, which depicts the collaborative community as an integrated structure.

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being members of the European Communities, shall endeavor jointly to formulate and implement an European foreign policy. 2. (a) The High Contracting Parties undertake to, inform and consult each other on any foreign policy matters of general interest so as to ensure that their combined influence is exercised as effectively as possible through coordination, the convergence of their positions and the implementation of joint action. (...)

Conclusions

Countering threats and building security has become a multi-agent process, as countries cannot ensure their security alone, security being prone to negotiation within collaborative environments. The liaison or "working together activity" is part of the Intelligence culture of an organization, integrated into the organization's mission, activity and operating strategy, while it also tends to become an autonomous supporting construction of norms, practices and mission across a diversity of independent cultures that are gathered in international communities of shared goals and common mission. Thus, the liaison culture does not draw on monolithic communities or supra-national intelligence organizations that supersede governments and country secret services, but rather works towards the establishment of proper mechanisms, partners and formulae that can bring maximum advantage to the security environment.

Notwithstanding, while cooperation in Intelligence becomes a shared praxis and evolves towards a *must* in countering threats, a complex question arise of how to build a common way of acting and thus overcome the differences in technology, accommodate opposite interests, shape a common voice, assimilate similar practices; in other words how to efficiently prepare actors (organizations, managers, agents) from already existing cultures with their own practices, ethos, and structure, for shaping a different culture of multinational collaboration and joint action, whose understanding should go beyond confined concerns and routines.

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COMPLEXITY AND ORDER IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

Aitana BOGDAN[*]

Motto: "*The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible*"
(Anthony C. Clark)

Abstract:

To be able to study intelligence organizations, one must first understand the *manner in which organizations have evolved in the last decades in parallel with the "revolutions" taking place in economy, technology and society. We can, therefore, notice a shift from the paradigm of the organization as a "machine", whose functioning can be understood through a detailed analysis of its inner mechanisms to the paradigm of the organization as an "intelligence organism", whose functioning surpasses from a complexity point of view everything we have previously imaged, limiting the knowledge we may gather on it. Therefore, this article argues for exploring ways in which intelligence organizations can stimulate and harness better their potential for improvisation, creativity and imagination.*

Keywords: *intelligence organizations, intelligence organism, transformation, complexity, order*

Introduction

There is first a need to define the term complexity and complexity theory, which is still a rather new and ambiguous field. Though, one may intuitively associate complexity with complicatedness, randomness or arbitrariness, this is an erroneous manner of looking at this particular concept. To understand complexity it is easier to first understand the contexts in which complexity is brought into discussion. For example, when looking at international relations one found questions such as: Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate in 1989 or why did the Apartheid regime of South Africa collapse

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in 1991? Questions for which no researcher could provide one answer. The reasons was the high number of variables interacting with one another, which needed to be considered in the analysis when attempting to root out the causes, which had led to that particular effect.

Though these questions may not have an easily identifiable answer their relevance and importance for intelligence agencies is undisputable, especially when considering the short and long term international security impact of those two events. These two cases are only examples of the manner in which the security environment has become a complex system, in which survival is conditioned by the ability to *spontaneously adapt.*

In other words the security puzzle is not only formed of thousands of pieces as a result of the information flood plaguing intelligence organizations but the image behind the puzzle is constantly changing.

The background research for these reflections can be found in the field of natural sciences, more precisely studies dealing with brain functions. According to Waldrop, "*organisms constantly adapt to each other through evolution, thereby organizing themselves into an exquisitely tuned ecosystem*" (Waldrop, 1992, p. 11).

Though spontaneous and unpredictable, complex systems should not be equaled with chaotic systems. Quite the opposite, complexity can be defined as a balance between chaos and order, something which is generally called *the edge of chaos.* An organization located at the edge of chaos is one which successfully manages to balance the need for coherence and cohesiveness with that of disorder and spontaneity in such a way as to produce innovation.

To be able to study intelligence organizations, one must first understand the manner in which organizations have evolved in the last decades in parallel with the "revolutions" taking place in economy, technology and society.

We can, therefore, notice a shift from the paradigm of the organization as a "*machine*", whose functioning can be understood through a detailed analysis of its inner mechanisms to the paradigm of the organization as an "*intelligence organism*", whose functioning surpasses from a complexity point of view everything we have previously imaged, limiting the knowledge we may gather on it.

But what makes and organizations *intelligent*? According to Schwaininger, there are four distinct features: capacity to adapt to external stimuli, capacity to influence the environment in which it acts, capacity to define itself in accordance with the environment (when this is required) and

the capacity to significantly contribute to the viability and development of the system to which it belongs (Schwaininger, 2003, p. 54).

Other authors have used the concept of "complex-adaptive intelligence systems" (CAS) to capture the new paradigm of organizational evolution. The main functions of these new types of organizations are learning and adaptation (Yick, 2004, p. 8).

On the assumption that intelligence organizations aspire towards such an organizational model we can immediately identify two fundamental questions in need of answers:

➢ *How do intelligence organizations learn*?

➢ *How must intelligence organizations adapt to the external environment and how to strengthen their resilience to external surprises*?

Without attempting to provide a final answer to any of the two questions, I propose exploring various options available so as to be able to provide a set of recommendations.

One of Yick's conclusions is that organizations are always negotiating an equilibrium between complexity and order, so that their survival is dependent on their ability to innovate and be creative. To preserve their adaptive character, the organization must be proactive and dynamic, evolving "intelligently" in parallel with the changes in the surrounding environment (Yick, 2004, p. 10). This explains why many of the authors in the field have labelled the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S. as a "*failure of imagination*" instead of a failure of procedures.

A good analogy for the way in which CAS function was presented by Brafman and Beckstrome, in their story on the search for the "grandmother cell". According to the two authors, for a long period of time scientists have tried with the help of several tests to prove that memories are located inside a single neuron. This effort entitled the search for the "grandmother cell" (the neuron holding the memory of the grandmother). In spite of the fact that they have sensors which were more and more sensitive, they haven't managed to prove this hypothesis, but quite the contrary they have discovered that memories are not located inside a single neuron, but they are distributed throughout an entire network of neurons (Beckstrome & Brafman, 2006).

Following this argument, it becomes clear that organizations should not try to place particular skills inside one single unit, but skills should be distributed evenly throughout the organizations, thus increasing its overall resilience. When it comes to putting this idea into practice, several pragmatic problems appear. One is that there are cases when the integration of

resources in one or several centers is preferable, facilitating the accumulation of expertise and limiting the inefficient use of resources.

A good example for such a situation from within the intelligence community is the institutional structure behind SIGINT production. Producing signals intelligence is costly, requiring a large quantity of human and material resources. Therefore, in order to save costs and because of the complexity and sensitivity of the task at hand most countries have opted for building national SIGINT platforms.

Other intelligence types are most suitable for the network model, such as OSINT capabilities, which can be easily distributed evenly inside the organization. The issue of decentralization v. centralization is further addressed in Section 4.3 of this thesis.

Another important feature of complex-adaptive systems observed by Brafman and Becksrome (2006, p. 75) is that once people are placed in an open system they will automatically desire to contribute to its development. From an organizational evolution perspective, this is especially important as it provides the basis for the organization's learning process.

CAS and leadership

Leadership has been another dimension often researched in CAS analyses. There is an emerging trend arguing for the replacement of the CEO-type of leader (who stands at the top of a hierarchy) with the "catalyst-type" leader, whose role is to use his creativity and innovative abilities to support the creation of a network necessary for solving the organization's problems while allowing individuals to develop freely (Beckstrome & Brafman, 2006, p. 75).

The idea of a "catalyst leader" is also to be found in the work of Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu who said "*A leader is best when people barely know he exists, when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say: we did it ourselves*" (Harrison, 2010). This is again a very provocative fact if we are to apply it to intelligence organizations, especially the military ones. Military organizations are by their very nature highly hierarchical and highly centralized, heavily relying on command lines and procedures, which makes such a transition in leadership very problematic.

When it comes to intelligence one could argue we can notice the transition from the CEO leader to the catalyst leader in the form of the project manager, whose role is to build a team, bring new ideas and disappear when the project ends and the HR expert. The project manager should benefit from

increased autonomy and should have the ability to bring together the necessary expertise to solve the problems encountered by the organization. This would mean bringing together individuals outside the limits of a single department.

If intelligence organizations aim to become competitive-adaptive systems they must engage in a process of "looking ahead" (intelligence transformation), often having to deal with the systemic effects produced as a result of such a process.

The first element to consider are the *unexpected outcomes*, which frequently emerge when the change is "constructed" as a linear top-bottom process, such as is the one under analysis in this article. The main caveat of this approach is that when the "*solution*" devised at the strategic level interacts with the complexity of the local circumstances, it does always behave as predicted (Burns, 2007, p. 29).

The other element, which needs to be considered are the *consequential outcomes*, namely the measure in which the changes affect the system's ability as a whole to conduct its activities. According to Stacey (2003) both of these effects can be better understood when employing chaos theory, which challenges the fundamental tenets of organizational change theory, by undermining the idea of linear causality. Chaos theory mentions interrelationships and spontaneous self-organizing, which imply the organization is characterized by intrinsic unpredictability.

What the theories on complexity do is to provide a framework for seeing and understanding the world, leading us to a new paradigm focusing on the simultaneity of action and decision-making, which challenges the old one, which states that planning and formal decision-making are the prerequisites of effective action.

However, one of the main challenges when dealing with organizational change in a complex environment is the *imagination gap*, summarized by Arthur Schopenhauer in the following statement: „*everyone takes the limits of his own vision for the limits of the world*".

Therefore, to achieve efficiency in this constantly changing environment we may see ourselves forced to move from planning and anticipation to improvisation, creativity and imagination (Weick, 1995). The general rule in organization theory is that an organization only hears what it expects to hear, or in other words it pre-filters the structures information it receives through a framework of beliefs and values already constructed, which reinforced the existing context and supports a pre-defined goal.

However, it is the information which is left outside the structured framework which has the potential to disrupt and more often than not to inspire and foster growth.

Therefore, this article argues for exploring ways in which intelligence organizations can stimulate and harness better their potential for improvisation, creativity and imagination. Though many people are tempted to confuse imagination with creativity, the two are actually distinct concepts. On one hand imagination is "*the ability to form images and ideas in the mind, especially of things never seen or never experienced directly*" (Manu, 2007, p. 9), while creativity can be defined as "*the ability to use imagination to develop new and original ideas or things*" (Manu, 2007, p. 10), usually driving the desire for innovation.

While creativity is used to improve the condition of the organizations by finding new variables to solve existent problems, imagination is used to discover new capabilities, existing behind latent behaviors and needs.

The value of imagination for preserving the organization's competitive edge has been illustrated yet and yet again in the business sector, with the emergence and success of new tools and technologies such as smart phones, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter etc. To be able to harness imagination to its full potential, one must start by mapping the current limits of knowledge, as well as the limits of people and the environment, something which Alexander Manu defines as „the imagination challenge" (Manu, 2007, p. 19). One of the ways to overcome the imagination challenge is by introducing the idea of play in the workplace.

Play is a concept, which only seldom applies to adults, and which is rarely if ever associated with the workplace. However, in the context of this thesis, the concept "play" is a reference to the creation of a space free of boundaries of common logic and other constraints, where people can employ their imagination and creativity freely.

Intelligence organizations and serious gaming

For an organization to evolve into a CAS, constantly learning and adapting, it must create a *temporary play space* – a platform for the exploration of imaginative possibility. Traditionally, the idea of play (as

understood in this paper[1]) has been absent from the intelligence environment, either because of time constraints or as a result of the organizational culture.

Lately, we have noticed a return of *play* inside intelligence organizations with the introduction of serious gaming into training programs dedicated to the intelligence community. The concept *serious games* refers to situations where gaming technology is used to support traditional training in real world problems (Zyda, 2005).

Already by 2002, the U.S. Army was using serious gaming (e.g. the game Americas Army) to promote its recruitment policy. The military used serious gaming in training for a wide variety of tasks, such as medical training, driving in convoys through hostile areas, language and cultural learning. Though the military has been one of the main clients for serious gaming, especially in the U.S, in the last years the list of users has expanded to include other governmental agencies such as universities, law-enforcement agencies and even the intelligence community (Harz, 2005).

By 2015 we witness several notable evolutions in this field, ranging from the organization of dedicated events (e.g. *The International Conference on Exercises, Gaming, and Simulations for Intelligence and National Security* organized by Georgetown University in March 2015) to research funds allocated for building capacity in this field (e.g. the European FP7 PANDORA project).

The main advantage of complementing intelligence training with serious gaming is that it allows trainees to learn from their mistakes without having to face real world consequences. Users are even encouraged to make mistakes so they may benefit from a truly experimental learning of the various consequences their actions may have.

Depending on the purpose, we can distinguish between different types of serious games, which can be used to stimulate imagination. The first and most common type of game is the simulation. In simulation games, real life situations are imitated in order to allow the trainee to learn certain procedures or acquire skills needed in real world actions. This type of game is ideal, when replicating high risk situations. In the case of intelligence training, these types of games are especially suited for training in the field of counterterrorism, surveillance and crisis management.

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[1] Ones cannot argue that intelligence organisations are engaged in a continuous game with their challengers (e.g. terrorist organisations), but this is not the meaning attributed to the concept in this thesis.

An alternative to simulation, when it comes to intelligence training is the *Serious Sandbox Game (SSG)*, a creative tool with the potential to create a free open space in which new perspectives on complex issues can develop. These types of games enable the players to briefly escape from reality with the purpose of returning with a fresh take on how to organize reality (STT Netherlands Study Centre for Technology, 2012, p. 4).

The main advantage of SSGs is the way it stimulates out-of-the-box thinking and experimentation, being especially suited for training intelligence analysts.

Nevertheless, studies have shown that using serious gaming in training comes with a downside, which organizations should be aware of:

a. It stimulates "Lazy thinking – it shortens the attention span of users;

b. It encourages wrong types of motivations – All games include extrinsic rewards (you play for the score), thus shadowing the more important issue of intrinsic motivation;

c. It may make trainees to lose sight of the main goal – Even serious games can be turned from learning tools to becoming a distraction (Noodle. The Social Intranet, 2013).

If intelligence organizations aspire to become complex-adaptive systems they must include improvisation, creativity and innovation as key pillars of their organizational model.

According to improvisation theatre, improvisation does not simply appear. It needs to be founded on three main dimensions:

- *Identifying opportunities and accepting the challenge* (**saying yes to new things**) (Burns, 2007, p. 50)

❖ In the case of the Romanian Intelligence Service, a good example of such a behavior is has been its willingness to participate in competitions for European grants. This is certainly not traditional for an intelligence organization, but it did bring benefits (in terms of both material and intellectual gains), that could not have been acquired differently.

- *Seeding small interventions into opportunity spaces* – because everything is connected, interventions in response to problems do not have to be direct responses to those problems. Complexity theory has brought improvements to this model, by arguing that small changes may have major effects (e.g. Yick's considerations on the butterfly effect) (Burns, 2007, p. 50).

❖ When applying this to the intelligence field, we may conclude that a full organizational reform process may not be the best solution. An intelligence agency may want to direct more of its efforts and resources

towards adjusting the surrounding environment, instead of its own structure. For example, in the case of Romania, efficiency of intelligence collection could be increased significantly by working more towards educating the population in the spirit of a security culture, by increasing the awareness of what public interest means in the security field, instead of investing in the technological instruments employed for collection or by insisting on reforming the collection process itself.

❖   This also means there needs to be more initiative at the lowest level of action, for small corrections, which may have a significant systemic effect.

-        *Re-incorporation* – improvisation does not occur in a blank space, but new elements need to be connected to the old ones, much like in a children's story, where different elements are woven in the storyline from beginning to end (Burns, 2007, p. 50). Therefore, for it to work, improvisation needs to bring different narratives together in a meaningful whole.

❖   This could be translated in the need of committing to a process of retrieving the memory of its non-democratic past, understanding its past and current organizational culture and exerting efforts towards linking its various reforms and projects in a unified whole.

Conclusion

One of the main challenges in stimulating creativity inside intelligence organizations is the "*fear of failure*". The risk that some of the creative ideas when put into practice will fail is something which all organizations supporting the creativity of their employees acknowledge and embrace. This is a normal occurrence as proven by famous cases such as Google, Apple or Amazon, who have had some notorious fails at some point in their evolutions. Nevertheless, when it comes to intelligence, the ideas of accepting and embracing failure beforehand is unconceivable. And to a certain extent this is normal, if we consider the effects of the 9/11 intelligence failure in the US or other similar cases around the word. Intelligence failure is generally accompanied by huge social and economic costs.

The consequences of intelligence failures are also observable inside the organization, where top management is being changed (under the public pressure) and employees see their work patterns being disrupted. This type of *retaliation* makes high level intelligence managers to be risks adverse, which in turn limits the level of creativity inside the organization. To re-phrase a quote of John Rockefeller, intelligence managers are afraid to give up the good

to go for the great. Therefore, instead of stimulating creativity they most often encourage the standardization of work flows, as this has proved successful in the past.

The second main challenge is that often creativity requires time. In order to be creative and come up with innovative solutions employees must have time in which to follow personal projects, independent of their normal task. When it comes to intelligence organizations, time is one of the scarcest resources available. The security evolutions take place with such speed and frequency that intelligence collectors and analysts seldom have the time to do anything else but try to catch up with the events. Though intelligence organizations have a foresight function, the complexity of the security environmental makes strategic surprises inevitable (Mattis, 2014).

Therefore, any strategy for increasing the creativity of an intelligence organization should have two levels:

1.   Creativity as a "*must*". Introducing creativity as a requirement in the recruitment process for intelligence organizations, for both field officers and analysts. Though studies made on the profile of intelligence analysts have long included creativity among the key skills, this has not been extended to field officers (the collectors of intelligence), though there are sufficient arguments to prove creativity is as important in this stage (e.g.: creative solutions for addressing a threat, creative means of collecting information)

2.   Harnessing creativity to its full potential. This can only be achieved if the organizational culture of intelligence agencies is changed, by creating a space for new ideas and open dialogue.

One method of harnessing creativity is encouraging analysts to develop a public presence and to engage in scientific research. According to Peter Mattis, senior intelligence analysts who engage in academic work outside the limits of their organizations should be encouraged for this will provoke them to adopt a different mode of thinking. People, would, thus, be free to explore new ideas and concepts, while being required to be very systematic in the arguments they provide in support of their ideas. It also helps build a bridge between intelligence practitioners and outside stakeholders, which can then be employed the intelligence organizations in support of their actions (Mattis, 2014).

Developing key research skills inside the intelligence community is another way to go as it helps connect intuition (which is tightly tied to creativity) with scientific arguments, brought in support of one's initial idea. The second role of research, according to Mattis is to build "*a repository of*

knowledge", in the sense that the more organized knowledge a person possesses the easier it is for that person to make intuitive leaps. (Mattis, 2014)

To conclude, for intelligence organizations to preserve and maximize their performance they must place themselves at the "*edge of chaos*", by blending an integrated vision of the organization with allowing each department, group and individual from the organization the freedom to define how they will contribute to achieving the objectives, through creativity, improvisation and innovation.

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM AS KEY CONCEPTUAL FRAME FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

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Abstract:

The goal of this paper is to explore the potential of using sociological paradigms as analysis frameworks within the intelligence tradecraft. Although macro-oriented theoretical systems (e.g. structuralism, functionalism, conflict theories) have tried and tested uses in intelligence, especially when it comes to making sense of large-scale phenomena, events and trends, there is still little attention given to the paradigm of symbolic interactionism. At first glance, intelligence analysis has little to gain, knowledge-wise, from an empirically untestable scientific perspective which deals with the social micro-cosmos. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the fact that societal systems are constantly negotiated, consolidated and reformed through the most minuscule of daily interactions, understating the latter can help paint a correct picture of the "shared reality" of large or small groups at any given moment. I believe that intelligence practitioners can use insight derived from symbolic interactionism to better apply their tradecraft in an extensive palate of cases. Moreover, in an increasingly virtualized social universe, human interactions take new forms and generate new types of shared meanings and symbols, altogether changing the very social structure that fosters them. For intelligence practitioners that operate online, from all-source strategic analysts to OSINTers and SOCMINTers, understanding how this new medium emerges is of the utmost importance.

Keywords: *symbolic interactionism, intelligence analysis, collective behavior, observer-expectancy effect, OSINT.*

Introduction

In the simplest terms, intelligence analysis aims at limiting or eliminating the ambiguity of certain situations characterized by a high degree of uncertainty using human cognition. To do so, the analyst mixes and

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matches data and information in order to evaluate the tableau of knowledge about target situations and entities. The analyst must also always keep in mind the blank spots that inherently appear on any knowledge map and focus on shaping and reshaping the constructed narrative through problematization. By checking all these items off of the "best practice" list, he or she can generate valid inferences at the operational, tactical and/or strategic level regarding future developments.

While this rather simple, albeit abstract, recipe has not changed profoundly since the "birth" of the intelligence practice, the backdrop of this process is today greatly different. Avoiding intelligence failures is, after 9/11, a task that is said to require a greater emphasis on what makes good analysis. Strategic surprises stem today not so much from poor collecting but from poor analysis.

The nexus of the scientific process and intelligence analysis

Augmenting the quality of intelligence analysis has been done through borrowing and adapting models, frameworks, methods and techniques from the outside. One of the most selfless "donors" has been science. For example, the fields of economy, psychology, sociology, history or anthropology (just to name a few) offer a huge volume of knowledge that can immediately be put to use in intelligence analysis. In sociology, functionalism, structuralism, conflict theory and interpretative sociology are the basic paradigms that build analysis frameworks for phenomena, processes and trends that define the social dynamic. The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for symbolic interactionism and phenomenological sociology, as intelligence analysts have yet to harness the explanatory power of these paradigms.

At first glance, the critique of symbolic interactionism as a "bad" theory, one that cannot be empirically validated and, by only dealing with the micro-cosmos of social interaction, circumvents the required criteria for paradigmatic frameworks, is persuasive.

This paper aims to argue that symbolic interactionism dully deserves a role in the paradigm repertoire of any sociologist that practices intelligence analysis.

Conceptual pivots of the interactionist paradigm

Symbolic interactionism stems from the idea (Thomas Theory) that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas &

Thomas, 1929, p. 572). In other word, reality is a social construct which is constantly generated, consolidated, and negotiated through the multiple daily interactions of the participants to the social life.

Through these repeated interactions, symbols are created (habits, rites, rules etc.) and the individuals assigns means and significance to the things, events, and situations around them, and also interpret them accordingly.

Thus, symbolic interactionism presumes that people do not actionably respond to what we might call „reality", but to the socially and individually accepted meaning of reality.

Herbert Blumer, the creator of symbolic interactionism, most clearly underlies the main ideas of this sociological perspective, stating that the significance the social actors convey about things and other persons, the bargaining they carry out and the interpretations generated in this way are being read in this paradigm.

Exponents of the Chicago School analyzed the way individuals socially act, considering the subject of *projected self-image*. George Herbert Mead coined the term „self", meaning that image about him/herself, equally composed from social ego (as a result of interiorizing social roles) and psychological ego (as a personal, intimate component) (Doise et al., 1996), where Charles Horton Cooley handled (1902) differently this matter, stating that there is a „looking glass self", amid an image about your own person which is build from the interaction between individual's image about himself and the image the individual thinks others have about him.

Erving Goffman introduced the concept of "dramatic perspective" into the social daily analysis. Through „ The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life" (1959), he proposed the theatre metaphor in order to explain the emergence of some particular features related to social context: in public, individuals "perform", trying to present themselves as favorable. They choose a "mask" (meaning they exhibit those features considered to be preferred in that particular social context), they use appropriate settings and props and, then don't find themselves in front of the audience, they use the back of the stage to temporary renounce the role that they assume.

Despite the critiques of conceptual incongruence and lack of empirical testability[1], symbolic interactionism takes advantage at the fact that it

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[1] These critiques are the result of treating symbolic interactionism as a theory not as a scientific orientation. More underlain critics reproach this paradigm the fact that it studies a very narrow social niche, meaning the interaction inside small groups and specific psychosociological

conceptually concatenates the way *some* social symbols are generated through a *particular* type of interaction that takes place in a *particular* social structure. This interaction produces also a *particular* type of interpretation and internalization of structure. Symbols, in turn, become a part of the social structure, feeding a cycle of social regeneration. This circular causal concatenation allows us to understand the smooth relation between macro- and micro-social frames – from social structure to group interaction.

Nevertheless, the reasoning of the present paper does not support the preeminence of symbolic interactionism over the other paradigms, but the fact that there are a series of relevant social instances in the security field that can be more easily understood through explanations originated from the interactionism.

Symbolic Interactionism and intelligence

Strategic surprises

Despite the discussion about "objective" and "social" reality may seem philosophical and less important in terms of practical consequences, some social phenomena do emerge on the score of symbolic inter-individual negotiations and do modify tangible reality. For intelligence analysts, the emergence of these phenomena takes the form of a strategic surprise when they have important implications in the field of national security.

For example, during an economic crisis, the diffuse perceptions such panic related to the banking systemic sustainability may generate phenomena with actual consequences, even if, objectively speaking, banks are stable. To that effect, the most famous example regarding the effects of emotional spiral that validates Thomas's Theorem in Black Tuesday, that historical day from October 1929, when the Wall Street Stock Market precipitated and provoked an economic collapse.

Amid a pronounced dynamic of the transactions, the Stock Market closed in October 24th with a 6.38 points decline of Dow Jones Index. During the weekend, the US newspapers heavily reported about the skid on the Wall Street, generating a large sense of panic amid investors. After the weekend, from Monday to Thursday, the Stock Market collapsed in a rapid pace because everybody tried to sell and get out of the market.

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phenomena. Obviously, no sociological paradigm ever reached the performance of delineating a theoretical frame that „explains everything".

Of course, Black Thursday only officialized the unsustainability of the speculative bubble that hallmarked the `20 in the United States of America. Despite this, the trigger was based on the spreading of rumors, false information or assumptions that, once considered as being the truth, brought into play actions that validated wrong premises.

Analyzing the causal chain of the events that generate "announced" crisis, Robert Merton proposed the term „self-fulfilling prophecy" (Merton, 1948, p. 195). In intelligence, generating self-fulfilling prophecies is a specific objective (example below) of influence operations. Black and grey propaganda are meant to create and disseminate a product-message that present a version of reality according to the interests of the issuing entity. Their scope is to obtain a certain reaction or non-reaction from the target.

The example from below, largely mentioned among experts, had a very ample social impact at its time: in the left image there is the picture press channels broadcasted after the statue of Saddam Hussein from Firdos Place in Bagdad was pulled down (April 9, 2003).

Press reports insisted on the large support of the Iraqi population for the military operations. In the right picture is the same picture but from another angle.

Influence operations that intend to coagulate a general consensus („all the Iraqi population in 2004 wants to throw down Saddam Hussein's regime") presenting a false local consensus („all the persons in Firdos Place participated to the pulling down of the Saddam Hussein's statue") work by the Keynesian principle of rational agent's action – individuals action according to their own assessment about majority's opinion (Keynes, 1936, p.100).

Tagging
Another situation intelligence analysts often confront when they try to anticipate the actions of a hostile actor is the confirmation of the most

dangerous scenario, despite the premises that might underpin less dramatic trends. Sometimes, the future seems to confirm the gloomiest expectations.

Howard Becker, a well known symbolic interactionist, proposes a social deviance theory derived from that of „looking glass self". *Social tagging* (Becker, 1963) is the trigger phenomenon of the deviance, not because of the intrinsic features of the acting, but as a result of the social network it generates.

The theory of social tagging is similar to the self-fulfilling prophecy theory, inserting in the explanatory circuit the driver of "others' expectations" and the of the way these expectation are internalized by the social agent. In intelligence, Zulaika (2009) states that this sort of mental frame usually emerges from cases related to preventing and countering terrorism. If authorities anticipate the fact that a specific group manifest violent tendencies (ideological radicalism, terrorism etc.), prevention and countering measures they adopt might push the members of those communities to that specific type of behavior they try to alleviate.

The example Zulaika offers related to military operations in Iraq, where the US Army and its allies intervened in order to eliminate Saddam Hussein, under the suspicion of Hussein developing chemical weapons of mass destruction and financially and logistically supporting terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda. Actual proofs for both hypothesis were not found, but the presence of US Army in Iraq favored the emergence of a high scale terrorist and insurgent phenomenon. If Iraq was not a propitious environment for terrorism before 2003, it surely became one after that.

Online collective behavior – the contribution of symbolic interactionism to understanding the emergence of new psycho – sociological phenomenon

Neither symbolic interactionism nor other paradigm will ever make „unknown unkowns", the field where strategic surprises develop, to disappear. According to Donald Rumsfeld's taxonomy (2002): "known knowns, unknown knowns, known unkowns, unknown unknowns". Nevertheless, a better understanding of the profound mechanisms of social emergence may diminish the field of „the unknown that can not be known" and the *effects* of strategic surprises.

Intelligence analysts became more and more interested in understanding the virtual space, a space of interaction and an informational resource with extensions that have never been substantially explored so far.

Hybridization of collective behavior, with emerging and actionable components both online and offline, generate surprising effects for those organizations responsible for preventing violent social movements.

Today, the daily global society is networked (Castells, 2004) and virtualized. The social density is exponentially growing, generating a "conductive" infrastructure that encourages social interactions using symbolic interactionism. That is why it is easy to understand the mechanism used to augment the velocity and frequency of generating new social symbols which, in turn, became part of the social structure, bolstering new interactions and internalized interpretations. This self-propelled cycle of symbol development will generate structural mutations at the limit between chaos and complexity, inducing more volatility in the security environment that seems to lose its sense of equilibrium.

Even if does not always permit this identifying of the next strategic surprise, this key of interpretation allows the intelligence analysts to be more alert in a renegotiated space between the participants to the social life, in a more alert pace than B.I. (*Before Internet* era)*.

Conclusions

Considering things in retrospect, the inability of intelligence analysts to foresee the moments of inflexion seem to be a natural consequence of cause-evolutions and is often due not only to the superficial knowledge of analyzed spaces, of history, of geopolitical profile, of culture or of psycho-social determinants regarding the targeted population.

Most of the time, this inability is generated by the social structure whose agent the actant is (the analyst), its features reflecting, at least partially, in his perspective, predilections, and preferences. Understanding this connection is very important in intelligence analysis, and the reasoning of the present paper is that symbolic interactionism, along with other scientific perspectives, may contribute to avoiding cognitive biases.

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THE EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS METHODS
AND TECHNIQUES –
ANOTHER STEP IN IMPROVING
THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS -

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Abstract:

Intelligence analysts are forced to face the most diverse challenges generated by the security environment they analyze, so they must constantly update methodologies and analytical techniques used to meet beneficiaries' needs.

On the other hand, the development of technological and scientific spectrum generally brings methodological development, offering a wide range of options for researchers and analysts in their respective fields.

From this point of view, we can talk about the temptation of novelty and accessibility of some analysis methods and techniques that can be borrowed and implemented in the field of intelligence analysis.

In this regard, this study proposes a tool for assessing the methods and analytical techniques developed in the form of an evaluation matrix, tested on a number of risk analysis methods and techniques suitable to be applied in intelligence analysis.

Keywords: *intelligence analysis, analytical techniques, assessing the methods, evaluation matrix*

Introduction

The abundance of information - one of the features of the contemporary society - generates ambivalent effects on the activity of the intelligence organizations.

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On the one hand, intelligence analysts are forced to face the most diverse challenges generated by the reference environment analyzed, so they must constantly update their methodologies and analytical techniques used to meet the beneficiaries' needs.

On the other hand, the development of the technological and scientific spectrum in general brings methodological development, offering a wide range of options for researchers and analysts in the respective fields.

From this point of view, we can talk about the temptation of novelty and accessibility of some analysis methods and techniques that can be borrowed and implemented in the current intelligence analysis process.

However, having in mind these considerations, one must highlight the necessity of testing and validating the methodological tools used in intelligence analysis, in order to meet specific needs with efficiency and effectiveness.

In this regard, this study proposes a tool for assessing the analytical methods and techniques, developed in the form of an evaluation matrix, tested on a number of risk analysis methods and techniques applicable in intelligence.

Thus, having as a prerequisite the elements of the marketing mix and the 3P project for intelligence analysis introduced by Ionel Nițu, we propose to complete the 3P project by adding three more concepts that constitute the indicators for developing the evaluation matrix of analytical methods used by analysts in their current activity.

Hence, according to economic science theorists, the marketing mix is a concept introduced in 1964 by Neil Borden, in order to coherently use variables through which an organization can consistently have the market under control. Initially, there were developed twelve variables: product, price, brand, distribution, direct selling, paid advertising (advertising), sales promotion, packaging, exposure, post-sale services, logistics and marketing research. Also in 1964, Jerome McCarthy simplified the mix to "4 Ps": product, price, placement and promotion (communication) (Pripp, 2002, p. 37):

1.   The Product (after Ph. Kotler - Marketing Management 126, New Jersey, 1992) is "something that can be offered in a market to be viewed, purchased, used or retained, so as to satisfy a desire or a necessity. This refers to physical objects, services, organizations and ideas" (Pripp, 2002, p. 38).

2.   The Price includes the costs that the "buyer" has to pay. It is a set of strategies, techniques and tactics that determine the levels and changes

in time, on demographic, psychographic and geographic zones of costs that the population has to incur.

3.   The Placement is ensured through the networks and distribution channels of products supported by the motivational component of individuals involved in realizing these projects. "The placement is built as a set of operations that aim to introduce in the physical circuit the products and services".

4.   The Promotion refers to how the population is informed about political programs and also on ways to stimulate interest in this kind of offer. Communication, as a mean of promoting political programs, is a set of policies, actions and media, advocacy and policy for influencing consumer behavior through advertising, public relations, permanent presentation and performance on all media channels of personalities and political programs, up to personalized communication (direct messages through personalized letters) (Pripp, 2002, p. 38-40).

For political structures, another three "Ps" are added, resulting a political marketing mix consisting of seven elements:

1. Personnel: is provided by people who contribute to manufacturing and delivering the product on all stages.

2. Physical premises: are represented by logistics, materials and financial conditions necessary to the realization of the program in all the phases of the mix.

3. Profit: signifies the real benefits the program brings both to political consumers and producers of offers alike, which, once accepted, will be basically involved in implementing it, through various functions they will hold (Pripp, 2002, p. 40).

In   the   field   of   intelligence,   starting   from   the   need to modernize and continuously adapt the intelligence organizations, Ionel Nițu identified three factors that are essential in the reforming process: Process, Personnel and Product. According to the Romanian expert's approach, the three factors are interrelated and are characterized by the following (Nițu, 2011, pp. 85-95):

The Process (Nițu, 2011) refers to the intelligence analysis activity from an organizational and operational perspective, with the entire set of methods, procedures and standards implemented.

The author analyzes this factor from several perspectives. Thus, from the functional perspective, he considers that intelligence analysis should have

a central place, facilitating the connection inside the intelligence cycle between the collection activity and the dissemination one.

From a methodological perspective, Ionel Nițu believes that improvements and structural and methodological adjustments of processes and products resulting from intelligence analysis must be made permanently in order to maintain high quality and efficiency standards.

From a structural viewpoint, the author believes that a clarification is necessary regarding the functional duties of different structures involved in the process of intelligence.

The Personnel (Nițu, 2011) refers to the human resource involved in the analysis process, but also to the selection and training process. Regarding this factor, Nițu believes that a model for training in intelligence analysis must be set up, in which different levels are merged, from the training of the new entrants up to optimal ways of training the trainers.

The Product (Nițu, 2011) factor refers to the results obtained after the intelligence analysis is conducted, including the feedback from the beneficiaries and the requests for information. Thus, equal importance must be given to all levels where intelligence results are disseminated– be it tactical, operational or strategic - and the products must be adapted to the needs of the beneficiary and their psychological profile alike.

Adaptation to the intelligence field - Additional elements for the "3P project"

Taking into account the theoretical aspects presented above, we propose the introduction of some additional elements to the "3P project", to be used in the evaluation of analytical methods available in the field of intelligence analysis, as follows:

Promotion

It focuses on two levels: how the guild of analysts is informed about new analytical methods and the ease with which the information about them is disseminated and assimilated. The second level concerns the way in which the intelligence activity beneficiaries are informed of new analytical methods discovered and introduced in the analysis.

Physical premises

Refer to the material conditions necessary for the flawless running of intelligence analysis. They include personnel costs, hardware and software

used and time spent for analytical work using a particular set of procedures and analytical methods.

Profit

Refers to the benefits obtained in the field of national security by applying certain methods or analytical techniques, which enhance the process of obtaining intelligence products relevant to the beneficiary. The benefits can be measured from the perspective of the beneficiary in terms of relevance and accuracy of the intelligence product received and from the perspective of the intelligence organization that can deliver intelligence products in less time and with less resource consumption.

On this basis, we have developed an evaluation matrix that has been operationalized and tested by assessing some risk analysis methods, as follows:

The operationalization of the items used in the matrix

No. Crt.		Factors					
		Process	Product	Personnel	Promotion	Physical premises	Profit
Features	**1.**	How does the method help the intelligence activity as a whole?	How does the method help the realization of intelligence products?	How does the method help the personnel in completing the task?	Is the method known?	How long does it take for the method to be applied?	What benefits does it bring for the organization in understanding the problem analyzed?
	2.	How does the method help the intelligence activity's effectiveness?	How quickly the product can be achieved by using the method?	Is it difficult to be understood and applied by the personnel involved in the analysis process?	What efforts should be made to promote it?	Can it be applied individually or as a team? What other conditions must be ensured for the team? (venue, special equipment, computers)	What advantages does it offer to the beneficiary in the decision-making process?

Scores from 1 to 5 given for each feature of each factor separately. An average is calculated for each factor separately. The total score is the sum of the averages obtained by the 6 factors. The maximum total score that can be obtained by a method: 30. The minimum total score that can be obtained by a method: 6.

The list of risk analysis methods evaluated

No. crt.	The name of the risk analysis method
1	Hazard checklist
2	Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA)
3	Hazard Review
4	Preliminary risk analysis
5	Change analysis
6	*What if* analysis*?*
7	*SWIFT* Analysis
8	Relative Ranking/Risk Indexing
9	Pareto Analysis
10	Facilitated Risk Analysis Process
11	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
12	Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)
13	Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
14	„5 whys" technique
15	Event tree analysis (ETA)
16	Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
17	Events and Causal Factor Charting
18	Scenario analysis
19	SWOT analysis
20	The analysis of competing hypotheses
21	Red Team analysis

Scores obtained by the risk analysis methods based on the matrix

No. Crt.	The name of the risk analysis method	Factors																		Total score
		Process			Product			Personnel			Promotion			Physical premises			Profit			
		Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	
1	Scenario analysis	4	5	4.50	4	3	3.50	4	5	4.50	5	5	5.00	3	4	3.50	4	4	4.00	25.00
2	SWOT analysis	4	5	4.50	4	3	3.50	4	5	4.50	5	5	5.00	3	4	3.50	4	4	4.00	25.00
3	SWIFT Analysis	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	24.00
4	The analysis of competing hypotheses	4	4	4.00	4	3	3.50	4	5	4.50	4	4	4.00	3	4	3.50	4	4	4.00	23.50
5	Red Team analysis	4	5	4.50	4	3	3.50	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	3	3	3.00	4	4	4.00	23.00
6	What if analysis?	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	4	3	3.50	4	4	4.00	21.50
7	Facilitated Risk Analysis Process	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	21.00

No. Crt.	The name of the risk analysis method	Factors																	Total score
		Process			Product			Personnel			Promotion			Physical premises			Profit			
		Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	
8	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)	3	3	3.00	4	3	3.50	4	4	4.00	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	21.00
9	Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)	3	3	3.00	4	3	3.50	4	4	4.00	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	21.00
10	Event tree analysis (ETA)	3	3	3.00	4	3	3.50	4	4	4.00	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	4	3	3.50	21.00
11	„5 whys" technique	2	3	2.50	3	3	3.00	4	4	4.00	3	4	3.50	4	4	4.00	3	3	3.00	20.00
12	Hazard checklist	2	4	3.00	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	2	2	2.00	3	4	3.50	3	4	3.50	19.00
13	Pareto Analysis	2	2	2.00	3	3	3.00	2	3	2.50	4	4	4.00	4	4	4.00	3	3	3.00	18.50

No. Crt.	The name of the risk analysis method	Factors																		Total score
		Process			Product			Personnel			Promotion			Physical premises			Profit			
		Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	
14	Hazard and Operability (HAZOP)	2	3	2.50	4	3	3.50	3	3	3.00	3	3	3.00	3	4	3.50	3	3	3.00	18.50
15	Preliminary risc analysis	2	3	2.50	3	3	3.00	3	3	3.00	2	2	2.00	4	4	4.00	3	3	3.00	17.50
16	Hazard Review	2	2	2.00	2	3	2.50	2	3	2.50	2	3	2.50	3	3	3.00	2	3	2.50	15.00
17	Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)	2	2	2.00	2	3	2.50	3	3	3.00	2	3	2.50	2	3	2.50	3	2	2.50	15.00
18	Events and Causal Factor Charting	3	3	3.00	2	2	2.00	3	3	3.00	2	2	2.00	2	3	2.50	3	2	2.50	15.00
19	Relative Ranking/Risk Indexing	3	3	3.00	3	3	3.00	2	2	2.00	2	2	2.00	3	2	2.50	2	2	2.00	14.50

No. Crt.	The name of the risk analysis method	Factors																	Total score
		Process			Product			Personnel			Promotion			Physical premises			Profit			
		Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	Score ft. 1	Score ft. 2	Average	
20	Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA)	2	3	2.50	3	3	3.00	2	2	2.00	2	2	2.00	3	2	2.50	2	2	2.00	14.00
21	Change analysis	2	2	2.00	2	2	2.00	2	3	2.50	1	2	1.50	3	2	2.50	2	2	2.00	12.50

Conclusion

In this study we have tried to evaluate some methods of intelligence analysis through the valences that they can prove to a specific field of activity, starting from the premise that one can find tools for risk analysis available to every analyst. From this point of view, it is important to calibrate the method on the situation/event/issue analyzed and to comply with the methodological steps of the method chosen.

Thus, we have tested the tool proposed for evaluating the risk analysis methods identified in the literature – The matrix for the evaluation of analysis methods - built on the theoretical model of the 3P (introduced by Ionel Nițu) to which we have added three more factors useful in evaluating the analytical methods.

In this way, every analyst has at his reach a tool to evaluate the methods that he's operating with, thus allowing him to prioritize and select the methods used according to the current needs. Finally, the analysis process is more efficient, when those methods and analysis techniques relevant to the issue under consideration are used.

Given these issues, we conclude that, by applying intelligence analysis methods adapted to the specificities of national security matters, the efficiency of the intelligence analysis process is enhanced.

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RELEVANCE TREE –QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE FORECASTING METHOD

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Abstract:

Most intelligence practitioners share the same experience when it comes to forecast and prognosis: the fact that, despite theoretical methods seem to offer great results on paper, when these are put into practice, expectations are rarely met. Given that quantitative methods do not take into account the subjective nature of phenomena and qualitative methods often include cognitive biases, we took a different approach. The case study I will further present is based on the application of the relevance tree, a graph-like method used by both sociology and cybernetics, as a complex combination between qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

Keywords: *forecast, prognosis, OSINT, relevance tree, energy security.*

Introduction

Prognosis is the "scientific art" of identifying the most likely event in the future, as it starts from the premise of a chain of causal events. Considering that prognosis applies to a wide range of areas, such as a company's profit and losses the progression of, weather conditions or candidates chances during elections, this form of art is an indispensable tool for intelligence services' activity: it may be a key element for decision makers' policies and strategies. However, a forecasting failure, identified or removed only too late, might generate serious disruptions to a national security system: destabilization of preventing and countering terrorism strategies, the emergence of major economic system dysfunctions, potentially resulting in a crisis situation, or even state instability.

Since experts in the field have repeatedly stressed that "if the intelligence sector is not a science yet, then it should become one", the forecast methods used by social sciences may apply to all subdomains, OSINT included.

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Though methods and patterns applied by OSINT experts are different, in terms of complexity and amount of unrefined data, the results are generally characterized by three main principles:

> ➢   Forecasts are seldom perfect;
> ➢   Forecasting accuracy is directly proportional to the number of considered variables and indicators;
> ➢   Forecasts tend to be more accurate on a short term, rather than on long term, potentially of generating strategic surprise.

Traditionally, forecasting methods used by OSINT analysis may be classified into two categories:

	Quantitative Methods	**Qualitative Methods**
Features	Based on quantifiable, numerical data.	Focused on opinions, proficiency and expertise.
Strong points	High degree of objectivity; It may include a significant amount of primary data.	It offers the possibility of including the latest developments and trends of the studied phenomenon, in the analysis.
Weak points	Limited access of open sources to recent, relevant information; Small number of employees with a degree in areas related to mathematics.	The risk of preconceptions and cognitive traps.

Figure no.1: Types of forecasting methods

The use of purely quantitative or qualitative methods in forecasting has been a constant subject of dispute and controversy. Upholders of each category have brought into question antithetical arguments: those in favor of quantitative patterns postulated that only the use of numerical models would contribute to making social sciences "real sciences", while those lobbying for qualitative methodology relied on the idea that quantitative methods tend to ignore social realities of the analyzed phenomena, since it neglects non-quantifiable variables, those which may prove to be the most relevant factors in the subject.

The exact contribution to forecast of each category depends both on the access to expertise and on the features of the analyzed theme. Generally,

practitioners' tendency was to grant more confidence to numerical information, often seen as "strong evidence". On the other hand, facts do not always reveal the truth, since qualitative data are very important, by providing insights on the dynamics and depth of the studied phenomenon, while quantitative information is strictly related to a fixed number of indicators, limited as regards to the interpretation of reality as a whole.

Current trends in OSINT practice entail using quantitative patterns as a qualitative methodology tool. For example, the Delphi method includes experts' assignment of numerical or scalable values to future developments, subsequently analyzed opinions, reported by an observer. Later, experts meet and examine the observer's report individually, offering the latter new values. The examination procedure and the observer's reporting are repeated until all experts involved reach an agreement upon the potential development.

Quantitative Methods

This class of analytical tools massively relies on numerical data and on mathematical algorithms, being mostly used in studying evolutions on a medium term. Similar to statistics and econometrics, quantitative methods use and combine various mathematical patterns.

Methodology for quantitative forecasts apply if the following conditions are met:

1.   The expert starts from the premise that the necessary information for generating forecast is available.

2.   The hypothesis – "the future is an image of previous models' combinations " – is confirmed.

Time Sequences	Causal and Associative Patterns
- The necessary information for producing forecast is included in time sequences;	- Based on cause-effect relations between independent and dependent variables;
- the future will follow up the patterns of the past;	- - include core indicators on account of forecasts formulation;
- future data= past pattern + errors;	- the most used method is linear regression[1]: Y=aX+b, where y = dependent variable

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[1] Concept defined and used by experts in statistics and econometrics.

- **historical patterns:** **Level: data revolve around a constant average;** **Trend: approximately linear increases and decreases;** **Cycle: usually specific to national economies;** **Seasonal: recurrent discrete patterns.** - **random errors/variations cannot be predicted.**	and x= independent variable; - multiple regression consists in expanding the number of independent variables: $$Y=a_nX_n+a_{n-1}X_{n-1}+...+a_1X_1+a_0.$$

Figure no.2: Types of forecasting quantitative methods

Qualitative Methods

In contrast with quantitative methodology, which relies mainly on statistics and models of the past, qualitative analysis is built around experts' advisory opinion. Qualitative forecasting is used in situations where numerical information are unavailable or lack consistency.

In time, the development of qualitative methods in social sciences and prognosis, generally, faced reluctance from researchers': practitioners' opinions must coincide on qualitative approaches, as their consent is mainly based on intuition and good judgment. On the other hand, in recent years, qualitative methodology has substantially improved as experts dispose of a wide range of tools, especially software, both for qualitative data collection and analysis.

Though qualitative methods' structure and scientific rigor are constantly increasing, analysts' creative thinking is being permanently encouraged.

Amid the rising OSINT contribution to the intelligence community's activity, a mention should be made on the ability of highlighting future changes in the security system and in interest groups' attitude, as being the main advantage of qualitative forecasting methods.

Given that OSINT is a nexus between civil society, academia and intelligence services, opinions and expertise, external to the intelligence community, which may have a crucial input on future developments, can be included in a complete analysis.

Nevertheless, qualitative forecasting methods are of particular importance when quantitative information is insufficient or non-existent: for example, in case of the outbreak of a newly discovered virus, near the borders, there won't be historical data to help outline a quantitative analysis. Extrapolating numerical data in the origin state/region of the virus is possible by means of indicators such as mortality or spread rate, but other factors, such as the endangered population's resilience to the new disease, despite being quantitative in nature, are impossible to quantify.

Moreover, this type of forecasting method provides intelligence decision makers the necessary flexibility to resort to non-quantitative information sources, such as experts' proficiency and best practices in a particular field. Applying these models can lead to an improved quality of forecast, as it is obvious that numerical data cannot capture nuances and clichés, noticeable after years of experience in the analyzed field.

Relevance Tree – Basics

The concept of relevance tree is essentially a technological method, its early stage of development being found in 1957 in operational research, a mathematics related area. Subsequently, the quantitative model was implemented by the PATTERN (Planning Assistance through Technical Evaluation of Relevance Numbers) planning program in the military and space programs of the American company, Honeywell. A year later, the same company improved and widely applied the method in all military and space activities it was involved in. Moreover, the relevance tree was massively implemented also in the cost assessment program of Apollo missions, conducted by NASA, by American air forces, as well as in advertising campaigns.

Essentially, the method is used to analyze and forecast situations and phenomena that require different levels of complexity, each level involving a high degree of specialization. The relevance tree, however, allows the identification of problems, solutions, and optimal or close to optimal solutions, as well. The long use in disjuncture was successful since the structured-like method facilitated a comprehensive approach: all important relations between the tree elements were taken into account, both in terms of present and future.

On the other hand, similar to most existing forecasting methods, relevance trees include a significant contribution of critical thinking, with the

risk of a possible human error. Also, if the analysis process is not a complete one, results will be irrelevant. Similar to morphological analysis, building up a relevance tree implies:

➢ Strict definition of the General Objective, identification of the Methods, and subsequently, Submethods/Processes which contribute to achieve the Objective;

➢ Considering all Methods and Processes.

Furthermore, each method will be assigned a grade or relevance coefficient ($M_1....M_n$, where n – number of identified methods), with the necessary condition that the sum $M_1+M_2+....+M_n=1$. Equally, Submethods/ Processes will be attributed grades ($P_{1(M1)}....P_{j(Mn)}$), with the necessary condition that, on each level (Method) of the tree, the sum $P_{1(M1)}+...+P_{m(M1)}=1$, where m – number of Submethods corresponding to a Method.


Figure no. 3: Relevance tree and relevance coefficients associated to each level of importance

Finally, products M_i x $P_{j(Mi)}$ type are calculated and the following chart are filled in:

Chart no. 1 – Relevance grades						
Relevance grade	M_1	M_2	...	M_i	...	M_n
$P_{1(M1)}$	$P_{1(M1) x}$ M_1	-	-	-	-	-
$P_{2(M1)}$	$P_{2(M1) x}$ M_1	-	-	-	-	-
...	...	...	...	...	...	...
$P_{j(Mi)}$	...	....	...	M_i x $P_{j(Mi)}$	...	...
....	...	...	...	...	...	...
$P_{m(Mn)}$	-	-	-	-	...	M_n x $P_{,(Mn)}$

Similar to the cases of relevance grades sums, associated to Methods and Processes, the sum of all products M_i x $P_{j(Mi)}$ type must be equal to one. The last step shall consist in the arranging the product values in decreasing order, the largest of them representing the most likely evolution/solution of the phenomenon/studied issue.

Relevance Tree – Application

Since the relevance tree was usually applied to macro issues, the case study of the article focuses on the simplified application of this method while identifying the most likely answer to the question: What will be Romania's solution in its efforts to diversify the energy mix?

In this respect, five experienced practitioners in energy were invited to attend a round of talks, inherent to a Delphi-type methodology.

After the first meeting, the following were set up as immediate Methods of diversifying energy resources:

➢ Entry into production of natural gas deposits in the Black Sea (Method 1);

➢ Exploration and exploitation of shale gas deposits (Method 2);

➢ Constant development of renewable resources sector (Method 3).

Also, each Method was assigned a specific process, thus contributing to its implementation:

1. Method 1
➢ Exploration-exploitation licensing by the Romanian state (1-1 Process);
➢ Development of royalties' national system (1-2 Process).
2. Method 2
➢ Providing environmental license (2-1 Process);
➢ Exploration-exploitation licensing by the Romanian state (2-2 Process);
➢ Constant research and development in exploration-exploitation sector (2-3 Process).
3. Method 3
➢ Development of support system for renewable energy (3-1 Process);
➢ Constant research and development in the field, including the nuclear one (3-2 Process);
➢ Providing location permits (3-3 Process).

Following the Methods and Processes set up, experts gathered during multiple rounds of discussions, giving relevance coefficients to each Method and Process, as follows:


Figure no. 4: Relevance tree related to the issue of Romania's energy resources diversification

The product chart was filled in below, resulting in:

Chart no. 2 – Relevance coefficients			
Relevance coefficient	M_1	M_2	M_3
$P_{1(M1)}$	0,196	-	-
$P_{2(M1)}$	0,294	-	-
$P_{1(M2)}$	-	0,069	-
$P_{2(M2)}$	-	0,069	-
$P_{3(M2)}$	-	0,92	-
$P_{1(M3)}$	-	-	0,14
$P_{2(M3)}$	-	-	0,084
$P_{3(M3)}$	-	-	0,056

Following the ordering of relevance grades, it's worth mentioning that reconfiguring the royalty system associated to the hydrocarbon reserves is the most likely solution to diversify our country's energy resources.

Nevertheless, ranking the first three solutions is supplemented by licensing exploration - exploitation of natural gas resources in the Black Sea and by further development of the support scheme for renewable energy resources, conclusions also supported by official documents issued by Romanian authorities.

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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

USING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN INTELLIGENCE: THE COMPLEX AND COMPLETE PROBLEM

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Abstract:

Using social network analysis in intelligence activities is a complex and complete problem, as an analogy with the computational complexity theory suggests. Complexity emerges as one connects a scientific approach with intelligence, and the civil and military realms, the national security strategy with a corresponding doctrine and develops a training program for the personnel. Solving this problem leads to one finding the key to other complex problems, such as the development and deployment of early warning systems, simulation and modeling systems, human terrain systems. The problem is complete and solving it is a keen organizational learning process. When reached, the promise a land of a solution adds value to the intelligence organization, processes and products.

Keywords: *social networks, intelligence, science, action, value* **Intelligence, knowledge and action**

As a product of the emotional echoes related with the event that was labeled "9/11", the "social network" keyword gained ubiquity. Its presence is visible not only in the media but also there where the Academia crosses borders with the institutionalized community defending national security. On the one hand there are academics, on the other hand security professionals, both public and private workers, enrolled in universities of all sorts, in police, army, intelligence agencies, and in private security companies.

Beyond the core of the perpetual security problem itself – the use of knowledge to support action and the use of action to support knowledge[1], – the meeting point between academics and professionals is where the need for financial support and research funding meets the need for effective and efficient institutional action. Since emotions are always called as explanatory

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[1] A formula rooted in the OODA Cycle – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

variables, leading us to a particular understanding of the evolution of political, social or economic processes, of the public opinion, one would expect that emotions affect at a lesser extent the rationality of scientific probity, or bureaucracies (positive meaning) specific to public institutions. That is not the case, as shown by the hype that followed 9/11, visible through the number of academic approaches on topics such as "terrorism" and "social networks supporting terrorism". Not only representatives of the social sciences, especially sociologists, but also computer scientists and mathematicians alike, they all went on the trails of terrorist organizations, using their abstract arsenal, academic specific tools and methods. As a response to requests from the institutional environment, academics sought the Scientific Truth but also funding, not necessarily in this order. Leaving aside the flourishing academic literature on the matter, one could think about the success of these research activities as secret documents were revealed to the public, through unauthorized means, describing hypothetical information systems operated by some of the US intelligence agencies, systems employing social network analysis. The systems, the documents reveal, use graphs and networks for representation purposes, dealing with "metadata" gathered from a plethora of sources (*The Guardian*, November 2013). While one could still cast doubt on this, it is more likely to have covered definitions for terms such as Human Terrain System or Human Aspects of the Operational Environment, to find that for the current armed conflicts, knowledge of social dynamics is a prerequisite. Thus, when learning about the social dynamics, defined as a "combination of social, cultural and behavioral relationships and activities that characterize a population of a theater of operations", one would have "to identify social networks, interpersonal interaction information, organizational, economic, describing the networks of trust, dependence, and sustainability, including tribal communities, institutions or community-level government" (Lamb et al., 2013, pp. 7-8).

The current article is the result of the author's efforts to identify a controllable environment for the interaction between academics and representatives of the national security system, using social network analysis as a means of dialogue between these two communities. In order to focus the discourse, the article reduces the generic "security related activity" to the "intelligence activity" – intelligence, in different variants thereof: intelligence that supports law enforcement and policing, military intelligence supporting counterinsurgency operations with knowledge of human terrain, economic intelligence supporting political and strategic interests. Distinct in details, such activities keep at the definition and principle levels a common

denominator, which allows for the existence of the national intelligence community in most countries of the Euro-Atlantic political space. Such a community, a goal in itself, depends upon the national security intelligence doctrine, supporting institutional interoperability but not enforcing the effectiveness of the community.

By the controllable environment, we mean a research and development environment (applied research), with feedback loops (Spink, 1997), meaning that academic researchers have access to empirical knowledge acquired by security practitioners and vice versa, practitioners employ working tools drawn from the theoretical-academic activities but showing utility to security or defense activities. The belief that such an environment exists and can be defined is maintained by those examples in which a representative of academia has contributed to a security problem, in the settings of the type mentioned above, describing the interactions with the institutional environment in a book or journal (Morselli, 2009; Klerks, 2001, pp. 53-65).

An exercise for thought

We are going to start the exercise by making an analogy, using as reference point the computational complexity theory (Goldreich, 2008, pp. 1-7). This theory makes a distinction between decision problems (accept „yes/no" solutions) which can be solved in short time (the time needed to reach a solution with a specific algorithm can be computed by using a polynomial function that takes as parameter the input data) and decision problems that take much longer to be solved, when an algorithm is known – labeled as complex problems (the time needed to reach a solution with a specific algorithm can be computed by using an exponential function that takes as parameter the input data). We say that the use of social network analysis to support intelligence activities is a complex problem.

It is definitely not an easy task to understand and plan the way in which one could use scientific results to define a methodology to be employed by national security institutions, either using it as it is or by translating it into institutional rules and procedures. Going further with the analogy we have to note that the computational complexity theory identifies a series of special complex problems. Not only that these problems are hard, but they are also complete. As the mentioned theory goes, if one finds a solution for a complete problem, a special fast (polynomial) algorithm, many other related complex

problems can be solved. Thus, when solving a complete problem, one finds the way to address a series of complex problems.

The current article is aimed at providing a framework to understand this analogy, so that if we find the settings for using social network analysis to enrich the intelligence activity, then we are in the position of addressing and solving problems of similar complexity. To name just a few of these problems: the development and use of an early warning system, of a center for modeling and simulation of security related scenarios or of a system for strategic analysis. Without entering in the details that emerge when comparing these problems, we have to establish at least the axes of similarity.

First, one has to note that these problems are part of a debate which search for solutions to reintegrate science in a relationship with the national intelligence culture (Agrell & Treverton, 2014, pp.1-31)[2]. This is an initiative emphasizing developments such as those of Reginald V. Jones or Harrold Lasswell, promoters of scientific intelligence (Clark, Studies in Intelligence, 19-1)[3] and, respectively, policy science – an interdisciplinary domain aimed at using social sciences to support governmental action .

Second, one has to notice that these problems are specific to the civil-military relations. At the end of the Second World War, the civil-military relations were analyzed by trying to establish the conceptual limits of the interactions between the military culture and the liberal – democratic values. Nowadays, such a theme continues to trigger questions yet from additional viewpoints: as an example, the topic of defining a contract between military and civilian entities (for defense services, technological development, research, etc.) received more and more attention. The subject recurrently

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[2] One should also take into account the way in which such a theme gained visibility in the USA, simply by comparing the Camelot project (aimed at studying counterinsurgency and started by the US Army 1964) and the Minerva Initiative project (aimed at financing academic research without passing through the National Science Foundation, project started by the US Army in 2008).

[3] Clark, Robert M. analyzes the evolution of scientific and technologic intelligence during the Cold War, starting with the definition Reginald V. Jones offered for these intelligence approaches during the Second World War. Clark asserted at that time that scientific intelligence was to be conceived as a support for the economic warfare and not only as a means of supporting the arms race. Concerning Lasswell, Harold in M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell, W.M. Reisman, „The Intelligence Function and World Public Order", Temple Law Quarterly, 46(3), 1973, 365-449 he defines intelligence as a means of identifying and solving social problems, useful in developing policy alternatives and not just in setting objectives, emphasizing trends and establishing policy development conditions.

emerges both in the operational environments of recent wars and during consultancy activities conducted by think tanks and NGO-s[4].

Third, the similarity of these problems is also visible when one draws connections between the national security strategy, the national defense strategy, the military and intelligence doctrines and the training programs developed for security professionals. The use of social network analysis by the intelligence practitioners should come as a result of special training programs developed by taking into account the latest developments of the doctrine and strategy, in an adaptive manner. Without entering into the dynamics of the relationship between the grand national strategy – the national security strategy – the military and intelligence doctrines, we have to note that this relationship leads to the continuous adaptation of the training programs and thus to the development of particular profiles for the human capital[5].

For each of these three remarks, young democracies stand as special cases, as the literature reveals. Regarding the link between science and society, the general framework in which we place the relationship between science and the intelligence culture, young democracies have to manage the use of new means to redefine the concept of value and the notion of property, for tangible and intangible goods. Such a situation leads to civil - military relations that tend to degenerate, with military institutions interfering in politics, beyond those limits imposed by the constitution and the legal settings of the liberal democracies, and with a political class that lacks knowledge and coherence[6]. In the absence of an effective political administration of the state, militarized institutions enter the arena of governance through ways and means that are not necessarily as obvious as the coups in Latin America or

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[4] From the debate that emerged around two classic viewpoints, Huntington (The Soldier and the State, 1957) – Janowitz (The Professional Soldier, 1960) to Finer's (The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 1988) attempt in finding the meaning of civil-military relations as the strong military institutions could distort the liberal democratic settings, from strategies that could potential mingle citizenship and patriotism in democratic settings to the privatization of the army, Camacho, Paul. "A Forum on Privatization With Comments on the Relevant Literature Found in Armed Forces & Society", Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 36, No. 4, 2010.

[5] The activity of national military centers in correlating the doctrine with the training programs seems to be more or less intensive, function of that state's role in setting military global trends, as member of NATO if we limit the argument to the Euro-Atlantic space.

[6] As in S. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press., 1988, which takes into account a series of „classic" military regimes, or as in the vast literature the political science and the media have dedicated to the subject of lustration in former communist countries, in Central and Eastern Europe, Romania being a particular case.

Africa. Depending on the level of political culture and the geopolitical space, such situations can lead to de facto or de jure militarized regimes, for shorter or longer periods of time. Inherently, these situations ask for different ways of describing the relationship between the national strategy, the political space and the policies it generates: defining profiles for security professionals becomes even more difficult, given that such professionals assume forms of political responsibility, in an environment with a developing political culture.

Change management in the intelligence organization

Social network analysis, imagined as a support for the intelligence activity is a complex and complete problem, in the sense that it depends on the way in which the relationship between science and security is understood in a society, on the civil-military relations, and on the way in which a society defines and periodically reviews the profiles of the security professionals. In terms of human resources, before being regulated as a labor market, with occupational standards as the venue of interaction between education providers and producers of goods and services, security is a market defined by state owned institutions, through documents promoted by these institutions, strategies and doctrines, through dedicated training programs for its security professionals. Without ignoring the transformations of the security environment (intelligence, defense and law enforcement alike), in terms of the entities involved, the state continues to hold the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, in the Weberian sense.

The goal of defining social networking analysis as a support for the intelligence work, with its definition as a complex and complete problem projected on all three listed dimensions, lies in the need for highlighting the ways in which an organization engaged in intelligence activity learns and adapts to the environment.

The intelligence literature of the last decade proposed topics addressing this issue but placed the analysis on a meta-level: existing studies present the way in which intelligence developed as a topic of interest for the academics in social sciences, as a two faceted domain, with academic and professional dimensions, and as a theory or theorization (Mazare, 2011, pp. 21-33). Such approaches are essential in a time when the security dynamics provide new contexts for interpretation, previously less visible, leading to subjects such as "social sciences and human behavior, support for improving analysis of information", "learning from other disciplines - intelligence and medicine, intelligence and policy analysis", "intelligence analyst as knowledge

workers (knowledge worker)". Praiseworthy and edifying in highlighting the relevance of this issue, these approaches do not provide guidelines, or a code of good practice for intelligence organizations, forced to adapt to the changes of the security environment. Such approaches do not provide even a brief formula that links the theoretical knowledge and the organizational action. In the author's view, such a guide should emphasize a number of general principles, policies and mechanisms, methodologies and procedures through which institutional action might gain consistency and coherence.

In terms of organizational change, as a mandatory process, when adapting to the security environment, the state owned institutions have sought alternatives, trying to outsource activities to entities such as private security companies and various non-governmental organizations, thus searching for capabilities that are not present at the institutional level. The typology of these outsourced activities are diverse, ranging from risk assessment to intelligence analysis, from recruitment and training of personnel to physical protection of objectives, from the public policies development to targeted scientific research.

Ethical and legal problems are inherent in this form of indirect transfer of responsibility, as those situations where the context of the outsourced activities is of extreme intensity tellingly reveal[7]. An example for this state of affairs is the development of the Human Terrain System project. Run by the US Army the project was aimed at joining the teams of the US military forces with representatives of social sciences, with a mission to provide support in understanding human communities in theaters of operations[8].

The development of the project that employed both representatives of social sciences and former military professionals, its adaptation and the

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[7] The theatre of operations is one of those contexts with extreme conditions, as long as the loss of human lives continues to be considered an extreme situation, no matter the side on which death might occur.

[8] The literature around this subject is pretty vast and polarized, with at least two opposing sides, of those who support the idea (most of them part of the project) and of those who oppose the program, the contesters. Many examples could be named: the critical literature offers more journalistic stances, like Jon Stanton's, US Army Human Terrain System. 2008 – 2013. The Program from Hell, 2013; in the supporting literature of the HTS one could note the work of the anthropologist Montgomery McFate, e.g "Anthropology and counterinsurgency: The strange story of their curious relationship", Military Review, 2005, 85.2: 24-38. For a more balanced approached, unanimously appreciated see Lamb, Christopher J., James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, T. Pikulsky Theodore, and LTG Michael T. Flynn. "Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare." 2013.

organizational changes which have been taking place for more than 7 years, the debate emerging in the American society as a whole, the polarization of contesters around the arguments brought by the critical voice of the American Anthropological Association, the way in which the idea was received and transferred to other countries of the Euro-Atlantic space, all these subjects stand as a useful example in understanding the issue of outsourcing some of the institutional activities.

One of the fundamental aspects defining the relationship that emerged between the state-owned institutions and the contractors is related to the assessment of the outsourcing's effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, the state has to imagine the means to measure the performance of contractors in carrying out the contracts they gain, especially when the outcome of their work remains in the category of intangible goods and services. In the case of Human Terrain System, the teams deployed in theater of operations supported the armed forces with analysis reports, covering the social aspects of the environment. According to the principles on which the program was based, the social scientists' support was meant to interfere only with the planning of military activities and not with the military action per se, as arising from the counterinsurgency doctrine in place ("seek and destroy" missions). Such a distinction increases the difficulty of the performance assessment. A balance between qualitative and quantitative assessment is absolutely necessary while the adoption of methodologies that integrate and ponder the relevance of various criteria is also mandatory.

As it was previously emphasized, the evaluation of such programs depends upon the institutional availability for change and environmental adaptation. The main critique this paper addresses to the before mentioned meta-level analyses of the intelligence transformations builds on the missing topic: the identification of the feedback cycles needed to change the organization, in terms of systems theory.

From this point of view, the current article advances the idea that an approach based on action science and double-loop learning, as these concepts were introduced by Chris Argyris, could lead to solutions supporting complex processes of institutional change and adaptation[9].

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[9] There is a vast amount of literature generated by the themes launched by Chris Argyris, going beyond the borders of academia, being contextualized and adapted to various professional settings. The current paper uses the concepts developed by Argyris, Chris, Schon Donald A, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective*, Addison-Wesley, 1978.

Such an approach makes a distinction between the theory in use and espoused theory, both being presented as theories of action. The difference lies in the fact that the theory in use is the engine that really moves the organization daily (values, beliefs, norms, strategies – hypotheses on which the behavior of people and the management practice in organizational processes is based on), while the espoused theory is the same amalgam of elements, but in the form officially presented to the others, a declarative version of truth.

It is this difference of the mechanism that starts to enlarge a gap between the models of communication and control that are used and those that are explicitly declared, between resources allocation strategies, personnel selection practices and norms, staff rewarding alternatives and so on. Due to these two perspectives, naturally present in any organization, the double loop learning brings an extension to the classical feedback learning mechanisms – present in technical and biological systems. The double loop learning asks for a reevaluation of the theory in use, in other words it calls for an introspective activity, a self – awareness that goes beyond declarative stances.

This sort of reevaluation is based on a methodology that questions the theory in use by creating the appropriate contexts, so that the norms, the hypotheses and the strategies on which the action is based in the organization are examined. According to this approach, an organization learns while the people inside the organization, particularly the managers, learn to falsify and challenge their assumptions, in individual and collective activities. Using a literary pencil, one would write that the organizational learning emerges when the "double-think" is understood and addressed.

Approaching social network analysis in this article we go beyond those elementary but useful exercises that identify practical scenarios in which the domain of social network analysis is used to represent and study social and technical structures (Wheaton & Melonie). The use of social network analysis in an intelligence organization is conceived as a complex and complete problem, so that approaching it one could hope for the inception of a double-loop learning process in the organization, enforcing change mechanisms and supporting other organizational topics. In the next section of the article we propose an assessment framework, based on which one could evaluate the use of social network analysis in the intelligence organization.

Adding value to intelligence

The exercise of searching for structural patterns and for the specificity of an ensemble of entities (human, organizational, institutional), interacting in

their attempt to reach goals, individually and collectively, is not a recent research endeavor. Such activities are not new, neither in theory, as academic literature proves it, nor in practice, as the institutions endowed with the responsibility of defending state security and citizen safety have used such approaches in a controllable manner since the Second World War at least. Yet, in the last two decades, we can speak of an effervescence in the use of relational representations for those political, social or economic processes interfering with the security context: processes generated by the changes of the global context at the end of the Cold War, by the spread of liberal democracy in geopolitical spaces previously closed, inaccessible areas in terms of movement of people, goods, services and information as such (Mazare, 2011, pp. 21-33).

Technology has only supported, nurtured, these processes, favoring the emergence of "social networks mediated by technological networks" (the cellular telephone networks, the Internet etc.).

Social network analysis, a phrase used to label any attempt to employ graphs for the conceptual and empiric representation of phenomena of all kinds, became an important research area (both fundamental and applied research) when it comes to security issues. Among the factors which supported such developments, one could list the new permeability of political borders and the migration per se, the impact of terrorist threats, the economic and financial crisis requiring new forms of organization and optimization of production and consumption processes, the evolutions in information and communication technology that shaped a new framework of trust and security. Yet, the difficulty one encounters when joining social network analysis as an applied research area lies precisely in the way of amalgamation of the aforementioned factors. In most of the cases, the networked individuals imagine and use both economic and technological processes to support terrorist and criminal activities, thus claiming political goals or just interfering with the law.

These changes of the security environment have required the adaptation of the intelligence analysis so that it can be adjusted to much faster information flows, to information sources that got richer in content, to scenarios dealing with both open and secret information. The purpose of the intelligence analysis remained the same, to support decision making in competitive environments, but intelligence as an organization, process (of which intelligence analysis is part of) and product changed. Change management always requires measurement: it is an appeal to building indicators and controlling the adjustment of previous well defined processes

and working groups, currently unable to support the organizational needs. From this point of view but also taking into account the budgetary constraints that prevailed in the last decade, the intelligence adaptation on all its three dimensions (organization, process and product) required better approaches on measuring the value added by the acquisition of new IT systems (Bouthillier și Shearer, 2003), and by the development of new training programs for the human resources, aimed at enriching the organizational portfolio of capabilities with new analytic methods.

When talking about the value of goods and services we make by default a comparison between two states, one placed before and one placed after the event through which we got to hold the goods or to operate the services. The two states are identifiable not only in those scenarios in which the economists talk of an exchange value - transactional value, equated with the purchasing power of goods or services, but also in those scenarios when one can establish the impact of the goods or services on developing activities, thus computing the value in use for the goods or services. In both cases, one has to quantify the transition between an initial state and a final state, thus assessing the value added, in terms of a specific financial framework or just in terms of a symbolic framework, for example related with the vision and the mission undertaken by the organization.

Using these benchmarks, we define and then map the dimensions needed to establish the value added to the intelligence activity when the social network analysis is inserted into the organizational portfolio of capabilities. The figure below synthetically shows the mentioned benchmarks, highlighting the triple valence of the term intelligence (organization, process, and product) and the dual nature of value (value in use and exchange value). It follows that there are six cases (A to ..., F), dimensions on which one can quantify the value added by social network analysis.

Social network analysis – not just a catchy keyword

Social network analysis is defined as a body of theoretic elements, procedures, dedicated software tools, an assembly of elements used in various disciplines when a representation of a set of entities and their relationships is needed, as a means to identify the development patterns of the parts and of the whole.

As a reaction to the effervescence in the use of terms such as "social networking" and "social network analysis", equally in a variety of disciplines (sociology, political science, anthropology, economics, computer science,

mathematics, criminology etc.) and the media, a group of researchers laid the foundations of what was called "network science". The promoters of this project define network science as "the study of the collection, management, analysis, interpretation and presentation of relational data." (Brandes, 2013, pp. 1-15)

Taking into the account this definition, one can establish certain analogies with the intelligence process, as collection, analysis, and presentation activities are also part of the so called intelligence cycle. It is this simple observation a first step in justifying the usefulness of any attempt to determine the value added by social network analysis to the intelligence process.

This assumption is further enforced as long as one compares intelligence activities with puzzle solving. The puzzle is made of pieces/entities and the relationships between this pieces / entities. Social network analysis, as a scientific method, offers to the analyst a procedural support in approaching puzzles – structures. It stands as body of methods which, when applied rigorously, could add knowledge and thus value, yet in a scientific manner that allows auditing measures to be defined and promoted.

A. Social network analysis - value in use for the intelligence organization

Social network analysis evolved as an activity which employs software tools and requires trained human resources, able to deal with theory and applications: first, one has to conceptualize and abstract the phenomena of interest in terms of entities and relationships between entities; second, there must be developed a corresponding network representation and data collected accordingly; third, a series of network indicators have to be computed and interpreted by taking into account the peculiar context of the phenomenon under scrutiny, thus revealing useful knowledge about the parts and the whole.

We have previously come across two factors that shaped the evolution of the intelligence organization in the last two decades: the technological progress and the increased pressure placed on the available human resources towards updating the portfolio of available analytics. In such a context, trying to determine the value in use added to the intelligence organization by the social network analysis availability at portfolio level, one enters a recurrent problem in a particular way: how the value added to an organization by training and any other form of knowledge transfer is to be computed.

This problem has a long career in the academic literature addressing the management of human resources. Precisely, it leads to finding the right indicators that could measure the performance of the organizational investments in specialization and training programs. This generic problem reveals that, in order to add value by using new goods and services in the organization, one has to follow a well-defined strategy and abide by the declared vision and mission of the organization (Fitz-Enz, 2010).

From this point of view, adding social network analysis to the organizational body of knowledge is in line with changes that have occurred in defining the functioning principles and policies of the intelligence organizations: the insertion of scientific method for the improved environmental scanning. Equally, such a decision could make of social network analysis a transmission belt between the operational levels on the one hand and the tactical and strategic levels on the other hand, serving as a means to deal with issues that start from data collection and resource allocation in intelligence operations up to issues specific to strategic decision making. It is appropriate to note that the value in use, that is the value added to the intelligence organization when the social network analysis becomes part of the organizational body of knowledge and practice, is first to be conceived in symbolic terms and not through its financial benefits.

As knowledge management is another hot topic for the intelligence organizations, somewhere between these two extremes, between the symbolic and financial benefits, we can also place the benefits that emerge when social network analysis is used as a means to define an archive of those phenomena of relational nature.

B. Social network analysis - exchange value for the intelligence organization

Beyond the necessity to adapt to technological change and to enrich the internalized analytical body of knowledge and practices, intelligence organizations have become entities in an ecosystem whose diversity has increased significantly: there are public or private organizations, endowed with social responsibility or not, state-owned institutions, corporations and nonprofit organizations, military academies and civilian universities, all addressing issues specific to the intelligence community and thus supporting decision-making chains or developing education and research projects. Communication on intelligence matters between these entities is the result of communication protocols defined in policies of organizational transparency. In terms of its exchange value, social network analysis can be approached

from the perspective of its role as a subject of communication between the various organizations of the before described ecosystem.

By its nature, social network analysis has evolved as a tool used by several academic disciplines, from those which are to be classified as social sciences (political science, sociology, anthropology) to economics, computer science or mathematics. Whatever the topic of interest, the social network analysis employs an analytical recipe, as mentioned above: data collection, processing, analysis, dissemination. Each disciplinary approach claims the ownership of some particular topics: a psychologist is interested in representing the human entities that are connected through trust based relations, the sociologist looks at the structure defined by these relationships, the anthropologist aims at approaching a particular entity of the network in a particular cultural context, and thus favors the so called ego-networks, the mathematician develops abstract reasoning about representation and numerical alternatives, the economist insists on the transactions and flows that emerge in the network. While for each of these specialists the network is an object of scientific research, for an intelligence organization having a particular role in defending a security framework, the network is an object of practice, a form of organization supporting competitive purposes in a competitive environment.

Given these observations, the current paper asserts that the exchange value brought by social network analysis to an intelligence organization derives precisely from the possibility of transforming it into an element of partnership with academia. The moment seems to be appropriate for such partnerships, to the extent that the identification of conceptual meeting points between the social sciences and intelligence studies is an evolving process. The young network science can also be enriched by connecting it with the intelligence studies, regardless of the perspective endorsed in such studies: theories/theorizations that substantiate the conceptual basis (Gill et al., 2008), developments of the analytical culture through scientific methods used in intelligence practice (Marrin, 2008, pp. 131-146), comparative studies of the intelligence communities in various cultural spaces (O'Connell, 2004, pp. 189-199).

What must be emphasized is that all these conceptual approaches migrated during the last two decades from a military to a civilian and academic interpretive framework, helping to define an intelligence culture in a given society. It is this migration the foundation on which an intelligence organization could seek to define the exchange value for social network analysis.

C. Social network analysis – value in use for the intelligence process

The information overload coupled with failures that affected some of the most prepared intelligence agencies challenged the previously undeniable validity of the so called intelligence cycle. The cyclic approach on the intelligence process (starts when a decision-maker issues a Request for Intelligence, continues with data collection and processing, leads to analysis and intelligence product development, ends when the intelligence report is delivered to the decision maker) was subject of various debates, without a final resolution of the issue. In order to emphasize the value in use brought to the intelligence process by the social network analysis, the current paper assumes, with no argumentative loses, that the intelligence process follows its classic description.

While previously we have defined social network analysis as a potential source for the enrichment of the organizational body of knowledge and practices (A), and as a means of conceptual exchanges in the intelligence ecosystem (B), on the current dimension (C) we place the value in use at the level of practice in the intelligence process.

The role social network analysis could play for intelligence analysis gets more visible as we focus on the analytic stage (thus leaving aside relational data collection and processing): there are at least two ways that show how value could be added to the intelligence analysis. First, social network analysis helps in defining and computing a series of indicators that measure the properties of the structural traits of the network or the flows manifested in the network (with tangible – (e.g. material goods) and intangible (e.g. influence, trust) assets flowing from one entity to another. Among the many existing indicators and their corresponding computation algorithms, those indicators defining central nodes in the network got more visible as they are able to reveal the so called key players of the network (nodes that connect or coordinate parts of the network, monopolizing particular relationship types) (Cross et al., 2003).

A special scenario of social network analysis is aimed at researching the alternative development patterns for a network that has to reconfigure after some particular nodes are removed. This scenario corresponds to those contexts in which law enforcement security institutions target and act upon a criminal network by imprisoning particular members (Carley, 2007, pp. 169-187). The Global War on Terrorism and all the other subsequent transformations that followed 9/11 and redefined the global security

environment placed social network analysis in a privileged role, with a plethora of disciplinary approaches on the subject. Unfortunately, in most of the case, the academics, sociologists or mathematicians, economists or computer scientists, approached the „terrorist network" as if they could have restrained it to only those characteristics accessible to their particular scientific tools. Such an approach is definitely not suitable to adding value to intelligence analysis, a process aimed at integrating evidences and ways of reasoning so that any cognitive bias is carefully avoided. The only academic domain that seems not to follow this recipe, criminology, offers an integrative viewpoint on such matters: the relevance of any network based reasoning can be established only by referring it to the practical support it would bring to the criminologist. Criminology is the domain that could offer examples for imagining use case scenarios in which social network analysis adds value to the intelligence process: the effective and efficient allocation of intelligence officers in missions targeting networks and the efficient deployment of surveillance equipment's are examples of open problems of this kind (Morselli, 2009 şi Klerks, 2001).

D. Social network analysis – exchange value for the intelligence process

The intelligence process is an integrative activity, asking for human resources in all the intelligence organization's departments, for collection and data processing, analysis and dissemination. Defined by so many transactions at departmental and interdepartmental levels, organizational and inter-organizational levels, the intelligence process is influenced by the intelligence community's way of addressing information and knowledge sharing.

Thinking about a security context in relational terms and subsequently representing the context as a network of interacting entities are activities specific to the intelligence process, as previously showed. The exchange value of social network analysis rests in defining the network as the key element for a successful dialog between the various actors / roles involved in the intelligence process.

The actors, collectors, analysts and decision makers exchange, at least different viewpoints having in mind a common representation of the phenomenon under investigation: the collectors have access to a detailed image of the network, analysts are able to advance particular hypotheses on the potential transformations of the network, and decision makers keep an eye on the central nodes – the key players. The exchange of information between such actors was proved to be favored by the existence of a visual

layer of the available information, so that knowledge fusion is better supported (Thomas et al., 2005).

E. Social network analysis – value in use for the intelligence product

While not supportive in integrative terms, the different disciplinary approaches on relational structures emphasized specific procedures for the management of network complexity: zooming in and out, hiding particular nodes while increasing the visibility of others, changing the point of view without losing relevance. Based on such assumptions one could draw a link to the way in which the intelligence report has to be conceived, as structure and content.

Yet, we have to note the limits of using a graphic network representation in an intelligence report. Such a report is most of the times particularly set up, avoiding any terms that might lead to misunderstandings. Social network analysis is a scientific approach so that its usefulness in offering the final touch on some intelligence report aimed at supporting decision makers could be questioned. From this point of view, when dealing with reports that are addressing issues under time and various other constraints pressure, the value in use brought by the social network analysis to the intelligence product has to be carefully considered.

F. Social network analysis – exchange value for the intelligence product

Information technology has shaped not only the way in which intelligence collection, processing and analysis take place but also the alternatives for the dissemination of the intelligence report (Few, 2005).

Most of the software tools aimed at supporting the intelligence process offer functionalities for the customization and scheduling of the intelligence reports delivery, by taking into account organizational roles and profiles, generic security policies or well defined access control settings. The decision maker receives a hypertext based report; he or she can interact with the report by using custom annotations, labels or further delivery options, thus acting like a reactive participant in the intelligence process.

Such software functionalities are aimed at supporting the collaborative work in intelligence teams, so that reports integrate from basic graphic elements to maps and interactive network widgets. Social network analysis is able to define and enhance particular visual representations thus adding value

for all those exchanges taking place during collaborative work, based on sharing intelligence products.

Concluding remarks

The current article has first defined social network analysis as a complex and complete problem. Using an analogy directing towards computational complexity theory, complexity comes out on three dimensions. Thus, the insertion of social network analysis into the intelligence analyst's bag of knowledge and practices depends upon the following three relationships: science – intelligence, civil – military relations, strategy – doctrine – training. The completeness of this problem (the insertion of) resides in the similarities that could be established with problems like the development and deployment of an early warning system, or the modeling and simulation of phenomena specific to the security environment. After carefully asserting that solutions to this complex and complete problem exist and are not unique, and directing the reader to this sort of projects – solutions, the article makes an appeal to the organizational change and learning framework laid down by Chris Argyris. It then goes further to identify those dimensions on which one should project the value added by the social network analysis to the organizational analytic portfolio.

„Social network analysis" is, first of all, a catchy phrase, well represented in the current discourse of the media and of the security professionals, in various contexts and scenarios, both in business and state-owned institutions. Such an increased visibility and ubiquity can be interpreted as a reaction to the political, economic and social transformations that led to the development of communication networks, supporting social decentralized and ad-hoc organization (the Internet and cellular phone networks being two examples of this kind). Yet, beyond discursive stances, „social network analysis" is an assembly of concepts and methods having scientific roots, attracting researchers in many domains while promising to offer ways of accessing the relational nature of the social, political and economic life. The promised land of the relational nature of things was laid at the base of the new network science, aimed at offering an integrative viewpoint, crossing the disciplinary divide.

In order to determine the potential value, added to the intelligence domain through the employment of the social network analysis, the article followed an argumentative schema based on segmentations of both intelligence (as an organization, process and product) and value (value in use

and exchange value). The resulting six points of intersection between these dimensions were then explicitly described, not approaching any financial quantification of the value under scrutiny. Social network analysis was proved to generate value for the intelligence domain in those use cases in which its strengths and limits were simultaneously taken into account.

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WHERE TO TOMORROW IN A BETTER INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS – FUTURES STUDIES AS A FACILITATOR

Iuliana UDROIU[*]

Abstract:

We need better predictive intelligence analysis. This statement has driven pundits and practitioners to find better ways to provide anticipative knowledge about future vulnerabilities, threats, and risks, but also about windows of opportunity to promote one countrie's national interests.

In this collective effort, futurists have managed to make a difference proposing vision, solutions, methods, and products in order to facilitate the making of better intelligence analysis.

But futures studies are not easy to study and futurists are not always right. They come with different names, different methodologies, complex argumentation and multiple plausible alternatives for better decision making processes. Either way, they provide a framework for creatively and proactively exploring the possibilities and working toward a safer future.

Keywords: *intelligence, analysis, future, predictive, decision.*

Predictive analysis – the emergent trend in intelligence

For individuals, as well as interest groups, businesses, and governmental institutions, including intelligence services, it is essential to anticipate changes, either to undertake protective measures, or to get an early advantage of new opportunities. Moreover, given the ubiquity, speed, and penetration of communications and the velocity at which events can escalate to crises, one of the great challenges to the broader security and defense strategy is surprise.

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The fear of being taken by surprise is what makes the policy-making community to demand timely, relevant assessments that address known or anticipated threats and challenges, generated by state or non-state actors, related to their development, deployment, or employment of force to achieve objectives contrary to national interests.

But anticipation is not the same as guessing. Intelligence analysts must base their predictions on solid analysis using specific tools and methodologies that go beyond examining, assessing, and comparing pieces of raw information and synthesize findings into an intelligence product that usually reflects vulnerabilities, risks and threats. Predictive analysis goes further because its objective is not just to establish capabilities or past events, but to determine intentions and probable courses of action.

Decision makers expect intelligence services to find better ways to provide anticipative knowledge about future vulnerabilities, threats, and risks, but also about windows of opportunity to promote national interests. They often demand answers to questions that haven't been formulated yet and solutions about problems that haven't occurred so far. That complicates intelligence services tasks that usually limit to presenting the facts and trends as they arise from operational, tactical and strategic intelligence.

On the other hand, in order to set their strategic, tactical and operational objectives, intelligence services are interested in anticipatory foreknowledge, for example, the terrorist type of actions, objectives, and targets, or the trends of organized crime. They make considerable efforts in order to improve anticipatory capabilities, using methods and techniques, such as horizon scanning, scenarios, Delphi or expert opinion, in conjunction with their needs, objectives and missions. Governmental organizations such as intelligence services must continuously identify and monitor indicators of change, but more importantly, evaluate all possible futures to identify those that offer conditions most conducive to meeting goals that help achieve the organizational vision, or "preferred future".

According to Riel Miller, coping with an universe that seems to be getting more complex is not an easy task without bringing the capacity to use the future into alignment with both the perception of the complex, emergent reality and aspirations. Nevertheless, as a suitable solution he proposes thinking about the future in terms of anticipatory systems because this perspective takes into account animate and inanimate, conscious and unconscious mechanisms for integrating the non-existent (yet) future into the present (Miller, 2011, pp.23-24).

Future studies

There is almost nothing in security or society matters that can be accurately predicted. Moreover, intelligence analysts must keep in mind 3 predicaments: the future is not predetermined, the future is not predictable, and future outcomes are our choices in the present. Joseph Voros explains these `laws`.

The future is not predetermined because at the most fundamental level of nature, the physical processes of the universe are inherently indeterminate. Given this: any future stemming out of present physical processes is indeterminate also; there is no, and cannot be, any future stemming out of present physical processes anything other than indeterminate also; there is no, and cannot be, any single predetermined future, rather there are considered to be infinitely many potential alternative futures.

The future is not predictable because even if the future were predetermined, we could never collect enough information about it to an arbitrary degree of accuracy to construct a complete model of how it would develop. At some point, the errors introduced by not having infinitely-precise information would cause the model to deviate from "reality" (whatever that is). And because the future is not predetermined, predictability is doubly impossible; we are therefore able, and forced, to make choices among the many potential alternative futures.

Future outcomes are our choices in the present because, even though we can't determine which future of an infinite possible variety will eventuate, nevertheless we can influence it by shaping the future which does eventuate by the choices we make regarding our actions (or inaction) in the present (inaction is also a choice). These choices have consequences and so they need to be made as wisely as we can (Voros, 2001).

One might get lucky and guess a course of action or event. But there is also always the possibility to anticipate one or multiple outcomes of someone's actions. And this is precisely what futures studies can do: they enable individuals and groups to anticipate their futures more usefully, and to shape them appreciably more to their own preferences. Futures studies is about exploring, inventing, and implementing ideas about the future. It is also about building and adapting alternative futures, integrating multidisciplinary perspectives about actions or phenomena people are interested in.

The multidisciplinary nature of foresight, while a strength for practice, creates a challenge in terms of boundary-setting. Different disciplines have

their own interest in the future and their own ways of producing knowledge about it (Hines & Gold, 2013, pp.37-38).

Futures studies and intelligence: methodological and practical complementarities

Decision-makers need and want more and more the kind of information that Futures Studies and intelligence analysis can offer, and anticipation and prediction are core functions of intelligence soon to develop into new scientific disciplines.

The connection between futures studies and intelligence is natural. Moreover, intelligence analysis can benefit if futures concepts are introduced into all facets of the analytical process. Understanding the benefits of placing into the future in order to cope with uncertainty, the intelligence analysts have been moving in a much more proactive direction for quite some time and using the techniques of futurists will speed up the process.

Like intelligence analysts, future watchers have several broad categories of 'clues' to look for: events (their interpretation, contexts and background); trends (which can give rise to events, fade from view, or lead to significant changes over time); emerging issues, which can arise from events or trends; weak signals, hard-to-detect-developments which are "below the radar" of public awareness, but can potentially become emerging issues, or even significant trends or events; ideas and visions (collective or individual) which can spark and sustain movements for change; alternative possibilities, which may be publicized as scenarios, or expressed in forms which we can categorize broadly as "What if…?; historical investigations and parallels which deepen our understanding of how other societies managed, or failed to manage, changes (Coote, 2012, p. 108).

Similarly to futures researchers, intelligence analysts have developed and used structured analytical techniques to improve the quality of analysis. Indeed, futurists and analysts often end up using the same tools, such as scenarios and the Delphi technique, to achieve somewhat different ends (Jensen, 2012).

Futurists have managed to make a difference in anticipating the future and reducing the possibility of strategic surprise by proposing vision, solutions, methods, and products in order to facilitate the production of better intelligence analysis. Not only do they offer alternative solutions for alternative futures, but they also discover possible new risks, threats, and opportunities, in the most diverse scientific fields, with major impact on

national security, such as nanotechnology, climate change, biotechnology, engineering, etc.

Very often scholars link futures studies with collective intelligence. For example, Riel Miller includes collective intelligence, along with narrative and reframing into the threefold framework of the foresight process. In his opinion, collective intelligence generates evidence through action research that uses imaginary futures to invent and create collaborative maps, enabling all participants to bring their deep and specific knowledge into the story (Miller, 2011, p. 27-28).

Harnessing collective intelligence can play an important role in generating new ideas, solving age-old problems, disaggregating and distributing work in new and innovative ways, and making better, more informed decisions about the future *(Collective Intelligence. Capitalizing on the crowd).*

In terms of methodology, Joseph Voros remarked that "foresight work" is similar to intelligence work. This can be conceived as comprising three broad steps which follow a logical sequence.

The first step is analysis, which is best considered as a preliminary stage to more in depth work, rather than as a stand-alone technique itself. Forecasting and trend analysis are the best known methods.

The results of the analysis are then fed into a second step, interpretation, which seeks to "probe beneath the surface" of the analysis to look for deeper structure and insights. This is the realm of critical futures studies and causal layered analysis, systems thinking, and other "depth" approaches to futures thinking.

The third step is the actual creation of forward views, prospection. "Prospection" is "the activity of looking forward and creating forward views. This is where various views of alternative futures are examined or created. It is where scenario planning, "visioning" and so-called "normative" ("preferred" futures) methods are located in the broader foresight process.

Great consideration has been given to the existing large palette of futures methods and techniques. Causal Layer Analysis (http://metafuture.org/Articles/CausalLayeredAnalysis.htm)and Integral Futures (Slaughter, 2005, pp. 1185-1192) are at the core of methodological renewal, complementary methods and techniques are needed to increase the accessibility and impact of these existing approaches (Voros, 2001).

For the sake of debate, I propose an *I3C concept*: *Imagination, Innovation, Investment, Connections*. The input of Futures Studies in governmental intelligence doesn't necessarily resume to this, but I believe this is the essence of the fusion between these two fields.

http://sourcesandmethods.blogspot.ro

As for imagination, let's play seriously! Forecasting games, simulation, scenario exercises, and modeling, as futures analytical methods, are not new in intelligence. They were used by military commanders from ancient time to determine possible patterns, enemy strength or alternative solutions for practical tasks in order to gain competitive advantage in the field of shadow actions. Nowadays, they are driven to perfection in intelligence research labs and scientifically applied and tested in collaborative networks. For example, in 2008, *Wired!* Magazine (Spy games, 2008) revealed 3 PC-games (*Rapid Onset, Vital Passage, Sudden Thurst*) (http://www.mercyhurst.edu/mu-news/news/faculty-spotlight/2013) used by newly and soon-to-be intelligence analysts to analyze complex issues such as organized crime or terrorism. Kristan J. Wheaton, associate professor of intelligence studies at Mercyhurst University in Erie, Pennsylvania, has made a habit from challenging his students to play strategy games in order to practice their natural skills as analysts and operational agents. Kristan Wheaton's gaming skills featured him as a subject-matter expert in notable academic publications and served as the impetus behind Mercyhurst being ranked among the nation's "10 best colleges for game-based learning" by bestcollegesonline.com (http://www.mercyhurst.edu/mu-news/news/faculty-spotlight/2013). One of his recent games, "The Mind's Lie," helps students identify cognitive biases and find ways to mitigate them.

Innovation is impossible without foresight. Good actionable intelligence is also impossible without innovation, for simple reasons: vectors do not live in a separate world from intelligence officers; they can and usually are more interested in accessing innovative technologies in order to cover actions or gain actionable advantages.

Anticipating future needs investment. It takes time, money, and human effort. These 3 resources are essential for intelligence analysts and futurists in order to accomplish their missions or goals. It involves investment in new technologies and development of revolutionary scientific domains, and it involves investment in people with original ideas, vision, patience and commitment.

Success in foresight and intelligence work also involves connections. Analysts and futurists both must benefit from the wisdom of crowds. That means to pool the analysts'/ experts' combined information processing power as well as the unique perspectives they bring.

One solution in this area is cloud computing. From data analytics and information sharing to innovation and cost efficiencies, the significance of cloud computing is extremely important in creating necessary knowledge and fresh perspectives about how the future should look like.

Another solution is valuating collaborative networks. Again, Millennium Project offers a very good example about how collaborative networks can be used for getting valuable validated information, through its Global Futures Intelligence System.

According to project disclaimer, "GFIS is The Millennium Project's new way for you to participate with and have access to all of our resources in one place. Participants can interact with all the elements of the system, make suggestions, initiate discussions with experts around the world, and search through over 10,000 pages of futures research and 1,300 pages of methods. The text has built-in Google translation with 52 languages" (http://millennium-project.org/millennium/GFIS.html).

Challenges and opportunities

Futures studies are very ambiguous and complex endeavors. They come with different names (futures research, futures studies, futures analysis, futurism, futuristics, futurology, prospective studies, etc.), different methodologies, complex argumentation and multiple plausible alternatives for better decision-making processes. This concept is extremely generous and it integrates various dimensions, such as anticipation, foresight, prognosis, and forecast. Even the community of practice is still divided about the name the practitioners should have, coming to a common ground with the notion of 'futurist'. They are still in search for a scientific field for prospective studies and argue about the theories they should promote. But the work they have done so far is very useful, no matter how they call it.

The main characteristic of this scientific discipline is the perishability of the solutions it offers, under the pressure of technological evolution and cultural changes – what appears to be out-of-the-box and challenging in the present can be outdated tomorrow. Futurists, in that sense, have the additional burden of making an initially-ridiculous idea plausible by

marshalling appropriate evidence and weaving alternative scenarios of its possible developments.

But the opportunities of using futures studies in the framework of intelligence and integrating them into analyst toolkit prove to be far more important.

First, they provide a framework for creatively and proactively exploring the possibilities and working toward a safer future. They have relevant inputs in decision-making processes, education or technology, setting the knowledge base of modern society. They make the best of intuition theories, in the same time relying on structured analytical methodology.

Second, they provide a sound, diverse, and solid scientifically-based methodology. Some methodological instruments are adapted from sociology, statistics, mathematics or political sciences; some are experimentally generated by the futurists. Through environmental scanning, trend impact analysis, cross-impact analysis, prediction market, etc. futures studies intend to solve tomorrow's problems today, and discover opportunities early on. A very good permanently updated compendium of futures methodologies is offered by the Millennium Project. Either way, intelligence analysts benefit from this experience. People often just choose one foresight activity as a stand-alone project, i.e. horizon scanning or scenario building or visioning. This creates weak and ineffective foresight projects. What should be useful, instead, would be to sensitize oneself to change and identify the change emerging around oneself—one can then consider and map out the potential impacts of change, in which combinations of impacts create scenarios of alternative possible futures.

Third, they create flexibility in decision-making by moving from a focus on one future to an analysis of alternative futures, moving from the management of reality to the creation of possibilities and from narrow problem-solving approaches to broader and deeper systemic and trans-disciplinarian perspectives and solutions.

Forth, they change the temporal horizon of planning from the short to the medium and long term; indeed, strategic foresight provides methods and tools to navigate the three horizons (short, medium and long term).

Fifth, they reduce risk by understanding the worldviews of multiple stakeholders. Blind spots - which are always built into the knowledge framework of each person and organization - are addressed by including difference. This makes implementation far easier and moves the focus from risk avoidance to risk reduction, and risk management to the creation of opportunities and innovation (Inayatullah, 2013).

Conclusions

Maybe we are too enthusiastic when we envision future intelligence as "the Big Game of assumptions and understandings", but ignoring the multiple possibilities futures studies bring into the intelligence processes in order to cope with uncertainty is worse that living in uncertainty. We have to find practical ways to use the future as part of the process of discovering and creating the present.

Without doubt, futures studies improve the intelligence analysts' capacity to reframe and attract collective intelligence and help them create a "foresight culture", meaning to engender a better anticipation of trends in both short and long terms. From this perspective, if we have to make predictions about "the future of intelligence", we can say that it would be cloud-based, collaborative, high tech, but still subjective to error due to human nature.

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HISTORY AND MEMORY IN INTELLIGENCE

TRANSYLVANIA
– STRATEGIC TARGET FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
STRUCTURES DURING THE PERIOD OF NEUTRALITY (1914–1916)

Ioan Codrut LUCINESCU*

Abstract:

The Intelligence and military counterintelligence Section of the Ministry of War and the Department for General State Security (DPSG), Ministry of Interior, in addition to providing counterintelligence support to Romanian army units, in order to counteract the actions of the Central Powers, gathered intelligence during two years of neutrality (1914-1916), employing complex actions of collecting information in Transylvania. With support from Romanian patriots in the territories under domination of Austria-Hungary, networks were created in Transylvania, Banat and Bukovina aimed at gathering information for political and military decision-makers in Bucharest and providing logistical support for the Romanian army's advance in these historical regions.

On 14/27 August 1916, after Romania declares war on Austria-Hungary, formally entering World War I, Romanian troops cross the border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire into the much-contested province of Transylvania. Despite the fact that, during World War I, Romania faced major problems, the sacrifice of Romanian Transylvanian Patriots was not fruitless, as, at the end of 1918, Great Romania was created, for the first time in history (unfortunately for only about two decades).

Keywords: *espionage, Transylvania, World War I, intelligence gathering, the Department for General State Security, Ministry of War, Romanian Army*

Introduction

The breakout of the future world conflict (in the summer of 1914 this future development was not known) generated the first crack between the Central Powers- Romania and Italy declared their neutrality because of

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the special situation of Austro-Hungarian Empire (the dual monarchy not only dominated parts a population composed of people of Romanian and Italian origin but also controlled territories legitimately claimed by the two states). The war brought great changes in the structure of the two political and military alliances. The alliance's members were constantly preoccupied with achieving the balance of power (both from the point of view of the forces involved in the conflict and of occupying areas important for the next operations).

The war also generated an extraordinary mobilization of troops and materiel by participating states. This contributed to a great quantitative and qualitative evolution of weapons, organization and means of war as well as to the carrying out of operations on an unprecedented scale, resulting in great human losses (dead, maimed, wounded) including among the civilian population.

The transformation of the war, which became a long-term conflict, showed that the winner would be the side which is able to overcome losses in life and material yet unknown in modern history. Therefore, each military alliance needed to attract more and more allies, even among those states which were initially regarded with suspicion. Romania became a legitimate target for both political and military blocks (The Entente and the Central Powers), each side attempting to attract the country's leadership to its side.

The Entente was the one which won Romania to its side because it was the only one that officially recognized, through the Political Convention of 4/17 August 1916, the unification of Romania with the territories held by Austria-Hungary, thus achieving the desideratum of national public opinion. This promise would be fulfilled only if victory was achieved. Through the Convention, Romania undertook the obligation to participate directly in the conflict by using military forces.

One has to mention that our country was, at the same time, the victim of "secret diplomacy" carried out by the Great Powers, which refused to grant Romania an equal status, and were forced to do so only by negative developments on the Western Front.

The fact that Imperial Russia adopted a duplicitous attitude regarding our country comes out from the tsarist Minister of Foreign Affairs' archive. The contents of this were published by Soviet communist authorities. A significant exchange of secret letters between Sankt Petersburg and its officials from allied states, including from Bucharest, occurred. The actions of the Tsarist government showed that it aimed (in the first 2 years of war

1914-1916) to slow down negotiations with Romania, hoping to obtain victory. Only when the war became global, and victory was far from sight and only under French pressure, Russia accepted the demands of Bratianu's government.

Once the communists came into power they condemned the "secret diplomacy" adopted by the greatest European powers in the previous century, and published documents from the imperial secret archive. As soon as the Romanian authorities found out about these disclosures, crucial to recent national history, they translated the documents from Russian and made them available to any interested institutions, including the Department for General State Security. A great amount of information regarding the unfolding of the secret diplomatic exchange between spring and summer of 1916, having Romania as the main topic can be found at the National Archive of Romania.

An eloquent example is *Foreign Affairs Minister's secret letter to ministers from Paris, London and Rome. July 31 (13 August) 1916.Nr. 3513* signed by Imperial Russia's Prime-Minister, Boris Vladimirovich Stürmer, which states:

Our Minister in Bucharest has been ordered to sign, together with the representatives of the Allies and with Romanian Government the political convention suggested by Bratianu, as it currently stands.

Please inform the Foreign Affairs Ministry so that it can instruct the representatives from Bucharest accordingly. The Imperial Government is confident that the great sacrifices and concessions it has made for the general success, following the requests of the allies, would be given the proper attention and, if a future interpretation of parts of the Convention would be needed, parts which are not clear enough in the convention, the allied governments would not refuse to endorse Russia's view. It would be desirable that you obtain the confirmation of the government you are commissioned with. (ANIC, SSI, 4/1934, f. 217)

Actually, the obligations assumed by Imperial Russia, the French Republic, the British Empire or the Kingdom of Italy with regard to Romania would be nullified if Petersburg's special interests in South-Eastern Europe demanded. Fortunately, the political-military developments generated by the fall of the tsarist regime radically altered the situation. Yet, until the unification of Romanian territories (1918), the intelligence structures of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of War had to deal with a difficult and dangerous situation not only for the civilian agents inside Transylvania but also for Transylvanian patriots – establishing a deep and thorough intelligence presence in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Collecting intelligence from Austro-Hungarian Empire - a priority for the national intelligence structures during the period of neutrality

Once the First World War started, the Romanian General Staff took action in order to prepare the Romanian army for participation in the war, if necessary. The large number of forces and materiel employed by participating states, the need to apply the principle of joint leadership regarding national armies and to operate together with allies in military operations required an intense activity from structures tasked with conception, planning and undertaking operations at both the strategic and the tactical level.

The General Staff was the institution tasked with command, conception and control (Giurcă, 2014, pp. 11-34) of the Romanian army. According to the legal framework of the pre-war period, the General Staff (at the strategic level) along with army and division-level staffs had to carry out complex operations adapted to operational requirements throughout the duration of the war. Therefore, the need to know the enemy in each of his aspects increased, generating a significant need for information. In meeting this need, the intelligence structures of all combatants, including Romania's, evolved.

Once the possibility that Romania join the Entente became realistic, the need for a continuous and diversified information flow from across the mountains increased exponentially. The modern war that had engulfed all of Europe made it clear that detailed knowledge of the potential of the Austro-Hungarian enemy was essential in order to create complex offensive plans.

During the two years of neutrality, the Army's intelligence and counter-intelligence structures, as well as the Ministry of Interior's Department for General State Security, part of the Department of Police and General Security (DPGS) undertook, apart from counter-intelligence support for the Romanian army's units (to prevent espionage by the Central Powers), complex operations aimed at intelligence collection in Transylvania.

The aim of these operations was to gather information related to fighting plans, maps, orders of the Austro-Hungarian headquarters, sketches of military construction work, photographs of the emplacement of artillery pieces and of machine-gun nests (a weapon whose operational value had been proven), the fighting capacity of the Austro-Hungarian soldiers, military-industrial objectives in Transylvania, means of transport and communication, main strategic points and people's state of mind (Şinca, 2009, p. 86).

The quality of the intelligence activity that took place in Transylvania, Banat or Bucovina lived up to requests, being also eased by the sympathetic attitude of the Romanians who, while subjects of the dual monarchy, awaited the liberation and the union with the Old Kingdom.

The head of The Special Intelligence Service (1940-1944), Eugen Cristescu commented on the successes achieved during the period of neutrality: "By using offensive intelligence actions, the General Security and the General Staff succeeded in obtaining information about the military situation in Transylvania, taking advantage of the great help provided by Romanians from Transylvania, used as informers and who, after the war, were employed as superior functionaries in the security service of the reunited country (*Din Memoriile lui Eugen Cristescu*, 1968, p. 14-15).

The recruitment of people who could both easily obtain information due to the nature of their work and who could easily travel in the targeted regions without arising suspicion from Austrian and Hungarian authorities (a very important feature in times of war, when free travel is restricted in all combatant states) was sought. Sources were recruited from among intellectuals- doctors, pharmacists, lawyers, professors, engineers, teachers or priests; or from among states employees – foresters, railway workers and traders (Brestoiu & Bobocescu, 1979, p. 105). Also, a great help came from Romanian peasants, who lived near borders and who could offer refuge for agents crossing to the Austro-Hungarian side or to people fleeing from Imperial authorities, as well as from those who knew well the mountain roads used by shepherds.

In a Note from June 8, 1915 written by a Transylvanian agent to his superiors from Bucharest (illegible signature), he reported: "In the matter discussed, namely for guides to lead our troops through mountains on safe paths, aside from me there are also others who can help: Constantin Solomon from Buzău; George Buzea Bordan, Alecse Bucur Comşa and Ioan Noaghi - Romanian refugees with an unknown residence. They can be found if needed. All of them are trustworthy." (ANIC, DPSG, 1914, f. 17)

The collaborators of the Romanian secret structures were trained in intelligence collecting techniques, on the categories of information relevant to the Romanian state and on how to deliver them-some of them had even a camera or other secret technical means. When the mission was highly dangerous, they were supervised by professionals from the Security Service and the army in order to verify their commitment. If collaborators were

arrested, they would manage the situation so as not to compromise the whole network.

Some information of a great military value was transmitted to Bureau III (General Staff's structure commissioned with making war plans) by military unit commanders stationed on the Austro-Hungarian border.

At the same time, the Romanian army engaged in a significant intelligence collection activity regarding the Austro-Hungarian military capabilities also, highly likely, attempting to undertake sabotage (unfortunately, we do not have information on concrete actions) using professional officers.

As evidence of this, we can show a confidential request sent by the General Secretariat of the Ministry of War to the Department of Police and General Security on 17 October, 1914 which requires that

At the proper time it must be transmitted to the Predeal border crossing point that tomorrow, Saturday, 18 October, some officers whose names are written on the back page will leave the country by train to Arad- they must receive permission to pass as they are on a special mission. This commission will have two MD.1893 weapons, four new weapon pipes, 630 g. of gunpowder, two boxes with controls and checkers, plans, tender book and other experience tools and I ask you, Minister, to give orders to Predeal not to obstruct this operation.

Notation:
1) Lieutenant colonel Limburg Dimitrie;
2) Caretaker lieutenant colonel Mandrin Petre;
3) Captain Păltineanu Anastase.
In total, three officers. (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 62-62v)

To keep the message private, the request made to the Predeal border crossing was encrypted, requiring maximum secrecy from Romanian custom officers in order not to arise suspicions.

The greatest part of the secret operations undertaken by the Romanian army inside the dual monarchy was aimed at collecting relevant intelligence for preparing a military offensive. To achieve these goals, the General Staff, using Section III, developed a set of *"Instructions and itineraries for agents sent scouting in Hungary".* The document, classified as top secret, and written in June, 1914 under the guidance of Colonel Nicolae Petala, head of Bureau's V, Intelligence, part of Section III, was addressed to a number of five intelligence officers who were commissioned to go scouting in Transylvania, the main future battlefield for the Romanian army (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 49-61).

These *"Scouting guidelines"* contained four main operationally valuable points: I) Relating to roads, II) Relating to towns, III) Scouting garrisoned troops and IV) If people meet receive weapons training– organization and the nationality of participants. One of the most important intelligence requirements was to possess information about the exact routes and railroad system from Transylvania. The information had to contain an inventory of roads and their characteristics: whether the roads were paved, if they were passable and also if alongside there were telegraph networks or check points. Moreover, details were required about the condition of bridges: their length and width, composition, the weight they could bear.

The greatest importance in intelligence collection requirements was given to the monitoring of imperial troops in each officer's area of responsibility :"type, name, and number of troops (Infantry, Cavalry, field or mountain Artillery), technical personnel, army deposits, hospitals et cetera…If they heard about fortifications being built and where?" (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 49-61).

All these officers, together with a large number of collaborators, charged with this "special missions" were to cover the whole area of Transylvania, from Romanian-Hungarian border in Predeal – especially communications in the mountains.

Some important means of information were media, maps and other Transylvanian publications which offered the Romanian General Staff data of great value. Romanian military attaches in capitals of states important for the Romanian national interest were charged with collecting information, having previously received special training for this. In July 1914, documents of the General Staff listed as military attaches: major Soutza Dimitrie (Paris and Brussels), major Trantomir Lucian (Costantinopol), major Prodan Ioan (St. Petersburg), major Ignat Mihail (Rome), major Gherculescu Dumitru(Sofia), major Dumitrescu Toma (Belgrade), major Crăiniceanu Constantin (Athens) and captain Stârcea Traian (Vienna) (Giurcă, 2014, p. 20).

Right after the beginning of the World War, significant work is undertaken to improve foreign intelligence collection and to achieve a unitary framework for intelligence activity for both the General Directorate of State Security of the Ministry of Interior and the representatives of the Romanian Army. An important document written by the army's leadership and also addressed to the director-general of the Department of Police and General Security, Ion (Iancu) Panaitescu (22 December 1914), with the goal of

implementing it inside the latter institution, shows the modern way that the Romanian army leadership thought, focusing on several tactical and strategic issues crucial to a contemporary conflict.

A secret Appendix called *"A program to guide the way that a permanent agent collects military news"* (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 75) shows that, beside classical military information from the *"Scouting guidelines",* collecting information meant much more: it was crucial to gather intelligence about the social and political realities and about the state of mind of the population of the adversary country.

This guide reveals an important fact regarding Romanian institutions: they had a good knowledge of the requirements of the new type of modern conflict being waged Europe, as their requests for information were similar to those made of the German and Austro-Hungarian services operating in Romania. Detailed information about the enemy were required: type of units, weapons, modifications in troop deployment, deposits and supply sources, detailed description of fortifications and where they were (ammunition and food reserves, quality of works). Moreover, general information about the budget of the Ministry of War of the targeted country was required, as well as "sensitive" information requiring a complex collection effort:

Information about municipali-ties. The amount of population by nationality. The amount of houses…Water resources".

Observation-Regarding communication ways: the publication of special maps and statistical dictionaries or any publication which concerns this will be monitored

17) Information about <u>national sentiment.</u>

Important rumors; issues discussed in newspapers; speeches in Parliament; national manifestations.

National patriotism and military spirit. Military instruction in schools, how it's organized and its results. Socialist ideas and their progress in cities or the countryside. Would antimilitarism succeed? How it could be spread?

Newspapers, their spirit: is their personnel national or foreign? – Would money be a good way to create a favorable trend oriented to certain goals? (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 76-77)

A request that intelligence agents monitor counterintellige-nce services and announce Bucharest about their activity is also important: "The research agent has to discover the foreign secret investigation organization in

the country he works in and to indicate the people engaged in this activity and the means of communication they are using." (ANIC, DPSG, 1910, f. 76-77).

The *"Memoirs of General Maximilian Ronge",* the head of the Austro-Hungarian High Command intelligence service, offer great information about the support Romanian civilians offered to Romanian intelligence structures during the war. The manuscript, translated in Romanian, in the beginning of the 1920s by Gherghe Baloşin can be found at National Archives of Romania and represents a precious source for studying World War I.

From a professional point of view, general Ronge showed that especially the Romanian State Security Service, but also the Romanian army's specialized structure had had great success: creating significant collecting networks in Transylvania and Bucovina evidenced by the about 100 cases of "betrayal" discovered by the Austro-Hungarian counter-intelligence during the two years of neutrality.

The Imperial officer accused especially Romanian priests and teachers of having an intense secret intelligence collection activity but also of creating a hostile atmosphere against state authorities: Austro-Hungarian soldiers of Romanian descent were advised to escape over the mountains or to surrender when they fought the Russian army (ANIC, MR, MSM, no. 119, f. 181-182).

The reoccupation of Transylvania by the dualistic monarchy at the end of August 1916 threatened Romanian patriots, as the punishment for spying for a foreign country was death, as General Ronge showed: *When war burst out (1914), the counter-intelligence service was extremely busy with discovering and detaining politically suspicious Romanians. After taking back the invaded territory, the traitors who had been in the service of General Security in Bucharest and in the Russian service, as well as those who appealed to people to enlist in the Romanian army had to be identified* (ANIC, MR, MSM, no. 119, f. 287).

National intelligence networks on the territory of the dualistic monarchy

Archival documents point out that the collection of intelligence necessary for decision-making in Bucharest, undertaken inside the dualistic monarchy was done professionally. Both Romanian Army military personnel, as well as civilians sent to undertake special missions and Transylvanian patriots acting for the Romanian national ideal acted together to fulfill well-

defined plans and specific objectives with the support of the State Security and Army officers.

A successful intelligence operation took place right in the imperial capital, Vienna, where military attaché Traian Stârcea established a network which included 50 agents- including diplomats and foreign military attaches. Important collaborators were Italian diplomats, Valerio Benuzzi and Mario Reusi, Chilean embassy secretary, Fernando Aninat or Argentine military attaché Villegas (Spânu, 2012, p. 182). The last two worked for Romanian intelligence services also after our country went to war against Austria-Hungary, sending information through neutral Switzerland.

Extremely valuable information on the Austro-Hungarian military plans against Romania came from Romanians enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian army who decided to cross the mountains and surrender to Romanian authorities. Marshall Alexandru Averescu pointed out that a hussar of Romanian nationality, who defected in the summer of 1916, provided the crucial information that the Central Powers' plan against Romania had taking Oltenia as a main objective. *"I gave credence to this information-said Marshal Averescu in his annotations-as it represented a judicious plan and that's why when great efforts against the Namaiesti group were undertaken, by concentrating 3 ½ of enemy division, I assumed that they wanted to isolate Oltenia by taking Piteşti."* (Averescu, p. 365).

By studying archival documents, one can realize that during the period of neutrality (1914-1916), approximately 1000 people (Ştefănescu, 2009, p. 41) – Romanians and other nationalities who lived in Transylvania were agents of the Romanian Army, General Security and Gendarmerie. This is not an exaggerated number if we consider that the best collaborators of Romanian national structures created their own networks. Examples of this kind of residents are David Pop, Spiridon Boita, Aurel Moldovan who created genuine intelligence "services" – each one containing from a few dozen up to 200 trustworthy people (the case of the network led by the lawyer Spiridon Boita and David Pop in Hărman) - that acted in Transylvanian cities and in border-crossing points (Bobocescu, 2000, p. 171).

Documents evidencing this professionally developed espionage network, made up of both civilians and military personnel, can be found at the National Archives of Romania. The lists with Transylvanians who were reliable agents of the State Security are presented in the so-called Special Files of the Department of Police and National Security. The necessity of keeping

their identity secret was vital if we consider that, given that Austria-Hungary was waging a war, the punishment for spying was death.

We can show the people in charge with collecting intelligence in areas of strategic interest for the Romanian army, in 1915.

"The list of reliable people from Transylvania, who collaborate with us.

Petroşeni Region

Sebastian Stanca	parson in Sebeş
Adam Basarab	parson in Romoş
Avram Stanca	parson in Petroşeni

Braşov-Bran Region

Costi Proca	parson in Râjnov
Petru Popovici	owner in Braşov
Spiridon Boita	employee in Braşov

Buzău-Oituz Region

George Negoescu	parson in Întorsura Buzăului
George Hamzea	parson in Breţcu
Ioan Coman	parson in Sita Buzăului

Cluj-Bistriţa Region

Nicodim Cristea	doctor of law
George Fodocean	student." (ANIC, DPSG, 1914, f. 18)

Apart from this main list, there are plenty that present the names of Transylvanian guides charged with leading Romanian military units across the Carpathians. For each person details as residence, place he/she could be found if mobilization was ordered and recognition password were specified. All the lists and charts presented in Special File (592/1914) entitled–"*Panel of informants and reliable persons from Transylvania, who could be used by Romanian state as guides, if a war with Austria-Hungary would eventually take place*" are only a small piece of the network that Romanian Army and State Security created in Transylvania.

New collaborators and guides were added, so that, in mid-1916, each unit engaged in the Transylvanian offensive could call upon the services of a number of such people. As an example, the head of Infantry Regiment Argeş, colonel M. Urdăreanu, indicated to his subordinates the names and files of the 54 Transylvanians who were about to be used as translators and guides (Brestoiu & Bobocescu, p. 108).

One of the most powerful and active Transylvanian network was the so-called "The club of the hanged" from Braşov, created and handled by lawyer Spiridon Boita. He recruited collaborators in all cities and border points in South-Eastern Transylvania, having a total of 200 reliable persons. (Troncotă, 2008, p. 67)

As the head of the network, his obligations were to establish connections between collaborators, to give them intelligence assignments, to receive and centralize information, to personally examine the most important ones, to compile intelligence reports and to pass them over to Romanian police chief from Predeal and to authorities in Bucharest.

Spiridon Boita undertook some missions in Timişoara, Seghedin and Szolnok, as well as in Bucovina, collecting information regarding the deployment of Austro-Hungarian and German forces. The most difficult mission was to obtain the plan of fortifications built in the Carpathians along the Olt and the Mureş rivers. In order to successfully achieve this operation, Spiridon Boita had to disguise himself "horse seller, factory hand, woodcutter in border forests, trader." (Brestoiu & Bobocescu, p. 108)

The General Security succeeded in building an authentic network in Bucovina with the support of professor Aurel Moldovan, who collected and delivered information about Austro-Hungarian personnel in that region. Another interesting fact is that important information were also sent to Russian command in Galicia. This foreshadowed the Romanian-Russian intelligence collaboration during 1916-1917. In the autumn of 1915, the members were discovered and sent before Austrian military justice, receiving prison sentences of 10 to 15 years. A copy of a report about the placement of the troops of the Central Powers in Bucovina at the beginning of 1915- report which was about to be given to Romanian secret structures- was cited as proof for the prosecution (Bobocescu, 2000, p. 172).

In the end, Aurel Moldovan managed to escape and, as recognition of his merits, he received from Ion (Iancu) Panaitescu, chief of the Department of Police and General Security the permission to reside in Bucharest and to be employed as General State Security agent.

Vasile and Clemansa Chiliman, a married couple, created an intelligence network made up of Romanian peasants, covering the Buzău Mountains and the territories of Vrancea. Its purpose was to deliver military intelligence of tactical importance. A great achievement of this intelligence network was to facilitate the passing of the border to Moldova of 2000

Romanian troops who has escaped imprisonment or managed to hide, after the defeat of 1916 (Chiriac, 2006, p. 45-46).

A Romanian agent with a great intelligence activity and for whose discovery the imperial secret service had to undertake significant efforts was agent "B 9".What is interesting is the fact that this agent wasn't a man but a woman from Banat recruited even since the beginning of the war. "B 9" succeeded in establishing close relationships with German and Austro-Hungarian officers from Timişoara and collected information valuable for Romania and Serbia (she acted as a double agent) regarding the Central Powers' military emplacement in Banat, prospective plans, and espionage actions (Bodunescu & Rusu-Şirianu, 1973, p. 311).

Unfortunately, "B 9" was discovered by the Austro-Hungarian secret service from Bucharest through an information leak. It came out that her real name was Maria Bălan, a beautiful woman. She was arrested and sentenced to death by hanging. However, she managed to break out of prison with the help of Romanian in the Austro-Hungarian military administration before the sentence was executed. After this, she arrived in Bucharest, where her secret activity will be heavily promoted in the post-war period (Bodunescu & Rusu-Şirianu, 1973, p. 312).

Another goal of the secret services was to ease the movement of Transylvanian Romanian secret agents in the border areas with the dual monarchy. A Security Service report from Dorohoi's Police sent to the head of the Ministry of Interior in the autumn of 1915, shows that "Gheorghe Popa and Dimitrie Moldoveanu are hired as secret agents and they travel on border with Austria for the interest of the intelligence service that you know and I ask you to urgently intervene at the Head of the Border Police so that border travel permits are issued for their work in the interest of State Security." (ANIC, DPSG, 1914, f. 32-34)

Ghiţă Pop, a Transylvanian patriot, went to the Romanian General Staff in the autumn of 1914 and asked for permission to organize a secret network to collect military information about imperial maneuvers, recruitments and weapons' condition. He was assigned to Colonel Nicoleanu from General Staff's Section I, who instructed him to create a circle of collaborators. His network gave precious information and documents to the Romanian Army. Although he was discovered by Austro-Hungarian counter-intelligence, he succeeded to move to Bucharest. In Transylvania he was sentenced to death in absentia (Bobocescu, 2000, p. 101).

Romanian secret structures appealed even to Romanian men who were married to Hungarian women. These directly participated to the collection of information for the Romanian army and State Security. At the end of the war, Romanians' courageous actions were revealed in the Romanian media: Spiridon Boita reminisced, in an interview for the newspaper "Dimineata" how he decided to work for Romania: "One day some men from the Kingdom came and offered me to work for the Romanian authorities. These men were professor Udrea, who worked at Salonic commercial highschool and General Grozea. I had expected their visit. They also went to others because they had been in charge of this area for a long time. I agreed. I remember that I discussed with my wife all night long. My wife is of Hungarian origin, but her actions make her worthy of a true Romanian woman. Not only that she helped me, but also she suffered along with me the harshness of Hungarian prisons." (Brestoiu şi Bobocescu, 1979, pp. 105-106)

Conclusions

In the complex conditions of the war, the political and military decision makers in Romania made great efforts, despite limited resources, to improve and to adapt the activity of both civilian (first and foremost the Ministry of Interior) and military (General Staff and the Ministry of War) intelligence structures to the dynamic of internal and external risks to state security. One of the great challenges of the national intelligence structures during the two years of preparation (1914-1916) was getting to know as much as possible about the socio-political situation in neighboring states – Bulgaria, Russia, but especially, Austria-Hungary.

An important role in this "intelligence game " was played by Romanian patriots in the territories controlled by the dualistic monarchy- in Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina there was created " a network of networks" that had to both collect information and give logistical aid and direct support to the Romanian army in order to cross the border in these historical territories. Unfortunately, the professionalism of the field work could not be exploited at its real value because the offensive in Transylvania was stopped after only two weeks. The end of August 1916 brought the retreat from Transylvania, under the pressure of the military disaster in Dobrogea (the defeat of our troops in Turtucaia).

This Romanian military failure also happened because some information was not taken into consideration. This information was given by the Constanta Security Brigade, led by security commissar, Constantin Duca, who had created an intelligence network in North-Eastern Bulgaria since January 1916. His network delivered information about the plans of German-Bulgarian troops to cross the Danube and to initiate the offensive in Dobrogea if the Romanian army attacked in Transylvania. But these important aspects were not taken into consideration by the General Staff (Pintilie et al., 2000, p. 17).

Intelligence support in Transylvania was at its best: the heads of the Romanian army were informed on the changes that appeared in the dual monarchy's order of batter up until the moment the country went to war, on 14/15 August 1916. But the fact that Romania represented only a tiny wheel in the world war and was never truly supported by its allies (especially Russia), led to the waste of the whole difficult and dangerous intelligence work.

Many Romanian patriots from Transylvania, Banat and Bucovina paid with their own lives their work for the national desideratum, or were permanently traumatized physically and psychologically. But their work was not in vain, as the breakdown of European multinational empires led to the birth of the Europe of nations and to the creation of Great Romania.

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REVIEWS AND NOTES

THE SHOCK DOCTRINE. THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM
- Review-

OANA PUIE [*]

In *The Shock Doctrine,* Naomi Klein - a Canadian journalist - offers the reader an alternative view upon certain economic and political evolutions of the world, starting with the 1960s. She begins from several hypotheses which she later illustrates by using some well documented case studies. The final product is a complex analysis of the global economic and political context, based on which she highlights some heated aspects regarding corporatist and governmental interests. The book is accessible to the general public due to the use of common language and the light approach of the subject.

The authors' main hypotheses concern the role of the global financial organizations, the corporatist interests in a state and the opportunity created by the outburst of disasters. Firstly, Klein argues that global financial institutions such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund use their resources and influence to open the borders of some targeted countries, ultimately aiming at increasing their own profit and the number of markets at their disposal. Within this framework, internal mechanisms of economic protection are destroyed, regardless of the additional cultural and social costs. This mostly leads to deepening poverty, increasing foreign debt and concentrating wealth in the hands of an elite minority. Secondly, by eliminating social protection mechanisms, free markets create a vacuum that, on the one hand harms people who do not have access to certain resources and, on the other hand, benefits the elites. Thirdly, as free market economy does not bear moral or social considerations, war, natural disasters and instability become opportunities to make profit. In accordance with this disaster capitalism, market interests will encourage the privatization of certain critical sectors

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related to national security and will enable decision makers to use war and social and political instability as tools to increase profit.

Klein described the free market ideology as it was projected by the economist Milton Friedman and subsequently promoted by the University of Chicago. Opposed to Keynesianism[1] and developmentalism[2], neoliberalism - in Friedman's approach – considers that the free market and „the invisible hand"[3] are the most appropriate forms of economic government and that any attempt of institutional regulation – taxes, tariffs and commercial barriers – will interfere and will affect economy's smooth running. Hence, according to this approach, the governments should first of all abolish any form of economic regulation that impedes the making of profit. Secondly, all the resources the state controls should be offered for privatization, allowing full ownership over them by private entrepreneurs. Thirdly, a drastic reduction of social spending is required, with the view of establishing prices and salaries from all the fields through the law of demand and supply.

Starting from this theoretical concept, the author's analysis focuses on the political, economic and social changes that, starting with the 1960s, affected countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Poland, Great Britain, Canada, Russia, the Asian Tigers[4] and Iraq. Klein highlights the elements that give each country's local color as well as the international context in which the changes took place. These are chronologically described, using a cause and effect pattern and with reference to a series a documentary sources that can support their veracity.

A cycle of disaster capitalism is put forward, which starts from the shock produced by war, torture and disaster. These generate a series of consequences which benefit minor, corporatist elite. By using the newly acquired strategic advantage, the corporations can impose the privatization of a society which is still under the effect of shock. Once the time passes and any

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[1] John Maynard Keynes was a British economist whose main ideas and theories concern: state interventionism in the economy, generating social spending and applying commercial barriers in order to avoid economic fluctuations and to keep a high standard of living.

[2] Economic theory which states that the best way for the Third World countries to develop is through fostering a strong and varied internal market and by excluding any interference of the multinational companies and the lack of commercial barriers. The aim is to promote the development of the internal economy, education and technology instead of exporting workforce and natural resources to the global market.

[3] Philosophic and economic concept introduced for the first time by Adam Smith in „The Wealth of Nations" and symbolizing the ideea that people following their own interests may indirectly contribute to the general well-being of the society and the economy as a whole.

[4] Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia and South Korea

stable form of social influence is paralyzed, the newly adopted reforms become even harder to abolish.

Beyond the historic and descriptive frame – which is a relish especially for those who are passionate about a recent, still unwritten history – the book is a delightful lecture due to its style. Her career in journalism left a strong mark upon the author's character and view and therefore her manner of writing is spectacular, full of interesting details and gripping stories. A particular characteristic is the strong anti-American attitude, which becomes obvious both from the emphasis put on the direct implication of the United States in the reported events and for the guilt the Americans are thought to bear for the values and practices they promote in their foreign policy. A special place goes to the American intelligence service, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Klein believes that the external activities of the agency had disastrous consequences for the mentioned countries, and the American government not only encouraged and concealed its activity, but also obtained several global strategic advantages with its help.

In conclusion, for any passionate reader interested in economics and politics and also in the field of intelligence practices and role, *The Shock Doctrine* may be a path opener in as far as it offers an alternative view at the Western approach upon the wars and changes of the 21st century, but also a way to discover and become familiar with concepts such as: *shock therapy economics, the „green zone" phenomenon, Shock and Awe, Volcker Shock, the Washington Consensus from 1989, war economy.*

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ANALIZA INFORMAȚIILOR – MANUAL
- Review-

Mihai Codruț GHINEA[*]

The volume "Information analysis" was written under the careful coordination of Mrs. Sorina Maria Cofan, a police instructor in the field of information analysis, and was published at the publishing house of the Ministry of Interior, in Bucharest, 2014 with a view to offering an exhaustive portrait of information analysis, highlighting its applicability to the field of public order.

The title of this manual of information analysis is suggestive and synthetizes the essence of the entire volume, which supports not only the consolidation of the security culture, but also the instauration and the uniformity of some concepts, whose definitions should be widely and unanimously accepted and used by the whole Romanian intelligence community.

The first chapter starts by defining the concepts *information, analysis* and *intelligence* – capital concepts of intelligence activity. Thus, the importance of information to the decision-making process, is emphasized –as "*a base of all he current activities,*" but this must take into consideration "*the compulsory elements of an information: novelty, opportunity, actuality, authenticity, accuracy, precision and utility*" in order to be exploited by the information user. The analysis represents the dynamic, cognitive and complex process that implies "*the decomposition of information in its components, the extraction and the adjustment of the meaning of the information's components and the assemblage of the explanation this meanings is a way that can be apprehended and applied.*" The *intelligence* concept is presented as a formula (*information + analysis = intelligence*), which underlines the fact that an analyzed information transforms into intelligence that offers the knowledge necessary to decision

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makers. Therefore, the first chapter has a descriptive role, presenting the concepts used in the intelligence field and offering details concerning the National Intelligence for Security Doctrine and the principles that guide the National Intelligence Community.

After this theoretical preamble, the intelligence process is presented. In the volume, it is called *informational cycle,* while in the Anglo-Saxon literature it is presented under the name of intelligence cycle. This schematizes the transformation of information to intelligence that is delivered to the political leaders. The stages of informational cycle are: *planning, collecting, evaluation, collating, analysis and dissemination.*

The first step is planning, which represents assessing the ways and the methods used in obtaining the information in accordance with the demands from the legal customer or with the internal auto-adjustment mechanisms. This plan is realized by the intelligence analyst, because through the corroboration of the information obtained from all the sources he is the only one who will have the panoramic view over the issue. The analysis of information is seen as a human activity that requires professionalism and that is why it must be planned with a view to maximizing its effect – obtaining an objective, pertinent analytical product. In other words, the efficiency of the analytical process is enhanced through planning, organization, because *"elaborating a plan of information collection ensures the analyst the premises of directed, accurate and relevant information collection for the current analysis and it is subscribed to achieving the objectives of analysis. This plan defines the amount of information that will be collected, the form in which the information is needed, the sources that will be exploited and the way in which will be realized the collection."*

The information collection phase represents all the activities used in order to find and get the information. After collection, the information passes through an *evaluation* process of both source credibility and information validity and then through a *collating* process, which implies organizing and putting the information in a data base. In respect of *evaluation*, the author decided to develop this stage in a different chapter, where he underlined the evaluation grid used by the intelligence structure of Ministry of Interior.

Analysis is the next step in the process. It has the role of filtering the information through the mental processes, creating links between pieces of information that seem disparate with a view to creating a portrait of the issue studied. After finishing the analytical product the analyst is required to ask for feedback from a colleague, who might detect the errors and the disparity in information by reading the whole written material.

The last step is the *dissemination* of the analytical product to the customer in order to have a solid and pertinent informational basis to sustain his decisions. Also, at this step the analyst can request feedback from the customer in order to quantify the degree to which the analytical product was in concordance with his needs, offered a panoramic view over the issue and to ask if he needs additional explanations.

Regarding the location of the chapters, some modifications could be made to group those in a logical sequence that won't interfere with the presentation of the analysis that occupies more than a half of this volume. Taking this into account, the shift of the chapter entitled *sources of information* after the one presenting the intelligence cycle would make the paper easily readable and comprehensible.

Considering the fact that this volume is a manual of information analysis published by the Ministry of Interior, it presents a distinctiveness that wasn't tapped before in the literature. This distinctiveness is marked by the presentation of punctual cases and the specific methods used by the intelligence structure of MAI. Hence, even if the concept of analysis is presented, detailing the analytical techniques and methods, the author wrote a separate chapter in which he presented the software products used by the Ministry of Interior in the field of information analysis.

The chapter *"Ethics and professional deontology,"* highlights another organizational disparity, as this is interposed between the chapters where the information analysis is detailed. Consequently, for easing the reading of this paper it is recommended that this chapter be put after the presentation of *informational cycle* and *sources of information*. In this manner it the needs for ethical behavior in a complex process such as intelligence would be apprehended.

To the end of this volume, the author comes again to the theoretical presentation of the more concepts, such as *threat*, defined as *"every unfavorable situation, the imminent modification tendency within an organization, that can be harmful or can put in danger the defensive capacity of the entity,"* vulnerability – *"a weakness in the defense system of an entity that can be exploited in order to prejudice or disrupt the normal activity"* and *risk* – *"the probability of an action or event to appear and have negative effect on the entity's integrity, on the normal activity of the entity and on its capacity of action."* I am of the opinion that this chapter is not correctly placed, as it should be near the basic concepts of information management, that open this volume. This is an organizational aspect, and the rearrangement of the chapters would make a more easy perusal.

The last chapter closes this volume in an original manner by synthetizing the methods of inter-institutional cooperation, cooperation that transcends the national borders, being made between intelligence structures of European police departments within European Police Office (EUROPOL), European Police College (CEPOL), International Organization of Criminal Police (INTRPOL), Southeast European Law Enforcement Cooperation (SELEC) and Frontex (European Agency for Operational Cooperation Management at the Borders Of Member States).

In conclusion, making this short presentation of the volume entitled "Information analysis," we have evaluated the extent to which it has achieved its goal – as an information analysis manual. Therefore, presenting exhaustively not only the concept of information analysis, from the theoretical approach to the practical applicability within the departments of the Ministry of Interior, but also the minimum knowledge necessary to apprehend the informational system, the manual succeeds in contextualizing the importance and the necessity of information analysis in the national intelligence system. Thus, excepting the organizational changes that should be made in the chapters' sequence, this volume succeeds in synthetizing the process of information analysis, bringing about novel elements – the applicability of intelligence analysis in the field of public order and the tools used by the structures that manage this issue.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SCIENCE –
Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy
- Review-

Oana Andreea SANDU[*]

At the beginning of 2015 the volume *National Intelligence and Science – Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy* (240 pp.), authored by two renowned scholars in the field of intelligence studies, Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton, was published by Oxford University Press. Wilhelm Agrell is a Professor within the Lund University, where he teaches courses focused on Intelligence Analysis; and Visiting Professor at the Swedish National Defence College. Author and editor of several volumes on intelligence, his research interests include topics such as intelligence transformation, the use and limits of scientific methods in intelligence analysis, the history of early Cold War intelligence.

Gregory Treverton is currently holding the position of National Intelligence Council Chairman. He has held several leadership positions within the American executive; he was a Director within RAND Corporation and at the time of this volume's writing he was Visiting Scholar at the Swedish National Defence College. His areas of expertise include intelligence transformation, countering transnational risks, prospective analysis, the public-private partnership, and the role of social media in the cooperation and analysis process.

The objective assumed by the two authors is to analyse intelligence from a perspective that has been less debated within the specific literature – as one of several modes of knowledge production for action, along with other fields, and especially scientific research. Thus, intelligence becomes "a way to define problems, structure data, formulate and test explanations, and manage uncertainty in a social context" particularly complex.

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Uncertainty is the *leitmotiv* of this volume and the main factor influencing the development and convergence of the two fields that are permanently analysed from a mirror reflection perspective within the book's nine chapters – intelligence and science.

According to the authors, the point of departure for this book is the observation of two simultaneous, and possibly converging, trends, with a common denominator in the rise of complex societal risks, characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Thus, if during the Cold War period, assessing the enemy seemed to have a more clearly defined framework, as the elements upon which there was a certain uncertainty decreased as new data was collected, nowadays, we are witnessing an opposite process: as new data becomes available, de degree of uncertainty related to the evolution of the new type of ricks, complex and novel, seems to increase.

The first trend is referring to the increasing pressure for the evolution of intelligence to a more "scientific" form, for developing and leveraging analytic skills and using lessons learned within intelligence structures. As early as 1955, Sherman Kent advocated for the development of intelligence analysis into the direction of a scientific discipline included in the sphere of positivist social sciences. However, 60 years later, "the epistemological basis for intelligence assessments tends to consist of a rather unsophisticated mixture of common sense, brainstorming, and established practice within a closed profession – and as such not comprehensible to outsiders".

In order to respond to the demand of using scientific methods to handle uncertainty and validate the analytic products elaborated, intelligence structures need to move away from the organizational culture based on secrecy and the need to know principle and to foster intra and inter-organizational cooperation, processes metaphorically called by the authors "*inter-intelligence*" and "*trans-intelligence*", concepts similar to those of inter-disciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity, which are characteristic for the scientific community, that is faced with managing similar challenges in adapting its structures and *modus operandi* to the more and more complex problems it must find solutions to.

The second trend is related to the shift of scientific researchers' focus from disciplinary research to the multi-disciplinary one, as a consequence of the public pressure for getting scientific results that are socially relevant, and can support the achievement of some public policies objectives.

If during the last century scientific knowledge was characterized by disciplinary specialization and the lack of cooperation between experts from different disciplines (similar to the intelligence activity undertaken at the same time frame), as the stakeholders' requests grew in number and

complexity, a major restructuring of the scientific field was achieved, in terms of activity organization and mode of knowledge production. Thus, in fields like urban studies, health, environment, or climate change, the dividing line between natural and social sciences had to be crossed, as researchers are forced to draw conclusions and supply scientific advice under increasing uncertainty.

In this framework, the authors of the book assume as their main hypothesis the fact that we are witnessing a process in which intelligence is becoming more "scientific", resembling more the new type of scientific efforts that have a complex and trans-disciplinary nature, and are target-oriented. Simultaneously, the new type of inter- and trans- disciplinary scientific research, focused on problem solving, is becoming more like intelligence in focusing its efforts on risk assessments and probabilities, and elaborating warnings and communicating not only the results attained but also the uncertainties identified with the stakeholders. As Agrell and Treverton underline, we are witnessing not so much to a bridging of the traditional divide between intelligence and Academia, but rather to "a development that is moving beyond both these traditional modes of knowledge production, thereby addressing the divide between the knowledge producers and the knowledge users, (…), between those responsible for assessments under uncertainty and those who have to comprehend, value, and act on those assessments".

The structure of the book reflects the cognitive oscillation between the "main characters". The first chapter starts by analysing a TV show where the participants are Nobel Prize winners, and the conclusion of the debate is that science has the duty to create the premises for innovation development, simultaneously with that of elaborating warnings about long term complex risks, such as global warming. Negative issues were also debated: the oversized demand for deliverables, the conundrum between expectations and uncertainty, and the disastrous consequences of losing the trust of the general public, which will turn to other so-called knowledge and alternative risk assessments providers.

Then, the authors imagine a similar debate, but this time the participants are the best intelligence analysts in the world. The debate topics would be different, but in the same time it would tackle similar problems: the loss of public trust as a consequence of highly broadcasted intelligence failures (the terrorist attacks from 2001, the war in Iraq, the Breivik case), the need to intensify intelligence cooperation and upgrade analysis, a wider public outreach and a better public communication, in order to legitimize the restriction of certain rights and liberties in the view of ensuring security.

The second chapter particularizes the divide between the scientific and intelligence realm, by analysing how the Second World War drove the two fields together, and how the Cold War drifted enhanced the initial gap. The authors ask themselves if we are witnessing a new convergence of the fields, especially as science becomes more entwined with the process of public policy substantiation.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to intelligence analysis, laying out some fundamentals of the process: types of problems, needs and beneficiaries. A particular focus is laid on the approaches of Clausewitz (he sees uncertainty as a precondition) and Jomini (he seeks to remove uncertainty and find the right answer) related to managing uncertainty. Also, the efficiency of the traditional intelligence cycle, focused on collection, is put under question, and alternatives to improve it are presented.

The next chapter is dedicated to science and looks at a series of failures in this field, thus identifying problems similar to those detailed in the case of intelligence analysis: the inadvertent establishment of a divide between risk and threat; the inability to communicate uncertainty in a visible, easily comprehensible, and actionable way; and the pitfalls of consensus assessments. Dealing with similar problems thus represents an argument for the cooperation between the two knowledge producing fields and the transfer of know how. As enhanced by the volume "intelligence has much to learn from science…operating in a fluid network structure, interacting with the public, stakeholders, and the policy domain in a way traditionally unthinkable in intelligence". On the other hand, science has numerous lessons to learn from intelligence analysis about the classical structural and conceptual roots of failed assessments.

Chapter 5 is drawing a series of analogies between intelligence and other fields. Although the literature in the field focused more on the comparison between intelligence analysis and medicine, and social and natural sciences, the authors identify several novel perspectives, and describe styles of analysis, ways to communicate uncertainty and collect data in fields such as sociology, anthropology, archaeology, journalism or weather forecasting.

The next chapter analyses three common issues that intelligence, medicine and public policy are facing: uncertainty; the focus on self-actions and their implications; and the need to enhance public transparency and outreach. The authors also analyse the role of social media instruments in transforming intelligence. These technologies "completely blur the distinctions between collectors, analysts, and operators, or between producers and consumers… they completely upset existing notions about what intelligence's "products" are."

The advantages of the new collaborative technologies such as wikis, blogs, platforms, and so on, and their impact on reforming the intelligence process are detailed in Chapter 7, which is also tackling the issue of intelligence failures and the reasons why often post event enquiries have not led to the expected transformations of the field, and the avoidance of new failures. In addition, the authors advocate for an intelligence paradigm shift, as intelligence beneficiaries are no longer treated as plain receivers of products but more like clients, to which intelligence services offer advice and help.

The penultimate chapter takes up a risk that seems to affect all fields: politicization. By analysing some case studies from the British, American or Nordic space, the authors conclude that this risk does not manifest itself as a subordination under the political which gives orders, but rather through the fact that intelligence analysts, or any other knowledge producer, are distorting the results, as they self-deter from presenting hypotheses contrary to the response expected by the intelligence beneficiaries.

The concluding chapter returns to the recurring theme of uncertainty. As science and intelligence are increasingly called upon to legitimize and guide the management of complex societal risks, new institutional forms are emerging, and old processes are yielding to new approaches. For instance, the sequential steps of the traditional intelligence cycle are becoming obsolete, and in a world of "mass data, we are less and less likely to start with requirements or formulated hypotheses and more to begin with bits and pieces that might, but only might, constitute part of an answer to questions not yet posed and perhaps not yet even thinkable".

The volume represents a plea for enhancing the cooperation between the intelligence community and the scientific one, as they are the main elements capable of efficiently managing the challenges of the current society which stands under the sign of risks.

The expertise of the authors, the concise language, the plethora of case studies and novel perspectives recommend this volume
development of an intelligence theory.

ACADEMIC FOCUS

„SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA REGION. SHARED CHALLENGES, SUSTAINABLE FUTURE" (SBSR) SECOND EDITION

The Romanian Intelligence Service organized during May 24-30, 2015 via its National Intelligence Academy, the second edition of the international program "Security in the Black Sea Region. Shared challenges, sustainable future" (SBSR), which has been developed in partnership with Harvard University and with the participation of National Intelligence University (US).

Carried out under the auspices of the Romanian Presidential Administration, SBSR takes on the philosophy, mission and goals of the Regional Black Sea Security Program (BSSP), which was initiated by Harvard University 15 years ago.

The current program also embraced the mission to promote and enhance regional actors' responsibility and initiative in approaching security challenges in the Black Sea Region. The second edition focused on "Drivers of conflict, factors of change in the Black Sea neighborhood".

This year's edition was attended by approximately 80 people, keynote speakers and participants from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Canada, Germany, Georgia, Greece, the Netherlands, the United States, the Russian Federation, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as high ranking officials and experts from the European Union and NATO. For details please visit http://www.sbsr.ro

THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR MODELING AND SIMULATION IN INTELLIGENCE

National Center for Modeling and Simulation in Intelligence became operational in 2015, as a structure of the National Intelligence Academy. It is equipped with one of the most advanced and complex virtual simulation platform, dedicated to training practitioners in the field of security and intelligence.

The establishment of the Center is ascribed to the need to consolidate the component of research and development in the field of simulation and modeling, this being an essential domain in the process of reducing subjectivity in intelligence analysis and delineating long-term prognosis on various topics pertained to national, regional and global security.

In order to attain its objective, the Center has been structured on three laboratories, as follows:

-Virtual Simulation and Modeling Laboratory

- Innovative Analytical Methods Laboratory

- OSINT Laboratory

The Center came as the result of implementing the project "Developing a National Center for Research in Intelligence and Security – INTELLISEC", initiated by the National Intelligence Academy within the Sectorial Operational Programme "Increase of Economic Competitiveness". For further details, access www.intellisec.eu

**„COUNTERING HYBRID WARFARE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UKRAINE"
WORKSHOP
Bucharest,
September 28-29, 2015**

The National Intelligence Academy organizes, during 28-29th September 2015, the research workshop "Countering hybrid warfare: lessons learned from Ukraine", which has been developed in cooperation with the National Institute of Intelligence and Security "Bogdan Intemeietorul" from Republic of Moldova, and under the auspices of NATO's Science for Peace and Security Programme.

The objective of the workshop is to offer the framework for debates and discussions, genial to the transfer of expertise and knowledge in matters of the nature of the Ukrainian conflict, the profile of the security threats and their inherent consequences and concurrently, analyzing the impact it had in the process of allocation and management of resources of the states located in the proximity of the conflict.

The event assembles experts from the academia and political environment, from the field of security and intelligence and representatives of the political and military decisional body, that will further disseminate the knowledge acquired and will create new opportunities for debates and discussions in an extended format, pertained to this new generation of conflicts, known as hybrid wars.

During the two-day conference, 50 participants from NATO-member states (Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, USA) and other partner-states (Armenia, Republic of Moldova, Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia and Ukraine), but also representatives of international organizations (OSCE) will debate the concept of hybrid war and its implications on regional and Euro-Atlantic security.

For further details, access www.animv.ro

INTELLIGENCE
IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY XXI
Bucharest,
October 16-17, 2015

The advent of the twenty-first century has had a profound impact on both societies at large and on intelligence organizations. As the digital age advances and the nature of the threats faced by modern states evolved from the classical to the asymmetric, old methods, concepts and approaches have gradually become obsolete.

The twenty-first edition of our annual conference „Intelligence in the Knowledge Society" aims to elicit international, trans-disciplinary debates on the needs of and obstacles to be overcome by the intelligence theory and practice in the twenty-first century.

Controversial topics, innovative solutions, best practices and challenges to be overcome will be addressed in an interactive manner by key note speakers and participants alike.

Surveillance, cyber-warfare, migration and radicalization, tradecraft and analysis, as well as lessons learnt from history will be the topics panelists and speakers will engage with over two days of the 2015 edition of the IKS conference, October 16-17th.

For details please visit the site http://www.intelligencestudies.ro

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ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW

"Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence Academy, via its National Institute for Intelligence Studies, publishes the Romanian Intelligence Studies Review (RISR), a high quality peer reviewed and indexed research journal, edited in Romanian and English twice a year. Submission deadlines: February 1st and July 1st.

The aim of the journal is to create a framework for debate and to provide a platform accessible to researchers, academicians, professional, practitioners and PhD students to share knowledge in the form of high quality empirical and theoretical original research papers, case studies, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, literature reviews and book review within security and intelligence studies and convergent scientific areas.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:
- Security paradigms in the 21st century
- International security environment
- Security strategies and policies
- Security Culture and public diplomacy
- Intelligence in the 21st century
- Intelligence Analysis
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
- History and memory in Intelligence

RISR shall not accept or publish manuscripts without prior peer review. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to the journal's theme, originality and scientific correctness, as well as observance of the publication's norms.

Material which has been previously copyrighted, published, or accepted for publication will not be considered for publication in the journal. There shall be a review process of manuscripts by one or more independent referees who are conversant in the pertinent subject area.

Author(s) should follow the latest edition **of APA style in referencing**. Please visit www.apastyle.org to learn more about APA style, and http://www.animv.ro for author guidelines.

Authors interested in publishing their paper in RISR are kindly invited to submit their proposals electronically in .doc/.docx format at our e-mail address rrsi@sri.ro, with the subject title: RRSI article proposal.