

# ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW

No. 12/December 2014  
Bucharest

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# **ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW**

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## **Syria, from Dictatorship to New Caliphate**

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### **Abstract**

*The outbreak of the Arab revolts<sup>1</sup> of 2010 – 2011, in MENA<sup>2</sup>, led to an unprecedented protest movement on March 15, 2011, in Syria. While in other countries the Arab Spring meant the beginning of the democratization process, Syria has been caught in a bloody civil war, with unexpected effects even for the international policy analysts. President Bashar Al-Assad manages to control a part of the country, while the rest of it is „split” between „rebel forces”. The Arab Spring meant also an Islamic Awakening, including the proclamation of the Caliphate, on the current territory of Syria and Iraq. In this context, Europe has to face new security challenges.*

**Keywords:** Arab Spring, Civil War, Islamic Awakening, Terror, Dictatorship.

### **1. Arab Spring - General Causes and Context of the Outbreak of Revolutions**

After 2010, most MENA countries have started a process of political, social and economic transformation which determined Europe as

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<sup>1</sup> Researchers have not reached a consensus: the Arab Spring events are defined as popular uprisings and sometimes as revolutions. The distinction is important when we talk about the structure of Muslim society.

<sup>2</sup> MENA is the term for the Middle East and North Africa (see World Bank definition at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/overview#1>), an acronym used in academia, military planning, economic literature. The countries included in MENA are, in alphabetical order: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, UAE, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen.

well as other international political actors to formulate more or less appropriate geopolitical replies. MENA was engulfed in a wave of uprisings, generically called by Western media and academia the Arab Spring. Four authoritarian regimes have fallen with the revolutionary wave: Ben Ali's in Tunisia (17 December 2010), of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt (11 February 2011), Gaddafi, Libya (August 23, 2011) and Saleh, Yemen (23 November 2011). Arab Spring reached other countries: Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. In some of these, the leaders have adopted urgent reforms demanded by citizens (Morocco, Jordan), and thus protests have stopped, in others the uprisings were violently suppressed (Bahrain).

Syria, however, is a special case: The Arab Spring has been violently repressed and turned into civil war, the population is caught between a dictatorial regime and the threat of terrorist rather than political opposition groups. Finally, the great international political actors do not have any solution to stabilize or normalize the situation very soon. Syria has seen a territorial division within the borders, more or less acknowledged by the authorities. The situation was further complicated in the summer of 2014, when the extremist group IS- Islamic State, also known as ISIL - Islamic State in Iraq and Levant or ISIS - Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Syria appears in the title as al-Sham, old name of a Syrian province) conquered large parts of the territories of the two countries, now being in control of some important resources and recently declared the restoration of the Caliphate.

Although it is considered that there were general causes, shared in the Arab revolutions, such as youth unemployment, violation of fundamental rights, corruption, etc., Andrea Margelletti<sup>3</sup> has shown that in each country the Arab Spring has a central element: in Tunisia the social character created by economic crisis was highlighted; in Egypt the riots had a political character and were targeted against Mubarak regime; in Libya it was a tribal, separatist revolt against Gaddafi regime. Also, in an article wrote in June 2011, just a few months after the outbreak of the Arab

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<sup>3</sup> Andrea Margelletti, „Introdizione” at *Atlante Geopolitico del Mediterraneo 2013*, Francesco Anghelone, Andrea Ungari (coord.), Istituto di Studi Politici S. Pio V, Rome, 2012, pp. 8-9.



revolutions, Giordano Altarozzi said that „*despite the obvious impact on the evolution of the international system, the causes of the new revolutionary process, that includes these regions, are predominantly internal*”<sup>4</sup>. The Arab Spring, however, coalesced all forces toward a single goal: to end the dictatorships, without necessarily stating a desire for democracy.

Regarding the international community's response to the crisis created by the Arab Spring, it varies from one country to another, even within the European Union, according to the interests of each country. For example, Sarkozy's France and Berlusconi's Italy, had special relationships with Gaddafi. There was even a separate vision of the Mediterranean countries, other than EU vision on the MENA issue: France proposed since 2007 a Union for the Mediterranean, „*a form of institutionalized and structured cooperation*”<sup>5</sup>, an economic cultural, social, health, etc. development program, and solidarity in case of natural disasters. „*In fact, France, Italy, Spain and UK are part of a group of EU countries most involved in the development of the Arab Spring. These four countries supporting the interests of the United States and its policy regarding the Arab Spring, but their national interests in the Mediterranean, as well as their capabilities, were and are very different*”<sup>6</sup>.

US foreign policy analysts for the Middle East show the double American discourse: on the one hand, human rights, and democracy are invoked, on the other hand the actions of governments against their own people are tolerated. The United States have supported the „*trends of democratization*” of Egypt and Libya, yet they have „*closed eyes*” when Bahrain's Pearl Revolution was violently repressed. Bahrain is „*the most glaring exception of a generally benevolent attitude of Obama, regarding*

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<sup>4</sup> Giordano Altarozzi, „Analisi di due processi rivoluzionari: dalle rivoluzioni del 1989 alla Rivoluzione dei Gelsomini”, *Focus- Rivista di Studi Politici, S. Pio V.* (N. 2/2011 - Anno XXIII - April / June, Roma, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> According to Alessandra Mignolli, Daniela Vitiello, „L'Unione Europea, il sistema Schengen e le migrazioni via mare. Considerazioni in merito al recente „Caso Lampedusa” in *Atlante (...)2013 cit.* p. 43.

<sup>6</sup> Roberto Aliboni, „A Transatlantic Perspective on the European Union and the United States in North Africa Strategic Transitions, Perceptions, and Policy Responses”, in *Mediterranean Paper Series 2012*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2012, p. 9.



*the protesters*”<sup>7</sup>. Kenneth Roth considers that the United States government values the relationship with Saudi Arabia and the maintaining of the American naval base for the Fifth Fleet, in Bahrain, rather than the rights of citizens of Bahrain.

Since 2012 there have been signs of „*the inability or refusal of major powers to take new risks to help manage hot spots*” that „*will lead to strong disorders in the Middle East (...) After the Arab Spring, the United States are confronted with an unprecedented lack of influence in the Middle East*”<sup>8</sup>. In close relationship with the United States, two other important political actors have played a role in the events preceding and subsequent to Arab Spring: Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Although the two monarchs do not support democratic movements „at home”, they were actively involved in the countries comprised of the Revolutions in 2011. Apart from investments made by Qatar into countries covered by the Revolution, the powerful TV station Al Jazeera is considered „*a major weapon in Qatar's foreign policy*”<sup>9</sup>. The reporters of this television are those who have transmitted the images of revolutions and the calls to protest. Through its editorial policy, Al Jazeera supports the Islamist political groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

## **2. Syria, Country Profile. Short History.**

Syrian Arab Republic is a semi-presidential republic. Bashar Al-Assad is the President of the Republic since 2000. He was running for presidency again in the summer of 2014, in an electoral process catalogued by his main opponents, and also by Western media, as a „caricature”. Its 21 million inhabitants are ethnically diverse (Arabs- 82%, Kurds - 7.3%,

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<sup>7</sup> Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, „Renunțați la acești opt aliați indezirabili!”, *Foreign Policy România*, January-February, 2013, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup> \*\*\*, „Cele mai mari 10 RISCURI care amenință lumea în 2012”, Institutul Pentru Cercetări Politice, available at: <http://www.icp.org.ro/stiri/cele-mai-mari-10-riscuri-care-ameninta-lumea-2012.htm>, accessed on September 15, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> Patrick Schulze-Heil, „Qatar: An economic and religious offensive”, *Monde Arabe*, June 28, 2012, available at: <http://monde-arabe.arte.tv/en/qatar-an-economic-and-religious-offensive/>, accessed on October 1, 2014.

Armenians - 2.7%, others - 3.8%), different denominations (Sunni Muslim - 74%, Shia Muslims<sup>10</sup> - 12%, Christian -5.5%, Druze<sup>11</sup> 3%, as other religions - 5.5%) and speak a multitude of languages and dialects (Arabic - official language, Aramaic, Armenian, Circassian and Kurdish)<sup>12</sup>. This mosaic of ethnicities and religions play an important role in the developments in Syria, as we shall see. Also, way that current events have unfolded has its roots in history. European powers, on the one hand, and the powers in the region, on the other hand, claim important roles in the political, economic, social and cultural life of Syria.

### **2.1. Syria, an Old Dispute between European Powers**

Since 1516 Syria has been ruled by the Ottoman Empire, but direct contact with the central authorities was limited. European powers such as France and Russia have called in the 16th and 18th centuries for the right to protect Catholics or Orthodox in this area. The creation of Lebanon in 1861 is thus related to the intervention of European powers, which demanded to the Ottoman Empire the separation from Syria, following the repression of Maronites' riots. In these circumstances, France gradually took over Lebanon's government. World War I made Syria, again, the theater of confrontation of European powers. Great Britain claimed the Arab nationalist movement in order to weaken the power of the Ottoman Empire. Hussein, „*Sharif of Mecca (...) defender of Holy Places and descendant of*

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<sup>10</sup> Shi'ism has existed since the beginning of Islam and refers to partisans (Shia) of the Prophet son-in-law, Ali. Unlike Sunni, there is a clergy responsible for the interpretation of doctrine, according to Francois Massoulie, *Conflictele din Orientul Mijlociu*, Publishing House BIC ALL, Bucharest, 2003, p. 41.

<sup>11</sup> Druze are relatively a small Middle Eastern religious sect characterized by an eclectic system of doctrines and by a cohesion and loyalty among its members that have enabled them to maintain for centuries of turbulent history their close-knit identity and distinctive faith, according to Enciclopedia Britannica, available at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/172195/Druze>, accessed on September 10, 2014. They enjoyed the protection of Assad regime, according to Gianmarco Volpe, „La Siria oggi”, in *Atlante Geopolitico del Mediterraneo 2014*, Francesco Anghelone, Andrea Ungari (coord.), Istituto di Studi Politici S. Pio V, DataneWS Editrice, Rome, 2014, p. 306.

<sup>12</sup> According to *Atlante (...)2014 cit.*, p. 286.

*the Prophet*"<sup>13</sup>, the head of the Hashemite family, supported by the British, triggered anti-Ottoman revolt in 1916. His son, Faysal entered triumphantly into Damascus in October 1918, as military government, and assumed the leadership of Syria, except for French-controlled areas. In July 1919, the General Syrian Congress declared a free and sovereign Syria, and in 1920 Faysal became King. The European powers, namely France and the UK, and the Jews in Palestine did not want an independent Syria. Under these conditions, the two allied powers signed the famous Sykes-Picot secret agreement: France controlled Syria and Lebanon, and Great Britain, Transjordan and Iraq, although the British promised to create an Arab kingdom. The two powers dealt in this Agreement also the Palestine issue. Neither under French mandate Syria did not enjoyed stability: in an attempt to weaken Arab nationalism, France had a number of initiatives for ethnic and territorial divisions. Syrian nationalists' riots and French riposte have continued until the eve of the Second World War. Charles de Gaulle's France allowed in 1943 the election of a Syrian Parliament, and in 1944 the Soviet Union recognized the sovereignty of Syria, followed by the United States and Britain. Syria became a founding member of the United Nations and the Arab League in 1945. After a year France has abandoned any claim on Syria, which became independent on April 17, 1946. Conflicts with the newly formed State of Israel (1948) and successive coups made, in the '50s and '60s, Syria an unstable country. Also it became close to Soviet ideology and the pan-Arab Ba'ath Party claimed the internal political scene. In this context, the military Hafez Al-Assad, a moderate Ba'athist member, came to power following a coup and ruled Syria since the '70s and until 2000.

After the seizure of power, Hafez Al-Assad has realized that a mix of religions and ethnicities requires the maintenance of a balance that enables it to govern Syria. Under the Constitution of 1973, Islam was not mentioned as the state religion, despite the fact that there is a Sunni majority. „*Ba'ath Party's founders, one Sunni Muslim and one Greek Orthodox Christian (...) considered Islam more of a cultural commonality than an all-guidang force (...) and Syria would be 'a planned socialist, economy*"<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> According to Francois Massoulie, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>14</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *The Battle for Arab Spring- Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era*, update edition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2013, p. 216.

After the death of Hafez, the position was taken over by his son, Bashar Al-Assad. It's important the Assad family's affiliation to an Alawite<sup>15</sup> branch and the presence of an axis Damascus - Lebanese Hezbollah - Shia Iran, which made Syria „an extremist country” in the eyes of the West and made George W. Bush's administration to declare Syria as part of „axis of evil”<sup>16</sup>. Hafez Al-Assad used three items to keep himself in power, elements „inherited” by Bashar: „a military security complex, Ba'athist party apparatus and a new Alawite elite”<sup>17</sup>. Bashar took over from his father an authoritarian state, with a stagnant economy, a persistent corruption and political oppression - a *mukhabarat*<sup>18</sup> state, ie dominated by security and military apparatus. Assad's offer was „more stability to the price of less freedom”, especially since there were always wars at the borders.

Bashar inherited from his father - is what we call, as in North Korea and most likely was planned to happen in Egypt and Libya, „a dynastic presidency”, a way to prepare the dictators' sons to take power, through apparent legal methods – a foreign policy that enables him to maintain power. Researchers say that is a „crossroads”<sup>19</sup> of foreign policy: Syria was close to Iran, while never turning its back on Europe; stored hopes of peace without a treaty with Israel, but encouraged the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah and certain Palestinian factions; Syria shared intelligence on Islamic militants with Washington, but also facilitated the insurgency in post-Saddam in Iraq. Maybe this is why the great powers did not know which card to play once of the Syrian Spring began.

Because I said that history has always played an important role in the shaping of this area, it is time to remember that Syria now has no peace treaty with Israel, although the two states have signed a ceasefire after the war for the heights Golan in 1973. Also, Syria has always considered

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<sup>15</sup> Alawites is a Shia community, widespread in Syria and Lebanon. They are seen as schismatics. According to Dumitru Chican, *Mic lexicon al Orientului Mijlociu –Istorie, conflicte, politică, religii, valori și concepte*, Publishing House Proema, Baia-Mare, 2011, p. 19.

<sup>16</sup> According to Francesco Anghelone, „Siria-La Storia”, in *Atlante(...)2014 cit.*, p.296.

<sup>17</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

<sup>18</sup> According to David W. Lesch, *Syria -The fall of the House of Assad*, New Update Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2012/2013, p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 223.

Lebanon „its province”<sup>20</sup>, has deployed troops in 1976 during the civil war in Lebanon, where they remained for nearly three decades. Meanwhile the Syrian regime has cultivated Shiite Hezbollah to fight Israel, and to prevent the creation of an Islamic (Sunni) Lebanese State.

After taking power, Bashar Al-Assad has brought economic cultural and social openness in order to permit greater political and media freedom and the cancellation of emergency state, instituted since 1963. In 2000 he allowed Internet access. But even with these measures, freedom of expression was almost nonexistent: „Syria was ranked a miserable 173 out of 178 countries in 2010 Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders”<sup>21</sup>. It is said that during the regime of Hafez Al-Assad was not even an ATM in Syria, but Bashar opened banks, tourism has flourished - 8,5 million foreigners visited Syria in 2010<sup>22</sup>. Despite the reforms, his regime remains one of the most authoritarian dictatorships in the Middle East.

### **3. The Syrian Spring**

An unprecedented protest movement began on 15 March 2011 in Syria, followed by an appeal on a Facebook page, „*Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad 2011*”<sup>23</sup>, that encouraged to uprising for „*a Syria without tyranny, without emergency law and without exceptional tribunals*”<sup>24</sup>. Daraa, a city near the border with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan started the revolution. Protests in the streets were extended and included the whole country, but were violently suppressed by the authorities. Even if those who wrote the first anti-Assad messages on school's walls were children, Syrian security had no moderation to arrest and torture them. In late March 2011, revolution swept Damascus, and until the end of the same year several Syrian cities were in full revolt.

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 217.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 219.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 220.

<sup>23</sup> <https://ar-ar.facebook.com/Syrian.Revolution>

<sup>24</sup> Rodica Binder, „Siria în stare de asediu”, *Deutsche Welle*, 25.04.2011, available at: <http://www.dw.de/siria-%C3%AEn-stare-de-asediu/a-15028273>, accessed on September 10, 2014.

Again, we go back to history and ethnic mosaic: Kurds in Syria have been marginalized by Assad dictatorships, many Kurdish refugees from Turkey having no Syrian nationality and being practically „stateless”<sup>25</sup>. Kurds in Syria were not cultural or linguistic rights and the Syrian authorities have handed the Turks many important leaders of the PKK. So, in 2012, the Kurds have chosen to rebel against the Assad regime. Also Sunni Islamists saw in Arab Spring the ideal moment to assert themselves. Christians lived in harmony with other faiths, with relative protection of the government, so they were not very determined, initially, to join the protests.

In 2012 Bashar Al-Assad began a campaign of „punishment” by aerial bombing aimed at the population. In 2013 ballistic missiles were used to attack residential districts in Aleppo, and the international community classified the attacks as war crimes. „*These conclusions were reached by foreign chanceries after the use of chemical weapons, in August, 2013, in Damascus*”<sup>26</sup>.

The real number of dead is not known, but in 2014 it is estimated at over 150,000 and 9 million Syrian are refugees (3,000,000 in other countries) or displaced to other parts of Syria, according to the UN Refugee Agency - UNHCR<sup>27</sup>. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, has called the situation in Syria „*the most critical humanitarian emergency of our era*”<sup>28</sup>.

The main causes of the outbreak of revolution in Syria were a combination of factors: youth unemployment, economic crisis, precarious political balance, military Alawi „dictatorship”, the political and economic control of Syrian resources. „*Theoretically, Syria is a parliamentary Republic that recognizes the principle of separation of powers. Executive power is exercised by the President of the Republic, which can initiate legislative proposals, gives decrees may amend the Constitution, decide the*

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<sup>25</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 232.

<sup>26</sup> Georg Meyr, *Siria, un inverno arabo*, Panozzi Editore, Rimini, 2013, p. 33.

<sup>27</sup> \*\*\*, „Syria Regional Refugee Response”, *UNHCR Report*, available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>, accessed on October 2, 2014.

<sup>28</sup> Quoted in „Siria: allarme dell’ONU, “oltre tre milioni di rifugiati”, *MediArabe.info*, August 29, 2014, available at: <http://www.mediarabe.info/spip.php?breve25230>, accessed on October 1, 2014. („Syria: UN warning, “more than three million refugees”)



*Cabinet and military officials, but the army may declare „state of emergency” and suspend all constitutional guarantees and rights”<sup>29</sup>.*

Syrian dictatorial regime does not recognize multipartism or free electoral competition. „Under the Constitution, the only party allowed is the Ba'ath Party”<sup>30</sup>. In this way the Assad family has direct access or right to operate, in the party-state apparatus.

### **3.1. A New Cold War? International Political Actors' Position**

Syria became immediately after the suppression of the first Arab Spring protests, the theater of a civil war between different religious forces, firstly. Alawite Minority supported by Iran and Hezbollah faces a Sunni majority. Tehran sees Syria as a vital ally to maintain influence in the Middle East, in mediating communication with Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supporting the Sunni „rebel forces” without supporting their ideas of democracy, which could bring problems „at home”. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are exactly the counterpart to the influence of Tehran. In Doha (Qatar) was formed in November 2012 the National Syrian Coalition of the opposition and revolutionary forces. The coalition is recognized by many European and MENA countries as „the legitimate representative of the Syrian people”. However, the coalition is challenged because of its inefficiency, even inside the Syrian rebel forces. Since 2011 Qatar withdrew its embassy in Damascus, followed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait so „several Gulf states became increasingly vocal in calling for outside intervention in Syria”<sup>31</sup>. Syrian rebel forces, so often quoted by the media, but rarely identified, are brought together under the Free Syrian Army and they recruit fighters from Arab-Muslim countries, and also from Western Europe and America. It is the army of the Coalition. Since the beginning of the Syrian Spring extremist forces like Al-Nusra Front emerged, considered part of the Iraqi branch of Al Qaeda. „The rebels” managed in 2013 to take control of Aleppo, „the economic heart of the country”<sup>32</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> According to Gianmarco Volpe, *op.cit.*, p.297.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, p.298.

<sup>31</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 236.

<sup>32</sup> According to Gianmarco Volpe, *op.cit.*, p. 300.



The Syrian conflict has already draw two „blocs” of the political actors: Arab monarchies, allies of the United States, while Putin's Russia has made clear its support for the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and Iran. It's probably a new Cold War, in view of the crisis in Ukraine which has polarized Europe, on the one hand, and MENA countries, on the other. In terms of an internal Cold War in the Arab-Muslim countries (this is because Iran is not an Arab country, but it is a Muslim one) Saudi Arabia-Iran relationship occurs. „As Washington and Moscow in the days of the Cold War, Iran and Saudi Arabia have not been directly confronted. But, as the ideological confrontation between the USA and USSR took place, religious conflict between Shiites and Sunnis, who are in charge of the two countries, led to bloody clashes elsewhere: Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain”<sup>33</sup>.

Regarding the US's attitude towards the crisis in Syria, David Rothkopf<sup>34</sup> argues that the Obama administration had, despite a tough speech, delayed reactions. These can be explained because the US did not want to repeat the Bush's administration mistakes in Iraq. According to the American researcher, the US administration showed indecision, plus „diplomatic mistakes” such as spying on European allies (Germany), who have now become more reluctant to USA. Now the United States faces a major shortcoming: „The United States has any power in large quantities, except one: legitimacy (...) that allows setting the agenda”<sup>35</sup>. Humanitarian aid to civilians in Syria, supporting the opposition against Assad regime, the demands to Syria to give up its chemical arsenal or the air raids against ISIS are not enough. Hesitations are explainable: more support to opponents of Assad could mean encouraging the jihadi movements.

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<sup>33</sup> Ugo Tramballi, „Le periferie della grande guerra contro il califfato”, *Affari Internazionali - Rivista online di politica, strategia ed economia*, October 7, 2014, available at: <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2827>, accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> David Rothkopf is CEO and editor for Foreign Policy Group. The Article „Încă sunteți o superputere”, published by Foreign Policy Romania, October/November 2014, pp. 60-65, is a prologue of his book *National Insecurity: American Leadership in an age of Fear*, volume to appear this year.

<sup>35</sup> Fareed Zakaria, *Lumea Postamericană*, Publishing House Polirom, Iasi, Bucharest, 2009, p. 215.

The Syrian Spring, now transformed in the war between the Assad regime and the „rebels”, and in addition a conflict „Iraq plus Syria” against ISIS, also affects other countries, „*brinkmanship: Turkey, Iran and Israel*”.<sup>36</sup>

Turkey is a NATO member, but seems a long way from becoming an EU member, has nearly 900 km of common border with Syria and faces new vulnerabilities that threaten its security: the creation of a Kurdish state, encouraged by the policy of arming the Kurds by European powers (Germany)<sup>37</sup> in order to confront ISIS. In addition, in Turkey there are over 1 million Syrian refugees, according to UNHCR<sup>38</sup>, in September 2014. Turkey has turned, over the three years since the outbreak of the Syrian Spring, from an ally, to an enemy of Syria.

Francois Massoulie argues that „*the existence of Israel in the heart of the Middle East polarizes most of the conflicts in the region*”<sup>39</sup>. Regarding the Syrian Spring, Israel's position is rather complicated and concerns the security issues: diplomatic interventions are marginal, but since 2013 the Israeli armed forces carried out three air raids in Syria which have targeted „*a military research center in Damascus where suspected that are produced and stored chemical weapons; a convoy carrying SA-17 air defense missiles for Hezbollah Lebanese most likely; an armory inside the airport in Damascus where it was believed to have been deposited Fateh-110 missile, that arrived from Iran and destined for Lebanon's „Party of God*”<sup>40</sup>. However, Israel is trying to remain outside the conflict: „*Only the failure of negotiations on the Iranian nuclear issue could push Israel directly into the battlefield*”<sup>41</sup>.

Currently, international political analysts do not see a practical and immediate solution to the Syrian crisis. There have been political and

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<sup>36</sup> Ugo Tramballi, *cit.*

<sup>37</sup> „*Council of Ministers headed by Angela Merkel decided to deliver weapons Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq. They will receive 16,000 automatic weapons G3 and G36, 8,000 guns, 10,000 hand grenades, 240 portable anti-tank weapons, 30 anti-tank weapons Milan type, 500 missiles and vehicles*”, according to: „*Arme germane pentru kurzii irakieni*”, *Deutsche Welle*, September 1, 2014, available at: <http://www.dw.de/arme-germane-pentru-kurzii-irakieni/a-17893258>, accessed on October 1, 2014.

<sup>38</sup> Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>, accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>39</sup> Francois Massoulie, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>40</sup> According to Gianmarco Volpe, *op.cit.*, p.302.

<sup>41</sup> Ugo Tramballi, *cit.*

economic sanctions against the Assad regime, adopted by EU and USA. The EU has tried to intervene with financial resources to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria and in January 2013 the European Commission has said it will support Syria with over 265 million euros plus contributions from states, reaching 453 million. A partial „derogation” to the economic embargo, for the supply of weapons for Syrian National Coalition has also been introduced by the European Council<sup>42</sup>. In June 2013, Egypt announced the cessation of diplomatic relations with Syria<sup>43</sup>. Diplomatic solution was attempted: Geneva 1 and Geneva 2 in January and February (2014), where the Syrian opposition forces and the Assad regime would have to negotiate reforms and the end to the civil war under UN auspices. To date (October 2014) an agreement has not been reached and the UN has established a new appointment.

Russia, however, opposes any Western intervention in Syria, including in the UN Security Council, although it is facing also the terrorism on Islamic foundations. There are strategic interests, Italian political analysts said: „*Moscow's strategic interests in the region (...) are related to the unique Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, at Tartus*”<sup>44</sup>. Moreover, Syria had since the early 50's special relations with Russia. At that time, the United States feared communist expansion in the Middle East, but Nasser's Egypt was favorable to USSR (remember that Egypt and Syria formed the United Arab Republic for 3 years). In addition, the Ba'ath Party came to power in Syria in 1963, which prompted the USSR to intervene in the Middle East. The Syria-Russia Alliance was strengthened even after the coming to power of Hafez Al-Assad, especially when the Arab-Israeli conflict became virulent. The USSR supported Damascus in the 1973 in Yom Kippur War, at military and diplomatic level, to achieve a ceasefire under UN. In 80s, the USSR - Syria partnership was reinforced by a friendship and cooperation treaty, including providing weapons to Syria. Today, a pipeline makes even strongly the Russian-Syrian relations. „*In fact, Russia wants the West to recognize its role in the Middle East. The*

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<sup>42</sup> Georg Meyr, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-44.

<sup>43</sup> \*\*\*, „Egypt Cuts Diplomatic Ties with Syria”, 15.06.2013, *Al-Jazeera*, available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/06/201361519182028756.html>, accessed on September 8, 2014.

<sup>44</sup> Gianmarco Volpe, *op.cit.*, p.300.

*difference between the Arab Spring in Syria and other countries is Russian intervention*”<sup>45</sup>.

### **3.2. „The Syrian Solution”**

While some scholars, such as David W. Lesch, consider it is only a matter of time until the fall of „the House of Assad”<sup>46</sup>, other researchers argue that „*the path towards it has already been longer, bloodier and fraught with more danger for Syria and all its neighbours*”<sup>47</sup>. There are scenarios that, in the absence of international solutions, the Assad regime could reform itself. This would mean however that Syria and the Assad regime will never be as before the outbreak of the Arab Spring<sup>48</sup>.

## **4. ISIS and the Proclamation of the Caliphate**

### **4.1. „The Islamic Awakening”, Islamism and Jihadism.**

The Arab Spring has meant an „Islamic awakening”. In all countries where dictators feared of opposition forces with Islamic bases, these parties were banned before the revolutions in 2010-2011. As the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) came to power after the Arab Spring. But after the overthrow of MB leader, Mohammad Morsi, and the installation of Sisi's regime (considered by some countries such as Turkey, a coup) MB and Freedom and Justice Party, were declared again illegal and more, the Brotherhood is now considered a terrorist group<sup>49</sup>.

Without many explanations of the term Islamism, we consider it as „religion translated into policy”. „*Allah is our goal, the Prophet is our model; Our constitution and our law is the Quran, the holy war is the path*

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<sup>45</sup> Georg Meyr, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>46</sup> David W. Lesch, *op.cit.*

<sup>47</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

<sup>48</sup> David W. Lesch, *op.cit.*, pp. 264-267.

<sup>49</sup> Jason Szep, Shadi Bushral, „Egypt says coalition must battle ISIS and other terrorist”, *Reuters* quoted by *The Daily Star Lebanon*, septembrie 2014, available at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Sep-14/270602-egypt-says-coalition-must-battle-isis-and-other-terrorists.ashx#axzz3FtjIHaNZ>, accessed on October 3, 2014.

we chose, and martyrdom is our deepest desire”, these are the MB's principles<sup>50</sup>, the first form of Islamism.

*Jihad*<sup>51</sup> would be, firstly, effort of self-purification to achieve perfection, to become a good Muslim. It also means an obligation to defend the Muslim community from external threats<sup>52</sup>. The term has experienced a political transformation and has become synonymous with terrorism with religious justification.

What is ISIS? Al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya, ISIS - Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant<sup>53</sup> or IS- Islamic State, is a special organization, precisely because it defines itself as „state”, not „group”. If we translate from Arabic exactly the term „al- Dawla”, this means „country”. It also covers a territorial expanse, and refers to an official designation of a country, so it is preferred the translation of the term by „state”.

ISIS is known for extreme violence directed not only against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and the Iraqi regime, but also against „moderate rebels” in Syria. It controls a territory in Syria and Iraq „the size of Belgium”<sup>54</sup>. It promotes total war within Islam and against the West and in June 2014, it proclaimed, on internet, the Caliphate.

The term *halifa*, caliph, is used in the Quran as „caretaker for law enforcement”<sup>55</sup> and it means successor to the Prophet. For the first time, the caliph role was assumed by Abu Bakr as-Siddiq (634 C.E.). The third caliph, Abd al-Malik Ibn Marwan (685-705) took the title of *halifat Allah*, „God's Deputy”<sup>56</sup>. Caliph should manage as a representative of *dawla* („state”) the relation between religion and the world, is the guarantor of Islamic law and the key-tool of authority. „Under the caliphs, the community of Medina (...)grew in a century into a vaste empire, and Islam became a world

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<sup>50</sup> According to Dumitru Chican, *op.cit*, p. 148.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 160.

<sup>52</sup> Albert Hourani, *Istoria Popoarelor Arabe*, Publishing House Polirom, Iasi, Bucharest, 2010, p. 165.

<sup>53</sup> territories of Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus

<sup>54</sup> Elena Zacchetti, „Che cos'è l'ISIS, spiegato bene”, *Il Post*, June 19, 2014, available at: <http://www.ilpost.it/2014/06/19/isis-iraq/>, accessed on October 3, 2014.

<sup>55</sup> Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă. Concepte-cheie între tradiție și inovație*, Publishing House Polirom, Iasi, Bucharest, 2009, p. 43.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 44.

religion”<sup>57</sup>. Bernard Lewis says that the theory of the Muslim law foresees there could be only one Muslim State, House of Islam<sup>58</sup>, and only one ruler, the caliph. The Caliphate, which has experienced a Golden Age during the first four „orthodox” caliphs, was abolished only in 1924 by the Turkish Republic.

ISIS’ religious fanaticism, beheadings posted online and the other forms of extreme violence that are designed to induce terror, are considered „a marginal fact”: „Instead, there is a conflict in the Arab-Islamic world, in order to exploit gaps left by the destruction of state power in countries such as Syria or Iraq”<sup>59</sup>. The UN<sup>60</sup>, as countries and media from around the world as well, declared the Islamic State a terrorist organization. Researchers of Arab political thought show that ISIS, as any jihadist organization, primarily focuses its actions on Muslims, residents of countries in which it operates and then on the foreigners. „The duty of Jihad (...) is to destroy the tyrant at home and thus make possible the restoration of a truly Islamic society”<sup>61</sup>

Roberto Iannuzzi<sup>62</sup> sees in ISIS a symptom, and not the cause of the catastrophic situation of the Arab-Muslim world. „The authoritarianism of Arab regimes, corruption, lack of freedom and social justice, but also the continuing external interference and regional conflicts have created a fertile ground for the growth of extremist groups such as IS”<sup>63</sup>. Iannuzzi sees a solution to the situation of Syria only in the context of diplomatic actions of the USA and other international political actors, which can bring political

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<sup>57</sup> Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History- Ideas, People and Events in the Middle East*, New Edition, Revised and Explained, Open Court Publishing Company, Illinois, 2002, p. 262.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 318.

<sup>59</sup> Marco Todarello, „ISIS, Silvia Colombo: «Non è solo guerra santa»”, în *Lettera 43*, September 5, 2014, available at: [http://www.lettera43.it/fatti/isis-silvia-colombo-non-e-solo-guerra-santa\\_43675139959.htm](http://www.lettera43.it/fatti/isis-silvia-colombo-non-e-solo-guerra-santa_43675139959.htm), accessed on October 6, 2014. Silvia Colombo is a researcher at Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome (Italy), expert in Middle East politics.

<sup>60</sup> \*\*\*, „Security Council concerned about illicit oil trade as revenue for terrorists in Iraq, Syria”, *UN News Centre*, July 28, 2014, available at: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48363#.VAjlAxaRYxB>, accessed on October 2, 2014.

<sup>61</sup> Bernard Lewis, *Islam...*, p. 379.

<sup>62</sup> Roberto Iannuzzi is a researcher at UNIMED, Unione delle Università del Mediterraneo.

<sup>63</sup> Roberto Iannuzzi, „I rischi della strategia di Obama contro lo Stato islamico”, *Affari Internazionali - Rivista online di politica, strategia ed economia*, September 13, 2014, available at: <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2804>, accessed on October 9, 2014.



and economic reform in the Middle East, not only by military action. „U.S. warplanes have carried out almost 90 percent of airstrikes against the ISIS while Arab and European countries all together carried out the remaining 10 percent”<sup>64</sup>. „The stakes are very high: the territorial integrity of countries such as Syria and Iraq, providing energy to the West and political and economic stability of the planet”<sup>65</sup>.

Giuseppe Cucchi<sup>66</sup> believes that the lack of major conflicts in Europe after the Second World War made the European countries believe in a future free of violence, to think they need only „sham armies”<sup>67</sup> which intervene only in peacekeeping missions. He also considers that the United States believed that through what is called *smart strategy*, ie the Obama administration's strategy of putting the responsibility to intervene on the shoulders of regional allies „without undermining the power of the United States”<sup>68</sup>, will work in the Middle East conflicts. What is the worst in the eyes of European governments and United States, is the fact that among fighters ISIS there are thousands of European and American *citizens*, most of them Muslims. The fear is that this conflict will be no longer „on the borders of Europe, but at home”<sup>69</sup>.

#### **4.2. Who are the European Jihadists?**

Who are European Muslims who choose to fight in extremist groups, in countries with they do not have seemingly any connection to? This is the question that troubles the European governments and the United States. It is not news that ISIS seeks followers from Europe. Al Qaeda made the same. „The Map of Al Qaeda recruitment do not corresponds to the conflicts in the Middle East, because it contains young European Muslims from the second

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<sup>64</sup> \*\*\*, „U.S. dominates military campaign against ISIS”, *Al-Arabiya News*, October 7, 2014, available at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/07/U-S-Air-Force-dominates-campaign-against-ISIS.html>, accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>65</sup> Roberto Iannuzzi, *op cit*.

<sup>66</sup> General Giuseppe Cucchi was permanent military representative to NATO, and EU military adviser to the President of the Council of Ministers.

<sup>67</sup> Giuseppe Cucchi, „Il campanello d'allarme: Grazie, Califfato! Grazie, Califfo!”, *Affari Internazionali - Rivista online di politica, strategia ed economia*, October 6, 2014, available at: <http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2825#sthash.q1l2jpDK.dpuf>, accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*.



generation”<sup>70</sup>. In fact, ISIS was part of Al Qaeda until it was deemed too violent even for it. At the end of 2013, the leader of Al Qaeda, Zawahiri, urged ISIL fighters to stay away from Syria, because there Al Qaeda was already represented by the extremist group Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIL, the new caliph, rejected the proposal, and Al Qaeda has publicly<sup>71</sup> recanted ISIL.

Two renowned researchers drew attention to recruiting European Muslims from the second or third generation by extremist groups: Olivier Roy and Bernard Lewis. The foundations of such a choice seem rather cultural.

Bernard Lewis explains that until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Muslims could not live in other territories but in those where Islam prevails, considered „the land of peace”. This is because Europe was called Christendom and also „the land of war”. Initially, a Muslim did not choose willingly to settle in Europe. Muslims came to Europe for employment, education and freedom of expression, etc. But first they define themselves as Muslims and then as Syrians, Egyptians, Turks. This brings compact Muslim communities in European territory, which must provide a way of life according to the Quran.

Olivier Roy<sup>72</sup> argues that Islamic fundamentalism is the result of a „territorial deprivation” of Islam and that „*Islamic identity of the second or third generation of immigrants in Western countries, which have been formed as personalities outside their traditional and cultural area, incite feelings of rejection of Western values, like of democracy and modernity, even stronger*”. Roy also stated that „*youngsters who join (...) jihads currently, they do it on a failure, a breaking*”<sup>73</sup> with the family, entourage, country of origin or the country where they live now.

Bernard Lewis sees in Saudi organizations, that accords material and financial support to Muslims in Europe, the source of radical sunnism. He points to the case of Germany, where generations of Muslims studied Wahhabi<sup>74</sup> Islam exported from Saudi Arabia: „*The last time I looked,*

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<sup>70</sup> Olivier Roy, *Semiluna și haosul*, Publishing House Nemira, Bucharest, 2010, p. 45.

<sup>71</sup> According to Elena Zacchetti, *op cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Olivier Roy *apud* Cristian Barna, „Resurgența terorismului fundamentalist islamic în era globalizării”, *Terorismul azi*, vol. IV-VI, October to December 2006, Cluj-Napoca, pp. 47-48.

<sup>73</sup> Olivier Roy, *op cit.* 114.

<sup>74</sup> In Saudi Arabia, Sharia is substitute for Constitution.

*twelve Turks have been arrested as members of Al Qaeda- all twelve of them born and educated in Germany*"<sup>75</sup>.

Currently, the figures show more than 3,000 Europeans<sup>76</sup> fighting on the side of ISIS. Olivier Roy considers, also ISIS, just a sign of a crisis of Islam: „*The number of converted people is also a sign of crisis: 20-25% of the jihadists are converted. Check out the video: all speak a perfect English or French. Most jihadists are converted Americans, followed by French*”<sup>77</sup>. Europeans and Americans, converted to Islam, is related to a „call of fundamentalists”: „*Fundamentalists call is heard because it invites people to participate, as opposed to a political culture that reduces citizens to mere spectators and asks them to leave everything to leaders*”<sup>78</sup>. Olivier Roy mentions the same cultural causes: young jihadists are activists, „*often uprooted (...)Islam gives a global dimension, perhaps a mystical name for a cause. Today, jihad is the only issue on the market (...)We refuge in the clash of cultures, without seeing the global aspect of the phenomenon. However, these conflicts are symptoms of the same cultural collapse*”<sup>79</sup>.

## **5. A Few Conclusions:**

1. Even if the Assad regime will fall as a result of internal/international interventions, or even due to the voluntary resignation of Bashar Al-Assad, „*the episode illustrated the ethnic, religious and geopolitical tightrope that any future leaders in Syria will have to walk*”<sup>80</sup>

2. Syria could „disintegrate” in several territories, on ethnic and religious bases. This would encourage also the creation of a Kurdish state in

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<sup>75</sup> Bernard Lewis, *Faith and Power-Religion and Politics in the Middle East*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, pp. 163-164.

<sup>76</sup> \*\*\*, „Islamic State crisis: '3,000 European jihadists join fight'”, *BBC News Middle East*, September 26, 2014, available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29372494>, accessed on October 9, 2014.

<sup>77</sup> Catherine Calvet, Anastasia Vécirin, „Olivier Roy: «Le jihad est aujourd'hui la seule cause sur le marché»”, interview of *Liberation*, October 3, 2014, available at: [http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2014/10/03/le-jihad-est-aujourd-hui-la-seule-cause-sur-le-marche\\_1114269](http://www.liberation.fr/monde/2014/10/03/le-jihad-est-aujourd-hui-la-seule-cause-sur-le-marche_1114269), accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>78</sup> Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, apud Fareed Zakaria, *Viitorul libertății-Democrația neliberală în Statele Unite ale Americii și în lume*, Publishing House Polirom, Iasi, Bucharest, 2009, p. 125.

<sup>79</sup> Catherine Calvet, Anastasia Vécirin, *op cit.*

<sup>80</sup> Lin Nouheihed, Alex Warren, *op.cit.*, p. 239.

the Iraq-Syria-Turkey joint area and claim a different status for the Kurds in Turkey.

3. Instability in Syria and Iraq could trigger a new Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and between the United States and Russia<sup>81</sup>, their major allies.

4. The „Power vacuum” in Syria has enabled the rise of extremist groups, which are now claiming a role in the management and organization of political and social life.

5. Europe - and I understand both EU member states and non-member states, such as Turkey - needs to reach an unified and clear standpoint, in terms of both Syria and other MENA countries that have experienced political changes after 2011. In the absence of common concept of action, for example, Turkey and Italy are hardly facing the wave of migrants from MENA, while European community does not allocate sufficient funds or other resources to solve the crisis. UNHCR data<sup>82</sup> shows that in 2014, over 165,000 refugees and migrants arrived by sea in the Mediterranean, compared to 60,000 in 2013. 140,000 of the 165,000 refugees, have arrived in Italy, about 500 refugees were rescued each day under Italian navy operation „Mare Nostrum”. Half of the refugees are from Syria and Eritrea. In December 2013, Amnesty International<sup>83</sup> accused the EU of „shameful behavior against Syrian refugees”, given the decisions of countries to not receive any refugees or to receive only a small number, while Turkey<sup>84</sup> is striving to receive and provide asylum to more than 1 million Syrian refugees.

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<sup>81</sup> Russia considers NATO a Cold War institution, which has to be abolished, despite the establishment of the Russia-NATO Council in 1997, according to Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, *Securitate, Suveranitate și instituții internaționale*, Publishing House Polirom, Iasi, Bucharest, 2010, p. 155.

<sup>82</sup> \*\*\*, UNHCR Report „So Close yet so far from Safety”, October 2014, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opedocPDFViewer.html?docid=542c07e39&query=refugees%20italy%20sea>, accessed on October 10, 2014.

<sup>83</sup> \*\*\*, „Amnesty International denuncia il vergognoso comportamento dell'Unione europea nei confronti dei rifugiati siriani”, December 2013, report available at: [http://www.amnesty.it/Vergognoso\\_comportamento-ue-verso-rifugiati-siriani](http://www.amnesty.it/Vergognoso_comportamento-ue-verso-rifugiati-siriani), accessed on October 9, 2014.

<sup>84</sup> According to AFP, „Almost one million Syrian refugees in Turkey”, *apud Al Arabyia*, April 2014, available at: <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/04/22/-Almost-one-million-Syrian-refugees-in-Turkey.html>, accessed on October 9, 2014.

6. In the absence of concrete measures to integrate immigrants from the Arab-Muslim world, in the presence of phenomena such as Islamophobia, and also given a cultural and identity crisis of Europeans seeking causes for which to fight (in the light of thesis submitted by Olivier Roy and Bernard Lewis), the risk of deepening the phenomenon of joining extremist groups and initiating terrorist actions in Europe is increased. „Moving toward an violent act is very fast when people return to religion or converting to”<sup>85</sup>, notices O. Roy.

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<sup>85</sup> Olivier Roy, *op. cit.*, p.114.

13. Laura Sitaru, *Gândirea politică arabă. Concepte-cheie între tradiție și inovație*, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, Bucharest, 2009.

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## **Open Sources in Diagnosing and Predicting Significant Evolutions in Afghanistan**

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### **Abstract**

*The study is aiming to explore how a detailed and skilful use of various open sources can strongly enhance both individual and institutional capabilities in the area of accurately analyzing / evaluating / diagnosing, and predicting significant evolution in Afghanistan. Extensive and sound use of open sources is to be regarded as being a significant for both purely academic research in the fields of International Relations and Strategic Studies, and also in shaping solid, flexible and accurate policy-oriented texts. Another aim of this very study is to list and evaluate some already present trends in Afghanistan, trends which might significantly influence both local and regional geo-strategic realities after 2014.*

**Keywords:** Afghanistan; ISAF; NATO; ANSF; insurgency; OSINT; trends; exploring and predicting future evolutions

Afghanistan is quite clearly a significant (or, more accurately, a vastly significant) element of the complex and highly dynamic set of geo-strategic contemporary realities. And this happens as a direct result of several reasons: a. *Afghanistan is definitely what Zbigniew Brzezinski calls a 'geopolitical pivot'; b. Afghanistan is definitely an area where the U.S. preeminent global status is, at this very moment, severely challenged and seriously tested; c. Afghanistan is definitely an element of the global geo-strategic landscape where the global relevance and perennial nature of NATO is also severely challenged and tested; d. Afghanistan is a country which, if and when it will become properly stabilized, might significantly boost stability, security and strategic predictability across a really vast region. On the contrary, an Afghanistan lacking stability and security might,*

*almost certainly, severely harm both the stability and the security of a very large region – from Iran to China and from Southern regions of the Russian Federation to India; e. For my country, Romania, Afghanistan and its general present – and future – evolutions are important as well. First of all, because, along several years, Romania deployed there an important number of military personnel (and, more than this, in some, clearly indicated by ISAF public documents, Romania had in Afghanistan more soldiers than some great European powers, a fact to be regarded as a very clear sign showing how strong is my country's commitment to both NATO and the strategic partnership with the USA).*

In order to better understand the ongoing evolutions in Afghanistan and, together with them, some *possible* (or even *probable*) future evolutions in the same region, it is important to *properly use open sources*. In many occasions, *open sources offer a very detailed picture of significant realities*. More than this, the professional approach of the journalist is, in many occasions, not the same as the professional approach of a governmental official. That is why *it might be useful to try to understand complex realities simply by mixing different pictures of the same reality: both official reports, and media reports* (in many occasions less concentrated than official reports on slow and long-term evolutions, less concentrated on very intricate connections of different layers of reality but, in the same time, significantly less influenced by what we usually call *wishful thinking* or *bureaucratic attitudes*).

I also feel the need to express here, from the very beginning, a *very firm belief* (it is true, one belonging to an individual whose professional skills, extensive professional experience and present jobs are not directly connected to active intelligence activities, so that – theoretically, at least – I might be wrong in the following evaluation): the ability of the average person (or institution) to significantly influence *real-time* evolutions in Afghanistan is severely limited. *Even with the best possible SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT and OSINT sources and products we might imagine, a complete and easy-to-handle real-time picture of ongoing realities in Afghanistan is, in most occasions, something we simply cannot accomplish*. And that, mainly because getting, interpreting and transforming valuable pieces of *raw* intelligence into coherent, clear and brief policy-oriented texts is, many times, a too large and, above all, an exceedingly time-consuming burden. But the same time-consuming nature of the process of dealing with a vast



array of various pieces of intelligence is suddenly acceptable, at least in its broad lines, when (or if) we target not the next minute or the next morning, but, let us say, a slightly more distant future. *How is, for example, Afghanistan going to evolve after the end of 2014*, when authorities in Kabul will be confronted with the *complete* responsibility for security, anywhere in the country, with a severely diminished Western military presence? This text does *not* aim to offer a *complete* answer to such a difficult question. Our aim is less ambitious (but *more realistic*, I think): to explore, with some details, what *some* open sources (mostly *media* ones) say about two facets of reality, *both* of them *potentially* important in shaping the *not so distant future* we were speaking about above.

#### **Brief introductory elements: on method and topics**

For this presentation I deliberately selected two topics, each of them allowing us *to commensurate* some ongoing realities, and also *to predict* some *possible* (or *probable*) elements in *the future* of Afghanistan. Each of these two topics is clearly present, in several occasions along the past few years, in *open sources* of all sorts. The method I am using is made up by several layers or steps: first of all, I quote *significant* parts of media reports published along the past few years, dealing with the topics I have selected. Extensive quotations are allowing *any* of the readers, and also *any* of the members of the very distinguished audience I will be speaking to, *to directly verify if the conclusions I have reached in the end are solid*. At the end of each text fragment I will put all major elements which are really important for our debate in a *compact table*. *Any* of these tables will tell the reader several things at once: *how reliable the open source is*; which are the *main facts and trends presented in the text*, which are important for a better understanding of the topic we are speaking about (with some significant details for any major fact or idea). At the end of each chapter, along a very few lines, some conclusions will be listed.

The first such topic is *the role of women in the daily life of Afghanistan*. I am not speaking here about an issue studied with the average tools of gender studies, simply because I am *not at all* a gender studies specialist. I am simply dealing here with a mental framework extensively used by both *Strategic Studies* and by *International Relations*: the ability to *properly* commensurate the way in which *national power* of a certain

country evolves. According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the founding father of the Realist School in International Relations, national power – usually defined as the general ability of an actor to strongly influence the behavior of other actors on the international arena – is founded on (or generated by) several constitutive elements. Morgenthau lists, in his well known work *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, nine such elements of national power. One of them is *population* (the demographic dimension of national power). Another one is what Morgenthau calls *industrial capacity* (or, in slightly larger or more general terms, the general state of economy, both at national and at local level). A third factor of national power is, according to the same author, *quality of government* (meaning, above all, the ability of authorities to identify priorities, to elaborate policies and to implement them in order to get significant and lasting results). Women in Afghanistan are – exactly like in any other country – *immensely* important for *any* (and for *all*) of these three elements of the national power: firstly, they represent, not only in Afghanistan, but anytime and anywhere, roughly 50 % of the total population; secondly, *if* and *when* they are offered real opportunities, they can sharply increase both the productive capability of a nation, and the general levels of economic demand, and of public and private consumption; thirdly, *the way in which Afghan central, provincial and local authorities can design and implement equal opportunities policies of all sorts is a tool accurately indicating the real level of governmental and administrative effectiveness, and also an accurate tool indicating how much Afghan authorities are able (or are not able) – and are willing (or are not willing) – to accept and to boost complete emancipation of women (emancipation we regard, here, as a major element of modernity).*

A second topic I have selected for a more detailed presentation is that of *insurgent attacks against airfields in Afghanistan*. In a way or another, it is a tactic aiming *several results at once* (or *several* results with to be accomplished with limited means): to harm the manpower of the opponents (both ISAF and ANSF are, from the perspective of Afghan insurgents of all sorts, the enemy), to test and – if possible – to harm (or even to break, in special circumstances) the political will of the opponents; to harm the public image of the opponents; *and, above all, to harm, as much as possible, skillfully using very limited resources, the airlift capabilities and the air mobility of both ISAF forces, and of the ANSF.*

**Women in Afghanistan: some significant evolutions, problems, concerns**

For a better understanding of the positive evolutions, but also of really major (and sharply increasing) problems and challenges in the field of *emancipation of women in Afghanistan* I decided to use a *limited* number of media reports (only five), some of them published a few years ago. Most of them are recent or even *very* recent pieces of *OSINT-heavy* media reports. Here are the texts, each of them accompanied by a brief *analytical table*:

On January 26, 2010, Public Affairs of the ISAF Joint Command published a media report called “Afghan Business Women Find Help, Hope”<sup>1</sup> (see brief evaluation in *Table 1*). The article states that “the AWBF is a non-profit, non-political, private sector organization providing technical training and business assistance to Afghan women business owners... The federation can be a helping hand for the Afghan business woman,” said Aziza Mohmmad, business owner and AWBF chairperson. “[AWBF] provides a good market for their products.” Founded in 2005 with help from USAID, AWBF has now 30,000 members....” Some of the figures quoted by the text can support both optimistic and pessimistic evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan (see *Table 1*).

**Table 1: Elements of OSINT in an ISAF media report published on January 26, 2010, dealing with evolution and results of the Afghan Women’s Business Federation (AWBF)**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	Very reliable, we think. Media service of the ISAF
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. With significant Western support, an Afghan NGO grouping almost 30,000 businesswomen operates with some success; b. Five years were necessary to build an NGO with 30,000 members (the figure itself is impressive, but let us not forget that Afghanistan has more than 20,000,000 people); c. 25 women selling their products in the same place, at the same moment is something to be regarded as important
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Western help and western direct involvement are clearly a must in starting and going on with initiatives concerning women in Afghanistan; b. Attempts of businesswomen in Afghanistan to reach foreign markets in order to sell their products

<sup>1</sup> For fragments quoted in this paragraph see Mary Hinson, Master Sgt., ISAF Joint Command, Public Affairs, “Afghan Business Women Find Help, Hope”, January 26, 2010, at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-business-women-find-help-hope.html>

4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None. Anyhow, even an author directly connected to a high official body has to recognize, almost directly, that local initiatives cannot start and cannot develop, in Afghanistan, without significant Western help. But this help is going, <i>most probably</i> , to diminish after 2014
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On July 22, 2013, *Spirit of America (SoA)* published an article depicting some positive results in some parts of the Kandahar province. The article, called “SoA Supports Spin Boldak Women's NGO”<sup>2</sup> (see brief evaluation of the text in *Table 2*), tells us that “Spin Boldak is a district in Kandahar province where progress on women's initiatives occurred over the past year. This happened because the villagers in Spin Boldak enjoy a relatively higher degree of security and they are supportive of women's initiatives”. The article also tells that “female soldiers, working closely with the Kandahar Department of Women's Affairs minister, helped set up an umbrella organization for all of the women's NGOs in the district. A tribe named the Achekzai set up the first women's NGO within this organization... Because of the success of the Achekzai women's NGO, women from another tribe, the Noorzai, were encouraged to form their own NGO....; during the Afghan-only shura, the women discussed economic development projects, health care and education. For example, the women discussed a plan to purchase a cow and chickens for the women's center, they discussed herbal medicine...”.

**Table 2: Elements of OSINT in article published by *Spirit of America*, July 22, 2013, dealing with situation of women in some districts of the Kandahar province**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	Can not answer, because I lack adequate amount of information about <i>SoA</i>
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	Limited progress is possible, even in a province notorious for being both conservative and non-secure
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Tribal structures influence one another, this time in improving general status of women; b. When women are present within state institutions, they can boost the chances of women-oriented initiatives and activities; c. Local initiatives aiming to improve general status of women can not survive without foreign help
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None. Anyhow, we can easily imagine consequences of severely diminished foreign help, after the end of 2014

<sup>2</sup> Jim Misencik, Afghanistan Field Reporter, “SoA Supports Spin Boldak Women's NGO”, in *Spirit of America*, July 22, 2013, at <http://www.spiritofamerica.net/recent-blog-posts/1480-soa-supports-spin-boldak-women-s-ngo.html>

On August 4, 2013, *Reuters* published an article called “Uncertain future for Afghan businesswomen as West leaves”<sup>3</sup> (see brief evaluation in *Table 3*). It concentrates the attention on the deeds and thoughts of a very successful Afghan businesswoman, Liza Ghausi Nooristani, chief executive of Mutaharek Construction Company. “The United States and its allies have put promoting women's rights at the core of their 12-year mission in Afghanistan and Liza Ghausi Nooristani has profited nicely from their intervention”, *Reuters* says. “Nooristani is one of the few women in conservative, male-dominated Afghanistan to set up and run a relatively big company. And she has done it in the mountainous eastern warzone. She has been undaunted by the danger and the death threats and her construction company has been building schools, roads and government offices, largely paid for by a flood of aid money that followed the arrival of U.S. troops.... She won her first contract in 2007, to build a village school worth \$10,000.... But now Nooristani faces the prospect of the withdrawal of Western troops. For Afghan women in general, the exit of most foreign troops by the end of next year could mean a slip back in the rights they have managed to secure over the past decade...” Liza Nooristani *clearly states – and proves, with details and figures – that windows of opportunity for Afghan women grow narrower and narrower, even if Western political influence and military presence is still strong in Afghanistan.*

**Table 3: Elements of OSINT, in a *Reuters* report on Liza Ghausi Nooristani, August 4, 2013**

	<b><i>Items to be taken into account</i></b>	<b><i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i></b>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	<i>Very reliable. Reuters is known to be serious, and Liza Ghausi Nooristani is well known (and very present in international media)</i>
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. At governmental level, after more than 10 years of continuous state building, modernization and massive Western influence, in Afghanistan there still is the sincere belief that “women are just for the home to wash clothes”; b. When direct Western presence comes to an end, chances for women simply collapse; c. Hard-line conservative attitudes made more potent by corruption and lack of effectiveness of authorities, at central or local levels

<sup>3</sup> For fragments quoted in this paragraph see “Uncertain future for Afghan businesswomen as West leaves”, *Reuters*, August 4, 2013, and *English.Alarabiya.net*, August 2013, at <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2013/08/04/Uncertain-future-for-Afghan-businesswomen-as-West-leaves.html>

3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. General level of social and economic chances for women in Afghanistan grow narrower and narrower; b. Success of Afghan women in business <i>continuously</i> generates a lot of criticism, and even death threats and terrorist attacks
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None. Anyhow, with severely diminished chances for women in economy, an important percentage of production and consumption in Afghanistan <i>will</i> be negatively affected

On August 13, 2013, *Reuters* published a report about the kidnapping of a female parliamentarian in Afghanistan. The article states, starting from the very title, that “high profile attacks on women in Afghanistan undermine rights campaign”<sup>4</sup> (see brief evaluation in *Table 4*). Let us see what happened, with more details: “Taliban fighters have kidnapped a female parliamentarian who was travelling by car through Afghanistan's central Ghazni province with her children, a local police commander said... the latest in a string of high-profile, violent attacks on women.... Kakar, a member of the lower house, was the second female parliamentarian to be attacked in Ghazni in less than a week.... In such a situation, states *Reuters*, “survivors of attacks often say their only hope is to leave Afghanistan, still one of the worst places in the world to be born female. "I need to go outside the country for my treatment and for my security," said Muzhgan Masoomi, a former government worker stabbed 14 times last year.... Kakar's abduction follows the shooting last week of female senator Rooh Gul, police said.... Last month, the most senior policewoman in southern Helmand province, Lieutenant Islam Bibi, was shot dead on her way to work in the provincial capital Lashkar Gah. Bibi, touted as a rising star of the Afghan National Police, said she received death threats even from within her own family. While the Taliban have often targeted senior female government officials, honor killings by conservative male relatives remain commonplace... Concerns have also been raised about a rise in Taliban-style edicts in some regions not overturned by the government. In June, clerics in a region of Baghlan province, north of Kabul, barred women from leaving home without a male chaperone and shut down beauty parlors”, the article also states.

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<sup>4</sup> For fragments quoted in this paragraph see Jessica Donati and Mustafa Andalib “High profile attacks on women in Afghanistan undermine rights campaign”, *Reuters*, August 13, 2013, at <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/13/us-afghanistan-women-idUSBRE97C08220130813>



**Table 4: Elements of OSINT in a Reuters report on an Afghan female official kidnapped, August 13, 2013**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	Very reliable. Reuters is notoriously serious; several native Afghans were involved in writing the text; the female officials listed are both well known, and their number indicates that we are speaking about a growing trend
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. Female Afghan officials kidnapped, attacked, stabbed or even killed in several provinces (some of them almost secure a few years ago)
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Increasing number of violent incidents targeting Afghan appointed or elected female officials; b. Increasing terror pushes more and more Afghans to wish to leave the country; c. Taliban-style edicts not any more overturned by central government.
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None. Anyhow, simply thinking that the three trends listed above might go on, and might become deeper and deeper realities can naturally generate a lot of legitimate worries

On August 19, 2013, a notorious social and political activist in Afghanistan published a text directly stating that the general fate of women in the country might quickly become as difficult as in the era of the Taliban regime. The text is called *Karzai: a legacy of failure on Afghan women's rights?*<sup>5</sup> (see a brief evaluation of the text in *Table 5*). Its author is dr. Massouda Jalal, a notorious political activist, former Minister of Women in Afghanistan, and founding President of Jalal Foundation, an NGO that brings together 50 women's councils and organizations to promote women's advancement through advocacy, service delivery, capacity building and ground breaking projects. Jalal stated that "With more fundamentalists predicted to win seats in the forthcoming election, the future is likely to see once again the use of religion as an instrument of extreme gender based oppression in Afghanistan...." She went on, saying that "as the departure of the international security forces approaches, each day turns every bit of hope into desperation for advocates of Afghan women's rights.... The bottom line of women's agenda is that the rights of women should never be a subject of negotiation before, during and after the peace process. More importantly, women of Afghanistan expected a strong commitment to their protection from violence, State support to the victims and their families, and prosecution of all perpetrators of violence against women". Jalal also states that "unfortunately, women have been marginalized in the decision making

<sup>5</sup> For elements quoted along this paragraph see Dr. Massouda Jalal, *Karzai: a legacy of failure on Afghan women's rights?*, at <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/massouda-jalal/karzai-legacy-of-failure-on-afghan-womens-rights>



for the peace process and their petitions have been ignored by national leaders. Except for a general statement that women's rights will not be sacrificed in the name of peace, nothing concrete was taken to guard against the reversion of women's status to the pre-2001 era. President Hamid Karzai has been turning a deaf ear to the pleadings of women's rights activists, claiming that he had already faced a lot of embarrassment in defending women's rights would no longer do anything in this regard. He now dances to the music of fundamentalism, drinks from the cups of people who are known butchers of women's rights, and appoints them to positions where they could tear down the foundations of women's rights that were painstakingly built a dozen of years ago. He has now elevated the practice of 'baad' to the level of national policy and law making - selling the daughters of his nation to appease the fundamentalists that he had brought to his administration". But the most troubling part of Jalal's statements is dealing with the fact that "the list of worrisome developments that betray the government's submission to fundamentalist dictates is growing: 1. President Hamid Karzai endorsed the Ulema Council's declaration that mandates women to fully comply with the hijab, respect polygamy, refrain from travelling without mohram, and avoid mingling with stranger men in social situations such as education, shopping, office and public life..." 2. the President of Afghanistan "marginalized women's voice in the development of the peace and transition framework and blatantly ignored the fact that the women of Afghanistan never acceded to the idea of making peace with the Taliban..." 3. Third, President Karzai never made good of his promises to implement the national policies and programs for the promotion of Afghan women's empowerment and gender equality .... 4. Fourth, the government remained silent amidst Parliamentary debates on the legality of his decree on the Elimination of Violence against Women. It allowed Parliamentarians to foment false interpretation of the law as being un-Islamic and derided the provisions that guarantee protection of women against abuse by their husband and relatives.... 5. Fifth, the government continues to fail in preventing violence against women and in providing services and access to justice to survivors. The latest report of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission indicated that 4,010 cases for VAW<sup>6</sup> were recorded from March 21 to October 21 of 2012 which is 57 percent higher than the 2,299 figure of the same period for 2011". Jalal

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<sup>6</sup> VAW means, in this text, violence against women

also states that “just recently, the President signed the National Election Law that removed the provision on the 25 percent quota for women in the provincial and district councils. This means that the forthcoming national election could bring more fundamentalists in government, both at the national and local levels. With their presence in positions of power, it means that a rights-sensitive law on the elimination of violence against women could not stand a chance of getting enacted. Worse, all the gains on women’s rights during the past twelve years are in danger of being challenged and overturned by policy makers who are un-enlightened about international standards of human rights. The future is likely to see once again the use of religion as an instrument of extreme gender based oppression in Afghanistan”. And, in the end, Jalal’s conclusions are, frankly speaking, clearly grim: “There are less and less reasons to be optimistic”, even if “the government could still choose to do good for the daughters of this country, especially in the remaining months of President Karzai’s incumbency...”.

**Table 5: Elements of open source intelligence in Massouda Jalal’s text, August 2013**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	<i>Very</i> reliable. Dr. Jalal had (and still holds) an institutional position allowing her to accurately know a lot about social, political and gender issues of all sorts
2.	<b>What does she say?</b>	a. That at this very moment, future of women in Afghanistan is not at all a reason to be optimistic; b. The author lists five really major reasons making her think that the Karzai regime is, in political terms, severely pushed back by hard-line conservatives
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Failure in going on with reforms and modernization; fears that fundamentalists are on the verge of becoming dominant again; b. Women have lost one of the most important safety-checks they could use in previous years: the 25 % quota in elected bodies, at provincial and district levels; c. Sharp increase of the number of cases with violence against women (more than 50 % in only one year)
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	Fundamentalists are going to win more seats in the next general elections (an element of future political realities already <i>very</i> clear, even if Western presence is still very strong in Afghanistan)

The final conclusion of evaluating the elements of *open source intelligence* (OSINT) present in the texts presented above are: 1. within the past years, the complete emancipation of women in Afghanistan was an aim not at all completely fulfilled, even if some positive results are obvious; 2.

recently, many reliable sources have a more and more obvious common denominator: that of depicting a clear decrease of the general level of freedom available for women in Afghanistan; 3. central government in Kabul is not able – or not willing – to preserve an adequate status for women in all areas of public life. *Put together, these elements shape a clearly negative trend, potentially able to influence a lot not only the future of the Afghan women, but – more generally – the fate of modernity and reforms in that country, and also the long-term stability and predictability of the entire region (mainly if we accept that severely diminished rights for women might be a sign that hard-line conservatives can become, again, very influential in Afghanistan, potentially able even to massively alter the national security agenda, and the foreign policy agenda of the decision makers in Kabul).*

#### **Insurgent attacks on airfields: harming and eroding operational mobility of both ISAF and ANSF**

For a better understanding of the (clearly limited) positive evolutions and results, but also of really major problems and challenges in the field of *properly and successfully facing insurgent attacks against airfields in Afghanistan*, I decided to use a total number of three media reports (slightly less than the total number of media reports used in the previous chapter), also published along the past few years.

On June 21, 2009, *Fox News* published an article dealing with a Taliban attack against the massive Bagram airbase, the largest and most important controlled and used by NATO in Afghanistan. The title of the article is “Rocket attack on Bagram Airbase - Afghanistan kills 2 US troops”<sup>7</sup> (see a brief evaluation of the article in *Table 6*). According to “a top Afghan official ... several rockets were fired at Base. A spokesperson for ISAF said three of the rockets landed inside the Base and one landed outside.... Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, claimed responsibility for the attack. Bagram Airbase lies about 25 miles northeast of Kabul. The Base is surrounded by mountains and endless stretches of desert. This provides insurgents with perfect conditions to fire rockets from concealed and secure positions. Tactically, they can move quickly, using the cover of

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<sup>7</sup> For the fragments quoted along this paragraph see “Rocket attack on Bagram Airbase - Afghanistan kills 2 US troops”, *Fox News* and *NowPublic*, June 21, 2009, at <http://www.nowpublic.com/world/rocket-attack-bagram-airbase-afghanistan-kills-2-us-troops>

the mountains and relocate. Attacks on Bagram Air Base have been rare. Although the terrain provides good concealment it is also difficult to negotiate and navigate”. The article goes on, telling that “Two U.S. troops died and four Americans were wounded, including four military personnel and two civilians, said Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker, a U.S. military spokeswoman (...) A spokesman with NATO's International Security Assistance Force said that three rounds landed inside Bagram and one landed outside. ISAF said it wasn't known if any Afghan civilians living near the base were harmed in the attack”. The article can be regarded as being a really interesting one, *mainly* because it depicts a *successful Taliban attack* on Bagram, the largest and a heavily fortified NATO / ISAF position, placed in a region which had had been *almost* completely pacified from the very beginning of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.

**Table 6: Elements of OSINT, in a Fox News media report, June 21, 2009, presenting details about a Taliban attack against Bagram airbase**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	<i>Very</i> reliable. In practically all occasions, Fox News is accurate when dealing with events taking place abroad
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. Several rockets launched by Taliban fighters hit Bagram airbase, killing two and wounding four U.S. soldiers; b. Taliban able to get tactical surprise, skillfully using natural cover offered by mountains; c. NATO forces not able to say if civilians residing outside the defensive perimeter have been hit; d. No element indicating that ISAF could strike back
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Taliban attacks against high-value targets; b. Taliban carefully selecting certain moments to attack with maximum results and minimal risks (early Sunday morning, in our case)
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None

On August 21, 2012, *New York Times* published a clearly shocking article, speaking about a daring Taliban attack, also at Bagram airbase, against the airplane of highest ranking U.S. military official, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The title of the article is “Rocket Fire Damages Plane Used by Joint Chiefs Chairman”<sup>8</sup> (see a brief evaluation of

<sup>8</sup>For fragments quoted along this paragraph see Richard A. Opperl, Jr, and Graham Bowley, *New York Times*, August 21, 2012, at [http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/asia/top-us-commanders-plane-damaged-in-afghan-attack.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/22/world/asia/top-us-commanders-plane-damaged-in-afghan-attack.html?_r=0)

the text in *Table 7*). “Insurgents hiding outside the heavily fortified Bagram Air Base fired a pair of rockets early Tuesday that damaged the parked C-17 transport plane used by Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, American and Afghan officials said. “General Dempsey was in quarters asleep when the rockets hit the airfield,” which is 35 miles north of Kabul, said Col. David Lapan, the general’s spokesman... The airplane was not directly hit, but flying shrapnel struck the crew door, the fuselage to the left of the door and one engine cowling, said Colonel Lapan, who was on the trip. A helicopter at the base was also damaged. A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, said militants planned Tuesday’s rocket attack with “precise intelligence” provided by someone inside the air base. But Jamie Graybeal, a spokesman for the American-led NATO coalition, said there was no indication that General Dempsey was the target or that militants knew the C-17 was his plane... The attack underscored what some officials describe as deterioration in security in the Shomali Plain, where Bagram sits. The plain has been a continually fought-over strategic link between the north of the country and Kabul during decades of war, dominated by different Afghan factions at various stages”. The article published by *New York Times* also states that “just a few years ago, the region experienced surprising gains in prosperity and security, driven in part by commerce around the massive air base and by NATO’s desire to keep the region stable. The area is important because of the airfield and because the main road that passes north through Bagram and the Salang Tunnel, and eventually into Uzbekistan, is an indispensable resupply corridor. But in the past few years some gains have deteriorated, with the Taliban and the militant group Hezb-i-Islami gaining strength in Parwan, the province where the base is.... The Afghan police chief for Bagram district, Alhaj Ezmarai Nasiri, said the rockets were most likely from a BM-12 launcher or similar model, which has a 12-tube array and can fire 107-millimeter rockets five miles. Insurgents have been known to strip off and use just one rocket tube, which can be carried in a car trunk...”. The article clearly indicates that *the general level of security was quickly eroding, at the end of August 2012, in an Afghan province which had had been stable and almost completely pacified some years ago*. Mainly this element of the entire story is really worrying, together with the fact that the Taliban used for the attack massive weapons, practically impossible to hide or to conceal (a fact which places under a large question mark the real effectiveness of check points on major roads).

**Table 7: Elements of OSINT, in a *New York Times* article, August 21, 2012, presenting an attack launched by the Taliban against the airplane used by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	<i>Very reliable. New York Times is a notoriously serious source. More that this, the article extensively quotes both U.S. and Afghan officials</i>
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. Rocket attack at Bagram air base, slightly damaging the airplane used by General Dempsey; b. Most probably, insurgents used a very large type of weapon which can be carried only by truck; c. Not very clear if the Taliban had an inside source, even if a Taliban spokesman said they knew exactly what target to attack; d. Anyhow, the episode badly harms the public image of the way in which the largest ISAF base is protected and / or defended
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Increasing ability of the Taliban to expand insurgency in previously pacified regions; b. Ability of the Taliban to freely operate along major land routes, allowing them to transport large caliber rockets by truck; c. General level of stability and security seems to be quickly eroded in Afghanistan by increasing Taliban actions
4.	<b>Direct predictions</b>	None. Anyhow, if we take into account the increasing audacity of Taliban attack, we might easily predict even more increased levels of Taliban political and military activism after the end of 2014

On June 9, 2013, a media report published by *AP* described an insurgent attack against several targets on the Kabul airport. The title of the article is “7 insurgents die during attack on Afghanistan airport”<sup>9</sup> (see brief evaluation of the article in *Table 8*). *AP* reported that Afghan police responded after reports of gunfire near Afghanistan's main international airport in the capital, Kabul, early on Monday. Afghan police responded after reports of gunfire near Afghanistan's main international airport in the capital, Kabul, early on Monday”. The article also states that the “seven Taliban fighters with rocket-propelled grenades and machine guns launched a rare assault on NATO's operational headquarters at the military section of Kabul's international airport on Monday. All seven militants were killed. Their failed attack showed that despite an asphyxiating security blanket around the capital, Afghanistan's insurgency is far from defeated after nearly 12 years of war, and militants can still menace the capital”. The opinion of

<sup>9</sup> “7 insurgents die during attack on Afghanistan airport”, *AP* piece of news, published by *CBC News*, June 9, 2013, at the <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/06/09/explosions-nato-kabul-airport.html>



the journalists is that such “spectacular attacks are aimed at demoralizing the population and sowing mistrust in the Afghan security forces' ability to protect their citizens — rather than military gains.... The attack was one of three against state facilities on Monday morning by insurgents around the country. In addition to the airport attack, six militants wearing suicide bomb vests tried to storm the provincial council building in the capital of southern Zabul province, while three attempted to attack a district police headquarters near the capital....”. The article also reports that “at the airport, the insurgents did not get close enough to attack aircraft and were not near the runway's flight path... But they did manage to sneak in a minivan full of explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns and assault rifles along with their suicide vests...”.

**Table 8: Elements of OSINT in an AP report, June 9, 2013, describing insurgents attacking the main international airport near Kabul**

	<i>Items to be taken into account</i>	<i>Significant details illustrating the listed items</i>
1.	<b>How reliable is the source?</b>	<i>Very reliable. AP, together with other news agencies quoted by the article (Reuters, for example) are notoriously serious and accurate</i>
2.	<b>What does the text say?</b>	a. Seven insurgents, heavily armed, attack a major civilian airport near Kabul and are defeated mainly by Afghan forces; b. Insurgents able to penetrate security perimeter, together with a van full of explosives and weapons
3.	<b>Trends depicted:</b>	a. Afghan and U.S. officials say that Afghan insurgent not yet defeated, in spite of a 12 years long fight against them; b. According to ISAF and to Western journalists, Afghan insurgents are aiming mainly to demoralize population, to harm the credibility of both ISAF and ANSF; c. Coordinated attacks targeting, at the same moment, several targets in different regions of the country
4.	<b>Direct predictions:</b>	None.

General conclusions of the second (and very brief) chapter of this are the next ones: a. *OSINT* shows that insurgents attack airports (both civilian and military) in Afghanistan in order to obtain *as many results as possible per unit of effort* (they harm, if possible, elements of infrastructure vital for both ISAF and ANSF; they also try to hit, if possible, high-value targets; they also try to kill or wound ISAF or ANSF military personnel; they also try to damage or destroy expensive airships); b. Afghan insurgents try – sometimes successfully – to transform such attacks into *potent propaganda tools*, deliberately trying to harm or erode credibility of defensive systems, tactics and general capabilities of both ISAF and ANSF; c. The resources used to stage attacks against airfields



might commensurate *the desire of the Afghan insurgents to cripple or to bloc both airlift capabilities and air mobility of ISAF and mainly of the ANSF*; and d. one of the common features of clearly more pieces of news than those directly presented here is that these media reports, together, describe *a resilient enemy, able to operate, in recent years, even in provinces and regions which had had been pacified many years ago* (such episodes might designate an effort of the insurgents to come back, in force, in territories they had lost 5 or even 10 years ago; and these attempts are really worrying, as long as we do not forget that, at the end of 2014, Western military presence will be severely diminished in Afghanistan, allowing the insurgents to become *even more active*).

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## **How Terrorism Operates. The Tamil Tigers Case**

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### **Abstract**

*In the contemporary era, terrorism is a main challenge and a key concept for security strategies all around the world. This article approaches the hypothesis according to which, in order to effectively respond to terrorist threats, it is vital to know how terrorists think and operate. This paper draws on the Sri Lankan experience and uses the Tamil Tigers case to analyse the tactics of one of the most reputed and dangerous terrorist organizations in the world.*

**Keywords:** war on terrorism, security challenge, intelligence, Tamil Tigers.

### **New Wars vs. Old Wars<sup>1</sup>**

The dynamic of war has changed. According to Mary Kaldor, the world is dealing with a new kind of warfare, different from what the author calls “old” wars. The latter took place at an inter-state level, had territorial objectives, were conducted symmetrically and were regulated by peace treaties and international law. “New” wars are different from “old” wars in terms of actors, objectives and methods. Kaldor states that “new wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of state and non-state actors”<sup>2</sup>, like criminal gangs and terrorist groups, whose goals are linked to identity (religious, ethnic etc.). Also, she emphasises that “in old wars, battle was the

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<sup>1</sup> Theory developed by Mary Kaldor in *New and Old wars: Organized violence in a global era*, 1<sup>st</sup> edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

<sup>2</sup> Kaldor, Mary, “In Defence of New Wars” in *International Journal Stability of Security & Development*, available at <http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/sta.at/41>, accessed on 10.05.2014.

decisive encounter. The method of waging war consisted of capturing territory through military means. In new wars, battles are rare and territory is captured through political means, through control of the population. A typical technique is population displacement – the forcible removal of those with a different identity or different opinions.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, there are a lot of civilians among victims, because unlike in “old” wars, carried by armies wearing uniforms, in “new” wars it is hard sometimes to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

This new paradigm of warfare demands us to conceive security strategies that can respond to the serious threats these asymmetrical, often “unending” wars pose. In Kaldor’s opinion, it “can’t be done through classic war fighting”, but it’s possible “through new defensive uses of forces aimed at prevention, protection and stabilization rather than victory”<sup>4</sup>.

### **Terrorism - a main security challenge**

After the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, President George W. Bush declared a “war on terror”, which “begins with Al Qaeda, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”<sup>5</sup>

The fight against terrorism constitutes currently one of the main focuses of security strategies all around the world. At the same time, it is a very complex and challenging task which requires a profound understanding of what terrorism is and how it operates.

#### *What is terrorism?*

Defining terrorism is very important because “it serves to stigmatize certain organizations as it renders the financing of these organizations illegal.”<sup>6</sup> It is, at the same time, very difficult. Fletcher suggests us to think of terrorism “not as a crime, but as a different dimension of crime, a higher,

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> *Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars and the War on Terror*, lecture given by Professor Mary Kaldor to the Cold War Studies Center, London School of Economics, February 2, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> George Bush’s speech, held on September 21, 2001, available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>, accessed 10.05.2014

<sup>6</sup> George Fletcher, “The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism” in *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 7.

more dangerous version of crime, a kind of super-crime incorporating some of the characteristics of warfare.”<sup>7</sup>

He identifies 8 traits of terrorism that can vary from case to case, meaning they can apply fully or partially to a particular situation. The first one is the factor of **violence**: terrorism implies a violent attack on human beings. It is followed by what the author calls the “**required intention**”. In other words, a terrorist attack is planned and carried out with a purpose, usually to achieve a political measure through intimidating the population. Another variable concerns the **victims**. Terrorism targets civilians, innocent people, and state officials. As important as establishing the nature of the victims is the link between the offenders and the state. The “**wrongdoers**” are private actors, but that does not exclude the possibility that they are supported or financed by governments. Therefore, indirectly, states can be involved in terrorist acts. Terrorists have a motivation, a **cause**, which they consider to be **just**. In most cases, the cause is linked to identity, whether from an ethnic, religious, racial or ideological point of view. What is condemned as terrorism by victims and third parties, can be seen as legitimate by terrorists and the community they belong to. Moreover, there is a widespread assumption that terrorists are part of a group, and their connection to an **organization** can be decisive when establishing if an attack should be classified as crime or terrorism. An individual is easier to arrest or kill, whereas an organization continues to operate through its many agents, willing to repeat the same act in the future, therefore spreading anxiety. Another aspect emphasized by Fletcher is **theatre**. In other words, there is a dramatic dimension of the terrorist act, which shocks the population, takes everyone by surprise and is intensely debated. Terrorism is closely connected to a public display of violence; otherwise it does not reach its purpose – a strong psychological impact on the population. Last but not least, there is the **absence of guilt**. It is commonly believed that terrorists have no qualms of conscience or fear of repercussions, that they are trained to think that what they are doing is right. This is partially why they are considered so dangerous.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 8-18.

*Terrorism in Sri Lanka. Historical Context*

Sri Lanka has been a multiethnic society from the earliest times and confrontations between Sinhalese and Tamils have been regular along the centuries. However, these wars were not so cruel in terms of communal violence compared to the post-independence events that shattered the country. Also, the central issues of pre-colonial confrontations were not ethnicity and culture. Therefore, it seems that the colonial period played an essential role in raising the awareness of Sinhalese and Tamils in regards to the ethnic, linguistic and religious differences between them.<sup>9</sup>

After independence proclaimed in 1948, the tensions accumulated under the divide-and-rule British dominance resulted in an escalating cultural struggle. The main minority group of the island, the Sri Lankan Tamils, felt discriminated by the political measures taken by an almost entirely Sinhalese Government eager to retrieve its ethnic heritage and reaffirm its pre-colonial position. Angered and alienated by the minimal concessions the government was willing to make in order to satisfy their demands, many Tamils youngsters turned to arms, and eventually founded a group in 1976 called the LTTE (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) or the Tamil Tigers. Convinced that the symbols of their ethnic group were threatened, they demanded a separate state in the northeast part of the island and turned to terrorist activities. Even though no international state recognized Tamil Eelam, parts of the region were under “de facto” control of the Tigers until 2009.<sup>10</sup>

The war broke out in 1983 and lasted for 26 years, unleashing massacres of a level of terror that hadn't been seen in the long history of the country. Despite efforts from the international community to mediate and settle the conflict peacefully, the confrontation lasted until 2009, when the LTTE, labeled by more than 32 countries<sup>11</sup> as a terrorist organization, was officially defeated by the Sri Lankan military forces.

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<sup>9</sup> Kearney, Robert, “Ethnic Conflict and the Tamil Separatist Movement in Sri Lanka” in *Asian Survey*, University of California Press, Vol. 25, No. 9, 1985, pp. 898-917

<sup>10</sup> DeVotta, N., “Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka” in *Pacific Affairs*, University of British Columbia, Vol. 73, No. 1, 2000, pp. 55-76

<sup>11</sup> India, USA, Malaysia, UK, the European Union, Canada



### **The Tamil Tigers Case**

In 2008, FBI stated in a report that “the LTTE is one of the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world and the world should be concerned about the outfit as they had “inspired” networks worldwide, including the al-Qaeda in Iraq.” To support this statement, FBI indicated that the Tamil Tigers “perfected the use of suicide bombers, invented the suicide belt, pioneered the use of women in suicide attacks and is the only terrorist organization that managed to assassinate two world leaders.”<sup>12</sup>

Given its impact, we will apply the 8 variables Fletcher identified on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in order to have a better understanding of how a terrorist group thinks and acts.

#### *1. Violence*

The LTTE deployed attacks on both public officials and civilians. Their human rights violations are a major reason why they have been banned as a terrorist organization. Even though it labeled itself as a guerilla movement, the organization became famous for its terrorist tactics, like sabotage, intimidation, assassination, bombing and murder. It is important to state that, even though officially fighting for the Tamil community, they did not hesitate to kill Tamil people if they didn't show support or if they tried to escape the war zone.

According to the UN Report of the Secretary General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, the LTTE “refused civilians permission to leave the conflict zone, using them as hostages, at times using their presence as a strategic human buffer between themselves and the advancing Sri Lankan Army.” Also, people of all ages, including children, were forcibly recruited and ordered to dig trenches, “thereby contributing to blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians.” Moreover, the Tigers are accused of using military equipment in the proximity of civilians and killing civilians through suicide attacks.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> FBI, “Taming the Tamil Tigers From Here in the U.S”, available at [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil\\_tigers011008](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008), accessed 02.06.2014.

<sup>13</sup> „UN Report of the Secretary General's Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka”, March 2011, page iii.

Glen Jenvey, a reputed specialist in international terrorism, labeled the LTTE as the inventor of the modern suicide bomber. The LTTE' special unit, called "The Black Tigers", carried out an impressive number of 168 suicide attacks. There are suspicions this tactic has been copied by Islamic groups, including Al-Qaeda, supported by the similarity between the LTTE attack on the World Trade Center in Sri Lanka and the Al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center in New York, and the resemblances between the Al-Qaeda bombings in London, on July 2005 and the LTTE attacks on the public transportation system in Sri Lanka.<sup>14</sup>

### *2. The required intention*

The objective of the Tigers was to create a new state for the Tamils of Sri Lanka - "Eezham" (Eelam in English), in the northern and the eastern parts of the island.

### *3. The victims*

The LTTE is the only terrorist organization in the world that has managed to kill two world leaders – Rajeev Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, in 1991, and Ranasinghe Premadasa, President of Sri Lanka, in 1993. They carried attacks on political rivals and opponents. For a group claiming to protect the Tamil cause, they paradoxically murdered Tamils politicians that were more moderate and tried to reach a peaceful agreement. Also, they systematically targeted civilians by placing explosives in buses, trains, temples, mosques and banks. According to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, large quantities of explosives were transported throughout the country in hidden compartments of tractors and buses.<sup>15</sup>

### *4. The wrongdoers*

The number of cadres fighting for the LTTE fluctuated during the years and, at times, was almost impossible to estimate by the Government. At its most, it is believed that the organization counted on about 18.000 cadres. A significant proportion was represented by children, turned into

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<sup>14</sup> „Al-Qaeda follows LTTE text book on terror faithfully” in *Asian Tribune*, available at <http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4518>, accessed 02.06.2014.

<sup>15</sup> The Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, „The LTTE in brief”, available at [www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf](http://www.defence.lk/pps/LTTEinbrief.pdf), accessed 03.06.2014.

soldiers through forcible recruitment, and women (up to 30%). All of them were carefully trained to handle weapons and explosives and to gather intelligence.<sup>16</sup>

#### *5. The just cause*

Tamils fighting for the LTTE had a strong motivation linked to the Tamil identity and believed that their actions were legitimate. The leader himself, Prabhakaran, claimed that “the LTTE killed only with a justified reason and in the fight for Tamil freedom.”<sup>17</sup> This perception developed around several sentiments, like fear that Tamil’s civil rights in Sri Lanka were threatened by the political measures taken by Sinhalese leaders, responsibility to protect the Tamil customs, values and traditions,<sup>18</sup> anger against a government that had denominated Sinhala the official language of the country and had given Buddhism a superior status in the Constitution. They felt disregarded and marginalized by the island’s main ethnic group and decided a separate state would be the solution to country’s “ethnic problem”.<sup>19</sup>

#### *6. Organization*

Extremely well organized and disciplined, the group was coordinated by Velupillai Prabhakaran and had three main branches: “Military Tigers”, “Sea Tigers” and “Air Tigers”. Apart from these, the organization benefited also from a political wing, a finance wing, a women’s wing called Birds of Freedom and a suicide commando wing entitled the Black Tigers.<sup>20</sup> To this the Leopold Brigade (orphan children) and the Internet Black Tigers (the first cyber-terrorist group) were added.<sup>21</sup> The latter attacked the e-mail systems of several Sri Lankan embassies, with the declared purpose of fighting the governmental propaganda.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>, accessed 03.06.2014.

<sup>17</sup> Jerrold M Post, „The Mind of the Terrorist: the Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to Al-Qaeda”, p. 87-.

<sup>18</sup> Most Sinhalese speak Sinhala and are Buddhists, whereas most Tamils speak Tamil and are Hindu.

<sup>19</sup> Viziru, Mirela, „The cultural dimension of the Sri Lankan civil war” in *Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations*, Vol. XI, 2014.

<sup>20</sup> Michael P Arena, Bruce A Arrigo, „The Terrorist Identity: Explaining the Terrorist Threat”, New York University Press, 2006, p. 94.

<sup>21</sup> Jerrold M Post, *op cit*, p. 93.

<sup>22</sup> The US State Department, „Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997”, april 1998, p. 12.

The headquarters were placed in the Wannu region, in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. The LTTE had its own intelligence system that operated through informers, both inside and outside the state. Within the country, there was a network of checkpoints whose purpose was to identify and supervise outsiders that would penetrate the area controlled by them. At an international level, it is believed that they had centers in no less than 54 countries, where they conducted fundraising and propaganda to buy explosives and weapons. The main support came from the countries with the largest number of Tamil inhabitants, like UK, Germany, Canada and Switzerland. However, the LTTE also operated in the United States<sup>23</sup>.

In 2008, FBI revealed they had arrested the U.S. director of the Tigers and 11 other suspects and advised Americans to be careful with their donations, because the Tigers were raising money under different covers, often for “charity.”<sup>24</sup> The criminal activities ran by the LTTE show a very dangerous and complex outfit. Apart from fundraising and propaganda, the Tigers gathered money through extortion, sea piracy, human smuggling, passport forgery, drug trafficking and arms smuggling.

#### *7. Theatre*

The LTTE deployed numerous attacks on a wide range of targets, like military facilities, buses, trains, temples, mosques, banks or national symbols. One of their most successful operations was the 1997 attack on the World Trade Center of Colombo, a newly constructed building of major economic importance. A suicide team formed of 5 cadres managed to bomb the complex only three days after it had been inaugurated. The WTC had been chosen as a metaphor to the Sri Lankan economy. Apart from destabilizing the country’s economy, the LTTE wanted to create a diversion from the war in the north, where the Sri Lankan authorities were gaining control and had concentrated most of their capabilities.

Peter Chalk cited the “government’s misuse of vital intelligence resources” as one of the reasons why the attack was successful. He also explained that the WTC attacks “demonstrated to the LTTE that terrorism in

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<sup>23</sup> Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>, accessed 06.06.2014.

<sup>24</sup> FBI, “Taming the Tamil Tigers From Here in the U.S”, available at [http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil\\_tigers011008](http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/january/tamil_tigers011008), accessed 07.06.2014.

Colombo was a useful tool for opening up multiple theatres”, which, for the next years of the conflict, prevented the country’s defense apparatus to concentrate its full capabilities against the north.<sup>25</sup> After the 9/11 attacks, Washington decided to expand its cooperation on matters of counterterrorism with the Sri Lankan authorities. Other countries, like France, and Germany, condemned the actions of the Tigers as well. So, on the long run, the WTC attack was a loss for the LTTE because it determined the Sri Lankan government to adopt a more efficient defensible space policy, and also generated a more supportive international context.<sup>26</sup>

#### *8. The absence of guilt*

It is hard to prove that the LTTE fighting cadre didn’t feel guilty at all, especially since many of them had been integrated in the organization through forcible recruitment. In turn, independently from what they felt, the Tigers were rigorously indoctrinated to die for the cause. Each and one of them carried a capsule of cyanide around their necks and were ready to swallow it to evade capture. Their training turned around the cult of martyrdom. All of them were supposed to die for the “mission” and were known for a high sense of dedication.<sup>27</sup> Prabhakaran portrayed best the profile of a Black Tiger during a speech he held in 1993: “The Black Tigers are different and also unique human beings. They possess an iron will, yet their hearts are so very soft. The Black Tigers have cast away fear from its very roots. Death has surrendered to them. They keep eagerly waiting for the day they would die.”<sup>28</sup>

#### **Generalizing the Sri Lankan experience to draw conclusions on how a terrorist threat should be handled**

It took the Sri Lankan authorities 26 years to end the conflict with the LTTE and it is going to take Sri Lanka a longer time to recover socially and economically.

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<sup>25</sup> P. Chalk, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, Vol. I, p. 171

<sup>26</sup> *Idem*, p. 172

<sup>27</sup> “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam”, available at <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terroristoutfits/LTTE.HTM>, accessed 07.06.2014.

<sup>28</sup> Jerrold M Post, *op cit.*, p. 93.

Undoubtedly, the key moment in defeating the Tigers was killing the leadership. Prabhakaran proved to be, on the one hand, a very powerful and charismatic leader, and determined the Tamil people to join the fight against the Sri Lankan government. He was the founder of LTTE and the force that kept the organization together. His followers saw him as a hero and had full faith in him – “They love him and adore him as mother, father, brother or god”.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, he was a very elusive target. He was killed by the Sri Lankan military forces on May 18, 2009 and, immediately after his death, the LTTE disintegrated the war ended.<sup>30</sup> We can infer that the high echelons of terrorist organization are a key vulnerability that can and should be exploited in counterterrorism.

Also, given LTTE’s high degree of sophistication (innovative tactics, external linkage, intelligence gathering, a wide range of criminal activities), it is clear that international cooperation between intelligence services is essential in order to permanently update security strategies to the fast evolution of terrorist tactics. The Country Reports in Terrorism submitted to the US Congress in 2010 stated that “Sri Lankan cooperation with the FBI has resulted in arrests of persons charged with material support to terrorist groups.”<sup>31</sup>

Last but not least, the new kind of warfare identified by Kaldor in the contemporary era demands anti-terrorism strategies to focus on prevention and stabilization. By this principle, it is more effective to anticipate a threat and use the intelligence resources to eradicate it, than to control the situation once it has expanded and the organization has opened multiple theatres. Victory over the LTTE meant an important step forward for Sri Lanka. Nonetheless, it was obtained with tremendous human, social and financial costs.

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<sup>29</sup> Jerrold M Post – *op cit.*, p. 91, declaration of a young LTTE cadre.

<sup>30</sup> „Defeating Terrorism – Why the Tamil Tigers Lost Eelam and How Sri Lanka Won the War”, available at <http://www.jinsa.org/publications/global-briefing/defeating-terrorism-why-tamil-tigers-lost-eelamand-how-sri-lanka-won-wa>, accessed 15.06.2014.

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## **Developing Components of Emotional Intelligence, as Part of the Integration Policies for the Afghan Refugees from the Central-Asian Countries<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*This work mainly focuses on the situation of the Afghan refugees from the Central-Asian countries and submits the proposal of a programme aiming to develop components of emotional intelligence – self-regulation, social skills, empathy – as part of their integration policies.*

**Keywords:** Afghan refugees, Central-Asian countries, emotional intelligence, integration policies, psychological assistance for refugees.

### **Introduction**

The retreat from Afghanistan of the NATO mission called ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) was completed at the end of 2014 and aroused the interest of various international intergovernmental organizations and countries from the region in finding solutions to inevitable and irregular population movements in Central Asia. It is expected that the

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number of refugees and asylum seekers would increase, given the existent conflict situation.

Throughout this work, we will take into consideration, on the one hand, highlighting the measures already adopted by state and non-state actors regarding the situation in Afghanistan, in particular the ones addressing the combat of transnational criminal activities such as irregular migration, illicit drug trafficking, terrorism, separatism and extremism, and on the other hand, presenting a programme that aims to develop components of emotional intelligence among the Afghan refugees, with the view of facilitating their acceptance and integration, in the context of the new situation.

### **Projects regarding the regional security of Afghanistan**

The fight against modern challenges and threats posed to the security of the region have generated the reaction of various international and regional intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which created common mechanisms of coordinating their activity. They engaged in the implementation of international projects that deal with the fight against illicit drug trafficking and also in the development of common and concrete data storage that would help prevent and counteract these threats.

Less known is the progress made - even from its founding in 2001 - by Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as a consequence of a debate which aimed at reaching a consensus regarding the situation from Afghanistan and reiterated the importance of combating “the three evil forces” – terrorism, extremism and separatism – mentioned in the framework documents of the member states: China, Russian Federation and the four Central-Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Subsequently, in 2005, as a consequence of the development of the relations between SCO and other states - principle stated in the Charter<sup>2</sup> of the organization - high-level officials of the SCO and Afghanistan, meaning the General Secretary of SCO and the President

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<sup>2</sup> According to the article 14, the Charter was signed at Sankt Petersburg, on July 7<sup>th</sup> 2002, available at [www.sectSCO.org](http://www.sectSCO.org).

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, signed the Protocol on Establishment of the SCO – Afghanistan Contact Group. The group launched its activity the next year, when the two actors agreed on cooperating and consulting on security issues.

The year of 2009 was marked by a series of measures which SCO adopted in connection with the situation in Afghanistan, among them the signing of documents<sup>3</sup> regarding common combat actions against terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime. The most important measures that were taken are:

a) in *the field of illicit drug trafficking combat*: data exchange between agencies; coordinating the common control actions upon drug trafficking; psychotropic substances and their precursors; instructing the personnel of anti-drug agencies; drug abuse prevention actions by introducing treatment possibilities, social and medical rehabilitation; contact establishment and development of efficient interaction between the heads of the anti-drug agencies within the SCO and authorities of Afghanistan.

b) in *the field of combatting terrorism*: monitoring mechanisms at the common border; arresting the people suspected to be involved in terrorist activities; coordinating the common operations of counteracting the terrorist threats; establishing an efficient mechanism with the view of preventing and eradicating terrorist activities; making common efforts to obtain data about terrorist organizations that threaten the security of SCO member states and Afghanistan; naming an expert of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) with the purpose of consulting with the Afghan authorities; data exchange on terrorist activities and organizations and practice exchange in the field of combat against them; mutual exchange of lists comprising names of terrorists/suspects of terrorism between the SCO member states and Afghanistan; assistance in the arrest and transfer of the terrorists; identifying and blocking the sources of income of the terrorist organizations; participation of the Afghan competent structures in joint trainings, seminars and workshops conducted by SCO.

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<sup>3</sup> Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime, Plan of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime; "Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", signed on March 27<sup>th</sup> 2009, available at [www.sectsc.org](http://www.sectsc.org).

c) in *the field of combatting organized crime*: good cooperation with the Afghan authorities in the combat of illegal trafficking of arms, weapons and ammunition, explosives or other forms of transnational crime; data and practice exchange in the combat of organized crime; mutual assistance in investigating organized crime cases; support in collecting and transferring the evidence; implementing training programmes for specialized officers.

**The need to implement a number of regional programs of assisting the refugees**

The situation in Afghanistan represents a security issue, since Afghanistan is a source of Islamic fundamentalism and the main supplier of narcotics for the Central-Asian countries, considered to be the core of SCO – both from a geographical point of view and due to the interests of the two big powers, members of the SCO, the Russian Federation and China. Based on the mechanisms of international public law, implemented with the aim of protecting and giving assistance to the refugees, asylum-seekers or to other people in need of international protection, they adopted in 2011, at the Regional Conference on Refugee Protection and International Migration, the Almaty<sup>4</sup> Declaration (Kazakhstan), through which they agreed on developing several common action policies<sup>5</sup> with the view of counteracting the effects of uncontrolled population movements in the region.

We appreciate that starting with its founding, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization proved political will and active engagement in building a stable and flexible security environment in a space characterized by insecurity, through maintaining the „spirit of Shanghai” and in establishing a platform of cooperation and practice exchange in Europe and Asia, not only in the political, economic and security field, but also in the humanitarian one, which represents an important sign of institutional maturity.

A refugee is a person who „owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of his

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<sup>4</sup> Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/4ddfb7cd6.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Such as the Regional Action Plan signed by the governments of the Central-Asian countries, available at <http://www.unhcr.kz/eng/mixedmigration/TheRegionalActionPlan/>



nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Article 1 of the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*).

Once he finds himself in a new country, which is qualified as foreign for him, the refugee enters a new cultural, economic environment, marked by other customs and values, more or less different from the ones of his country of origin.

Frequently, a refugee is not warmly welcomed by the local inhabitants. Instinctively, we are afraid of people we do not know, and this way fear transforms the foreign person into the bad one. The supporters of Carl Jung’s depth psychology were interested in explaining this fact. Subsequently, Verena Kast (2003) believed that when we project a shadow on the foreigners, we do it because we face the fear that something we deny in us may enter our lives along with them. The ones who project are convinced of the righteousness of their projection, because the „shadow bearer” is not, as practice shows us, an ordinary object, but it becomes every single time one which proves itself to be adequate to the nature of the content which is to be projected - in other words, it offers the thing that is going to be hung an appropriate hook.

Thus, the refugees always become the greedy, the bad, the violent and the immoral. We have the tendency to transform bad experiences in the bad itself, in order to remove it. But when we project the bad, we produce the bad, without even having the intention to; and the torches of the Middle Age burn again at our windows while we lose ourselves in a meaningless witch-hunt, which cannot bring any benefit to any of the parties involved.

### **Programs of integrating the refugees by developing components of emotional intelligence**

Which are the „hooks” a foreigner can offer – without even being aware of it - and which eventually may hinder his acceptance and integration? The fact that most of the time the refugees come from very poor countries, with a much lower degree of civilization and deficient standard of living, may activate among the local inhabitants, including among the ones whose jobs are to offer them psychological assistance, native biases and stereotypes. We will not discuss here about the offences committed by some of the Afghans, which unfortunately contribute to the stigmatization of the

others, because these facts cannot be controlled at an individual level by the refugees. We will rather refer to the cultural differences which imprints every community behavioral specifics.

To tackle these possible problems, a solution would be that these refugees attend a programme focusing on the development of components of emotional intelligence.

The culture in which we have been raised influences the way we externalize our feelings and also the way we express ourselves using the non-verbal language. Personal distance is a good example in this case: social rules can make us diminish, exaggerate, completely hide or disguise a feeling that we try at a certain point. For example, when watching a movie about accidents, the Japanese have a much bigger tendency to disguise the bad feeling with a smile (Ekman, 2009). There are also gestures which have different meanings from country to country, such as, for example, the one with the thumb, which in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand has three implications: it is used by the hitchhikers, it stands for „OK” and when it is all of a sudden arisen, it becomes a sign of offense; whereas in other countries, such as Greece, it always means something offensive (Pease, Allan, 1997). From this perspective, one cannot correctly interpret the non-verbal communication without referring to the cultural environment it occurs. There are highly contextual cultures that confer great importance to the context in order to establish the meaning of a message (such as the Chinese, Korean and Japanese cultures), and cultures that do not emphasize the context so much (examples of which are the North-American, Australian and North-European cultures). For instance, keeping eye contact with a dialogue interlocutor is considered a gesture of politeness in the western cultures, but a rather impolite one in other cultures. One cannot project a successful inter-cultural approach without taking into account these aspects. Non-compliance with them could put us in risky postures from which we might commit mistakes that are hard to manage afterwards.

The way we choose to externalize our feelings and to interpret and understand the non-verbal communication is strongly related to our emotional intelligence. For example, after conducting numerous researches, Paul Ekman (2003) established that, in spite of people’s ability to display over 10.000 different facial expressions, using a series of muscles that precisely control the lips, the mouth, the nose, the eyes, the forehead and the cheeks, all people, irrespective of their culture, can easily recognize that

these expressions are conveying basic emotions – sadness, happiness, fury, fear, surprise, disgust and disdain. Therefore, expressing emotions is universal, so as emotional expressions are, in all the cultures. However, most of the researchers agree that there is an innate ability to express joy, anger, sorrow, surprise and despair (Izard, 1971). These emotions are considered to be primordial, elementary from the point of view of the physiological component, transcending the cultural and even the species borders and appearing from birth or from the first year of life, as an expression of the adaptation process. There is still not a unanimously accepted agreement among the researchers regarding the number and nature of these basic, elementary emotions, but the utility of the process must be rather considered from the point of view of the necessity to identify the genetically transmitted emotions, in contrast to the secondary ones, which appear subsequently but are equally important if we aim at understanding the behavior of an individual in a social context.

Research established that people who can observe and efficiently understand and interpret non-verbal communication, influencing the way they are perceived by the others, will have bigger success in life than the individuals who do not possess this ability (Navaro, Joe, 2006, *apud* Goleman, 1995: 13-92). The acting talent is different from person to person. The ability to adjust the emotional communication and the non-verbal language is related to the self-control capacity, but also to the social control, which includes the ability to play a role and abilities of self-presentation, both representing components of emotional intelligence. Riggio (1986) appreciates that the emotional and social control, dramatization and social expressiveness are associated with acting. Most of the time, in professional life, the non-verbal and paraverbal communication count more than the verbal language. Gestures, face expression, intonation, the tone we use when we want to express an opinion, the verbal tics we would rather ignore, they all create our social image, they influence our credibility in the eyes of our collaborators and our business, more than we are even aware of. It is important to be adequate to the cultural environment we enter, to smile, to offer firm hand shakes, to pay attention to our interlocutor and to offer him due consideration by keeping eye contact while we are having a conversation, so that the person in front of us may feel he is engaged in a talk with somebody who is actually interested in his faith. By improving the

way we use the non-verbal language, we strengthen our relationships and we increase the probability of our initiatives to be as successful as we expect. All these can be learned, practiced and improved. Moreover, the ability to recognize other person's emotions, based on the expression indicators – for which there is a certain cultural consensus on meaning - is truly important and, according to Bar-On, characteristic to the emotional intelligence.

The refugee can be assisted in understanding the culture he encounters and in developing and improving social abilities, so that he can integrate into the new environment. Last but not least, he can be helped to become aware and then to manage possible conflicts between systems of values. The adaptation and integration effort is an intensive one and a refugee can easily find himself in the posture of having to evaluate his entire life with the view of building a new identity. Leaving behind the culture he belonged to and his family could become a trauma itself, which might affect his self-confidence. Other feelings and emotions hard to accept and bear may come along: the feeling of alienation, the idea of uprooting, inferiority, guilt, shame, regret, longing, the feeling of losing your own identity. Under the influence of these feelings, even an ordinary event, such as the situation in which somebody did not understand his accent, can remind him of the fact he is an intruder. Hence, it is important for him to change his way of thinking, the lens through which he perceives the reality, because along with their transformation, comes the emotional change which will accelerate the integration process. To alleviate these feelings, the refugee needs a supportive environment, in which he could feel integrated, valued as individual, understood. The necessity of such an environment, healthy through itself, is not a new concept in psychotherapy since Carl Rogers. In order to create and manage this context, the psychologist must first work with himself in order to develop respect and tolerance for different cultures, familiarize himself and empathize with the refugee's situation and with the impact or consequences of the socio-cultural environment he comes from, to understand the complexity of the cultural values, with clear reference to universal human rights.

It happens frequently for the refugee to be the survivor of various traumatic experiences – mutilating practices, extreme acts of violence, rapes, abortions, murders, terror – which must be approached as they are, in

an individual or group psychotherapy. All sorts of trauma affect human dignity and individual independence, breaking fundamental human rights and badly affecting the harmonious development of the human being. The process of healing in this kind of cases can be really slow, requiring from the psychologist a lot of patience, flexibility, tolerance, empathy, perseverance and emotional availability. We must not forget that prolonged stress may facilitate the appearance or worsening of health problems. The probability that emotions influence our health condition on the long run generated a major interest for researchers from various fields. In general, it is appreciated that the emotional-physiological processes involved in cardiovascular diseases are different from the ones we observe in malignant disorders or infectious diseases. In the case of cardio-vascular diseases, most of the people focus on behavior type A, which means managing the hostility, along with the bio-chemical implications it generates, whereas in the case of malignant disorders, the explanations are concentrated on the attitude of resignation, on repressing the feelings he has, process considered to be producing negative effects on the immune system. On the other hand, positive emotions generate another pattern of hormone secretion such as, for example, the peptides, which at a cerebral level are attached to the receptors in a similar way to morphine, reducing the destructive metabolic impact owed to the adrenocortical hormones. However, there are a small number of valuable systemic studies to attest the fact that every emotion produces a typical pattern of physiological response and even fewer studies to describe these patterns and the way in which they could generate distinct effects upon health status (Lazarus, R., 2011). Seyle very thoroughly described the way stressing factors influence hormone secretion produced by the adrenal cortex. In other words, through blood, the adrenal cortical steroids spread in the entire body, as a response to the disruptive factors, whichever they might be. This defensive mobilization causes an increase of general predisposition of the body to various diseases. Individuals develop a form of pathology, according to the heredity, physiological conditioning and vulnerabilities that every person has. Physiological imbalance produced by stress weakens the immune capacity of the body, which rapidly increases the appearance of diseases, with numerous causes. The immune system is a very complex one and science, at present, is not capable of offering us a theory which could make us understand very clearly the operating mode of all the mechanisms involved in the immune system and the interaction between them. Most of

the researchers believe that it is rational to assume that organic changes produced by emotions, only when they have a prominent or prolonged character, greatly influence our health status, which at its turn, like in a vicious circle, amplifies the emotional problems.

### **Instead of conclusions**

The central Asian countries are certainly interested not only in finding solutions to prevent and counteract the transnational threats, but also in developing protection measures addressing the problem of the Afghan refugees, given the fact that UNHCR warned about the problems that could be raised by the asylum and migration issues in the case of a possible massive influx of refugees from Afghanistan. With the help of this UN Agency, they improved the national asylum systems regarding both the alternative accomodation arrangements and local integration of a smaller or bigger number of refugees, and the release of various identification and travelling documents they need, according to the international standards. Hence, based on the information provided by the UNHCR Offices in Uzbekistan<sup>6</sup> and Turkmenistan, these states managed to offer asylum to a small number of Afghan refugees, whereas Kyrkyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan prepared emergency measures for several thousands<sup>7</sup> of asylum seekers and refugees.

We agree that the path from the improvement of the national legislation and the exchange of good case practices regarding the protection of the refugees to the implementation of integration programs through the development of components of emotional intelligence, may be long and tough. We also agree that providing sustainable solutions to assist the asylum seekers and the refugees requires an allocation of considerable financial resources, in the context of a gradual decrease of the budget for Central Asia<sup>8</sup>. Given the actual instable security environment from

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<sup>6</sup> Source: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487466.html>

<sup>7</sup> According to <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487466.html>, Tajikistan hosts approximately 4000 asylum seekers and refugees (97% of them are of Afghan origin), this representing the biggest refugee population from Central Asia, even though Tajikistan is a country facing several socio-economic problems.

<sup>8</sup> According to <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487466.html>, in 2010, this represented \$33.3 mil, in 2014 it dropped to \$16.7 mil., whereas in 2015, it will raise only to \$14.7 mil.



Afghanistan, in Central Asia, UNHCR developed emergency plans that imply the mobilisation of additional funds, in the case of an outbreak of possible uncontrolled movements started by the Afghan population.

The implementation of several integration programs concerning the Afghan refugees from the central Asian countries through the development of components of emotional intelligence, do not represent strategical priorities for any of the involved parties, but they certainly represent innovative solutions that may improve the dialogue between the governments and the communities, and, why not, between civilizations, by promoting and consolidating peace in a region rather affected by conflict and ethnic violence.

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## **Islamic (self-)Radicalization on the Internet: A Global Process Reflected Nationally<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*Islamic (self-)radicalization is one of the major threats to the global security environment, because, via this process, people with a moderate view of Islam grow to adopt an extremist ideology and attitude, to the point of perpetrating a terrorist attack, of their own volition or at the request of a terrorist group.*

**Keywords:** (Self-) radicalization process, global security environment, online Islamic radicalization

### **I. Radicalization factors in the global security environment**

Islamic (self-) radicalization is one of the major threats to the global security environment, because, via this process, people with a moderate view of Islam grow to adopt an extremist ideology and attitude, to the point of perpetrating a terrorist attack, of their own volition or at the request of a terrorist group.

At the European level, risks are amplified by the existence, in the Western- and Northern-European countries, of significant Muslim communities, still not integrated into the economic, social and cultural landscape in those countries, with living standards that are lower than those

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of the population's majority. Against such a backdrop, various radicalization factors find fertile ground for action.

Although there haven't been major attacks generated by Islamic radicalism after those in London, in 2005, smaller-scale attacks took place in the UK (Woolwich), France (Toulouse), Denmark (Copenhagen), Sweden (Stockholm), etc. This phenomenon manifests itself differently upon the continent, but even lower-risk countries cannot consider themselves security islands in a Europe that faces the danger of radicalization. This impossibility to isolate oneself from global developments is all the more obvious on the Internet, which by definition does not have and does not acknowledge borders. For reasons that will be presented below, the Internet has become the main source of Islamic radicalization.

The developments near the European area provide radicalized people with opportunities to go to theatres of conflict and put their radical ideas into practice. There, their radicalization and indoctrination process is continued and reaches the final stages. Additionally radicalized, having fighting experience and a terrorist modus operandi, some of those people return to Europe, posing significant terrorist threats, even major threats in some situations (see the case of the UK).

The same developments in Syria, Iraq or northern Africa brought to the fore terrorist structures (such as the Islamic State/IS) that are present and very efficient in the online propaganda, which is the most important source of radicalization.

IS and even its leader, Baghdadi, are very present on the Internet. The intense use of the opportunities offered by the Internet started immediately after ISIL distanced itself from AQ (February 2014) and reached a peak in June 2014, after the start of the offensive that led to the occupation of northern Iraq and of the city of Mosul. A video uploaded on Youtube, on 29 June 2014, titled "The end of Sykes-Picot" (the secret 1916 agreement by which France and the UK divided between themselves the spheres of influence in the Middle East), and posted on the Islamist forums and social media, illustrate the symbolic demolition of the border stones between Syria and Iraq, by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the spokesman of the group and an emir in Syria. Moreover, the organization knew how to

efficiently use Twitter to announce and spread its rapid advance in Iraq to the Muslim communities in the West.

The acknowledgment of IS's efficiency in using Twitter came from the Western states themselves, which took sustained steps to block all the official or unofficial accounts of the organization, which, far from putting an end to the online propaganda, actually redirected it to other social media (Facebook, Youtube, Diaspora – a social networking website known for its emphasis on respecting the intimacy of its users)<sup>2</sup>.

The subsequent moments of the beheading of the Western journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff represent sophisticated, professional “productions”, loaded with symbols (the hostage's orange suit, the terrorist's British accent, etc.)<sup>3</sup>.

Via such activities, IS relatively rapidly succeeded in drawing support from the online jihadist community, with numerous benefits in the short- and medium-term (recruits, finance, increase in prestige, etc.).

## **II. The role of the Internet in the radicalization process**

The advantages of the use of the Internet gradually became known and assumed by so many users that the applicability of this communication means probably is infinite; and the multitude of activities that the Internet makes possible includes a special one, such as the Islamic (self-)radicalization.

In order to try and outline an as-complete-as-possible image of this phenomenon, it is necessary to acquire a good knowledge of the pieces in the (self-)radicalization puzzle, with a view to developing tools to prevent and counter the use of the Internet for (self-)radicalization actions.

The following dimensions are relevant in this connection:

**□ WHY? ☞ *What are the favouring factors that the Internet makes available for the (self-)radicalization process?***

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<sup>2</sup> BBC News, “Islamic State shifts to new platforms after Twitter block”, available on <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28843350>, accessed on 22 September 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Kaplan, “Terrorism as a theater”, *Stratfor*, 27 August 2014, accessed on 12 September 2014.

The United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs appreciates that the Internet represents a virtual “*echo room*”, which acts as an accelerator of radicalization<sup>4</sup>. The Internet plays an important role in creating the social ties that are needed for radicalization and recruitment; if the individuals have started to explore those areas and have established ties with others who share similar ideas, radicalization may continue within those groups. Moreover, there is a large trend among the researchers in this field, according to which the Internet may intensify the feeling of identity and of membership via the phenomenon of “*group polarization*”, in which the members of a specific radicalization group “*transmit*” / develop their own radicalization via a continuous discussion, possibly also via a recruiting terrorist<sup>5</sup>.

The use of the Internet has a number of advantages / aspects exploitable by all the users, of which the following can be mentioned:

- **Anonymity** – allows the individual to hide their identity;
- **Accessibility** – enables one to exceed conventional borders;
- **Relatively low costs** for accessing and using the Internet – which leads to a large number of users of this instrument;
- **Reduced censorship** – encourages people to exceed the right of expression and to conduct propaganda activities;
- **Popularity** – the high degree of use of the Internet ensures a public and, moreover, a permanent target.

#### **□ WHO? ☞ Who are the actors involved in (self-)radicalization on the Internet?**

As regards the subjects of online (self-) radicalization, one should make a distinction between the processes of *radicalization* (which entail the existence of a person with potential for radicalization and of a radicalizing entity) and that of *self-radicalization* (in which the individual’s vulnerability and willingness are the only elements needed to start the process).

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<sup>4</sup> United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Violent Islamist Extremism, The Internet, and the Home Grown Terrorist Threat*, published in Majority & Minority Staff Report, 8 May 2008, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup> Madden, Christina L., *Typing TERROR in a Crowded Chat*, published in *Policy Innovations*, 5 February 2008, p. 31.

**People with potential for (self-)radicalization** – the risk of Islamic (self-)radicalization appears preponderantly in individuals from precarious security areas (inter-ethnic, inter-racial, state conflict areas, areas of terrorist concern, etc.), as well as in individuals converted to Islam.

☞ **Example:** Aabid Hussein Khan, a 22-year old Muslim British who, along with two other persons, established a terrorist cell in the UK. “*In 1997, when he was only 22 years of age, Khan rapidly became a fan of anything he could find on the Internet about Jihad and mujahideen (...) and he started using news groups and discussion forums to be able to join the people debating such topics (...)*”<sup>6</sup> Even at that age, Khan adopted an aggressive strategy on the Internet, succeeding in creating an online network of supporters in Europe, Canada and the US. “*These young men and women, most of who never met in reality, became a small circle in which they share a common interest in computers and global jihadist movements*”<sup>7</sup>. The cell was eventually dismantled in June 2006.

**Radicalizing entities** – terrorist organizations, groups ideologically affiliated to the former, micro-groups or individuals, these entities may act on the people with a potential for (self-) radicalization, located on a national territory, being in the same country or outside it.

Extremist-terrorist organizations have developed specialized media departments, whose purpose is to communicate professionally. The responsibilities of such departments include “wrapping” the organization’s messages “attractively”, protecting the identity of the real sender of the message, and identifying and exploiting the optimal ways to ensure a powerful media impact. All such preoccupations are destined for transmitting strong messages to entities that support or that *might become supporters* of the terrorist phenomenon.

☞ **Examples:** Tarek Mehanna, a pharmacist living with his parents in a well-off suburb in Boston, arrested on accusations of terrorism in October 2009<sup>8</sup>. Mehanna and his collaborators translated from Arabic into

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<sup>6</sup> Kohlmann, Evan F., *Anatomy of a Modern Homegrown Terror Cell: Aabid Khan et al.*, the NEFA Foundation, September 2008, p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>8</sup> Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School”, Guardian.co.uk, Associated Press, foreign, October 2009, accessed at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970>.

English documents supporting terrorism and posted them on jihadist websites<sup>9</sup>. They considered themselves as being the media apparatus of the extremist-terrorist organization Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Mehanna case proves that the recruiters in terrorist organizations no longer consider it necessary to bring the radicalized individuals to the training camps abroad (Mehanna himself tried, without success, to reach such camps). In December 2011, Mehanna was convicted for “plotting / conspiring” to provide material support to Al Qaeda and for conspiring to perpetrate a crime in a foreign state<sup>10</sup>.

**□ HOW? ☞ *What are the tools used on the Internet in the (self-) radicalization process?***

The most used tools that favour the (self-)radicalization process on the Internet include the following:

(1) Watching **videos** promoting the actions organized by the terrorist entities (thus amplifying their media impact and offering a pre-defined decoder of the motivation behind the action or of their ideology).

(2) Watching and participating in discussions in **certain chat-rooms, forums and websites**, where various materials are promoted and diverse problems are debated, which leads to solutions favourable to the doctrine promoted by extremist-terrorist entities, such as Al Qaeda.

(3) Using **social networking websites**, which offer the possibility to exchange messages rapidly and quasi-anonymously, as well as to filter the people with access to certain information (groups of “friends” may be established – one can limit the way in which the information is spread to a *certain* public; furthermore, the group of “friends” may be divided into sub-groups with different access, etc.).

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<sup>9</sup> Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet”, *The Boston Globe*, February 2010, [http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/web\\_is\\_now\\_refuge\\_for\\_man\\_caught\\_online/?page=1](http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1); Denise Lavoie, Abby Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case, *New York Times*, October 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html>.

<sup>10</sup> DOJ Press Release, Massachusetts Man Convicted on Terrorism-Related Charges, December 20, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/massachusetts-man-convicted-on-terrorism-related-charges>



(4) Involvement in **virtual video games**, a field where propaganda and recruitment activities may be carried out, enjoying the ability to transmit, in real time, messages via the communication systems within the game (chat rooms, instant messaging systems – text and voice, etc.). Concretely, a number of virtual games (*Second Life, Active Worlds, There, Cybertown, The Manor or Muse*, entail connecting the user to a session (“party”) of the game – opened by one of the users – who may allow access by password. During the session, the users may communicate via an instant communication system which is not visible by other users, who are connected to other instances (sessions) of the game.

**□ WHAT IS THE RESULT? ☞ What are the effects of online (self-)radicalization?**

Many times, radicalization, propaganda and proselytism activities that start online continue in real life, as well: on the one hand as preoccupations of the recruiting terrorist organization to test its candidates, and on the other as the radicalized individual’s involvement in concrete activities in favour of the terrorist entity: fund raising, hostile study on facilities targeted for potential attacks, etc.<sup>11</sup>

The impact of Internet on the potential radicalized individuals may vary. In some cases, accessing the jihadist rhetoric may orient the individual towards perpetrating violent acts. A study that comprised 18,130 entries from 2,112 online discussions on 15 Arab jihadist forums showed that more than one fifth of the discussions urged people to commit terrorist attacks. In total, two thirds of the discussions contained encouragements to perpetrate terrorist attacks<sup>12</sup>. An author states that the activity on the Internet was essential to the development of the self-activation phenomenon<sup>13</sup> - those that self-activate belong to groups that do not have important ties with

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<sup>11</sup> Maisami, Mona; “Islamand Globalization”, *Fountain Magazine*, no. 43, July – September 2003, available on [www.fountainmagazine.com](http://www.fountainmagazine.com)

<sup>12</sup> Edna Erez, Gabriel Weimann, and A. Aaron Weisburd, Jihad, *Crime, and the Internet: Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions*, October 2011, Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice in fulfilment of requirements for Award Number 2006-IJ-CX-0038, pp. i, vii, x.

<sup>13</sup> A. Kirby, *The London Bombers as Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and Emergence of Autonomous Cliques*, 2007, p. 416.

international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from them.<sup>14</sup> In turn, radicalization strictly originating on the Internet, without any interaction in real life, is rather rare<sup>15</sup>. Most radicalizations seem to require a direct contact with a social network<sup>16</sup>.

Irrespective of whether the jihadist activity conducted on the Internet leads or doesn't lead the individuals to perpetrating violent actions, the Internet stimulates radicalization in three ways:

(1) It enables the jihadists to communicate their messages in audio and visual format;

(2) It offers the potential jihadists the possibility to interact with people having similar ideas worldwide;

(3) It makes behaviour considered unacceptable in real life seem normal<sup>17</sup>. Terrorists publish online materials by which they justify their violent actions, which they describe as being unavoidable responses to the confrontation with stronger enemies such as the Western ones<sup>18</sup>.

### **III. Online Islamic radicalization – connections with Romania**

As regards the online Islamic (self-)radicalization phenomenon, Romania does not face propaganda / recruitment in favour of extremist or terrorist movements that is conducted systematically, of the individuals' own volition or at the request of external entities.

Particularly, there are people that consult and/or disseminate radical-extremist content, for which they preponderantly use new-media (e.g. Facebook). Social networking websites are preferred because they enable audio-visual and/or text postings, ensuring instant feedback that favours the

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 415.

<sup>15</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, *Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2011, p. 17.

<sup>16</sup> Tim Stevens, "Regulating the 'Dark Web:' How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation", *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 154, no. 2, April 2009, p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006, p. 116.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*.

establishment of an interactive connection between the originator and the target public.

In general, these manifestations in the “Romanian” online environment do not fall into the terrorist field, but into the “Islamist” one, which approaches Islam radically, but the impact on the target public (assessed by distribution, comments, “Like”, etc.) is generally low.

Of the total number of people that access pages with radical content, only approximately 10% are active users that open topics, post, comment, etc., while most of them only view the discussions. However, even the latter represent a potential radicalization / recruitment pool.

Propaganda activities are predominant and, in rare cases, there were terrorist threats to facilities or persons in Romania. Many of the latter remained simple statements, and were not followed by indications that there was an intention to put them into practice (which is, as a matter of fact, unlikely to occur on social networking websites and in open groups).

On Facebook, numerous discussion groups are active (“Muslim sisters and brothers”, “We live by the Koran”, “Correct Islam”, “Muslims of Bucharest”, etc.) which are coagulated by their belonging to the Muslim religion. On these discussion groups, certain postings or options that are extremist in nature appear sometimes.

These groups or the affiliated people may display indications of Islamist options, such as the following:

- Appreciations for official or unofficial pages of terrorist / extremist organizations (Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamist groups of the Syrian opposition), including by taking over some of their symbols (flags, logos, photographs, etc.).

For example, the account “AAB”, whose avatar is a photograph of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (recently proclaimed “caliph” under the name Ibrahim), is followed by two users whose profile shows that they are located in Romania, “NA” and “AR”.

Moreover, the list of those that follow the Salafia Jihadiya group includes the profile “Sheikh Ahmad Ghandour Al-Tarabay” who, in his turn, appears in the list of friends of the user FO in Romania;

- Appreciations for people such as Sayyid Qutb (an ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood/MB), Mohammad Morsi (a former Egyptian

president, a representative of the MB), Yusuf al Qaradawi (a cleric known for his affiliation to the MB), Bilal Philips (a preacher known for his radical views, etc.);

- Postings expressing support for extremist concepts (*jihād*, the firm application of *sharia*);

- Female users (possibly of Romanian origin, married to Arab nationals and converted to Islam) appear in conservative Islamic clothes or express their appreciation of the burka, niqab clothes, etc.;

- Posting, taking over or appreciating favourite theses of the Islamist propaganda (Islam is the target of an attack by the Western world and Christianity, terrorism is a pretext to target Muslims).

Many of the people affiliated to these groups are connected (“friends”) and at the same time belong to several groups, so that, in Romania, a pool of Facebook users may be outlined that share radical views, make their points of view known on this social networking website and try to attract new followers.

Significant similarities between lists of friends, affiliations, options also show that some users may use several accounts simultaneously, in an attempt to make groups seem larger, to attract followers, to keep certain activities secret, etc.

To outline the image of the Islamic radicalization phenomenon on the Internet conducted in Romania, we chose two case studies:

1. GT, present in Romania since 2008 as a student, started to radicalize in 2011, when significant changes appeared in his behaviour, which worried the members of his circle of contacts.

Although he initially was an ordinary student with abilities in the IT domain, willing to help his colleagues in this field, after the summer holidays in 2011, he returned from his home country (northern Africa) with a different behaviour. He started being more selective about the people in his circle, giving up those that didn’t strictly apply the precepts of Islam.

In approximately six months he became almost completely isolated, he gave up his friends, moved from the room he shared with a colleague to live alone. He spent time in his hostel room for days on end, without going

out or meeting people. He only went out to the mosque, but, apart for the sermons, he didn't spend much time there either, saying that he needed to return to his room to study. He started missing classes, so that, in the session of examinations in the spring of 2012, the first exam failures appeared.

GT stayed in front of the computer for hours on end, administering a number of jihadist websites that stated the necessity for terrorist actions against the West. In real life, in his discussions with his colleagues, he didn't express such opinions, so that, with the exception of the self-isolation tendencies, he seemed a normal person, who didn't have radical points of view.

GT didn't try to radicalize people in Romania. He acted as a "lone wolf", promoting extremist-terrorist movements and recruiting jihad followers; he had materials on the means and methods to conduct terrorist attacks, which contained, among others, drafts and video documentaries on how to manufacture improvised explosive devices.

2. The Facebook profile AY has ties with autochthonous Muslims known as senior members of Islamic activism, such as Abu Al Ola Nagi, the leader of the Islam Today Cultural Centre Foundation (FCCIIA), Bari Nerdin (a leader of FCCIIA), Dane Mela (the leader of the Association of the Romanians Converted to Islam), Roba Adriana Steluta (the coordinator of the Facebook group Hizbut Tahrir Romania), etc.

This profile has affinities with terrorist or extremist structures such as Hamas or Hizb Ut Tahrir, a pan-Islamic political organization that promotes an Islamic state led by *sharia*.

This profile received appreciations from the Facebook user Al Imaano Wal Jihaad, a native of Somalia, who expresses appreciations for the Islamic State terrorist organization.

The account is registered in 45 Facebook groups in Romania, which are focused on their belonging to the Muslim religion.

If the profile arouses suspicion as regards a potential radicalization or a person potentially undergoing such a process, the comments posted on Facebook for the materials posted by other people do not indicate a radicalized person, being rather focused on promoting the Islamic religion.

#### **IV. Conclusions**

Investigating the Romanian online environment led to identifying a small number of Islamic radicalization processes, in incipient stages. For example, the case study on the AY Facebook profile indicates a process that is similar to that of Aabid Hussein Khan in the UK. What is worth mentioning is that AY hasn't yet reached the phase of follower recruitment, being in a stage where he accumulates, views and appreciates extremist postings.

Although it is far away from the effervescence of websites, forums, discussion groups in English or (on a smaller scale) French, German, Italian, the Romanian online environment has potential for Islamic radicalization, however, as there are connections with radical people or entities outside our country. As a matter of fact, as long as the Internet is universally accessible and goes beyond national borders, the lack of major sources of radicalization in Romania becomes irrelevant.

The small scale of the online (self-)radicalization phenomenon in Romania generates a collateral problem: the little attention devoted to this risk factor. The investigation conducted in order to determine the national dimension of the radicalization phenomenon was based on searching and directly identifying such people / processes, in the absence of a systematic investigation in the academic or national security environment approaching this reality. While in the West the radicalization phenomenon, including its online dimension, receives the adequate attention, both in the shape of academic and national security approach, and of prevention or de-radicalization programmes, in Romania, such initiatives are in an incipient stage, many times as the use of opportunities offered by European programmes (such as RAN, CoPPRA, etc.).

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## **Purifying language as the mechanism for success in promoting Iranian nationalism**

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### **Abstract**

*The possessor of a highly powerful imperial pre-Islamic past, with an unique Islamic- Shiite identity, doubled by the Persian language(which belongs to the linguistic group of indo- European languages), the Iran of the 21<sup>st</sup> century tends to project a sentiment of superiority towards its fellow Arab neighbours, often being associated to the term *ġāhilīyya* (in translation ignorance). Iran also tends to accentuate its belonging to the Arian race, hence the origin of the word "Iran", derived from the Proto-Persian "aryānā", which means land of the Arians.*

*The linguistic domain is relevant in building a Persian nationalism, since imposing a pure language and cleaning it of borrowed words (which inevitably lead to the loss of the Persian language of its national identity) represent measures brought into attention by the post-revolutionary Iranian leadership in amplifying the Iranian nationalism.*

**Keywords:** Iranity, nationalism, linguistic, purism, culture

### **Introduction**

Iran disposes of an ancient identity and seems now more than anytime preoccupied with consolidating its "Iranianness", this privilege of the past, which is being doubled by the country's belonging to one of the first empires in history. The feeling of having belonged to a great civilization, of being a state rich in natural resources, with an educated population, placed in a strategic point on the global map animates the Iranian society and leads to words of praise regarding Iran's history, culture, civilization and language.

On the other side, over the past few years we witness the tendency of returning to the Persian tradition, to authenticity and cultural identity, often rebuilt depending on the needs and myths of the moment. Teheran opts for this tendency out of the wish to fix in the global conscience its contribution to the world's civilization.

Therefore, in a state characterized by an unique ethno-linguistic diversity and ancient cohabitation between the Persian-, Turkish-, and Arabic speaking population<sup>1</sup>, with a history that lasts for over several millennia, the language played a key role in constructing a national identity. On the other side, as a result of the massive alphabetization from the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Persian language knew an extraordinary dynamic in contrast to the other languages spoken in Iran, hence contributing to a greater integration of the existent minorities on Iranian soil.

Built around the language, religion and culture, the Persian national unity completed itself as a result of this cultural diversity, which never became the source of any ethnic, civil wars; the reported sporadic incidents had a profound political character<sup>2</sup>. Teheran encouraged the conservation of the Iranian national cohesion and consensus with the Arab, Indian of Turkish linguistic worlds, actions carefully thought, which in fact translate to the need for political and cultural equilibrium.

The Islamic revolution consolidated the nation state, but at the same time provoked a post-modern dynamic through a process of identity restoration, combining three constitutive forces of the current Iran: nationalism, Islam and culture.

If initially nationalism (in Persian "*melat parasti*") was assimilated to a symbol of the modern, anticlerical intellectuality, then it assimilated nuances associated to the promotion of a transnational Islamic identity, becoming one of the most modified in meaning terms, with the meaning of national independence and sacred earth of the mother land<sup>3</sup>.

Mostly composed of nationalism and intimately tied to the pre-Islamic heritage, the Islamic religious component is part of this identity and after the instauration of the Islamic republic, to the concept of iranity, understood as Iranian identity was added the concept of Islamity, the expression Islamic Iran<sup>4</sup> being one of privilege and initially proposing the abandoning of ancient Persia's image. Afterwards, these symbols, traditions and myths, which were strongly anchored in the collective conscience were

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<sup>1</sup> Iran is a multiethnic state, the Persian language is currently spoken and understood by quasi the entire population, yet it is the mother tongue for only half of Iran's population.

<sup>2</sup> The assassinations after 1979 of the Kurdish leaders from Vienna and Berlin had political background.

<sup>3</sup> In Persian "*zamin-e moqadas \_e vatan* "

<sup>4</sup> In Persian "*īrān-e eslāmī*,"

reactivated and gained a new connotation; feasts such as *Nōrūz*<sup>5</sup> (New Year) and *Čahāršanbe sūrī*<sup>6</sup> ( in translation, *the lighted Wednesday*) are celebrated with great with great feast and seen as symbols of the Persian identity; the visits of the prominent figures of the Iranian politics at the Persepolis ruins highlighted the new direction Teheran tends to adopt, namely to connect itself to the grandeur of the pre-Islamic Iran.

This Iranity forms a series, whose specificity and vocation can only be explained under the premises that the Iranian spiritual universe forms a whole, anterior and posterior to Islam, thesis which is being successfully promoted by the Iranian leadership, aware of the necessity of highlighting the non-Islamic Persian element, which brought added value to the Islam situated over the zoroastriasm background.

In this matter, Teheran accentuated more than ever the need to reorganize the Persian language through a completion of the language's purity, its regenerative power being at present highly visible through a gradual liberation of the Arab grammatical and stylistic influence. Most vivid is the bold replacement of the term God from the very well known "Allāh" with the Persian "Khodā" exactly for the reason to highlight the principle of Persian specificity and intention to reactivate the language as a symbol of the sacred values of the Persian culture, but also to place the Shiite Islam in the national linguistic context subordinated to ethnicity.

### **Diachronic perspectives over the Iranian nationalism manifested in the linguistic context**

Manifesting its superiority over the Occident, Iran had and has much at stake, now more than ever in the notion of nationalism. Ofering it a unique identity, offered by the fecundity of the marriage between the cultural hegemony of the Shiite Islam and the Iranian assets, nationalism was built on the pre-Islamic history and civilization, Persian culture and language, all transformed afterwards in instruments needed to contour the homogenous national identity.

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<sup>5</sup> Takes place on the 20/21 of March according to the spring equinox.

<sup>6</sup> Zoroastriasm feast, which celebrates the fire on the Wednesday prior to the New Year through passing over the fire, tradition which is also present in Oltenia and takes place the night before Easter Fasting.

At a first glance, the theocratic apparatus in Teheran seems to have ignored the Iranian reality based on multi-ethnicity, multi-linguism, multi-culturality, where each ethnic group is the possessor of its own history, language, religion, tradition, but a more thorough study of this problem brings to light the fact that, over its history, this nation managed to implement a form of cohabitation, which is unique all over the Middle East<sup>7</sup>.

On the other side, the Iranian nationalism brought into light the pre-Islamic period or the so called golden age of the Iranian civilization, which was marked by the glory of an empire with an administration, culture, language and writing system, unique to the eastern area, which gathered alongside the Islamic tradition during the Arab conquest and demise of the Sasanid dynasty. The legitimate question that rises even at present in the Iranian society is regarding the added value element that the Arab conquerors brought to the Iranian society, aware of the fact that the Arabs lead a nomadic life, which lacked the depth of the Persian one.

If, during the first stage, as a result of the superiority background, "the culture of the losers outranked the one of the conquerors"<sup>8</sup>, there was still the very complicated process of the meeting point of different cultures, which meant the assimilation of the Islamic traditions, with consequences including at the political independence layer.

The contamination with the Arab element and implicitly with the Arab language, lead to a new type of culture, as the Arab Isaac Filshtinsky pointed out the fact that "the connection between the nomad conquerors' culture and the one of the conquered populations also has one other essential aspect, without which one cannot fully correctly understand the dynamic of the historic-literary process, because not only the Arab conquerors, but also the Arabic population of the caliphate actively participated to the creation of a common Arabic - Islamic culture"<sup>9</sup>.

Without losing touch with their own national culture in this process of assimilation, the Iranian elite continued to stay in contact with the pre-Islamic legacy, as well as the Islamic traditions and Arabic as the language of the conquerors and language of the new religion.

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<sup>7</sup> KIA Mehrdad, "Persian nationalism and the campaign for language purification", in *Middle Eastern Studies* (vol. 34, 1998).

<sup>8</sup> According to the Ukrainian orientalist Ahatanhel Krymsky, beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>9</sup> FILSHTINSKY Isaac. *Arabic Literature*, in *Viorel Bageacu Note de curs*, University of Bucharest, 1995 – 1996.

With a rich cultural past and aware of the risk of losing the national identity through the imposition of the Islamic religion, the Iranian populations tried to revive the ancient traditions through the resistance movement against the Arab domination, called "aš-šū'ūbī yya", which brought into discussion the national Iranian triumph, which surfaced through the Arab language layer. Therefore, for a while the colossal Islamic world recognized the pre-Islamic art of the word as an own collective antiquity, the Iranian cultural invasion going up the point that it managed to be rooted in the popular conscience, on behalf of the universal ethical and aesthetic ideal, the supremacy of the Persian culture<sup>10</sup>.

Offering an unspeakable position of the Arab influence on the Persian language, it needs to be mentioned that this conquest hindered the development of the Persian culture; one first argument in favor of this thesis is the new imposed writing, since the Arab alphabet did not correspond in structure to the Persian language and hence the need to add four graphemes to express the Persian morphemes- "p", "j", "č", "g".

In other words, the two poles of the Iranian culture represented on the one hand by the non-Muslim culture which stretches over several millennia and on the other by the more recent, yet profoundly rooted in the Iranian mind, Shiite Islam (16<sup>th</sup> century), seem to be undistinguishable.

Nonetheless, the cultural rebirth of Persia took place under extremely complicated circumstances, since over the centuries of foreign domination and in spite of the Shiite Islamic religion, the Iranians have preserved their culture and national conscience through the speaking of the Persian language, even though, through time, it was altered by Arab, Turkish or European elements.

Convinced of the necessity of preserving of their national identity, the Iranian intellectuality, lobbying for an exacerbated nationalism, started cleaning the Persian language of the foreign terminology and words/expressions, which entered the language in a fraudulent manner, without following their own linguistic norms.

Triggered by the need to preserve the purity and distinction of the Persian language, this movement wished to guarantee the integrity and independence of the language through replacing/eliminating of the foreign

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<sup>10</sup> ANGHELESCU Nadia. *Identitatea arabă. Istorie, limbă, cultură* (Polirom:Iași, 2009): p.53-57.

words or of non-Persian origin, since it was firmly convinced of the force of the borrowed words to influence the specificity of the national language.

### **The purism movement before the Islamic Revolution**

Of all the compartments of the language, the vocabulary is the most mobile one and if the norms dictate, also to some extent the morphology, syntax, even pronunciation, still these cannot prevent the loss/entry of some new words. The changes in vocabulary are strictly parallel to the development of the society, since new words often appear alongside the object they represent, which was absent before or in circumstances that did not exist before. The bond between the language and especially the vocabulary and the society is so tight, that the lexical data allow to a certain extent the piecing together of the nation's history. The vocabulary is more complex than it is thought to be, because it reflects the history of the nation, along with chapters of the history of all the other languages to which it came into contact<sup>11</sup>.

Over time, the Persian language suffered significant changes as a result of the influence of other languages; this longstanding history is proven by the linguistic contacts of the words derived from Arabic, Greek, Latin, Armenian, Hindi and the related Iranian languages from the pre-Islamic century.

During this period, Arabic words start to enter the language. The volume of entry starts growing during the dissemination of Islam and Persia's conquest by the Arabs by the 7<sup>th</sup> century BC. This is the time when the Persian language is invaded by a large volume of Arabic words, associated mostly to the religious and scientific language and are integrated in an organic manner into the language. Therefore, the Persian language fosters words which appeared or entered in different historical periods and resulted from different ways of forming or appeared through different techniques of language enrichment.

The process of entering of foreign words into the language accentuated during the prospering age of the Persian literature (11<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> centuries), when the Arab element massively enters, whilst during the modern decade (end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century - beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century) the processes of transformation of the language and semantic transformations become preponderant.

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<sup>11</sup> VRACIU Angela, *Lingvistica* (EDP: București, 1980), p.78.



As a result, the 20<sup>th</sup> century marked the beginning of the stabilization of the official Persian language, full of contradictions due to the tough fight between the Iranian and Arabic influences, which left deep marks on the Persian language, as a result of its longstanding presence on Iranian territory.

Under this context, as a result of the need to create a linguistic terminology, the purist movement arises. This translates itself into the intense fight against the foreign element in the language and into the forming a new terminology starting from the pure Persian words.

The Iranian Purist movement was no isolated phenomenon, in Iran it started only during the last period of the ruling of *Rezā -šāh* (1935 - 1941). During this period, the governmental apparatus imposes the Persian language as the general spoken language all over the Iranian territories, the city and family names are changed and the Persian language is being cleaned of the Arabic elements and of the foreign influences, especially the Turkish ones.

The new city names had nominal roots from the word "šāh" or reminded the glorious historic past of Iran (for example *Anzālī* became *Pahlavī* and *Tūs* became *Ferdōsī*).

Separated into more opinion movements, the Purist movement is dominated, at the beginning by the extremist Purists, who were the adepts of a pure Persian language and who proposed the full cleaning of the language of foreign elements by resurrection of the old Persian language and the Medio - Persian language. Yet, afterwards, this extremist current was to be replaced by a more moderate one regarding its views and attitude towards adopting the language of the classical literature. In their opinion, there was no need to give up all the Arabic heritage, since a lot of them gained rightful access into the language and even for some there were no Persian equivalents.

Without being singular, the Iranian Purist movement was to some extent influenced by the Purist campaigns in the Middle East. In Turkey, during the same time, slogans against foreign word borrowings were released with the purpose of the future development of the Turkish language on its own terms. Also Egypt organized during the same time a language academy with the purpose of building a new scientific terminology.

The Purist tendencies never ceased to appear, hence by its founding (in 1935) the Persian Language and Literature Academy (in Persian

*Farhangestān-e zabān va adab-e fārsī*) assumed responsibility for cleaning the language and putting a halt to the mess in the Persian language. Having as a starting point the saying that the language is the root of a nation's history, the Persian Language and Literature Academy was founded with the purpose of purifying the Persian language and of grounding its cultural identity, in the attempt to distinguish it from the European and especially Arab one.

Hence, alongside the instauration of the *Pahlavī* dynasty, the Persian language was subject to a process of reorganization, manifested through a tighter bond to the spoken forms and perfecting of the official norms in the fight for language purity, fight to eliminate the pro-Arabic tendency and democratization of the official language in the press and publishing domain.

The Purist movement, which was initiated during the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is bound to the modernization politics of Iran, *Rezā Pahlavī* encouraging therefore nationalism, which finds strength in the pure Persian linguistic sector. With more or less chauvinistic connotations, yet still loaded with pregnant nationalism, in the sense of imposing of a unique official language, this movement of purification of the Persian language represented a normal stage of a process of emancipation from the feudal Islamic culture dominated by Arabic as the language of Islam.

Hence, the spoken language, the so called country language (in Persian "*estelāhāt*"), gained access into the press and becomes this way seen in a different light out of the wish to eliminate the precious imposed Arabic words. This tendency gets accentuated after the 1930s, a time when writers agree on using the national language as the language of mostly Persian literature. The Iranian linguist claims that "*the language is necessary to develop and one of the most important means for this development is to claim help from the freshly used words and expressions, that the people use every day to satisfy its needs for communication*".<sup>12</sup>

By creating a lot of "Persanized" words, by adopting new terms in various domains of activity and by eliminating from the language the foreign words and expressions, the Persian Language and Literature Academy took responsibility of reforming the language and the system of forming new terminology, the military one being exclusively built under the supervision of the Shach and Minister of War. In March 1925, by means of

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<sup>12</sup> KHĀNLARĪ Parvīz Nātel. *Zabānšenāsī va zabān-e fārsī (Linguistics and the Persian language)*, (Tehrān: Tus, 1343 Hs): p.123.

a special law, the calendar was reformed and instead of the Arabic months (the lunar calendar) the Iranian months were adopted (the solar calendar), with a laic use at first. The old "laqab"s (nicknames) were replaced with family names composed of old Persian roots. Still, adopting the terminology was no random act, some models being analyzed beforehand. Yet again, the need for terms was not solved, at present still being a pressing issue taking into account the new notions that impose urgent correspondences in the linguistic field.

The majority of the words adopted by the first academy entered the language indefinitely, for example the Arabic "tayāra" (airplane) was replaced by the Persian „havāpeymā", the Arabic "tabīb" (doctor) was replaced by the Persian word "pezešk", and the Arabic "nahr" was replaced by the Persian "rūdkhāne".

The second Academy (reinstated in 1968) brought back to light the problem of the language purification and processing of a united terminology. The magazine "Khabarnāme-ye farhangestān zabān va adab-e fārsī"<sup>13</sup> consecrated an edition to criticizing the manner in which it had been forced by film translators through brutal use of French and English words alongside with slang elements.

Hence, the creation of new word was realized at the initiative of the Academy, which launched a serious call to people in the literature field to stop as well as possible the entering of foreign elements into the Persian language, which inevitably lead to the loss of its national specificity.

The contribution of the Iranian elite to rejuvenating the Persian language and to imprint a Persian identity is obvious, since it demonstrated to the people that the Persian language is still viable in producing new compounds.

### **Post-revolutionary linguistic developments**

Starting from the idea that even if the Persian territory had been conquered along history and the Persian language survived by having the capacity of rejuvenating and reinventing itself<sup>14</sup>, the political class, doubled

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<sup>13</sup> \*\*\**Khabarnāme-ye farhangestān zabān va adab-e fārsī* ( The Journal of the Persian Language and Literature Academy) (Tehrān, no. 2, 1374 H): 7-11.

<sup>14</sup> EMAMI Karim. "La contribution de Farhangestan", in *Journal de Teheran* (nr. 9054, 1965): 6.

by the academic environment accentuated the necessity to preserve the threatened by the ongoing flux of borrowed words (which came from French, English or Arabic) Persian language. This can illustrate the manifestation of a tendency in the contemporary Persian language to open to international influences certain parts of the language, especially that of the terminology.

As a result, the years after the Islamic revolution marked a meandering track of the Persian language; the positioning of the Iranian linguistic environments towards the acceptance or not of the borrowings from different languages was exclusively realized on the basis of political considerations, even though the Persian language had its superiority and importance in the completion of the Shiite Iranian state confirmed.

During the *Pahlavī* dynasty, the Arabic language was seen as an obstacle in the way of modernization of the Iranian nation and a target to the Purist activists. Along with the Islamic revolution, this language had an unsecure path in the evolution of the Islamic Iran, because in its beginning, Arabic was officially recognized as an indispensable part of the Iranian nation, being placed alongside of the Persian language. Afterwards, in the 1980<sup>s</sup>, the foremost objective of the third Persian Language and Literature Academy was to “consolidate the force and originality of the language as one of the pillars of the Persian national identity” through “identification and usage of Persian equivalents for foreign terms” and Arabic became exclusively an instrument for supplying words that could not be created by the Persian language.

Under thorough analysis, the Islamic Revolution consolidated the Iranian nationalism, manifested at the language level through highlighting the fact that the revolution identifies itself with the Persian language. The politicization of this field consisted of the political leaders’ speeches, focused on language as an instrument to add potency to the Iranian identity. An example that speaks volumes is *seyyed* ‘ *Alī Khāmeneī*, who as well as in his quality as the president of Iran, as well as the supreme leader (in Persian *valī-ye faqīh-e īrān*), assumed the role of defender of the Persian language as the language of revolution and Shi’ite Islam, being careful about also embracing Arabic words with the purpose of not irritating the Iranian theocracy. This message willingly reactivated the moderate Purist currents of the 40<sup>s</sup>, deploring the eccentricities of the language. The linguist *Mohammad Forūqī* declares himself in favor of

total elimination of Arabic words and their replacement with a pure Persian lexicon of an archaic nature.

Having as objective the preservation of the Persian language's authenticity, the Academy concentrated its interest on adopting of proper words to represent new concepts in Persian. Arabic is still being associated to some extent to religion, even though Shi'ism, by the way it is understood and assimilated at present by the Iranian nation seems more than ever to be tied to the Persian language.

This purification action gained a totally different intention with the presidency of Ahmadinejad, who as a response to the American policies in the Middle East, immediately eliminated all foreign words, that entered the Persian language and replaced them in all governmental releases with Persian words agreed by the Academy.

The Arabic words and expressions were also targeted in the context of Arabic being the only language of the Qur'an. It was still argued that the use of Arabic words brings prejudice to the Persian language, since the strict grammar rules of Arabic are not being assimilated by the native Persian speakers. Under these circumstances, the clerical circles adopted a clear position in supporting the mandatory study of Arabic in schools and universities, claiming that the Persian language should remain unchanged in status and Arabic to keep its role to cosmetize the Persian language.

Under the same umbrella of eliminating the Arab influence comes the practice of giving up the use of numerous synonyms to describe one object or express one notion, since the result often translates into a disturbing, prolix style. "Mot juste" became popular thanks to the literature world and the word invested with figurative meanings can come either from the old dusty lexicon, or be invented. At present we are witnessing a regeneration of the Persian language<sup>15</sup>, most likely derived from the wish to deepen the fertility of the Persian language and bring potency to the Iranian culture, including its religious one, encouraged to be written in a language that got rid of the prolix Arab expressions and even some borrowed words that came into use by force.

The last 15 years brought to attention the Iranian cultural element through promoting the Persian art, medicine, science, philosophy, claiming at its rightfully legitimacy *Al-Bīrūnī*, *Ibn Sīnā*, *Al-Ghazālī*, *Al-Fārābī*,

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<sup>15</sup> \*\*\*\*"Javānsāzī-ye zabān-e fārsī" (Rejuvenation of the Persian Language), in *Khabarnāme-ye farhangestān zabān va adab-e fārsī* (Tehrān, no. 8, 1375 H): 3.

*Sībawayh* sau *Az-Zamakhšarī* and highlighting their belonging to the Persian cultural pantheon.

Literature and especially Persian poetry continues to play a leading role in animating the Persian national feeling, the political and religious speeches of the elites from public squares often end with lyrics from the "Šāhnāme" by *Ferdōsī* or refer more and more to the rebirth of the Iranian nation during the umayyade and abbaside dynasties.

### Conclusions

In spite of the ethno-linguistic diversity, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century and beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the Persian language managed to be assimilated to the national identity and the awareness of the Persian culture and history. Alongside linguistic nationalism, it served as a force to coagulate the Iranian nation, capable to overcome the different sporadic movements with the potential for separation.

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## **China 2030: a Chinese century or the „kingdoms” at war**

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### **Abstract**

*Often, academics make a bold claim that the future is expected to somehow parallel with the recent past. Predicting the future is, though, obviously impossible. This paper aims to take a look into the future and see how China, a unique development success story until now, will look in 2030, using scenario building. The process of building future scenarios is based on two main drivers (i) the Chinese economy and (ii) US-China relations, integrated with different combinations of assumptions, trends and other internal or external drivers shaping a country's ethos. The dilemma comes from the possibility of China becoming the world's number one economic superpower and challenging US hegemony. How would the future look like under such coordinates?*

**Keywords:** China 2030, scenario building, global turn, Chinese economy, US-China relations.

### **Introduction**

After decades of isolation from the Western influences and after internal struggles and traumatizing political experiments<sup>1</sup>, China seems to have discovered a magical formula and, at the same time, to have found again its interest of stepping in the international arena.

While China's economic and political power is on the rise, experts are thinking at the ways the Chinese emergence will mould the current international order, the dilemmas starting from a China challenging the

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<sup>1</sup> See details in Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations. Power and Policy since the Cold War*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2009, pp.69-110.

American hegemony and a potential transition from unipolarity toward a new type of bipolarity or even toward a Chinese international order<sup>2</sup>.

Given the uncertainty regarding the way Beijing will relate to the world, the most appropriate method for scanning China's future would be the scenarios. Even though this is not an entirely new approach, the scenarios provide enough flexibility in order to identify coherent landmarks regarding China's evolution for the next two decades.

### **Scanning the future of China – studies and scenarios**

There are a large number of studies exploring the future of China toward the 2020s or 2030s. Each of these is building scenarios based on relatively similar sets of drivers, most of them being related to China's internal development.

The Center for Global Affairs from New York University projects three scenarios for China in 2020. The first scenario envisions the fragmentation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) given the actions of a wide range of actors (for instance, provincial leaders cooperating with the local commanders of the armed forces deployed within their provinces) chipping away CCP legitimacy. On the contrary, the second scenario imagines a powerful China in 2020, led by a profoundly autocratic CCP, which extensively uses technology to control the society. Finally, the third scenario is built on a middle approach - "partial" democracy, where CCP moulds the political and economic agenda of the state pending on the popular requirements for opening and involvement in the government actions. The list of drivers used by CGA is extensive and includes the economic policy (fiscal, exchange rate, etc.), as well as the energy, the environment, social inequality, the minorities, the demography, the Internet, the political changes or the external actors.<sup>3</sup>

Another study carried out by the National Intelligence Council, widely known globally, is envisaging also the future of China across four extensive scenarios, focused actually on the US evolution toward 2030. The four scenarios are continuing to a certain extent CGA projections, describing either a nationalistic China, whose authority is fragmented by corruption

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<sup>2</sup> David Scott, *The Chinese Century? The Challenge to Global Order*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2008, p.7.

<sup>3</sup>The Center for Global Affairs of the New York University, *China 2020*, no. 3, Winter 2009, [www.cgascenarios.wordpress.com](http://www.cgascenarios.wordpress.com).

and economic stagnation (*Stalled Engines, Gini Out-of-the-Bottle* and *Nonstate World*), or a powerful China, whose soft power allows an active involvement both regionally and globally (Fusion). *Global Trends 2030* uses a larger number of types of drivers – megatrends (such as the diffusion of power or the demographic shifts) and game changers (such as an increasing potential for conflict or the impact of the new technologies).<sup>4</sup>

The present article starts from the premises that even though the internal setting is essential for scanning the future of China, there is a need to take also into account the way Beijing relates to the significant international actors. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that for scenario building in this case we use the Alternative Scenarios method as described by Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson while studying the structured analytic techniques<sup>5</sup>.

Therefore, in order to create the framework needed for scenario building regarding the future of Beijing, we will take into account two key drivers - China's economy and its relation to the US - as well as the values these two drivers could get for the future. As part of this logic, the economic power might increase or decrease and the relation to the US could evolve toward cooperation or degenerate to conflict. Combining the above-mentioned extreme values, we obtained four possible scenarios.

Of course, we cannot reduce scenario building to these two key drivers. The international order as well as the national interests and the political, economic, social and military developments in the two countries are offering the real overall picture and a certain amount of vision or perspective in the scenario building process. The correlation of each scenario to the other data regarding the studied issue is fostering analysis' complexity. Consequently, in the scenario building process we will take into account other significant drivers influencing the future of China toward 2030, alongside the two above-mentioned key drivers.

### **The future of China – internal versus external drivers**

#### ***China – economic model or Marxist deception?***

The Chinese economy's dimension, whose unprecedented increase amazed and still amazes the world is the main argument for China's

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<sup>4</sup> National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, December 2012.

<sup>5</sup> Heuer, Richards, Pherson, Randolph, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, Washington, D.C., CQ Press, 2011, pp. 119-143.

diplomacy in building and consolidating a new role for Beijing in the international arena.

The Chinese economic miracle started with the reforms<sup>6</sup> implemented in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping, the then CCP leader, which were envisioning a partial liberalization of the market, the creation of “special economic areas”<sup>7</sup> and the orientation toward massive exports by exploiting the demographic potential leading to reduced labor costs. Deng Xiaoping’s socialism with Chinese characteristics became a euphemism for what we are calling nowadays state controlled capitalism.

The opening toward the West and the direct foreign investments proved more than useful for Beijing. From 1979 until 2013, the medium economic growth of China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was of 9.8%, while the highest reduction of poverty rate was registered, with 440 millions of Chinese surpassing the poverty threshold. In 2013, the Chinese economy was 14 times larger than China’s economy in 1976 and the GDP per capita increased ten times<sup>8</sup>.

China is nowadays the second world economic power, according to the GDP, after the US, being the country with the fastest rate of growth amongst the emergent economies.<sup>9</sup> During the last years China became a real world production center, being the largest goods exporter and the second largest importer<sup>10</sup>. The combination between the Western know-how, the cheap labor and the international opening of the markets as part of globalization, proved to be the ingredients creating the Chinese recipe for economic success.

Such an intense development was however based on the rapid burn of stages, the exploitation of the working class generating certain differences between the rich and the poor, but also significant discrepancies between the Eastern China – urbanized, maritime, with favorable

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<sup>6</sup> Barry Naughton, *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth*, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2007, pp.35-39.

<sup>7</sup> Justin Yifu Lin, *Economic Development and Transition: Thought, Strategy and Viability*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p.56.

<sup>8</sup> For supplementary data, see the World bank reports, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china>, IMF reports, <http://www.imf.org/external/country/Chn/> or JP Morgan economic assessments, <http://www.jpmorganam.com.hk/JFAM/en/download/mthfsh/p128.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> See details at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table>.

<sup>10</sup> Idem.

geographic conditions and the western China – mostly rural, continental and dominated by ethnic and religious conflicts (Tibet and Xinjiang)<sup>11</sup>.

The 2008 economic crisis also highlighted a certain number of weaknesses of the exports based model. The impact of the decrease in the external demand and implicitly of the internal production emphasized China's dependence on the economic state of its external partners (especially the US) and stressed the importance of economic diversification and of the sustainability for an increasing internal demand.

All these drivers, together with the changing international economic and geopolitical realities are underlining an urgent need of adaptation of the CCP policies to the new macroeconomic environment. The central issue in this case is not the sustainability of the economic mechanism, but its ability to absorb the shocks and to adapt to the new international shifts. Therefore, the dilemmas deriving from all the above-mentioned traits are not centered on the mechanism itself or on the battle between capitalism and socialism, but on a simple equation of economic Darwinism: the natural selection of the optimal economic model.

#### ***The US-China relation***

The strategic dialogue between China and the US had contrasting features after the Cold War. There were a number of strained episodes and significant crises altogether with cooperative moments and complex economic developments. The interdependence between the two powers increased step by step during the last period, focusing mainly on the economic issues.

The complex dynamics in the South China Sea created a conflicting rhetoric between the two parties and fueled the diplomatic tensions in time. The common interests and the ambitions of the two international actors led to a relative polarization of the opinions. However, the contrasting political views, as well as the different visions on the international system made the US-China relation extremely complicated and with a particular evolution, difficult to manage both by Beijing as well as by Washington<sup>12</sup>.

Since we are discussing a special relationship between two major international actors, an optimal level of understanding of the US-China

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<sup>11</sup> Andreea Cristina Brînză, *China - între a fi și nu fi prima putere economică a lumii*, available at <http://geopolitics.ro/china-intre-a-fi-si-nu-a-fi-prima-putere-economica-a-lumii/>

<sup>12</sup> Jeffrey Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, Brookings Institution Press, New York, 2012, p.5.

relation requires an assessment of the historical premises leading to the construction and consolidation of their diplomatic affairs.

On 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1949, the Communist leader Mao Zedong created the Popular Republic of China, after winning the war against the Chinese nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang and his supporters left to Taiwan. The US - which supported the nationalist forces during the Japanese invasion of the Second World War - provided support also to the government in exile, called The Republic of China (Taiwan) with the headquarters at Taipei. Both entities claimed the other's territory and international recognition. US support for Taiwan was the starting point for a US-China conflicting relationship, leading to the freezing of the diplomatic affairs between the two countries for a few decades.

The rapprochement or the reconciliation between China and the US started in July 1971, when the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger traveled in secret to the Popular Republic of China. Afterward, President Richard Nixon visited China in February 1972 and met Mao Zedong. During this meeting a common declaration is signed with the then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, known as the Shanghai Communiqué<sup>13</sup>. This declaration is viewed as the angular stone of the relations between of the two states after 1949.

Following a sinusoidal trend, the normalization of the US-China relation entered into a blind area after the 1989 events, which led to the fall of the Communist regimes in most of the countries in the world. The reverberations of these geopolitical movements, as well as the appetite for change and opening toward the democratic values were found among the Chinese youth at that time. They gathered in the Tiananmen Square in Beijing for protesting against the CCP. The Communist leaders decided to use force for stopping the rebellion, resulting in bloodshed, a moment known as the Tiananmen massacre.

This episode was harshly criticized by the international community (especially by the US) leading to a new low in the US-China relation. However, the mutual economic interests, as well as the externalization of production and the cheap Chinese labor consolidated the commercial relation between the US and China starting with 2000.

This complex interdependence surmounted all the past misunderstandings and convinced both actors to reconsider their positions. The advantages of cooperation were more than obvious for the Chinese

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<sup>13</sup> The document can be read at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26012.htm>

part. The surpassing of Japan as the second superpower in terms of GDP in 2010, as well as the extraordinary potential and the signs that the Chinese economy will continue to grow significantly in the following years led to political rumor in Washington and convinced the US to rethink its priorities.

This situation became more visible with the reorientation of the US foreign policy from the Middle East toward Asia-Pacific, starting with November 2011. In this way, the main foreign policy goal of the US became the management of its relation with China and of the regional issues.

***Other drivers - from the internal PEST<sup>14</sup> to the external relations' network***

Alongside the Chinese economy and the US-China relation, there are a number of other drivers which can be used in scenario building with regard to China's evolution toward 2030, both internal - such as the political system, the social transformations or the technological development - as well as external, taking into account Beijing's foreign policy actions.

While the political system is related to the institutional actors having the capacity to influence decisions and to adopt courses of action (such as the State Council or the Chinese army), as well as to the interaction between them, the social issues are covering the disparities generated by the poverty, the demographic boom or the gender imbalance.


The technological development has a particular role since the access (legal or not) to new technologies on the one hand consolidated China's offensive capacity with regard to conventional or unconventional (cyber) military capabilities and, on the other hand, allowed the creation of resistance movements at different social layers. Moreover, CCP's future depends on the way the party will manage the technological development.

At the same time, aside from the US-China relation, it is worth mentioning Beijing's positions as part of the international organizations where China is a member, as well as its relations with the regional key actors - Russia, India and Japan - or the use of non formal organizations, such as BRICS. Nevertheless, the global economic crisis allowed China to consolidate its stance compared to other globally relevant actors, such as the EU.

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<sup>14</sup> Acronym describing a method of analysis using the political, economic, social and technological drivers.





### **China in 2030 – conflict vs cooperation**

Due the fact that 2 out of the 4 scenarios are, at this moment, not so likely to happen for China in 2030, we've chosen to talk about the future events that would be shaped by a growing economy.

### **SCENARIO 1. Chinese challenge to American supremacy**

The very simple fact of Chinese economic power – increasingly supported by military power – will lead to a particular degree of tension in the years that follow. The United States, as the regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the regional hegemon over much of the Eastern Hemisphere<sup>15</sup>. Uncertainty will, most likely, be driven by the wrangle over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

<sup>15</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *Tragedia politicii de forță, realismul ofensiv și lupta pentru putere*, Antet, Bucharest, 2003, p.386.

At this moment, in Central-East Asia and West Pacific, we see China developing its naval capabilities in The East China and South China Seas. At the same time, Beijing is strongly involved in projects that seek harbor-building on the coast of the Indian Ocean<sup>16</sup>. This tendency will undoubtedly follow in the next years, the birth of political and economical turmoil in China being the only exponent for a different evolution. The Chinese economy, although heavily criticised and pessimistically forecasted by international analysts, continues to grow. This sustained growth is the main component for building the premises of a potential challenge of US supremacy. Quite a surprise for some, a reality foreseen by others, China has surpassed the US in terms of GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP), becoming the largest in the world by this measure, as recent International Monetary Fund estimates show<sup>17</sup>.

The uncertainty that I was talking about above would be inflamed by the fact that, across the securitized and defended Chinese border we'll find an entire stream of American warships, predominantly concentrated in Oceania, partnered with other warships from India, Japan or other US strategic allies that feel vulnerable in face of Chinese expansion and are forced to balance against it<sup>18</sup>.

Given time, a Chinese water force could become less territorial. As Robert Kaplan stressed out, because of the particular geography of East Asia, the struggle between Beijing and Washington will remain more stable than that in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States. That is because American maritime power during the Cold War was not enough to contain the Soviet Union, a significant land force in Europe also being required.

Keeping the same critical thinking, even given a slightly pro-Chinese Greater Korea, no such land force will ever be needed around the Rimland of Eurasia, an area in which the US Navy will stand face to face with a weaker Chinese one<sup>19</sup>. Backed by its growing economy, China is using all

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<sup>16</sup> Robert Kaplan, *Războiul geografic*, Litera, Bucharest, 2014, pp.272-289.

<sup>17</sup> Vezi <http://rt.com/business/194264-china-surpass-us-gdp/>

<sup>18</sup> Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Relations. Power and Policy since the Cold War*, Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, New York, 2009, p.69-110.

<sup>19</sup> Robert Kaplan, *The geography of chinese power*, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20iht-edkaplan.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20iht-edkaplan.html?_r=0).

forms of its national power—political, diplomatic, economic, military, and demographic—to virtually extend beyond its legal land and sea borders in order to reestablish the borders of imperial China at its historical high points<sup>20</sup>. Going even forward, China intends to deny access in its coastal seas. From here, we have the emergence of “the possibility that China may be closer than ever to mastering the ability to hit a moving target at sea, such as a US carrier, with a land-based missile, and may plan a strategically publicized test sometime in the future”<sup>21</sup>

Such an objective like access denial, without the Chinese army’s ability to protect its own sea lines of communication makes a possible strike on an American combatant (let alone war with the United States) futile and dangerously naive, since the U.S. Navy would maintain the ability to cut off Chinese energy supplies by deterring Chinese ships from entering in the Pacific and Indian oceans<sup>22</sup>.

The future security environment in Asia will fundamentally evolve towards a model of instability that will prove to be much more volatile than the one that emerged after World War II. As American unipolarity becomes less visible and Chinese economic and military strength is skyrocketing, multipolarity seeks to be the law-order in Asia 2030 power politics.

## **SCENARIO 2. Cooperation and Interdependence**

The political realm in the region is as follows : the Chinese economy continues its sustained growth<sup>23</sup> and U.S.-China relations are a mix of intensifying cooperation and increasingly intertwined economies. The two main political actors build, in this way, a strong interdependency.

Where will such a architecture lead to? Could the sino-american relations evolve around cooperation and mutual benefits? The premises and variables of such a scenarios are extremely sensitive and hard to unveil. According to some leading scholars, geographic configuration and economic interdependence are, though, the core elements that help draw such a scenario.

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<sup>20</sup> Robert Kaplan *Răzbuarea geografiei*, Litera, , Bucharest, 2014, p.299.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>23</sup> See Xiaodung Zhu, *Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present, Future*, available at <http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.26.4.103>.

Map configuration could, generally, shape future conflicts and the way in which the fight against forces leading in the opposite direction will take place<sup>24</sup>. Throughout history, Chinese strategic thinking was oriented to the interior of the continent, with only few and shy attempts do build a strong naval presence in the area. Chinese Heartland is exposed to a potential threat from Russia, in the north, Japan in the east, different nationalist factions in the west (Xinjiang) or other emergent powers (Thailand, India, Vietnam) in the south.

Analyzing the actual geographical display, it is clear that China is virtually surrounded from all parts and the biggest threat comes from continental power, especially India, China and Russia. American presence in the costal lines will become, consequently, not the top priority for the communist leaders in Beijing. Putting things in balance, China can't antagonize its U.S. partner because it would need American support or a silent neutrality in case of a conflict with India (or Russia)<sup>25</sup>.

Whichever course of action China decides upon, it must be one that brings it into harmony with policies adopted by Washington, otherwise risking a domino effect that would finally lead to the breaking down of U.S.-China strategic partnership. The Chinese government is smart enough not to trigger a war on mutiple fronts, especially one that can't be won.<sup>26</sup>

Integrated and interdependent economies eventually give birth to strategic alliances. United States follows a laissez-faire economic model, seeking economic consolidation and stability on the long term. The Chinese economy has instead a unique pattern, a socialism with Chinese characteristics. China's economic boom has lasted for three decades will, according to some scholars, end due to the inability of moving from an export-orientated driven economy to a self sustainable economic model, based on internal demand and consumption.

China has yet to reach an equal level of wealth and resource distribution among its citizens. Economic growth is unequally shared between social classes and this will eventually lead to social fragmentation and strong social turmoil<sup>27</sup>. On the other hand, a transition from an export-

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<sup>24</sup> Robert Kaplan, *Răzbumarea geografiei*, Litera, Bucharest 2014, p.296.

<sup>25</sup> Andrew Follet, *China and USA: Destined to cooperate?*, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-us-destined-to-cooperate/>.

<sup>26</sup> Robert Kaplan, *The geography of chinese power*, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20iht-edkaplan.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/opinion/20iht-edkaplan.html?_r=0).

<sup>27</sup> Andrew Follet, *China and USA: Destined to cooperate?*, available at la

oriented economy to the internal market would reduce the CCP's ability to exert its influence in international negotiations, absent the economic factor as a bargaining chip.

Both perspectives argue for on the hypothesis of sino-american cooperation and reduce the possibility of a conflict. Even though economic estimates show that, by 2030, the Chinese economy would become the largest in the world, Americans are perfectly aware that the US is the largest consumer for Chinese goods.

A deliberate decrease in demand for Chinese goods could be counterbalanced by the US economy's diversity in supply, while, for China, American exports are 40% of the GDP. Even if Beijing would try to build economic relations with other emerging markets (BRICS, Africa, Central America), export contractions from a mature economy like U.S. would be extremely hard to surpass.

The fundamental question that arises is not when China will become the world's economic power, surpassing USA, but whether the two actors could reduce their level of interdependence<sup>28</sup>. Cooperation that derives from this aspect will become a key element of the future of sino-american relations. Both Beijing and Washington wish to build a strong and wealthy economy. Are they willing to work together and consolidate such a complementarity?

### **Conclusions**

There are strong signs that China could become the economic center around which the future global order will be built. The very simple fact of Chinese economic power, increasingly supported by military power, will lead to a particular degree of tension in the years that follow. The United States, as the regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, will try to prevent China from becoming the regional hegemon over much of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The world, as we know it, has two main foreseeable futures (i) the American hold on the First Island Chain is beginning to weaken and (ii) China is flexing its muscles and acts both as an intimidator and attractor that can complicate America's bilateral relations with its Pacific allies. The

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<http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-us-destined-to-cooperate/>.

<sup>28</sup> Anne Mary Brady, *Chinese Foreign Policy. A new era dawns*, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/chinese-foreign-policy-a-new-era-dawns>.

Chinese economy is growing and, we ask ourselves, what will happen a few days after China will surpass US in terms of GDP? Will this be the starting point for building a multipolar international system or Chinese strategic thinking envisions a new model of unipolarity?

How will China 4.0 look like if we adopt the ideas of *European Council for Foreign Relations* and take into consideration that Mao Zedong's China 1.0 had a planned economy and a leninist political system, Deng Xiaoping's China 2.0 introduced the world to socialism with Chinese characteristics and China 3.0 is driven by provincial systems built on Chongqing and Guangdong<sup>29</sup>?

These uncertainties incline to be more and more relevant as the next power shift in CCP could lead to the replacement of the old top government officials, who had been elected in a classical way, with experienced/strongly connected technocrats, like Zhang Qingwei, former CEO of COMAC

Last but not least, it is worth reflecting on the impact of „black swans”, highlighted by the experts of *National Intelligence Council*, which puts the light on the possible effects of a democratic China (that could become more nationalist) or a China on the brink of collapse (with devastating effects on global economy) for the international system.<sup>30</sup>

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## **The Role of *Intelligence* in Avoiding Surprise. Case Study: Trends in Militant Movement in Romania<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*Dilemmas raised, on the one hand, by the need to get anticipatory and predictive information and, on the other hand, by the lack of a unitary perspective on the nature and terminology specific to prediction and foresight are a particular cause of concern for intelligence practitioners given that their core activities focus on preventing and countering actions with potential impact on national interests.*

*This paper highlights some aspects aimed at confirming that, in many cases, intelligence services have the necessary tools and are successful in anticipating and warning about potential negative developments and phenomenon, but they do not always succeed, out of objective reasons, in preventing their occurrence.*

*In order to substantiate this theoretical perspective, the results of a case study on the short and medium dynamics and prospects for the militant movement in Romania are put forth.*

**Keywords:** *warning, prediction, security, national interest, crisis, indicators*

### **Anticipation and Prediction - Perishable Processes and Products**

As defined in the dictionary, *to predict* means *doing or saying something before a certain (fixed) date or before the agreed time, to prevent, to get ahead, to avert* the occurrence of an event or phenomenon.

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It is a process associated, psychologically speaking, to a change in perception (Zlate, 1999), the latter being, in turn, a key element in assessing a situation as potentially negative in terms of security or protection of national interests. What was considered a risk factor yesterday, given its potentially harmful nature, is either a threat or a reality today and will turn into an opportunity tomorrow. That is the case of the global crisis that broke out in 2007: long preached by economists such as Warren Buffett, George Soros and Alan Greenspan (Morris, 2009), it has become the main threat to economic stability of the entire international community, from the USA to Lichenstein, generating also some measures, which, in time, have set a series of financial and economic mechanisms that did not seem damaged at first glance (through austerity measures) and established the premise for healthy economic recovery by stimulating investment.

According to the same source, *to predict*<sup>2</sup> is defined as *saying, announcing in advance what is going to happen, positioning according to certain existing indications, intuition, reasoning, reading or foretelling the future.*

Predictions are made in order to substantiate customer's decisions, thus avoiding surprises. However, according to Michael McCormick (1995), *surprise is characterized as a result of intelligence failure, specifically a failure of warning (...). Most attacks that have achieved tactical surprise have taken place in an atmosphere of strategic warning (...). In fact, more ironic is that so much surprise has been achieved in spite of warning.*

Based on these considerations, we find that it is difficult to quantify intelligence agencies' failure and success in making predictions. "To be right", meaning warning in advance about an event or phenomenon that subsequently happened, can be a success for theorists, but it is a real failure for an *intelligence* professional as important as the lack of warning itself.

Besides the global crisis that occurred in 2007, recent examples that fall into this category and have had a major impact on the strategic environment in which Romania develops include:

- The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 9, 1989) and collapse of the Communist regime in Romania (December 1989) that changed: the relevant geopolitical environment, triggering a fundamental shift of the

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<sup>2</sup> Given that, in Romanian, there is no corresponding action word for the noun *prediction*, we chose the verb *to predict* as equivalent, based on the synonymy between the words *prediction* and *forecast/ foresight*.

foreign policy towards the West and in-depth resizing of national objectives, with priority being given to Euro-Atlantic integration; the economic environment in which our country operates, characterized by painful but necessary transition from a centralized to market economy and a dynamic of trade relations with major impact on Romania's presence on international markets;

- The September 11 terrorist attacks, a tragic moment for the international community, which highlighted the action potential of our country in the fight against global terrorism and probably hastened our entry into NATO, a huge strategic advantage in terms of security guarantees Romania enjoys.

Last but not least, the crisis in Ukraine (2014) is a negative landmark for regional stability in Southeast Europe, the situation in the neighboring state surprising information services not only because it illustrates the so far theoretical concept of “hybrid war” but especially through the transparent manner in which actors such as Russia are conducting their actions, many of them specific to the *intelligence* community (diversion, sabotage, strategic influencing, etc.).

Because of their potential impact on domestic stability, even if they cannot be considered “strategic surprises”, natural disasters such as the Fukushima nuclear accident (March 11, 2011) bring to attention the issue of nuclear security as well as of energy security, as a nuclear plant is operating in our country and great attention must be paid to its security.

Such contexts generated by human action or uncontrollable natural phenomena can make the information containing elements of warning and prediction to be provided to decision makers obsolete. Thus, we note that, sometimes, it is not crises themselves that take us by surprise but their magnitude in a certain context created by specific triggers and the actors involved.

Modern society continues to give us arguments about the uncertain environment we are living in and non-linear logic of events and the fact that intelligence cannot anticipate every potential crisis is a consequence of evolution itself, which has become more than a natural, linear, and gradual process, but one directed or at least steerable, where results can be optimally oriented towards a specific purpose by certain factors and known actors.

### **Conceptual Challenges**

The inability to give accurate answers to security developments is also caused by profound terminology contradictions and failure to clearly

define the terms of *foresight* and *prediction*.

The specific literature has not reached a consensus on the perspective on prediction as well as on warning or anticipatory mechanisms.

On the one hand, it is difficult to establish the points where *foresight* processes end, which are translated into Romanian as prediction – prognosis - forecast, and where the warning processes start. For example, according to Denis Loveridge (2009), foresight is “practical and qualitative anticipation”, but Bob Johansen (2009) found that the foresight does not refer to creating predictions, but to making decisions.

Language barriers add to ambiguity, the terms being used with the same meaning or with specific shades of meaning or in completely different contexts. The correspondence between the concepts of *foresight* (in English<sup>3</sup> meaning *the ability of looking into the future, becoming aware of something that has not happened yet*) and *la prospective* (in French, used to define *the science studying technical, scientific, economic, and social causes that accelerate development of the modern world, and predicting situations that may arise from their combined influences*<sup>4</sup>) is questioned.

Methodological aspects represent another debated issue, as foresight principles are not clear and transparency and replicability of its results are challenged, although efforts in this regard have already begun to get a clear outline. Jan Erik Karlsen (2014) proposed the use of an online platform to prove that there are practical and easy ways to build a common body of knowledge in the field to be further used and practiced by professionals.

All these challenges lead to the conclusion that we cannot talk about a conceptualization of anticipation and foresight or about a specific scientific field that explains these two terms and processes associated to them. For this reason, products resulting after applying anticipatory and predictive methodologies often lack consistency, clarity and durability.

### **Intelligence Agencies' Role in Issuing Warnings and Forecasts**

Theorists' inability to set clear, scientific guidelines for these dilemmas does not help much intelligence community practitioners. In their activity, anticipation is a prerequisite for creating national security information and warning policy makers about developments that may

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/foresight>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/prospective/64476>

impact on national interests and domestic balance so necessary for the state development. It also represents a landmark in elaborating strategies to counter risks and threats or to eliminate systemic vulnerabilities that could have a major impact on society.

High quality predictive information requires solid expertise and sufficient and reliable data to be analyzed and converted into *intelligence* products, elements that can be found ready-made in external environments.

*Intelligence* organizations cannot compete with institutions that have a long tradition and expertise in prognosis and forecasting or with their databases and such an effort would not be feasible, being a major waste of time, the most valuable resource for analysts and case officers of the specialized information structures.

Surveys conducted by national statistical institutes, reports drafted by national banks or specialized companies, such as cyber security firms, assessments by academic institutions are used by intelligence practitioners to develop predictive analyses, scenarios or forecasts on economic, financial, social, cyber issues.

Although a valuable information resource, their level of abstraction is often so high that it is necessary to “translate” raw data in order to use it, forcing intelligence structures to develop cooperation with civil society partners. That is the case of exact sciences, which have, unlike social and political sciences, effective tools to issue predictions (Markov chains being one of them), but that requires *intelligence* practitioners to hold specialized knowledge and understanding of highly abstract models, the reason why most people avoid using them.

From this perspective, it is here where OSINT can bring a more significant contribution than secret intelligence disciplines (HUMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, etc.) to avoid surprise, especially strategic ones.

On the other hand, intelligence services keep the monopoly on crucial missions: espionage and counterespionage, preventing and combating terrorism, extremism and transnational organized crime. This is the niche where the contribution of secret *intelligence* disciplines is greater than that of open sources, whose role is to identify and analyze the phenomenon, but the real prevention activity is implemented by case officers.

Maintaining social stability is a primary mission for any intelligence service, which is achieved by specific means. These include monitoring security status based on lists of indicators whose variation can signal potential macro and micro imbalances, analysis of domestic and foreign security

environment, respectively, as a last resort, conducting specific activities to prevent and combat phenomena that may impact on national security.

#### **Case Study: Trends in Militant Movement in Romania**

The aim of this study was to identify potential developments of the radical leftist movement in Romania.

In order to conduct quantitative and qualitative comparative analysis, we selected materials and messages disseminated in the public space in the context of protest actions involving representatives who showed such ideological orientation, who challenged:

- Rosia Montana gold ore mining project using cyanide technology;
- exploration of shale gas deposits using the hydraulic fracturing technique;
- adoption of the Law on euthanasia of stray dogs captured on public domain;
- adoption of European cyber security norms, known as ACTA.

The reference period under review was 2013 - 2014, during which several public events of different intensity and duration, spread across the country and in locations outside the country, that challenged those decisions, took place.

At descriptive level, the analysis focused on presenting and tallying, from the historical point of view, the militant acts of protests in our country in the past 25 years. The most important movements specific to leftist radicalism took place in 2008, amid the Bucharest NATO Summit, when protests targeted globalization, war, the system, representing a classic example of anarchy in action.

Comparing the protests against the four civic causes, one can notice that if initially they had their own public and a distinct critical mass, which militated for each cause separately, shortly afterwards, the participants started to support each other and carry out joint actions.

Another conclusion was that the typology of these situations links only partially to the anarchist movement revealing traits specific to the civic militancy that may take the shape of street riots and violence.

Such mutations can be explained and included among *intelligence* services' activities by combining the knowledge provided by science and specific means of intelligence. A scientific approach aims at theories stemming in sociology of crowds and leadership, history, politics, economics, anthropology.

The explicative level resulted in identifying the causes and contexts of the manifestations unfolded around the invoked witness-situation, identifying a series of relevant trends for the activity of leading organizations promoting such ideologies.

By applying the simplified methodology of scenario analysis, as proposed by Daniela Mitu (2014, pp. 123-125), the following factors were selected to conduct an analysis of significant developments of those movements: tactical and operational models, communication *patterns* and channels, domestic and foreign actors, and types of message dissemination. Based on these benchmarks, we identified a series of patterns that affect the way messages and actions related to analyzed topics were aggregated.

As for actionable models, we note the import from the West of civil disobedience tactics and operational patterns that include strategies of organizing and mobilizing supporters, creation of a critical relatively stable crowd having long-term objectives.

For instance, online petitions have been started to reject Government's decisions in the four cases, the one relating to shale gas exploration and exploitation by using hydraulic fracturing having gathered about 50,000 accessions. We also witnessed flash mobs in important spots, such as University Square; cultural fund-raising events, most recent one being held in August 2014 at Pungesti, Vaslui County; DIY (*do it yourself*) projects, flyers and dedicated websites used for disseminating materials illustrating the justice of the cause they support; *Occupy*-type “resistance camp”; protests in various locations, most of them peaceful and consistent with the legal exercise of citizens' rights.

In topical cases, and rather scanty, the manifestations had a slight tinge of violence – as in the case of Pungesti protesters, who “sanctioned” the presence of the gendarmerie and its attempt to unblock the public road for traffic and the wire mesh fences they lifted around the Chevron’s drilling site.

Another major trend is using mainly the online environment for communication especially the socializing and content dissemination platforms, such as Facebook or Youtube.

Therefore, it was no surprise finding that the number of protests and civic initiatives was significantly higher in the cities with largest number of people using communication platforms, namely Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara and Iasi. Demonstrations against Rosia Montana project are marked in blue,



protests against shale gas exploitation in green, those against ACTA in yellow, and rallies against stray dog euthanasia in red.

Topul oraselor din Romania:

Oras	Utilizatori	Procent	
Bucuresti	1.480.640	21.97%	
Cluj-Napoca	260.040	3.86%	
Timisoara	260.000	3.86%	
Iasi	260.000	3.86%	
Constanta	207.900	3.08%	
Craiova	172.480	2.56%	
Brasov	169.200	2.51%	
Galati	152.040	2.26%	
Ploiesti	142.000	2.11%	
Oradea	133.400	1.98%	
Bacau	114.000	1.69%	
Arad	112.460	1.67%	
Pitesti	110.020	1.63%	
Sibiu	107.000	1.59%	
Targu-Mures	88.060	1.31%	
Buzau	88.000	1.31%	
Braila	86.000	1.28%	
Suceava	80.000	1.19%	
Baia Mare	76.000	1.13%	
Botosani	70.000	1.04%	
Râmnicu Vâlcea	69.420	1.03%	
Targoviste	64.000	0.95%	
Satu Mare	63.000	0.93%	
Piatra Neamt	60.000	0.89%	
Focsani	56.000	0.83%	

Fig.1 Facebook users nationwide and incidence of analyzed protests  
Source: www.facebrands.ro

Recent statistics show that the Romanian population is part of the international trend on the use of mobile communication and Internet access. Thus, it appears that the number of mobile phones is higher than the total population, being an average 115 mobile phones per 100 inhabitants. As for the use of smartphones, the number of owners of such devices tripled in 2013 as compared to 2012.



Fig. 2 Trend of mobile phone users in Romania  
Source: [www.ancom.org.ro](http://www.ancom.org.ro)

As for the involved actors, two distinct elements came in the limelight. On the internal plane, environmental organizations are among the most active and potent in terms of action and logistics. The rejection of the Rosia Montana mining project, as well as the shale gas alternative energy, enjoyed the highest public support as compared to the other two cases, both in the virtual environment, considering the large number of pages devoted and those who accessed them, and in the real world, as the number of participants in public protests held in various locations nationwide shows.

The connection between homegrown militant movements and international campaigners has become stronger. For instance, in the case of shale gas, visible liaisons was created with campaigners in Bulgaria, where protests had started earlier, as well as with Greenpeace, and, in the case of ACTA, ties between Romanian protesters and the Anonymus movement were obvious.

Some activists bragged with their experience gained in Turkey during Istanbul protests. No signals have been identified in the public space regarding their direct participation in the events, but just the fact that they have established ties with Turkish demonstrators and taken lessons on their resistance tactics.

From this point of view, the most important finding was the emergence of a civic activism nucleus in which environmental, animal rights and personal data protection activists have established strong connections so that they would be always prepared to support a certain civil cause, not

necessarily one of those already mentioned. The public message is developed around the following keywords: “solidarity”, “united” and “saving”.

Strength and relevance of connections established between the various involved entities are clearly shown in the chart drafted based on the social network analysis: the *organizations* that openly claimed their involvement in supporting a single cause are outlined in red, those involved in supporting two causes in blue, and those involved in three causes in black.




Fig. 3 Connections among the involved organizations involved in 2013-2014 protests  
Source: Drafted during the research, using UCInet soft

No entity has been identified in all four cases, but this fact does not rule out the participation of distinct *persons* in these events.

It should also be noted that the analysis is based strictly on open sources and mass media, results being likely to be incomplete given that a significant amount of messages is disseminated through restricted channels such as closed discussion groups, private messages or the *dark web*.

As for the types of disseminated messages, an improvement in techniques for influencing public opinion can be noticed, starting from

emotional messages to the shocking ones, as well as the increased efforts in arguing the points of view through some specialized websites.

Viral marketing strategies are also widely used in promoting public causes, especially environmental ones, mentioning the efforts to “educate” the supporters by posting good practice guides on civic involvement and easing access to information resources. The degree of virulence of messages varies, reaching incitement to civil disobedience, but the transfer from virtual world into the real world is, at this time, reduced.

The anticipative dimension has been ensured by drafting several scenarios on development of the militant movement in Romania in terms of SRI’s fundamental mission to protect democratic values and promote national interests in order to achieve national security, guarantee citizens’ rights and freedoms and defend the rule of law<sup>5</sup>.

To that end, we applied method called cone of plausibility (Taylor, 1990), which led to the following possible developments in the short- and medium-term:

- *Basis scenario*: a clear assumption of civic militancy will be outlined and “anti-system” hybrid movement will be agglutinated;
- *Best case*: a critical activist mass will be formed who will closely monitor policy decisions impacting the domestic social environment;
- *Worst case*: a core of potentially violent eco-anarchists will gradually strengthen that may have an impact on social stability, the most serious of which is eco-terrorism.

### **Conclusions**

Intelligence services can avoid neither success nor failure, but they have to be rationally assumed and capitalized on to generate the anticipatory knowledge providing a country with the capacity of coping with any security challenge, regardless of how decision-makers are provided with future development projections, in multiple or single versions, as scenarios, respectively forecasts.

Beyond practical findings that can be developed in a strategic assessment on the militancy phenomenon in Romania, the case study

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<sup>5</sup> <https://www.sri.ro/misiune-viziune-valori.html>.

reveals, once again, the dynamics of potential threats to which intelligence services have to find solutions. Most times, using their actionable tools and analytical capabilities, they manage to anticipate and warn on the evolution of negative events or phenomena.

In plainer words, they can predict the occurrence of certain events, but not the exact moment, and can also anticipate where and when messages and subsequent communications will be disseminated as well as the level of public support.

However, when failing to avoid surprises, they will be able to manage the crisis by: providing one or several versions of what the future might look like, building scenarios, projections or simulations; developing contingency or continuity plans, if facing a foreseen or unforeseen security crisis; strengthening internal flexibility in terms of organizational structure, capabilities to collect, analyze and disseminate national security information and to allocate resources.

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## **Intelligence organizations stuck in the chaos-complexity dichotomy<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*Understanding today's intelligence (conceptualized as practice, activity, organization, and domain) requires an explanatory model that takes into account several paradigms, chaos theory, decision modeling and systems' theory. Intelligence analysis, viewed as a fundamental step in the intelligence cycle, the main purpose of which is facilitating the decision-making process, cannot remain blind to these new ways of understanding reality. Alas, the systems approach is not just a theoretical framework used for building better taxonomies, but a viable solution to the problems facing practitioners and managers on a day-to-day basis.*

**Keywords:** chaos, intelligence, decision, analysis, system.

### **Prolegomena**

In the current stage of human society, scientific community and *intelligence* specialists are facing one of the most consistent challenges: is it possible to identify, manage, and, if necessary, counter existing and emerging risks amid the social, political, and cultural framework of the 21st century? Is it possible to implement an efficient organizational reform to

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ensure, in our case, *intelligence* structures' adjustment to environment changes as the environment is permanently changing itself<sup>2</sup>?

The debate on this topic is all the more important as the general perception is that of a crisis facing the analytical activity and existing management models, translated as incongruent developments as far as the broader and expert public expectations and predictions are concerned. These developments are seen as strategic surprises or, as Nassim Taleb suggestively defined them, „black swans”.

A proof of the cleavage between expectations and reality is the fact that in the expert literature we find a great number of terms with a rather negative connotation, such as „crisis”, „breakdown”, „chaos”, „unpredictable”, „turbulences”, „disaster”, „strategic surprise”, etc., that are used to describe contemporary society developments.

Furthermore, the intense way this reality is felt can be observed in the fact that the debate has come to the forefront of media attention, most probably due to the direct impact of different developments or phenomena at individual level. One can mention among these effects the economic crisis or the September 11 events.

The fact that debates on future projections entered the common space had some undesirable consequences that influenced, in our opinion, the scientific debate, namely the focus on sensational instead of applied debate (negative or alarming aspects are put forward), perception shift (exploiting a topic in order to argue ideological assertions, respectively capitalism's crash), and the emergence of false experts or even „prophets” (emblematic in this respect is the success Nouriel Roubini has long enjoyed as he permanently predicted imminent economic disasters that have never occurred).

Another important issue is the increasingly extensive contemporary literature reflecting the efforts to develop a theoretical matrix integrating, in a coherent and complete way, different sets of data, signals, or processes describing present-day reality.

Corroborated with the complex development of contemporary society, the working model proposed by the current theory does not allow us to change the way *intelligence* is perceived, that is more likely as a *tradecraft* component (focusing on procedures and techniques).

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<sup>2</sup> A rephrase of Fred Emery and Eric Trist's assertion: *A main problem in the study of organizational change is that the environmental contexts in which organizations exist are themselves changing at an increasing rate, and towards increasing complexity*, apud Bettis, Richard A. and Hitt, Michael A., 1995, *The new competitive landscape in Strategic Management Journal*, vol. 16, no. S1, pp. 7–19.

Knowledge is rather considered a physical product by most part of the current analyst community, less material aspects, such as personal or collective intuition, being neglected. That explains the almost general idea that *intelligence* is a support in the decision-making process<sup>3</sup>.

The aim of this analysis is to identify inflexion points that can determine vulnerabilities or, obversely opportunities for intelligence in the society model projected along with information technology globalization.

We have started this research from the premise that the current state of analysis and its organizational structures, which are facing a dynamic reality specific to a model at the edge of chaos, cannot be coherently analyzed without taking into consideration the connections with other scientific fields as the theories of decision, systems, and chaos.

More precisely, one should notice that analysis is a fundamental component of the chain of actions specific to the decision-making process and its aim is to propose alternative decisions in different fields of activity, in our case, national security.

Also, taking into consideration the current role of intelligence as an activity aimed at consolidating general and individual level of knowledge, we must look at the organizational management system theories in order to identify, if possible, the specific framework to be applied as part of a functioning plan integrated at the state/ institution level.

The theories proposed over the years to describe and manage different complex systems still have a great potential to substantiate realistic and topical solutions through which transformations required by the new environment coordinates could be developed. The numerous contemporary economic studies on chaos and different experts' answers to these challenges are an example to that end.

The relevance to our research comes from the increasingly significant transfer of terms, methods, and modern tools from competitive business intelligence models that are used by most modern intelligence agencies.

### **Chaos or Complexity as Organizational Process Shaping**

As we mentioned before, in order to create a unitary perspective and bring relevance to assertions regarding the various management forms

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<sup>3</sup> Hoppe, Magnus, "The intelligence worker as a knowledge activist – an alternative view on intelligence by the use of Burke's pentad", in *Journal of Intelligence Studies in Business 1* (2013) pp.59-68 available at <https://ojs.hh.se/>

developed over the past century, we should turn to the original fundamental research that began at the end of the Second World War.

Without being an entirely new domain, the issue of chaos, complex systems, and combined impact of multiple endogen and exogen factors on the human society development and the way we can efficiently answer this challenge began to be addressed in an applied manner in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The modern origin of the two concepts - chaos and complexity - can be found in fundamental research in the fields of mathematics and physics, namely Henry Poincare's works at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century

They became a subject of scientific debate in the field of social sciences and economics simultaneously with the emergence of various phenomena specific to the period known as "The Great Acceleration". In an exhaustive formula, that period was characterized by an increase in human activities which has not slowed down so far.

More precisely, around 1950, one could notice, as statistics show, an increase in indicators reflecting various activities, at all levels, a fact that resulted in a growing information flow. There were multiple causes: democratization and development of open society (in the Western institutional model), technological progress, globalization, and the development of consumer society.

All these have contributed to the establishment of a system of values, information, and knowledge in general whose emergent capacity has triggered an asymptotic multiplication of knowledge in increasingly diverse and complex ways.

The first theoretical works on complex systems date back from that period. Not by chance, economics is the field that has extensively approached the phenomena, involving a large number of factors as the field was hit by the 1929 world crisis and the Second World War.

From the perspective of our research, the relevance of the two concepts is given by their contribution to understanding the impact of current security environment on the intelligence activity. However, one should understand correlations and influences emerging in different stages of the decision-making process in order to figure out the complex mechanisms of that interaction.

Even if, in the intelligence field, issues related to the decision-making process are mostly connected to the intelligence chain, fundamental

research emphasizes a more complex interdisciplinary theory and a series of elements which are sensitive to exogenous, more complex, and numerous stimuli that could influence the decision-making.

Friederich Hayek, a pioneer of modern economic thinking, is among the theoretician who laid the foundation of complex phenomenon management.

In his work “The Theory of Complex Phenomena: A Precocious Play on the Epistemology of Complexity”, Friedrich Hayek stresses, referring to “complex phenomena”, that the expert who examines the complexity has to deal with a tough choice between the empirically gained experience and experience based on knowledge and theoretical understanding<sup>4</sup>.

The distinction made by the Austrian expert between human ability to make predictions about the behavior of simple and complex systems, by modeling, is relevant to analysis.

His 1974 speech at the ceremony in which he was awarded the Nobel Prize, called "The Pretence of Knowledge" is fundamental for economics. On that occasion Friederich Hayek argued that it was impossible for economics and, generally, areas characterized by massive influence of complex phenomena – including, in his view, alongside economics, biology and psychology - to be modeled upon sciences approaching simple phenomena in their essence, as physics. Even if they were not included in the same category by Hayek, social sciences can be included in the phenomena he describes in the area devoted to systems theory, considering that the actions and interactions described above do not comply with predefined rules, being marked by subjective elements.

For that reason, Hayek concludes that, by modeling, complex phenomena allow only pattern predictions, unlike specific predictions that can be made in the case of non-complex phenomena<sup>5</sup>. Hence, the absence of a suitable theoretical distinction between them triggers a dichotomous

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<sup>4</sup> Hayek, F. A., *The Theory of Complex Phenomena: A Precocious Play on the Epistemology of Complexity*, in *Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics*, 1967, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 22-42., available at <http://highmesa.us/Hayek/Theory%20of%20Complex%20Phenomena.pdf>, on June 15, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> Hayek, F. A., *The Pretence of Knowledge*, Nobel Prize Lecture, December 11, 1974, available at [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html), on June 20, 2013.

explanation of complexity, which becomes evident when a category prevails over the other.

Friederich Hayek's research is completed by Edward Lorenz's theory, who in 1963 advanced the idea that the long term dynamics of some dynamical systems (such as those created by joining / merging the system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations that he tried to numerically solve with computer-generated finite precision arithmetic operations) is highly dependent upon initial conditions<sup>6</sup>.

As a result, two points that are arbitrarily very close in the system phase space<sup>7</sup> will end up - as the system evolves, and only after a certain period of time - very far apart. The "chaos theory" does not influence reality through precise predictions about events but rather by specifying the dynamic systems and regimes or regions of those space parameters that show the "transition to chaos"<sup>8</sup>, in other words, by making predictions about behavior patterns rather than behavior points / hypervolumes well placed in space and time.

### **Organization from a Systemic Perspective**

For the analyst, the impact of chaos is felt at the system level, which is why it requires an in depth knowledge of all theoretical work on which the current constructs are based on.

From that perspective, the emergence of the study entitled "Zu einer Allgemeinen Systemlehre" in which Ludwig von Bertalanffy presented what was to be known as the foundation of the general systems theory<sup>9</sup> was decisive for setting up an integrated vision by assembling several models.

He defined a new fundamental scientific discipline called General System Theory, a logico-mathematical discipline applicable to all sciences concerned with systems.

According to the theory, objects, phenomena, properties, and processes, regardless of their nature, can be considered as systems with a

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<sup>6</sup> Lorenz, Edward N., *Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow*. *Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences.*, 1963, 20, p.130–141.

<sup>7</sup> A phase space is a space in which all possible states of a system are represented, each possible state of the system corresponding to a unique point in the phase space.

<sup>8</sup> According to Edward Ott's paper *Chaos in dynamical systems*, Cambridge University, 2002, 2nd Edition Press.

<sup>9</sup> Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *Zu einer Allgemeinen Systemlehre*, *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*, ¾, 1945. (Extract in: *Biologia Generalis*, 19 - 1949), pp. 139-164.

certain structure to the extent to which they represent a whole whose elements are in logically determined relations to each other and thus have characteristics irreducible to elements or relationships. Quite generally, the system may be defined as a set of elements found in an organized connection, among which dynamic relationships are established<sup>10</sup>.

The meaning of these concepts becomes relevant for our research when they are translated to the social level.

Specifically, the organization can be characterized as a social activity that brings together people (human resources) and material resources by means of which it achieves the purpose for which it was created: products, works, and services, according to social order<sup>11</sup>. It is consciously and deliberately built by people to satisfy a pressing social need.

The vision of the systemic school (represented mainly by D. Katz and R.L. Kahn) seems to be, in the author's opinion, the most appropriate to characterize the level it needs to reach a structure of this type. According to the two authors, the organization is a self-regulating and self-organized system with the ability to cope with various internal and external influences, with the leadership's help, through decision-making acts<sup>12</sup>.

In the spirit of the TGS, according to which each element of a system (in the present meaning of organization) is also a subsystem, D. Katz and R.L. Kahn made an operational classification of the systems (subsystems) participating in the internal "life" of organization, identifying five key generic types:

- Production subsystem, which is the most important because here the transformations are made by processing system "inputs".
- Supportive subsystem that gets environment "inputs" (people, materials, energy), distributes "outputs", and achieves organization's institutional links to external environment.
- Maintenance subsystem that equips the organization with all it needs to carry out activity in the best possible conditions, including mechanisms of labor force recruitment and training, of application and motivation according to organizational rules, of positive and negative sanctions to achieve organizational goals.

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<sup>10</sup> Ludwig von Bertalanffy, cited works.

<sup>11</sup> Mihaela Vlasceanu, *Organizations and Management Culture*, Trei Publishing House, Iasi, 1999, p.37.

<sup>12</sup> Katz, Daniel. and Kahn, Robert L. *The social psychology of organizations*, 2nd ed., New York, Wiley, 1978.

- Adaptive subsystem that develops corrective measures, adjusting the system after receiving influence from the environment
- Managerial subsystem which includes activities aimed at controlling, coordinating, and directing the numerous organization structure subsystems. This subsystem has regulatory mechanisms and is invested with structural authority at several levels.

It is the one who makes the decisions for managing and directing all other subsystems<sup>13</sup>. In order to make the distinction necessary to further address the intelligence institutional patterns it is necessary to emphasize its particularity in the institutional sphere. Thus, if organizations are the result of a construction based on behavioral regularities that are accepted and used by individuals, at individual level, institutions are mental models that facilitate the solving of recurring problems emerging from social interactions.

"As mental models, institutions structure interactions, provides initiation and practice solutions, generate binding frameworks of individual actions saturated by meanings as well as opportunities for appropriate action. Institutions operate at mental level as collective solutions to social problems. They are responsible for coordinating individual knowledge"<sup>14</sup>.

### **Decision – Between Reason and Compromise**

The first theoretical contributions on how a decision is adopted in an organization occurred amid growing interest of the Western society in improving public administration systems and making private organizations more efficient.

The influence of technical concepts and positivism led, in the first instance, to a model based on rational choice.

Henri Fayol<sup>15</sup> (founder of the administrative management school), Frederick Taylor<sup>16</sup> (who defined the principles of scientific management), and Max Weber are the pioneers of this scientific approach, but they limited themselves to approaching organizations' internal mechanisms in order to

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13 *Ibidem*.

14 Lazar Vlasceanu, *Sociology and Modernism. Transition towards Reflexive Modernism*, Polirom Publishing House, Iasi, 2007.

15 Fayol, Henri, *Administration industrielle et générale; prévoyance, organisation, commandement, coordination, controle*, Paris, 1916, H. Dunod et E. Pinat.

16 Taylor, Frederick, *Principles of Scientific Management*, New York and London, 1911, Harper & brothers.



identify the principles of efficiency and rationality in order to achieve the proposed goals.

In fact, the most accurate representation of this perspective can be found in Max Weber's theory, which identifies the ideal leadership model as the bureaucratic one.

The theory was subsequently, in the 1950s and 1960s, translated into a series of decision models, the rational and the incremental gaining ground at that time<sup>17</sup>. The end of the last century marked a shift to a new research phase aimed at developing alternative decision-making models and even proposing integrative models.

The concept of rational decision can be implemented as accurately as possible under the form of instrumental rationality, ie by choosing the most appropriate means to achieve goals, considering that the decision maker:

- has certain objectives, goals,
- has at his disposal a number of options (alternatives)
- has at his disposal a set of criteria to evaluate alternative data;
- may order these alternatives according to criteria used;
- can choose the best alternative, ie the one that fully achieves the objectives and goals
- may lead to similar decisions in any similar situations<sup>18</sup>.

Analyzing these principles, we see how much this model replicates the institutional practice today, despite signals that underline the difficulties in implementing a system that requires a careful inputs control and rigid compliance schemes.

Moreover, the utopian character of this concept fueled fervent criticism as social studies progressed, one of the strongest being that formulated by Herbert Simon in his "Administrative Behavior"<sup>19</sup>. He noticed that:

„The behavior of a single individual, isolated, is impossible to achieve any degree of rationality. The number of alternatives he must

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<sup>17</sup> Seen from a comparative perspective, the rational model has a more *normative character* aimed at how should decisions be made while the incremental model has a more *descriptive character* reflecting the way the decision are made.

<sup>18</sup> Miroiu, Adrian, *Introduction to Public Policy Analysis*, Bucharest, 2001, accessed on June 15, 2013, available at <http://www.spidd.ro/carti/analiza%20politicilorpublice.pdf>

<sup>19</sup> Simon, Herbert A., *Administrative Behavior*, New York, 1947 Macmillan.

explore is so great, the information he needs is so vast that it's hard to even imagine an approximation of objective rationality. Individual choice takes place in an environment where there is too much 'data' - premises accepted by him as the basis of his choice. His behavior is adaptive only within the limits set by these given 'data'<sup>20</sup>.

To harmonize theory with practice, Simon has adopted the rational decision model of "bounded rationality" (limited rationality) imposing a relativization of predeterminations such as the level of knowledge (which can not be total), the role of time to the detriment of the generic interests, and he has accepted the influence of external factors on decisions.

Thus, the human capacity to gather and process information is always limited and manifests itself in many forms, including:

- our knowledge is always fragmentary and incomplete;
- the consequences of actions are not all known, the decision maker use the ability to make simplifying evaluations;
- our attention has limits: decisions are based on a serious analysis (the individual cannot think of too many things at once), and attention changes from moment to moment;
- our observation and communication capabilities are limited; we learn by adapting our behavior to our aims;
- our memory capacity is limited;
- we are creatures of habit and routine
- we are limited by the psychological environment<sup>21</sup>.

From what we see, assessments launched over half a century ago are virtually identical to those issued by the supporters of specific complex systems, being familiar to information analysis practitioners.

Another major determinant for setting organizational decision-making process is the organizational environment that generates our decision-making framework. Institutional structures, procedures adopted within, and organizational culture determine certain types of decisions.

Organizations impose their values on acceptable decisions, but time constraints often hamper the search for more alternatives from which to make your choice. Therefore, decision makers cannot choose from all the possible options, but rather, they are looking at a few alternatives.

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<sup>20</sup> Idem, p.79.

<sup>21</sup> Miroiu, Adrian, *op.cit.*

Moreover, acceptance of a policy as a real alternative that could be selected depends on the ideological choices and the values that decision makers accept.

For these reasons, Herbert Simon argues that man is *rational*, but his rationality is *limited*. The most important conclusion that follows from this is that the alternative chosen is the one that produces the greatest benefits to the costs of implementing them or expressing the best means to achieve goals, as required by the idea of instrumental rationality.

For this reason, rational behavior is "**satisficient**". Simon coined the term combining the two conditions of limited rationality: a rational behavior arises in this regard as **satisfactory** and **sufficient**. An action of choice is satisficient when the one who searches for it does seek to identify those alternatives that are "pretty good": they are satisfactory and sufficient to achieve the goals<sup>22</sup>.

The importance of the decision chain is that the decision maker will have to investigate all the alternatives which in principle could produce greater benefits. He must take into account only the alternatives that will produce reasonable growth - so satisficient – of its benefits.

The problems identified by various theorists in the rational model of decision, even the greatly improved one, prompted the initiation of efforts to identify and attempt to build alternative models.

Among the models proposed, the one that seems to approach the enormously practical application is the incremental one, proposed by Charles Lindblom<sup>23</sup>. Observations made on the behavior of decision makers allowed him to draw a conclusion that they do not act rationally, but subjectively. Thus, it appeared that decisions in general, and public policy are the result of compromises made between the decision maker and factors implied in different ways in the effective management, the alternatives that were imposed being not the desired one from the rational point of view but those that prove to be feasible and applicable given the organizational context.

This is why, Lindblom issued a series of assumptions about decision makers, namely they:

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<sup>22</sup> Simon, H. A., *Rational choice and the structure of the environment*. Psychological Review, Vol. 63 No. 2, 1956, p: 129.

<sup>23</sup> Lindblom, Charles E, *The policy making process*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968.

- promote only those goals and objectives that differ very little (incremental) of the status quo to be implemented;
- assess the effect of a limited number of consequences of decision alternatives initially considered based on rational process;
- adjust goals according to available alternatives, and conversely, the alternatives available to adjust goals without resorting to a full analysis of decision variants;
- continually redefine the problem faced (goals, alternatives) as they get new information;
- continuously change over time their choices rather than just choose at one point of the process based on the result of the analysis, and evaluation of alternatives is achieved through a series of small steps;
- apply a treatment to improve challenges/problems resulting from application of the decision rather than to decisively act to completely solve them at some point<sup>24</sup>.

This approach distributes the responsibility of analyzing, evaluating, creating and choosing solutions with other organizational or external actors, so that decision-making is fragmented and *disjoint* (divided among different stakeholders).

From this perspective, the analyst tends to adapt to the need of the beneficiary, building variants of solutions increasingly tailored to the recipient requirements, which consistently decreases the innovative added value of the intelligence products.

So Lindblom's theory starts from the assumption that policy makers produce their decisions through a process of "successive limited comparisons" with previous decisions, namely those that are most familiar.

He defined two major reasons for not producing major changes in the way decisions are made and how decisions tend to perpetuate the status quo, despite the fact that theoretically they are far from being the best<sup>25</sup>:

- It is easier to continue, based on negotiation, a scheme for the distribution of given (limited) organizational resources than to try forcing on us new limits with radical modified proposals.

For this reason, maintaining the original picture or, at most, the changes is minor.

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<sup>24</sup> Apud Etzioni, Amitai, *Mixed-Scanning. A "Third" Approach to Decision-Making*, Public Administration Review, Vol 27, No.5 (Dec. 1967), p. 386.

<sup>25</sup> Miroiu, Adrian, *op.cit.*, p. 106.

A local example of this type of action is the apparent distribution of minor changes undergone by the national budget in the past two years, although the solutions proposed by the two ideologies that guided governments to draw them up in 2012, and respectively 2013 are totally different.

- Development and implementation of policies is achieved through organizational structures /institutions, therefore through bureaucracy. Thus, it inherently, it tends to promote similar practices.

The methods by which bureaucrats identify problems, decision alternatives, the criteria on which to make choices are those imposed by its routines, not by scientific reasons, so innovation is inhibited and perpetuation of existing mechanisms is encouraged.

The apparent incompatible contradiction between the two perspectives has led to the need for a theoretical alternative to overcome the systemic challenges.

To that end, Amitai Etzioni proposed a weighted variant called *mixed scanning decision-making process*, involving a combination of rational and incremental approach. He also provided a set of recommendations on the situations in which they are used<sup>26</sup>.

According to the theory formulated by Amitai Etzioni, decision-making strategy should combine the use of a thorough (rational) examination of some fields and a partial examination of other areas.

The decision to choose between the two types of approach should be taken after an assessment of the actual partial approaches consequences (only after an incomplete examination of the subject submitted to the decision and its consequences) and an additional analysis and by taking into account the allocated time.

Starting from these premises, Etzioni proposes a dynamic adaptation, at each step, of the amount of resources (including time) needed for decision-making process.

Etzioni recommends<sup>27</sup> that fundamental decisions should be based on a rational approach, even if that might face some problems when it recommends major changes that are not feasible for solving issues related to implementation. For this reason the companies that have applied that (usually the authoritarian, dictatorial ones where interest in consensus is limited) faced major gaps between objectives set and actual results.

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<sup>26</sup> Etzioni, Amitai, *op.cit.*, p. 388-389.

<sup>27</sup> Idem, p. 390.

Incremental decisions (applied mainly in Western democracies) are made in the context of fundamental decisions and they contribute to addressing unrealistic issues about important decisions taken on the basis of a rational approach.

### **The Role of Analysis in the Decision-Making Process**

The stages of the decision-making process are one of the oldest issues faced by modern-day management researchers and theoreticians. Initially approached by John Dewey in 1910<sup>28</sup>, the sequencing of the decision-making process in the modern sense of the theory is also made by Herbert Simon.

According to Simon, one uses a number of three distinct activities within the decision-making process, to which he gave relevant names:

- “searching for opportunities in order to make a decision” – called “Intelligence activity”;
- „searching for possible courses of action that are to be developed in implementing the decision” - „Design activity”;
- „selecting a course of action” – also called „Choice activity”<sup>29</sup>.

Simon’s work inspired one of the models that influenced mostly the organizational management published in 1976 by Henry Mintzberg, Duru Raisinghani and Andre Theoret.

According to the three experts, although the decision-making process requires distinct phases, they are not just simple sequential relationships.

In order to adapt them to a contemporary perspective, they renamed Simon’s phases and divided them in routines.

- **Information** implies two distinct activities:
  - *recognition* which identifies “problems and opportunities”
  - *diagnosis* or “the examination of current and new sources of information in order to explain and define problems”;
- **Development** includes two phases (or “routines”):

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<sup>28</sup> John Dewey, *How We Think*, 1910, Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., retrieved June 15, 2013 from <http://rci.rutgers.edu/~tripmcc/phil/dewey-hwt-pt1-selections.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Simon, Herbert (1960), *The New Science of Management Decision*, 1960, New York, Harper & Row, p. 1,2.

- *search* which looks for ready-made solutions;
- *design* which creates new or custom-made solutions;
- **Selection** contains three activities:
  - *filtration* (used only when the number of ready-made solutions is too large to be “thoroughly reviewed, in which case suboptimal solutions are removed);
  - *evaluation and selection of alternatives* based on judgment, bargaining and analysis;
  - *authorization* (validation by upper management).

Relations between these routines are rather circular than linear, the decision-maker being able to use the three phases in a dynamic way, changing their order, approaching them simultaneously or returning to a previous phase depending on the decisional context<sup>30</sup>.

Peter Drucker advances a more practical approach specific to contemporary organizational activities according to which the rational steps in the decision-making process are:

- Define the problem;
- Analyze the problem;
- Develop alternative solutions;
- Decide on the best solution;
- Convert decisions into effective actions<sup>31</sup>.

As one can see, the theoretical language adapts itself as we approach the present, but the content and fundamental knowledge are essentially similar to those developed 50 years ago, some phases and activities being refined so that they become applicable while the technological and social coordinates of the humanity change.

In order to achieve an early transition towards the intelligence spectrum we need a detailed presentation of the activities claimed in the decision chain and subsequently of the approach method from the management process perspective.

But it is obvious that the analytical work presents in fact three

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<sup>30</sup> Mintzberg, Henry; Raisinghani, Duru; Théorêt, André, *The Structure of "Unstructured" Decision Process*, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Jun., 1976), pp. 246-275

<sup>31</sup> Drucker, Peter, *The Effective Decision*, in *Harvard Business Review On Decision Making*, 2001, Harvard Business Press, p. 1 – 20



distinct forms of decision effort coagulation which are assigned to different moments in the decision chain with major differences in regard to intellectual effort type and the resulting product.

Therefore, the three types which are specific to the first three phases of the decision-making process correspond to totally different needs. While the analyst has to identify and correctly match the pieces of a puzzle during the first phase, which involves identification and subsequent rule compliance, it takes understanding, interconnectivity and systemic perception during the second one.

The third phase, which implies solution development, is largely opposite the first. A nonconformist, creative spirit, that is able “to dream” how a decision can change rules and can remedy and stabilize the system is necessary in order to overcome a problem arising from the accumulation of negative consequences of a given situation.

For this reason, the delivery of a complex range of possible solutions or the identification of the desired optimal state of the system which subsequently can be subject to incremental approach is essential for a system on the edge of chaos.

In order to reach this goal, one has to overcome mental constructs that are rather common to rational models as it is more obvious that a total environmental knowledge is impossible much and less a swift one.

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## **Using social media: Online social networks - A new security challenge<sup>1</sup>**

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### **Abstract**

*In recent years, innovatory digital forms and the interactions between technology and people were expanded. Online social networks provide an opportunity for intelligence analysts to study how users interact on this area.*

*There are many challenges of using online social networks, both for users and for intelligence services. This paper shows the new challenges of online social networks for intelligence services and for users. We find there are conflicts between some actual practices and the traditional goals of online networks, such as communication, sharing and sociability.*

**Keywords:** Social Media, Online Social Networks, challenges, national security.

### **Introduction**

The purpose of this paper is to underline the idea that there are a number of challenges for national security due online social networks. Social networks and social network analysis represent a security challenge, both for individuals and intelligence agencies. The activity of many social networks may affect the national security. Actually, this is more likely to happen, taking into account that we face a great development of the online area. Online social networks are visible in the virtual field due to the social

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media. Nowadays it is obvious that social media is everywhere. More than that, social media components are in a constant development, due to the technological advances. Also, there is no age, occupation or social statute limit for users. Anyone who wants can use social media components in their work or in other activities.

Actually, social media components, especially the online social networks have extended in the business field. More companies and individuals use them as a framework to develop their work.

Last but not least, social media became accessible especially for travelers. Furthermore, free WIFI offered at almost every public place makes social media reachable.

Basically, when you operate the social media components (websites, online social networks, blogs, social platforms, etc.), people associate meanings and symbols, such as: speed, accessibility, transparency, choice, risk and vulnerability, so there are a lot of challenges for using social media, both for users and intelligence agencies who try to maintain national security.

### **Online Social Networks (OSN) – a component of the Social Media**

Social media include: websites, wikis enciclopedies, blogs, e-mail, podcasts, online social networks or online platforms (for example Twitter, My Space, Facebook, Kickstarter, WikiLeaks, Skype, YouTube, Flickr, Rollyo, Dapper, etc), podcasts, interactive television and even virtual worlds (such as "Second life"). All these are intended to provide information through data sharing.<sup>2</sup>

“OSNs are popular infrastructures for information sharing, communication and interaction on the Internet. With over half a billion users, OSNs are nowadays a mainstream research topic of interest for computer



Figure no. 1  
Online Social Networks  
<http://socialwebthing.com/2014/05/tech-products-social-media/>

<sup>2</sup> POP Marta, „Serviciile de informa number 12, September 2008.

scientists, economists, sociologists. Specifically, an OSN consists of users who communicate with each other in an online setting in diverse ways. Nowadays, we have been witnessing the rise of a variety of OSN sites, which publish user-generated or aggregated content, allow users to annotate published content with tags, reviews, comments and recommendations, and provide mechanisms that enable the establishment of user communities based on shared interests”.<sup>3</sup>

Due to the large number of users worldwide, online social networks have become relevant to intelligence communication strategies.

Their communication with civil society through socialization is only for information, prevention and improving the relationship between institutions and citizens. It also helps to strengthen cooperation between agencies and with the private sector and the academic one. Also, ”the rapid proliferation of Online Social Network sites has made a profound impact on the www, which tends to reshape its structure, design, and utility. Industry experts believe that OSNs create a potentially transformational change in consumer behavior and will bring a far-reaching impact on traditional industries of content, media, and communications”.<sup>4</sup>

### **Technological products that completed the Social Media**

According to Ben Cotton, in an article published on his personal blog, named Social Web Thing, smartphones, tablets and ultrabooks are some new tech products that complete the social media field. In the author’s opinion, these new gadgets are now used frequently in our activity.

Regarding the smartphones category, ”social media has experienced a massive rise in popularity due to the smartphone boom, with more and more people using their mobile devices to access their favorite social media sites. Low-cost data charges also mean that smartphones today often have a constant connection, even when there’s no WIFI available in the near vicinity. Moreover, all the major social networking sites have their own mobile apps that make accessing them from a smartphone even easier”.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> PALLIS George, DEMETRIOS Zeinalipour-Yazti and DIKAI AKOS Marios D., *Online Social Networks: Status and Trends*, accessed 27 August 2014 at <http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/mdd/docs/2011-SpringerBook-OSN.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>5</sup> COTTON Ben, ”Tech Products that Have Fuelled the Social Media Phenomenon”, in *Web Social Thing*, accessed 25 August 2014 at <http://socialwebthing.com/2014/05/tech->



Figure no. 2  
Technological products that completed the Social  
Media  
<http://www.anandtech.com/show/5294/why->

Since 2013, when smartphones have hit the maximum level, we see them everywhere because they have become a part of our daily routine. Actually, they keep us permanently connected with the rest of the world.

Very similar to smartphones, we find tablets anywhere around us, which make the access to the internet, including the access to the social media very convenient. In the acceptance of the author, "smartphones and tablets

offer the same application choices, so social network fans can access their profiles directly from an application, rather than having to navigate the mobile website offering".<sup>6</sup>

The third category is represented by ultrabooks, that are "one of the best options for people who want the power of a traditional high-end laptop and the portability of a netbook. This class of laptop offers a sleek chassis without compromising performance or battery life. They feature hi-resolution screens, a range of connectivity options and are very portable and stylish, also are perfect for people who want to be able to multi-task while on the go".

Overall, the convenience that mobile devices like laptops, smartphones and tablets afford has meant that social media is now more accessible.

### **Challenges for users of using online social networks**

Information like biographical data, concerns, interests, hobbies, media affiliation, degree of social integration, position in frame structure etc., that are obtained from social networks help some criminal

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products-social-media/

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem.*



organizations or some offenders to trick users and to gain their trust and then to transform them into victims. For that reason, the social media users have to be very careful and to set a minimum of security settings on their online profiles.

All these risks can occur because of elements such as the large area investigated, unconsciousness or lack of public education on the provision of personal data and privacy details, poor protection of the personal computer and using public terminals to access important personal accounts, lack of discipline policy on Internet use in public places.

Social media components, including also the online social networks, have the power to influence the behavior of individuals by the mere possibility of being observed. Susan Barnes (2006) observed the paradox of living in a society in which individuals disclose personal information online under the impression that they remain private, while government agencies and companies or even criminal organizations collect data about users.

The most common challenges that internet users face on social media products are: spam, scams, phishing, clickjacking, malicious applications etc.

Characteristics of social networks that make them interesting from the point of view of the information available about users are: the persistence (what you post remains available), the ability to search (you can relatively easily find someone), replicability of digital content (pictures can be given away, shown, reposted) and invisible audience. For these reasons, users tend to adjust messages and behavior in accordance with rules of conduct perceived as acceptable / desirable (Boyd and Heer 2006).

Given the risks of disclosure of personal information in the online environment, users are generally cautious in disclosure of data. Miller Maier, Goya-Martinez and Schuler (2008) found that users are generally careful about posting personal information, a few posting information such as telephone numbers and addresses, although younger users (18-19 years) reveal more than adults.

Summarizing, the big social media challenges that users (even individuals or companies) face represent the answers to the next questions:<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> \*\*\*<http://www.slideshare.net/randfish/the-10-big-social-media-challenges-and-how-to-solve-them> accessed at 29 August 2014.

With whom should I interact? – sorting information by social authority can help ID influential accounts that may not have huge follower counts;

What should I share? – it is recommended not to share personal information with strange persons, just with real “friends”;

When should I share? – when user’s audience is online and more than once when users want to share information that they really want to be noticed;

How do users get more people to see their shares? – Information that no one has seen before have a great impact;

Which Network are right for each user? – The response is where their audience’s influencers are most active and receptive;

How can users increase the numer of followers on Social? – By sharing great, useful and interesting things that get amplified, by creating a conversion point from other trafficked channels, getting influential accounts to mention them and participating in events;

What formats should they use for sharing? – Users have to test and see what works better for them (firs they look at the quantity – the number of different post types on online social networks and second, they look at the quality of the posts (by Engagement Rate);

How much time do they need to commit to social sharing and engaging? – Actually, quantity matters less than consistency. They can share intermittently, replying and engaging on social media while they are catching up on their daily reading and email;

How should they track success in social media? – Rand Fishhkin, on his presentation on Slideshare platform, presents which metrics are worth tracking, so he compares the online social platforms Facebook, Twitter and Google + taking into account the audience, conversation, amplification, applause and traffic in the form of the table bellow:

	Audience	Conversation	Amplification	Applause	Traffic
<b>facebook</b>	Page likes	Comments	Shares	Likes	Visits from Facebook
<b>twitter</b>	Followers	@ replies	Retweets @ mentions Brand/site mentions	Favorites	Visits from Twitter
<b>Google+</b>	Have You in Circles	Comments	Shares Brand mentions Name mentions	+1s	Visits from Google+

Figure no. 3  
Social Media Metrics  
<http://www.slideshare.net/randfish/the-10-big-social-media-challenges-and-how-to-solve-them> slide no. 36

### Challenges for intelligence agencies

The evolution and dynamic nature of contemporary society have influenced the work of intelligence agencies. The development and the increasing use of social media have developed two directions: to support on the one hand, and to threat and challenge on the other hand. In the intelligence community, the development and the increasing use of social media components produced major changes also in the methods of collection and analysis steps.

Some intelligence services have created their own closed circuit networks as to facilitate communication between their agents worldwide. Social networks can also be used by intelligence services in order to recruit potential agents. They offer candidates the opportunity to become familiar with the work of



the organization.

Social media components provide some opportunities, but also many challenges for the intelligence agencies that led to the idea that these can threaten national security. Therefore, the most common challenges posed by technological developments of the social media elements, including online social networks, that have led to uncertainty in the intelligence community are: organized crime networks, criminal networks, cyberterrorism, facilitating the leaks (by posting photos, videos, presence in some places), recruitment, promotion and indoctrination of ideologies that threaten the national security, collection of personal information about potential victims, viruses infiltrated through online applications.

Figure no. 4  
Collaboration in social media  
<http://www.smedio.com/7-social-media-challenges-you-will-have-to-overcome/>

The main problem in the analysis of online social networks is collecting posts that may be used later for content analysis. Thus, those who penetrate the existing networks need to have access to the content information. Then, the role of crawler type programs, or those devoted to content analysis, is crucial, as they can determine the presence of potentially suspicious messages with high repeatability, and the intensity of ties between individuals.

Also, referring to companies, and their relation with social media, it can be said that "once considered taboo by organizations, social media is now a key component for the development of products for collecting feedback and interaction with customers. However, many companies do not have a coordinated approach to use social media in their organization".<sup>8</sup>

Social media has reinvented the relationship between organizations, customers, employees, suppliers and regulators. Along with the many opportunities that social media generates, there are also other challenges, such as security, privacy issues, regulatory requirements and compliance aspects of time use by employees and business tools to manage social media.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> CRĂCIUN Marian, *Social media: o provocare ce nu mai poate fi ignorată*, accessed 26 August at <http://gadgetrends.ro/2013/04/12/social-media-o-provocare-ce-nu-mai-poate-fi-ignorata/>.

<sup>9</sup> Idem.

## **Conclusions**

Today, a lot of things are about social media. Many authors and specialists on the field think that if you are not active in this area, you are not part of cyberspace anymore. The concept of Social Media is top of the agenda for many business executives today. Decision makers, as well as consultants, try to identify ways in which firms can make profitable use of applications such as Wikipedia, YouTube, Facebook, Second Life, and Twitter.<sup>10</sup>

Social networking activity has become most popular in today's Internet world, with billions of people across the world using this media to meet old friends, make new friends, to collect and share information. Social networking while being a popular media has several disadvantages associated with it. These sites can be trapped by scammers or hackers leading to loss of confidentiality and identity thefts, of the users.<sup>11</sup>

Among the challenges faced by communication on social media specialists currently include: understanding how different social media websites work. In the USA, there is a list of books dedicated to this topic: establish communication opportunities, the challenges and risk communication through social media platforms type; differentiating social networks, strengths and their weaknesses, especially to compare Facebook to MySpace, Facebook and Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr; it tries to determine "rules of behavior" in the online environment and the difference between traditional PR and online PR; analysis of trends in social networks - applications emerging, new methods of use; identify the best tactics for promoting organizations through social media. Chad Norman, the specialist in online communication (2009) proposes a list of tactics to promote an NGO. It recommended the P.O.S.T. method for developing a social media program; measuring the effectiveness of communication in social networks.<sup>12</sup>

An actual trend for social media is represented by a new technical evolution, namely mobile social media. This is laying the groundwork for

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<sup>10</sup> KAPLAN \*Andreas M., HAENLEIN Michael, *Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of Social Media*, Accessed 26 August at <http://michaelhaenlein.com/Publications/Kaplan,%20Andreas%20%20Users%20of%20the%20world,%20unite.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> *Social Networking Risks and Challenges* accessed 29 August at <http://infosecawareness.in/students/social-networking-risks-and-challenges>.

<sup>12</sup> \*\*\*<http://www.informatiiprofesionale.ro/marketing/social-media-e2-80-93-o-noua-provocare>.

moving social media applications away from desktop PCs and laptops toward mobile devices. Referring to that, according to specialists, the market for mobile web 2.0 evolutions will keep growing.<sup>13</sup>

A Ernst & Young study shows that 38% of organizations have a coordinated approach to the use social media in their organization. The result is an overall increase in risk and a limited ability to fully exploit social media channels in the future; Organizations with a formal approach in using social media often choose to mitigate risks by limiting or banning access to social media sites (45%), adjustment policies (45%) and implementing outreach programs (40%).<sup>14</sup>

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## **Intelligence Ethics and the German Spying Scandal**

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### **Abstract**

*The article aims to evaluate the burgeoning literature on intelligence ethics and to analyze the 2014 German spying scandal from this perspective. It presents an appraisal of American espionage actions in Germany, based on public revelations and concludes that ethical aspects were violated.*

*The first part of the article elaborates the principle of gradual intelligence action, as formulated by the just intelligence doctrine. While doing so, the article also presents two other competing views on ethics, realism and utilitarianism. Yet, it selects just intelligence doctrine as the paradigm which best combines the state's duty to ensure its citizens' security with the fundamental premise of universal human moral status. The first part concludes by arguing that intelligence action should be gradual in both intention and means.*

*The second part discusses the 2014 revelations of American espionage in Germany and appraises them according to principles of intelligence ethics. It argues that the goal of action was not the discovery of a grave and imminent threat and that the means employed were disproportionate and indiscriminate. The article closes with an appeal for rebuilding trans-Atlantic trust.*

**Keywords:** intelligence, ethics, Snowden, Germany.

### **Introduction**

The idea of ethics in intelligence has been approached differently by the literature and by practitioners. An obvious tension exists between the way common sense perceives the idea of morality and the practice of intelligence activity. The latter implies actions which are, many times, outside the common understanding of the concept of morality. For example,

keeping up a fake identity, blackmailing a potential source or motivating it financially to make him/her deceive his workmates, intercepting communications and breaking the law of the state in which one operates are viewed as immoral by common sense morality. To overcome this difficulty, intelligence practitioners prefer to take up an „amoral”<sup>1</sup> stance (all is fair in love and war) or to justify their actions by arguing that they were serving the interest of their state. For example, Hugh Seton Lady the head of the CIA in Italy, when speaking about his involvement in the rendition of imam Abu Omar in Milano, argued that „I was only a soldier, we were in a war against terrorism and I could not question the orders I was given”<sup>2</sup>.

On the other hand, the human need for security is a fundamental one, being considered by political philosophy as one of the reasons for which individuals choose to leave the state of nature and to form states. These are invested by their citizens with the primordial aim to protect the life and physical integrity of individuals, as well as their fundamental rights. Throughout its history, western philosophy entrusted the state with the right and even duty to employ violence to defend its citizens, both in front of an external threat and against those who breach the laws of a legitimate state. Concerning the relations between a state’s citizens, political philosophy (Rousseau, Kant) supposes that the person committing acts of violence against its co-citizens breaks the social contract and is the only one responsible for the punishment which he then receives. For example, Kant believes that punishing a criminal is justified because his crime violates the principle of equality between citizens and the punishment reestablishes this equality.<sup>3</sup> Rousseau believes that those that break the law become traitors and rebels and declare war on their own state.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> J.E. Drexel Godfrey „Ethics in intelligence” in Jan Goldman (ed.) *Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional* vol 1 Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2006, 5.

<sup>2</sup> Reuters, U.S. spy says just followed orders in Italy kidnap, 30.06.2009, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/30/us-italy-usa-rendition-idUSTRE55T3H420090630>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>3</sup> Immanuel Kant, *The Science of Right*, <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16sr/introduction.html#D>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>4</sup> J.J. Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, translated by Jonathan Bennett, 2010, <http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdfs/rousseau1762.pdf> , Accessed 15.10.2014, 17.

Thus, the ethics of intelligence activity has to be seen within this context and moral evaluation has to overcome common sense understandings. When discussing the topic, different authors sharing different philosophical conceptions, concluded that the morality of intelligence actions can be evaluated by the principle of graduality, according to which any action is permissible if it is adapted to the gravity of the threat and to the degree of protection of the information that has to be uncovered. The aim of this article is to present and synthesize the principle of graduality as encountered in the literature and to apply it to analyze the spying scandal which came out in the summer of 2014 between the United States of America and Germany.

Of course, considering that authors begin from different premises, their conclusions also differ. While all conceptions agree that some actions are legitimate, the sphere of those considered impermissible or the demandingness of the conditions required for permissibility is different.

An important limitation of this article has to be mentioned from the beginning. Intelligence ethics literature, as well as public statements of practitioners, confuses three distinct concepts. The first one is the idea of legality, which means conformity of intelligence action with the law of the state ordering the action, regardless of what this might be. Thus, listening to the telephone conversations of a citizen without a warrant is a breach of the law of democratic states. The second concept is that of accountability. This has been defined by admiral Stansfield Turner as “there is only one test for the ethics of intelligence activities based on human sources-if those approving them believe that they can justify their actions in front of the public opinion when these become known”<sup>5</sup> As an example, although this might be in accordance with the law (a warrant was obtained), intercepting the communications of a group of students critical of the current foreign policy will be hard to be accepted by the public of a democratic country. The third benchmark of evaluation of an action/norm is ethics, a wider concept, which can provide principles used in critically evaluating both

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<sup>5</sup> Michael Quinlan, „Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an ethical theory”, *Intelligence and National Security* Vol 22, No.1, 1-13.

actions and formal and informal norms governing the intelligence field. These norms are derived by different authors on the basis of moral philosophy, which aims to make universal statements. Only these theories will be covered in this article.

### **Literature review**

Toni Erskine<sup>6</sup> shows that the realist conception on the morality of intelligence action is the most permissive. This view, derived from the conceptions of Thomas Hobbes and Nicolo Machiavelli, sees the state as first and foremost bound to ensure its own survival, then the welfare of its citizens while not needing to be concerned with the welfare of other states or their citizens. According to realism, not only that intelligence action is not immoral, but is permissible and welcome if it improves the state's chances of survival and power. Intelligence officers are compared with the strands of a spider's web, offering the sovereign information on the outside world, or with rays of light illuminating the human soul.<sup>7</sup> As Erskine shows, this is not an amoral view (intelligence does not allow for morality) but a view conflating national interest with the criterion of permissibility for an action. Of course, the realist view justifies many kinds of action, including the extreme ones such a torture or political assassination (while taking precautions that this does not damage a state's reputation, if reputation is a means of exercising power).<sup>8</sup>

The second view on the morality of intelligence action is that justified by Michael Herman<sup>9</sup> and criticized by Erskine. This relies on utilitarianism and appraises actions according to whether they lead to good or bad outcomes. Utilitarianism is an old tradition in contemporary political

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<sup>6</sup> Toni Erskine „As Rays of Light to the Human Soul? Moral Agents and Intelligence Gathering” in Jan Goldman (ed.) *Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional* vol 2 Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2010, 122-125.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 125.

<sup>9</sup> Michael Herman, „Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001” in Jan Goldman (ed.) *Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional* vol 2 Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2010, 107.

philosophy, starting from the writings of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, while its main contemporary representatives are Peter Singer and Henry Sidgwick. The basic principle of this view is that an action or rule should be evaluated by adding up the good and the bad it generates. A moral action is the one that maximizes the good and minimizes the bad outcomes. It can be argued that the central idea of utilitarianism is maximizing utility (no matter how this is defined), giving each person an equal importance.<sup>10</sup> Of course, the different criticism raised against this view have led to it being refined and improved in order to avoid unfortunate implications, such as those employed by Erskine when criticizing Herman. When trying to offer a substantive view on the good that intelligence action should promote, Herman avoids philosophical discussions and employs “common terms” such as “encouraging responsible behavior by governments, good inter-state relations, minimizing tensions, cooperation for valuable purposes and avoidance of war”<sup>11</sup>. On the other hand, Erskine criticizes this approach, as he believes that the standards of good and evil are not clear.<sup>12</sup>

A second argument against utilitarian theories is that they ignore the „separateness of persons”<sup>13</sup>. Thus, at least classical utilitarianism allows for a great evil to be perpetrated on a person to generate a relatively small good for many other people. The best example employed against utilitarianism is the use of torture to find out information which can stop a threat to many other people. Excepting extreme situations, torture represents a great evil, while the intelligence acquired might only prevent small threats. This is also one of the arguments Erskine uses.<sup>14</sup>

The last criticism against Herman’s utilitarian theory is that the unintended consequences of an action must be also included in the “ethical balance sheet”. Many times, an action can affect persons who are not

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<sup>10</sup>Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: an introduction* Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2002 12.

<sup>11</sup> Herman, „Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001”, 111.

<sup>12</sup>Erskine „As Rays of Light to the Human Soul”, 130.

<sup>13</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, second edition Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999, 167.

<sup>14</sup> Erskine „As Rays of Light to the Human Soul”, 129.

directly involved, either by compromising their reputation or by causing emotional harm. Erskine believes that this argument unjustifiably limits the margin of permissible intelligence action, considering the fact that most intelligence activities have hard-to-predict, unintended consequences.<sup>15</sup> For example, obtaining information from a foreign institution, which is a legitimate target, can affect, without this being the aim of the action, the career of those that had to guard this information. If this unintended harm is included in the ethical balance sheet, acting against what appears to be a legitimate target might be considered impermissible.

A development of utilitarian theory is the view of Ross Bellaby, who begins from the principle *primum non nocere*<sup>16</sup>, or „first do no harm”. Bellaby analyzes the works of some political philosophers, but is mostly influenced by Amartya Sen’s and Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory and defines some of the individual’s basic interests (as opposed to Herman who starts from the interests of international society). These are physical and mental integrity, autonomy, freedom, the feeling of self-confidence and the protection of privacy. Each of these can be affected by intelligence action in several ways, from torture, which affects the first two to the violation of privacy.<sup>17</sup> Bellaby does not offer solutions based on his theory, as he chooses to employ the theory of just war/just intelligence (see below) as a solution to the problem.

The third view on ethics that Erskine presents is the deontological one, derived from the categorical imperative, as it is defined by Immanuel Kant. The categorical imperative expressly forbids some actions under any circumstances. It can be formulated in two ways: “Act such that the norm guiding your action can become universal law” and “Act such that you treat others as ends in themselves and not as means”<sup>18</sup>. Both formulations represent strict limits against actions such as deceptions, invasion of privacy and breaking promises. Both the Kantian and the utilitarian perspective, as opposed to realism, give equal concern to the citizens of other states, but

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<sup>15</sup> Erskine „As Rays of Light to the Human Soul”, 133.

<sup>16</sup> Ross Bellaby, „What’s the Harm? The Ethics of Intelligence Collection”, *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 27, Issue 1, 2012, pp 93-117.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, 109.

<sup>18</sup> Erskine „As Rays of Light to the Human Soul” 132.



offer different solutions to this conundrum.

An important moral theory is “just intelligence”, an application of the just war doctrine. Just war theory is advocated by Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan and Frances Kahn. The main supporter of this view within the field of intelligence is Angela Gendron.<sup>19</sup> This theory distinguishes, as just war theory also does, between *jus ad bello* (the moral right to start a war-later adapted by Quinlan as *jus ad intelligentiam*) and *jus in bellum* (the way to morally fight a war-adapted as *jus in intelligentsia*)<sup>20</sup>, and believes intelligence action should be evaluated against both criteria. Michael Quinlan correctly argues that adapting the theory of just war to the field of intelligence needs to be done creatively, as there are significant differences between the two activities. Firstly, far less is known about intelligence action as opposed to military action and discussing the first can only be done with a high level of generality. Secondly, unlike in international relations, governments make only very general statements on the intelligence action they are willing to tolerate from an adversary, so that these do not have much leeway.<sup>21</sup>

Both Gendron and Quinlan agree that significant differences between just war theory and just intelligence exist, regarding the *jus ad bello/intelligentiam* part. If war can be legitimate only when the state has been attacked or when a grave and imminent threat exists, intelligence activity can be legitimately undertaken to identify and combat threats before they materialise. Gendron recommends that identifying threats should be done in the least intrusive ways possible, until serious indications that a threat is materializing are discovered. This approach excludes economic espionage done only for getting a competitive advantage for a country or spying on the private life of an individual without him being in an important position or having the authority to issue orders leading to a potentially dangerous action.

Regarding behavior during intelligence action, Gendron suggests the

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<sup>19</sup> Angela Gendron, „Just War, Just Intelligence: An Ethical Framework for Foreign Espionage”, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol 18, No.3, 2005, 398-434.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid*, 415.

<sup>21</sup> Quinlan, „Just Intelligence: Prolegomena to an ethical theory”, 4.

classical criteria of just war: proportionality, the probability of success, considering unintended consequences and differentiation between combatants and non-combatants.<sup>22</sup> For the last criterion, Gendron quotes the proposals of Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey Tiel, who believe that there is a scale of involvement in intelligence activity, and methods can be employed according to this. Thus, persons who are not part of a state's intelligence activity can only be targeted by minimally invasive measures, while active intelligence officers can be subjected to blackmail based on fabricated evidence or tough interrogation methods.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the principle of proportionality also recommends methods that are intrusive enough to ensure success but no more than that. Furthermore, the principle of probability of success claims that the method with the highest chances of success should be adopted, without waiting and trying all the methods and expecting the emergence of negative consequences<sup>24</sup>. Thus, Gendron concludes that the moral evaluation of intelligence action can be done according to a matrix, and the methods can be selected according to the adversary's hostility, the opacity of the target-organization and the imminence of the threat.<sup>25</sup>

Although the criteria of just war are similar across all authors, small differences exist between them. For example, Bellaby adds to Gendron's proposals the criteria of right intention and legitimate authority. The idea of right intention limits the methods of intelligence action to only those that serve the legitimate intention for combating the threat, excluding those which serve selfish purposes such as the overthrow of an enemy regime or economically benefitting one's own state. Further, intelligence action must be ordered only by the state's legitimate authority, be it either the supreme executive for external actions or a law-enforcement authority, with the agreements of the judiciary, for actions against one's own citizens.

In the Romanian context, ethical aspects have been discussed and applied on the collection of open source intelligence. Thus, it was

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<sup>22</sup> Gendron, „Just War, Just Intelligence”, 419.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, Tony Pfaff and Jeffrey R. Tiel, „The ethics of espionage”, *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol 3, No. 1, 2004, 1-15.

<sup>24</sup> Gendron, „Just War, Just Intelligence”, 425.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

recommended that open source intelligence “can only be included in a file [...] if they concern the breach of a law [...] the source from which they were obtained being irrelevant [...] so to avoid any problems arising later in keeping the information on the suspected person, if the connection between that person and a terrorist or extremist group cannot be proven by corroborating intelligence from different sources.”<sup>26</sup>

The literature concludes that intelligence action cannot be indiscriminate or used for any purpose. Those that decide on operations need to evaluate their purpose (if the discovery or combating of a grave and maybe imminent threat is sought) as well as the intrusiveness of the methods against the operation’s chance of success, the proportion between aim and means and the type of adversary. To offer extreme examples, it is legitimate to place listening devices in or to secretly search locations where terrorist attacks are planned ( a well-known case of such a search was that performed on the apartment of one of the 2006 transatlantic airliner bomb plot, an action which foiled the plot<sup>27</sup>) but it is not legitimate for these methods to be employed against groups who have different political opinions than the government. It is permissible to recruit human sources (even by blackmail) among the officials of a regime which, it is believed, is developing nuclear weapons with the intent of using them, but illegitimate to do so against a regime without warlike intentions. Of course, in the case of such a regime, it is perfectly acceptable for the public speeches of its officials to be monitored and analyzed on the eve of the signing of a major bilateral trade treaty.

### **The case of American espionage against Germany**

In the summer of 2014, a major spying scandal rocked the relation between Germany and the United States of America, two allied countries. After the defection of Edward Snowden, a series of documents belonging to

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<sup>26</sup> Cristina Posaștiuc, Emilia Enescu, „Aspecte etice în activitatea de intelligence din surse deschise” în *Revista Română de Studii de Intelligence* nr. 4 / decembrie 2010.

<sup>27</sup> BBC.co.uk, Liquid bomb plot: What happened, 9.09.2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/7564184.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7564184.stm), Accessed 15.10.2014.

the National Security Agency were revealed to the public, allowing people to find out more on the NSA's secret activities. One of the most important revelations was that the American agency had intercepted the phone calls of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel for ten years, beginning in 2002, when she had begun her career on the national stage, and up to 2013. An investigation of the *Der Spiegel* magazine, based on Snowden's documents led to a major scandal between the two countries<sup>28</sup>.

According to the revelations, a special NSA unit installed listening equipment in the attic of the American embassy in Berlin and employed it to intercept the telephone conversations in Berlin's governmental quarter. Confronted with this claim, German officials then contacted their American counterparts, who, both in private and in public, neither confirmed nor explicitly denied the accusations.<sup>29</sup> Angela Merkel's spokesperson called this a „grave breach of trust” while the chancellor herself expressed her dissatisfaction in a telephone conversation with Barack Obama.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, it was asserted that this scandal can lead to the freezing of negotiations for the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership agreement, currently being discussed between the European Union and the United States of America.

The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership is a major agreement currently being negotiated by the EU and US. Its aim is to eliminate trade barriers between the two blocs, by giving up customs duties and by harmonizing non-tariff barriers such as safety standards. The European Commission argues that this agreement would increase the EU's aggregate GDP by 120 billion Euros.<sup>31</sup> Negotiations on this agreement have been gravely endangered by the spying scandal discussed in this article.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Der Spiegel, Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> European commission, The Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>32</sup> Bloomberg.com, German Spy Scandal Tests Merkel's Partnership With U.S., 8.07.2014 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-08/merkel-tested-as-u-s-partner-by-spy-uproar-in-germany.html>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

In addition to wiretapping the Chancellor's phone scandal, two others revelations have led to the further cooling of the relations between the two countries. Just several months after Edward Snowden made public the NSA's actions, two employees of the German Federal Government, one employed at the Ministry of Defense and another at BND (Germany's Foreign Intelligence Service) were arrested under the accusation of espionage for the USA. All this have led to the expulsion of the CIA's station chief in Germany<sup>33</sup> and to the considerable reduction in trust between the two countries. American officials reacted angrily to this expulsion, claiming that Germany should be more concerned by Russian or Chinese espionage.<sup>34</sup> Despite these statements and actions, German officials tried to negotiate with the US a no-spying agreement, asking that Germany be accepted in the club of Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), who agree to give up intelligence activities against one another.<sup>35</sup>

This case represented one of the most spectacular revelations of spying among allied countries in recent years (it can be compared with the Pollard case of the 80s)<sup>36</sup>. According to the statements of German officials, they trusted the USA too much, believing that spying between allied countries is not practiced and preferred to focus their limited capacities ( at least when compared to those of the US)<sup>37</sup> on threats such as Russia, China or terrorist networks.

#### **Intelligence ethics and the analysis of US espionage actions**

With the prominent exception of the realist paradigm, all the other

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<sup>33</sup> Bbc.com, Germany expels CIA official in US spy row, 10.07.2014 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28243933> Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>34</sup> Deutsche Welle, US irritated by German response to spying scandal, 11.07.2014, <http://www.dw.de/us-irritated-by-german-response-to-spying-scandal/a-17780705>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>35</sup> Stephane Lefebvre, „The Difficulties and Dilemmas of Intelligence Cooperation”, *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, Vol 16, No.4, 2003, 527-540.

<sup>36</sup> Csmmonitor, Who is Jonathan Pollard, and why is his spy case inflammatory? <http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2014/0401/Who-is-Jonathan-Pollard-and-why-is-his-spy-case-inflammatory-video>, Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>37</sup> „Der Spiegel”, Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin.

theories of permissibility of intelligence action lead to a negative appraisal of the activities of the American Intelligence services. The realist theory believes that almost anything is permitted and that the need of a state to maximize its power cannot be bound by alliances or formal promises. Moreover, this theory does not take into account the action's purpose, viewing the aim of discovering a state's position in a commercial negotiation as equally legitimate as that of combating the actions of a potentially enemy state.

Other moral theories reviewed above strongly condemn US actions against Germany. Utilitarian theory sees US actions as wrong because they generate only a small good for the US and the international community (discovering foreign policy intentions which could be anyway found out through usual diplomatic channels) while causing a great harm (the breach of trust between two allied countries, the diminishing of intelligence exchanges between the two agencies of the two countries, having as a potential consequence the decrease of the capability of combating real threats such as Russia, China or terrorism, the weakening of citizens' trust in the trans-Atlantic community, the freezing of TTIP negotiations).

Taking into consideration the aspects discussed above, about intelligence action being gradual and just war theory, the US actions can be criticized on all counts. Firstly, the aim was not combating a threat already detected using open sources or less intrusive means. It is not clear what the purpose of intercepting Chancellor Merkel's communications for ten years was, but it is possible that the intelligence acquired was employed to anticipate Germany's foreign policy or to evaluate its positions in commercial negotiations. Germany is not a traditional threat to the US and it is hard to imagine that the wiretapping revealed information which changed this perception. Moreover, recruiting human sources inside German military and intelligence agencies shows that the aim was to not only obtain information on foreign policy, but also on defense policy and to, maybe, criticize the insufficient (according to the US) military collaboration between the two countries or the fact that Germany does not invest enough in developing NATO resources.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> „Time”, Not New NATO News, <http://nation.time.com/2011/06/10/not-new-nato-news/>,

Accepting that following German foreign policy is a legitimate aim, it is obvious that the means employed were disproportionate and indiscriminate. Firstly, this purpose could be achieved by open source intelligence, such as Chancellor Merkel's speeches or those of other foreign policy officials. Considering the tight collaboration between these two countries, it can be assumed that sufficient channels of communication exist to communicate information away from the public eyes.

Furthermore, the indiscriminate character of the espionage action was obvious from the fact that the electronic devices were directly pointed to the government quarter<sup>39</sup>, listening to all communications possible, including multiple telephone numbers. It could be argued that, although the purpose was wrong and the means disproportionate, the persons whose telephones were intercepted could be chosen in a more discriminate fashion, based on the probability of obtaining valuable intelligence. From what was revealed to the public, it can be glimpsed that the approach was completely the opposite. Finally, it can be argued that the means were not proportional with the type of society in which the action was undertaken, as Germany is a relatively open society, where the government's intentions are mostly public, only private data and national security aspects being secret.

In addition to those mentioned above, the seriousness of the spying scandal can be analyzed considering that Germany and the US are countries allied in NATO. If some moral duties are universal, it can be said that duties between individuals that are close are stricter. For example, one does not have a duty to financially help an unknown person who is not in an immediate financial need, but this duty appears when a friend is involved. The force of moral obligation is almost absolute, if the person promised to help his friend. The case of the relationship between Germany and the US lies somewhere in between on this continuum of moral strictness. On the one hand, the US did not explicitly promise to refrain from intelligence action against Germany, as it did with other Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand, its close relationship with the US allowed Germany to believe that the US is not a threat and to concentrate its resources against other

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Accessed 15.10.2014.

<sup>39</sup> „Der Spiegel”, Embassy Espionage: The NSA's Secret Spy Hub in Berlin.



targets. A case permanently mentioned in the literature is that of US Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, who, in 1929 closed down the infamous Black Chamber, the US' decrypting department, founded during World War I, by claiming that "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail".<sup>40</sup> At that time, Stimson believed that all other countries should be treated in a gentlemanly way. Within the current context, it can be argued that the international security environment led to the elimination of rules of politeness, but that an alliance relation has the implication that both allies will behave gentlemanly with each other.

Of course, those mentioned above do not exclude the legitimacy of similar action by the US or other NATO countries against states or organizations that represent a threat to their security, such as Russia, China or ISIS. Still, the principles developed in the intelligence ethics literature allow evaluating actions and discussing their permissibility.

### **Conclusion**

Intelligence ethics literature lies at the crossroads between the need for security and the moral right of the state to ensure the safety of its own citizens, on the one hand, and political philosophy which grants equal moral standing to individuals and aims to create a bridge between the two. The principle of gradual action, as it was formulated by this article, admits the importance of both perspectives and achieves a balance sometimes thought impossible. Its application to concrete cases is many times, in agreement with individual intuition of what a democratic state should do, allowing action against threats but forbidding the same behavior against other targets.

Edward Snowden's revelations can represent a departure point for new rules of trans-Atlantic intelligence cooperation, leading to the formulation of new rules to further mutual trust. Yet, a period of reflection is necessary to draw conclusions from events and to rebuild cooperation.

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<sup>40</sup> R.V. Jones „Intelligence Ethics” în Jan Goldman (ed.) *Ethics of Spying: a Reader for the Intelligence Professional* vol 1 Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2006, 21.

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## **Intelligence for competitiveness and national security in the knowledge society (2)**

A short benchmarking analysis on the creation of a Romanian national intelligence system

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### **Abstract**

*With the transition to the knowledge economy, the value of all social, organizational and individual entities is directly dependent on its intellectual and knowledge capital. Unfortunately, the majority of decision-makers focus too much on the tangible assets, almost to the point of ignoring the intangible ones.*

*However, in order to successfully navigate this world, where the global is directly connected to the local it is essential, to first understand the interaction between certain key-concepts, such as politics, economy, knowledge, intelligence, strategy, competitiveness and security.*

*In the new evolution paradigm knowledge means value, while intelligence means power, that is why the paper analyzes the evolution of national intelligence systems in an attempt to shed some light on the interaction models employed at international level, which can then be adapted and re-configured to fit the necessities of developing countries, willing to engage in such a national endeavor.*

*To develop a national intelligence model applicable for Romania, the study employs benchmarking analysis to compare the structure and performance of various national intelligence systems and extract those structural elements that fit the overall approach to continuous improvement. To insure the efficiency of the results, we have selected for the comparison leading examples of national intelligence systems: the US, France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany.*

*The analysis resulted in a set of guidelines and best practices that, after integration can be used to elaborate a blueprint for the development of a Romanian national intelligence system by both decision-makers and representative of the academia and private sectors. This research product is by no means comprehensive, as there are many other case studies that could and should have been included in the benchmarking analysis, in order to create a full picture of the*

*overall evolution undergone by states in the process of developing national intelligence systems. Though the issue of national intelligence system has been debated before, both in the academia and at governmental level, as proven by the existence of the Carayon Report and the works of Robert Steele, this has always occurred in large states, with a strong tradition in the field. The originality of this paper is that it uses benchmarking to try to understand the processes taking place in all those places and then extract key elements and patterns that then can be re-adapted and replicated for a different type of state, such is the case of Romania.*

**Keywords:** national intelligence model, competitiveness, national security, Knowledge Society, knowledge capital

### **Reflections on the Comparative Analysis of the National Intelligence Systems**

The comparative analysis of several national intelligence systems has underlined the fact that these systems have been built in a systematic manner, having a distribution compatible with the knowledge society through informational networks (Dedijer, 1984, p. 18-37). The institutions and organizations, the structures and means are organized in a network model and collaboration mechanism are set in place for national security issues, which are understood in a trans disciplinary and integrated fashion.

There are two fundamental conclusions, which can be drawn out of this analysis:

The first one regards the interoperability among the components, which shape the national intelligence system. This interoperability is insured both through a formalized procedural framework of inter-relation and through the existence of a mental profile which is compatible and complementary (at the informal level) at the level of the human resources employed by the organizations and institutions, which are part of the system. In this way, the human resources become a human capital, which is incorporated in the national intelligence system.

The second conclusion refers to the manner in which the components of the national intelligence systems can be grouped:

- institutions holding public accountability, with an executive or legislative role (president-monarch, government, parliament);
- institutions holding public accountability, which, legally speaking, play a role in defending national security (intelligence services as well as other military institutions) – the intelligence community in its narrowest sense;

- institutions and organizations which manage knowledge production at societal level (universities, research institutes, think-tanks);
- institutions and organizations that do not hold formal public accountability and act only on the basis of economic performance criteria, representing the environment that must generate the welfare of the respective society on the basis of ethical principles and mechanisms that regulate knowledge capitalization.

By grouping the institutions on these four dimensions, we can design a model for a so-called virtual entity entitled the new National Intelligence Distributed System/OSINT, comprising all the main public and private institutions of a state, which have adapted to the requirements of the knowledge society and knowledge economy.

The system should be designed in such a way so as not to be dependent on individuals, but on the formal and informal framework, used by the people working for the institutions and organizations, which are part of the system, to interact in order to insure national security. Only then can we speak of the existence of a time invariant set of identity values for that society.

The informal framework is based on the existence of a common knowledge horizon in the field of intelligence and national security, in what concerns human resources and the administration, management and leadership processes by which this resource is transformed into human capital.

The formal framework is related to the creation of a setting in which the defining principles of a state, the criteria which form the basis for its legal framework, the legal framework itself would allow the strengthening of the formal network of the national intelligence system. In this manner, the informal and formal aspects can be integrated organizationally, as well as the human capital-related processes.

This proposal aims to define and design the informal framework and shape the common knowledge horizon at the level of the individuals and institutions, eligible to become part of the formal framework. Implementing such an informal framework is a process, which required ad-hoc organizational constructions, which would need to be integrated in the final formal framework.

An example in this respect is the Swedish I&S system/community, as reflected in Stevan Dedijer's studies.

### **How to achieve this goal?**

By analyzing the state of affairs at international level, we can see that all initiatives aimed at redesigning national intelligence systems have lasted several years, starting with an in-depth analysis, followed by a multi-annual implementation process, which employed flexible platforms enabling

organizational adaptability. Given the current situation, it is difficult to believe, Romania will be able to avoid the complexity of this process as well as its direct consequences, namely the large consumption of time and financial resources.

Therefore, when starting a formal design process at state level it is necessary to first establish a decision-making framework, which would enable the leadership to maintain its control over the entire project and set a strategy, which through a rational budgetary allocation would enable the first operational steps to be taken. Moreover, this decision-making framework should not only ensure the unitary character of the systemic knowledge in terms of security but also insure the selection and implementation of efficient formal design methods at the level of inter and intra-institutional connections.

The intelligence culture/OSINT represents a key feature of this model, which should be understood as a new dimension<sup>1</sup> of the nation-state, through which, in the context of democratic values, a new type of cohesion between the military, private and civilian sectors is being built. The integration of the security, governance, knowledge and corporate segments enables the state to gain control over the processes of acquiring sustainable competitive advantage.

In order to understand the role of this design we must review, study and understand the following key events at least:

- Wilensky's theory that established integration among the corporate and governance dimensions as a necessary precondition for ensuring sustainable competitive advantage (organizational intelligence theory, 1967);
- Dedijer's theory<sup>2</sup> on how the integration of the security and knowledge dimensions (the "social intelligence"<sup>3</sup> concept) provides support for the

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<sup>1</sup> Characteristic for the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the transition from the Information Society to the Network Society given the complexity of globalization, through the management of regional and local security.

<sup>2</sup> The Economic Intelligence approach promoted in the French community is inspired particularly from Dedijer's framework e.g. Philippe Clerc, Economic Intelligence, p. 304-317 in *World Information Report 1997/1998*, UNESCO, [www.unesco.org/webworld/wirerpt/wirenglish/chap22.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/webworld/wirerpt/wirenglish/chap22.pdf); N. Moinet (2010), *Petite histoire de l'intelligence économique: Une innovation "à la française"*, Paris: L'Harmattan.

<sup>3</sup> S. Dedijer (1982), *Transnationals, Intelligence and Development. Looking beyond Informatics to Social Intelligence*, International Foundation for Development Alternatives,



corporate dimension (the “business intelligence” concept (Dedijer, 1999, p. 67-78), which completes the conceptual framework on competitive intelligence (Dedijer, 1998, 66-68); and the Swedish model (Dedijer and Hedin, 1993) of intelligence & security system/community (2003);

□ Kotler and Singh’s work (1981), which identified as a premise for integration, the security dimension positing political marketing as its support field; (Kotler and Singh, 1981, p. 30-41)

□ Steele’s initiative (1996) which saw integration on the basis of knowledge among all components through the idea of a smart nation, where the citizen becomes an intelligence customer (Steele, 1996, p. 159-173.).

These are the most important moments in the process of designing the new system. On the other hand, no design process of any national intelligence/OSINT system can ignore those theories; on the contrary, they develop them by adapting them to their national context. Nowadays, we witness a conscious effort to transform these separate conceptual frameworks into a theory of intelligence;

### **The Romanian case**

Romania’s EU Membership makes it imperative for it to design its own national intelligence system in accordance with the significance that these words - intelligence and integration - have in a NATO and EU context. Therefore:

The isolationist and fractionalized behavior practiced by the institutions which must be part of the national intelligence system architecture is incompatible with the working environment practices in the cases analyzed before. To gain credibility in an inter-state framework, the collaborative feature of information, knowledge and intelligence must first and foremost be applied to the country’s institutions. The domestic consequences of such a behavior are the lack of a national intelligence community meeting the standards adopted by the partners. But this type of behavior is only an effect. The cause lies in the intellectual chaos present in the collective brain and memory of the institutions’ managers, who must

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29 (May/June), p. 15-24; S. Dedijer (1983), Science transfer versus technology transfer, *International Foundation for Development Alternatives*, 36 (July/August), p. 30; S. Dedijer (1985), *Social Intelligence for Self-Reliant Development*, *International Foundation for Development Alternatives*, p. 49-52.

ensure the knowledge and implementation dimension at national level. Among the causal factors we can identify the following fundamental elements that are required by any democratic state:

- the absence of a national security strategy for 8 years after the Romanian Revolution;
- lack of coordination between the main institutions (Presidency, Government and Parliament) as a result of the lack of a strategy;
- the human resource lacks the necessary skills in the field of strategic management, strategy, strategic planning, national intelligence, strategic intelligence, economic and competitive intelligence;
- lack of a national intelligence strategy;
- lack of a national intelligence doctrine (there is one from 2004, but it lacks essence and clarity; it is not in accordance with NATO doctrine);
- absence of a Romanian equivalent to the concept of intelligence in the theory and practice of intelligence agencies;
- lack of an intelligence doctrine for each of the main intelligence agencies;
- lack of a legislative framework in the field of security and intelligence adapted to the Romanian context and the requirements of the Knowledge Society.

Inside the Euro-Atlantic system there was a diffusion of the necessary principles and criteria for the transformation of the information culture into an intelligence culture through activities centered on the OSINT concept, formulated by Robert Steele (in the period 1993-2003). In addition to the European solutions for this problem identified by Stevan Dedijer in Sweden (Dedijer, 2003) we can also mention the steps taken by France in accordance with the ideas formulated by the Martre (1994) and Carayon Reports (2003), which have helped France design a unique national intelligence system.

Although nobody has openly expressed Romania's necessity to build a national intelligence system, it is important to note that in the competitive environment of the EU or of the "global village" all those competing in different fields, such as the attraction of European funds are interested in maximizing their chances knowing that at least one of their competitors is unprepared. Romania has encountered this type of circumstances before, for example it was not invited to join the Visegrad group as the other countries were interested in sharing the common budget between fewer members.

A correct assessment of the significance borne by the intelligence field is a necessary precondition for the governing potential, which conditions the acquisition of competitive advantage. On one hand, any delay in making this assessment leads to a serious national handicap in producing human capital and in gaining, through the creation of a national intelligence system, a competitive advantage. On the other hand such a delay eliminates almost any possibility of transforming the information culture into an intelligence culture. The reasons for this is that a culture cannot be transformed during the mandate of a certain political or corporate elite, being a process of political innovation that must be undertaken at state level. Although, in the last years we have witnessed some isolated attempts to promote academic and civil components of the intelligence culture in Romania (at least one Romanian university and NGO have been conducting such an effort starting with 1998), these disparate efforts could and did not create the critical mass required for a nation-wide transformation. Moreover, any initiative to begin such a transformation process is faced with a serious challenge that of identifying factors which could accelerate the process, as, given the obstacles ahead, one year in the near future is not the same as a year from the time when open systems & sources and knowledge management concepts were being implemented in the Euro-Atlantic area.

The acceleration factors can function coherently and in harmony with an objective only so far as Orientation is not lacking (Boyd, 1976). It would be pointless to pretend that policies defending the national interest are a corollary of other policies, be them European as long as Jacques Delors<sup>4</sup> himself explained the logic behind organized hypocrisy<sup>5</sup>. In short,

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<sup>4</sup> Initially the project was carried by the enthusiasm of the post-war and then by an elitist project that was economic. Simply, as Europe is not a federation like the United States, to live through democracy it is through the national governments. But if they decide to talk about Europe today as they were in the Congress of Vienna two centuries ago, then there is nothing to do. You cannot make Europe against the governments, yet they are far from enthusiastic about Europe at present.' Cf. Jacques Delors' interview on the future of Europe/European integration, "Europe needs a 'soul'", November 10th, 2010; available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story\\_page/002-85429-286-10-42-901-20101006STO85428-2010-13-10-2010/default\\_en.htm](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/002-85429-286-10-42-901-20101006STO85428-2010-13-10-2010/default_en.htm)

<sup>5</sup> The explanation for "organized hypocrisy" can be found in N. Brunsson (2007), *The Consequences of Decision-Making*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., p. 111-134.

the responsibility of Romania's national interest does not admit 'outsourcing', while on the other hand, the organized hypocrisy of the Romanian elite is more devastating than any external factor.

The governing elite should have tried at least to identify these types of problems (something which happened in France) as it was charged with national responsibility, for the time when the meaning of this concept was being built inside the EU (1999-2004). In addition, the delay in starting the intelligence development process led to a lack of intellectual capital, which Romania sorely feels up to his day.

The mental map of the elite is not in line with the system "research - education - operation". In our culture we are missing the meaning of research and the importance it has in our economic life. We have in command a lot of practitioners, and they are not the leaders we need in knowledge and economic society.

In other words, it is naive to believe that somebody working eight hours a day on different issues could have the physical time required to successfully complete even the documentation phase of any research process. Research is not a hobby and cannot be conducted as an additional burden to daily tasks. The result of conceiving the research activity in such a manner has led to a fractionalized research system, which similarly to the education system has been perceived as a trifle in comparison to "practical activities". It is not by chance that one of the studies dedicated to the creation of an intelligence culture, which has preceded by a decade the institutional creation necessary for its implementation is dedicated to the research methodology in intelligence and begins by eliminating a common misunderstanding<sup>6</sup>. In reality, we can only achieve Orientation if we adopt, what is now called "research-led education" and the principles by which this

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The problem is not to accuse somebody on ethical or moral grounds but to apply defensive intelligence techniques after the evaluation has placed a certain event in such a framework.

<sup>6</sup> "the idea that the object of research is new knowledge does not seem to be widely understood and 'a schoolboy looking up the meaning of a word in the dictionary is now said to be doing research'. Indeed, it has been debased even further. Research is frequently used to describe reading by those to whom reading, apparently, is a research activity, and for many a graduate student it is a euphemism for wholesale plagiarism. The work needs a rest or at least less promiscuous handling", in J.K. Clauser, S.M. Weir (1975), *Intelligence Research Methodology. An Introduction to Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Research in Defense Intelligence*, Defense Intelligence School, Washington D.C., p. 30.

takes place. Otherwise we get something completely different, whose negative effect are easily spot in today's Romania.

What is currently missing in Romania is precisely this type of Orientation. Today the Romanian system is filled with "practitioners" that have no understanding of complex issues and take for granted the results of studies written by foreign authors without attempting to increase their knowledge; in the best case they enhance the volume of information they possess without increasing their knowledge, as this requires another type of Orientation. To sum up, they lack an Orientation in harmony with the idea of research, which they cannot possess without fully changing their mentalities. To achieve this they should return to the inner meaning of Benjamin Franklin's words "true merit" and "true learning" from his 1747 speech (Franklin, 1976, p. 256-261).

The continuous embrittlement of the education system for the past 24 years in parallel with the fracturing of the ties between the fundamental and applied research places Romania in the situation to redesign its system from scrap in a significantly more complex context than any of those faced by the states analyzed above.

The mentality of those inhabiting the Romanian corporate environment does not have the slightest connection to the mentality of the corporation environment in the countries that have built such systems, although the social responsibility of the first is infinitely greater than that of the latter, as they have gained their current status by appropriating the properties of the Socialist state during the transition period.

The greatest error that anyone could make in what concerns the creation of a national intelligence system, in the meaning given by Shotwell, is to try to copy a foreign system as some have tried irresponsibly, thinking it would be easier or more practical this way. It is important to mention here that simplicity requires an understood complexity (Bunge, 1962, p. 113-135), and rarely can this aspect be ignored without significant consequences.

The purely reactive mentality to the importance of the intelligence culture inside the integration process raises serious concerns and makes the education system the only available starting point for this initiative - which requires at least five years to mature. Only through these types of processes can we transform the mental framework of those possessing the skills

required to deal with the complex challenges of the modern world.

This type of integration is necessary if we are to successfully *understand*, as the negative consequences of faking understanding can be easily observed today in various fields. The question we must pose ourselves today is: what type of position do we want to occupy in the future and especially where?

The only way to introduce a new national intelligence system in Romania is through the implementation of a concept that would offer a solution in the shape of an adaptive architecture. A rigid approach would only lead to a creation, which would seem adequate today but on the long run it would lead us to a completely different direction than we intend to go as a result of its poor employment of resources.

This paper does not employ the words revolution, reform or re-invention as in the core of the aforementioned ideas is the concept of adaptive mechanism. The adaptive mechanism must be understood, identified, defined and implemented by skillful people and not necessary practitioners as adaptation is a rationalization process by its nature. In this field of intelligence culture, as long as its identity is respected, it is wisdom (Andregg, 2003) that rules and not action.

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## **Intelligence activity of the Romanian Army during the Romanian War of Independence (1877 – 1878)**

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**Romania during 1877**

Source: <http://www.mesagerulromanesc.info/?p=3387>

### **Abstract**

*The development of the military intelligence services of the Romanian army was influenced both by the transformation of the Romanian army in its structure, and by the changes and the regional and continental political-military interests influencing our country's development throughout the years. Lacking the tradition of other states, the Independence War (1877 - 1878) was a serious challenge for both civilian and military Romanian intelligence. Due to the close collaboration between the different structures of the power institutions belonging to the state (especially the Ministry of Interior and the Army) most of the Ottoman Empire's attempts to find out about Romania's strengths and vulnerabilities were discovered and annihilated. Taking as a starting point the experience gained during the war of independence, the political and military authorities implemented major reforms concerning the leadership and management of the army, as well as the physiognomy of the military structures. Starting with the creation of the General Staff in 1882, the intelligence structure of the army acquired more coherence and stability and the intelligence activity entered a second stage of evolution based on the unity of intelligence and counter-intelligence structures.*

**Keywords:** *espionage, intelligence cooperation, Romanian Army, intelligence gathering, General Army Headquarters.*

### **Introduction**

During the year 1875, the Eastern Question was reopened through the uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the next year the conflict was amplified through the uprising of the Bulgarians and the slaughter made by the Turks in the South of the Danube or the war between the Ottoman Empire, Serbia and Montenegro; Romanian authorities adopted a neutral position but supported in secret these freedom fight movements, under various forms (by facilitating the weapons smuggling towards the South Danubian fighters, by providing refuge on the Romanian territory for the people persecuted by the Ottomans etc.).

The failure of the Constantinople Conference (December 1876 and January 1877) and London Conference (March 1877) shattered any hope for peace, giving the Tsarist Empire the appropriate opportunity to declare war on the Sublime Porte. Ensuring the benevolent neutrality of Austro-Hungarian Empire by signing the secret Budapest Convention on 3/15

January 1877 (in exchange of the „right” to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vienna agreed that, following the imminent Russo-Turkish war, the three counties in the South of Basarabia will be incorporated in the Russian Empire), Petrograd asked Romania, on March 31/April 12, to sign a convention stipulating that the Russian troops were allowed to cross its territory. This was signed on April 4/16, Russia taking on the obligation to „maintain and respect the political rights of the country, in the way this results from the internal laws and the existing treaties, as well as to maintain and defend the present integrity of Romania.”<sup>1</sup>.

The economic and socio-political development of the Romanian state proved the anachronism of the Turkish suzerainty through the creation in the spring of 1877 of the favorable internal and external premises for its removal. Subsequently, in the Extraordinary Session of the Deputies Assembly on 9 May 1877, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mihail Kogălniceanu claimed that Romania broke any relations with the Sublime Porte and proclaimed the independence of the country – “The Assembly commits to paper the fact that the war between Romania and Turkey, the interruption of our relations with the Sublime Porte and the absolute state independence of Romania receive their official consecration”<sup>2</sup>.

The proclamation of independence did not necessarily mean the beginning of a close military cooperation between the Romanians and the Russians in the Balkans, due to the divergent positions of the involved actors. Bucharest, naturally, wanted to get involved in the conflict as an individual actor and to have a military contribution, with the view of obtaining a seat at the peace talks that were to end the imminent war. Subsequently, the Romanian leader, Carol I, negotiated both with the Grand Duke Nicolae and the Tsar Alexander II. The collaboration offers and the suggestion of giving its own base for military actions did not receive the expected answers, due to geopolitical reasons – the Tsarist Empire pursued the objective of assuming the whole merit of the presumed easy victory against the Ottoman Empire.

As a proof to this stands the diplomatic note received by the Romanian government on 17/29 of May 1877 from the Russian chancellor Gorceakov, in which it was written that “ (...) the Emperor does not invite

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<sup>1</sup> Gheorghe Platon, *Modern History of Romania*, Didactic and Pedagogical Publishing, Bucharest, 1985, p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> Costin Scorpan, *The History of Romania. Encyclopedia*, Nemira Publishing, Bucharest, 1997, p. 595.

Romania to cooperate across the Danube. But if the Romanian government would wish to undertake such an action at its own expenses, at its own risks and threats, this could not take place unless the condition of absolute unity of the superior command is met and this remains in the hands of the supreme command of the imperial army. *Russia does not need the contribution of the Romanian Army.* The forces that have been mobilized with the aim of combating the Turks are ample enough to accomplish this objective”<sup>3</sup>

Dominated by this atmosphere of enthusiasm, without having a real value for the military capabilities of the Porte (which started a decade ago a complex modernization process of the army, with the help of counselors and Western arms suppliers), Petersburg decides to launch the offensive in the South of the Danube, declaring war on the Ottoman Empire on 12/24 April 1877.

#### *Collecting raw intelligence – a priority for the Romanian military structures*

In 1877 Romania did not hold a numerous army, but through the mobilization that was ordered on 6/18 April of the same year, it significantly increased the number of its troops. The permanent and territorial army formed “the first line army”, the militia that were to be organized in **active corps** formed “the second line army”, and the civic guard were responsible for the protection of the cities. The mobilized army was young, the soldiers were mainly under the age of 30, and the total troops were made up of virtually 120.000 people. Among these, 58.700 formed the operative army, 30.000 the troops of the militia battalions, 16.000 the civic or city guards and virtually 5.000 horse and foot soldiers left to guard the border and maintain order<sup>4</sup>.

In the first phase of the conflict development, the units of the Romanian army were distributed, starting with April, in order to be able to respond to a possible attack against Calafat from the numerous Turkish troops that were concentrated in the area of Vidin and also to be able to reject any future advance of the Turkish troops from Giurgiu to Bucharest.

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<sup>3</sup> Gheorghe Platon, op. cit., p. 242.

<sup>4</sup> Romanian Academy, *History of the Romanians*, vol. VII, tome I, coord. Dan Berindei, Encyclopedia Publishing, Bucharest, 2003, p. 664.

The Turks, following the intensive bombardment launched by our artillery from Calafat, Oltenita, Izlaz, Bechet and Corabia, eventually relinquished the intention to initiate a military campaign on our national territory.

Given the fact that the national territory of Romania was threatened to become a theatre of war, the authorities within the Ministry of Interior responsible with the raw intelligence collection and counter espionage activities, in collaboration with the similar authorities belonging to the Ministry of War, intensified, during the winter and spring of 1877, their monitoring activities and their abilities to use human sources within the Turkish garrison on the right bank of the Danube. The safety measures adopted by the Romanian authorities regarding the expulsion of several Turkish secret agents, as well as the positioning of the Romanian military units along the river, had the effect of annihilating most of the Turkish espionage activities. The Turks relied on an espionage practice which involved getting raw intelligence by recruiting people that had the Austro-Hungarian, Greek or other citizenship and that were in Romania under legal cover. The counterespionage authorities became aware early of these new practices and therefore arrested numerous agents that were operating mostly in the ports from the Danube being under the cover of various traders, entrepreneurs or sailors<sup>5</sup>.

Due to their vigilance, the administrative authorities timely discovered and unveiled several acts of diversion created by the agents of the Turkish espionage, such as the attempts to destroy the telegraph network. The chiefs of the telegraph stations were forbidden to communicate to other people, except for the authorized ones, copies of the Romanian commanders' reports. During the crossing of the Danube by the Russian armies, all the post offices and telegraph stations from the Southern part of the country stopped any form of communication activity.

The necessity of adopting counteracting measures, in order to combat the espionage and sabotage actions initiated by the Turkish army, was emphasized in a telegram sent in May 1877 by the Ministry of War and addressed to all the military units that were situated in the proximity of the city Craiova. The military preparations and the massive influx of arms and ammunition reflected the necessity of building in the area a series of

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<sup>5</sup> Vasile Bobocescu, *Moments from the history of the Ministry of Interns*, vol. I, Ministry of Interns Publishing, Bucharest, 2000, p.69.



military storage facilities which had to be highly protected “in order not to risk falling in the hands of spies or audacious adventurers, who could set them on fire or destroy them - and this protection has to be made as thoroughly as possible given the fact that the enemy is using whatever means to accomplish his aim and the military and civil police are very weak, as they totally lack any means”<sup>6</sup>.

The need of an intense military intelligence collection strongly prevailed even from the moment when Alexandru Ioan Cuza created the United Principalities. He himself supported the creation of a military structure that would be connected to the events on the continent. Therefore, due to the fact that his priority was to have the military structures from Moldavia and Wallachia united in a single and unique entity, through the decree number 83 issued on 12/24 November 1859, he created the *General Staff of the United Principalities*, having among its most important duties “the execution of military technical workings and other missions that request special military knowledge”<sup>7</sup>.

This first General Staff of the Romanian army consisted of three sections; among these, the director of *Section II – topographic and geodesic projects*<sup>8</sup> was Sub-lieutenant Gheorghe Slăniceanu (he later became a general), and its deputy directors were the Sub-lieutenants Nicolae Dona, Constantin Barozzi and Ștefan Fălcoianu (officers who also, during the next decades, became generals and were named into important leading posts). Their main responsibilities, established by the normative act, referred to the elaboration of topographic, geodesic and statistical papers, collection and centralization of data and information necessary for the planning of tactical and strategic operations of the army and ensuring the most appropriate and safe movements of the military units<sup>9</sup>.

Section II was active until 1865, when the General Staff was dissolved and its administrative attributions were passed to Direction I within the Ministry of War<sup>10</sup>. Even though the first steps in this complex and

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<sup>6</sup> The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters*, Folder no.6/1877, File 82.

<sup>7</sup> „The Army Monitor” no 21 from 3 June 1860, p.322, apud Maria Georgescu, *The Creation of the General Staff (1859)*, in magazine „Folder”, no. 3(45)/2009, p. 2, <http://www.mapn.ro/smg/SIA/document1.html>

<sup>8</sup> Maria Georgescu, op. cit., p.3.

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>10</sup> Cristian Troncotă, *Romania and the Secret Front*, ELION Publishing, Bucharest, 2008, p. 23.



vital field of the modern war were taken, the activity of this structure was limited; nevertheless, the basis of the external military intelligence was created with the help of the officers that were sent to study abroad, especially in France and Belgium, and to observe the major conflicts on the continents or the American Civil War.

Based on the interest of having an efficient military structure, on 17 March 1877 the General Deposit of War was created, within which Section II was revived – its missions were to collect and process data about the enemy. Once the General Army Headquarters (*Marele Cartier General – MCG*)<sup>11</sup> was created, two sections from the General Deposit of War – *Map of Romania* and *Historical works* – became subordinated to this new structure. The officers from MCG responsible with the intelligence analysis and the elaboration of some specific synthesis papers regarding the Turkish army were Major Constantin Brătianu and Captain Constantin Căpităneanu from the Topographic Section.

Before starting the war, MCG edited a range of instructions referring to the way soldiers had to be aware of the positions and intentions of the enemy, in general of the capabilities of the Turkish troops established in the Southern Danube.

Two days after Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, on 14/26 April 1877, the Chief of the General Army Headquarters, Colonel Gheorghe Slăniceanu issued Decree Number 1, in which the emphasis was once more on the importance and the role of the military orders – which had to be precise, clear and concise - and on the necessity of knowing the condition and the power of the enemy<sup>12</sup>.

The Army Decree number 3, from 18 April 1877, requested that “the Commanders of the Army Corps and Active Divisions will submit to the General Army Headquarters the discoveries that resulted from the ordered reconnaissance missions and the information regarding the enemy’s position and movements and the topography of the area he occupies, according to the following instructions.”

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<sup>11</sup> The General Army Headquarters was created on 6/18 April 1877, having as its first chief Colonel Gheorghe Slăniceanu. During the War of Independence, the General Army Headquarters worked successively in Romania and Bulgaria, in Bucharest, Poiana, Craiova, Corabia, Verbița, Poradim and Lom Palanka.

<sup>12</sup> Alin Spănu, *Romania’s Secret Service during the First World War*, Military Publishing, Bucharest, 2012, p. 20.

“The map shared among the Corps is at a scale of 1/57600. The General Staff of the major units have the duty to rectify the differences noticed between the map and the reality. The special papers ordered by various commanders, concerning the recognition of the enemy as well as its positions and all sorts of resources, its artificial methods of defense or the obstacles it encounters, are to be conveyed to the General Army Headquarters every week”<sup>13</sup>.

As far as the necessity of intelligence collection regarding the Ottoman troops was concerned, *Article 3 – Information*, stated: “During rest, the security service of the troops will gather all the statements about the position of the enemy, its effective forces, its moral state and its projects, that were directly or indirectly conveyed.

These statements will be also sent to the General Army Headquarters when they are of immediate importance. In any other case, they will be safely kept in the archive of the army corps and divisions. The discoveries that are aimed at revealing the forces of the enemy and its battle orders and which are centered on transmitting the precise location of the enemy’s cavalry and artillery are to be immediately conveyed to the General Army Headquarters”<sup>14</sup>.

Further on, the General Army Headquarters emitted, on 4 July 1877, Decree Number 23<sup>15</sup>, which referred to the safety measures that were to be adopted by the units: establishing and resetting the military passwords, passing across the lines, reconnaissance missions accomplished on the enemy’s territory, the behavior towards the enemy’s negotiators, prisoners and defectors. “It is highly recommended to use the *intoxication of the enemy method*, which implies misleading the foes by releasing false information regarding the capabilities and intentions of the Romanian army. It is even possible to execute at times wrong movements so that the enemy would be deceived about our objectives, positions or capabilities”<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters. Army Corp II*, Folder no. 6/1877, File 25.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>15</sup> The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters. Brigade 1 Division 1 Cavalry*, Folder no. 7/1877, Files 27-29.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem

Decree Number 26<sup>17</sup> from 6 July 1877 described the actual methods that had to be used in order to collect raw intelligence about the enemy, except for the ones obtained through using human sources (soldiers participating in reconnaissance missions or patrolling). The document represented the most detailed version of such a record, having a paramount importance in a modern war. The value of obtaining real and correct information about the enemy was stated as following: “The bigger the importance of acquiring precise data, the more dangerous is to adjust future actions according to false or imprecise data. When we have even the most insignificant reason to doubt the data source, it is prudent to consider it useless. The main means, except for the missions of reconnaissance and patrols, resorted to with the view of acquiring news about the enemy during the military campaigns are:

1. Prisoners
2. Defectors
3. Local inhabitants
4. Spies
5. Various other indicators

Apart from these means, news can still be obtained through intercepting the letters and the telegraph messages or through controlling the latter ones by installing a telegraph system on the lines of the enemy’s telegraph.”

The interesting details were further described in the document, proving that the Romanian soldiers acknowledged based on the training they underwent in the country or abroad, the “art” of intelligence collection and the check on their veracity. In the case of war prisoners, strict procedures had to be respected within the questioning process, and this excluded the use of gratuitous violence to obtain the information requested by the commanders, because the objective was to have qualitative, not only quantitative data. As for the defectors, the situation was in general quite the contrary. They delivered a big amount of information with the aim of becoming useful; subsequently, each piece of information delivered had to be checked from several sources.

A special attention was paid to the spies that proved to be working on this double front. “Through spies we may obtain much news on the enemy, but using it may pose some difficulties, as anyone doing this job for

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<sup>17</sup> The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters. Brigade 1 Division 1 Cavalry*, Folder no. 7/1877, Files 33-34.

money cannot be a man of trust. They are chosen from the ones who can be least doubted [by the enemy<sup>18</sup>]: priests, traders and smugglers. Spies must have knowledge of the other spies, with the view of mutually checking their claims and words and even for facilitating their mutual supervising.”

*“There are often spies paid by both parties. These are by far the best, but to be able to efficiently use them, a lot of skill is required. On one hand, the more satisfying the reward should be, the better the news is; on the other hand, they have to be severely punished, in some cases even shot, the minute there is any evidence they are traitors<sup>19</sup>.”*

Further on, a description of other aspects that may be considered extremely useful for the Romanian commanders to be able to notice the changes in the Ottomans’ combat dispositions was given: “Apart from these means there are other indicators that can at least enable us to make some assumptions about the enemy’s movements and intentions. New clothes found on the battlefield show us the arrival of new troops. Dust risen by a column marching can indicate the direction of the march and even an approximate number of the troops that form that column; hence, if there is an infantry column, dust rises at a low height, but if there is a cavalry column dust touches much higher heights; if the column is compound of coaches, the height of the dust consequently changes, depending on the ground and soil. The direction of the troops can be judged based upon the shining of the arms, which is brighter if the enemy troops are approaching us and darker if they are withdrawing...”<sup>20</sup>

These general rules were at the disposal of the army before they started the military campaign in Bulgaria. They represented the ground foundation of the raw intelligence collection process regarding the Ottoman troops, based on which the Romanians generally managed to know both the enemy’s capabilities and plans.

An important issue is the necessity of having specially trained officers responsible for the interrogations of all the categories of people previously described, with the view of detecting “misleading information intentionally released” before it entered the informational fluxes established at the level of the army preparing for the siege of Plevna. These soldiers

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<sup>18</sup> Editor’s note

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem.

were asked to “try to guess, grasp and discover using all the means their intelligence and skill put at their disposal, the whole truth”<sup>21</sup>.

Beyond the obvious modern character of the instructions presented in the previously mentioned documents, the war experience also revealed the drawbacks that existed. Even though the need to adapt the intelligence collection activity to the battlefield conditions was precisely stated, the indications were later considered as being too general and applying to all types of war. Thus, there were not any requests about the fortifications, natural or artificial obstacles that existed on the enemy’s ground<sup>22</sup>, about the disguise of the hostile artillery and its real possibilities, the type of arms the enemy held and their characteristics (unfortunately these proved to be superior to initial estimates). People interrogated had to be asked precise, relevant questions in order to render valuable information, exploited at its maximum potential; as for this, unfortunately, the instructions of the General Army Headquarters notably lacked essential aspects, leading to the initial failures of the military hostilities.

### *Intelligence Contribution of the Romanian Army during the War of Independence*

After the several easy successes recorded on the Bulgarian front (May – July 1877), the situation became more complicated for the Russian expeditionary force once the intervention army led by Osman Pasha left the citadel of Vidin. At first, the Ottoman general intended to support Nicopole, but since this was conquered, he soon changed the direction of his march, heading towards Plevna. Realizing the strategic importance of the fortified system from Plevna, the wise Turkish commander transformed the simple citadel “from an accidental war position, as it was considered at the beginning by the Russians, in a strong moment citadel: the final and decisive objective of the campaign”<sup>23</sup>.

The military campaign suffered a dramatic turn for the Tsarist Russia, as it even had to take into consideration its prolongation (according

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<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> Paul Ștefănescu, *The history of Romanian secret services*, ANTET Publishing, Bucharest, 2007, p.25.

<sup>23</sup> Nicolae Densușianu, *The military history of the Romanian people*, Vestala Publishing, Bucharest, 2002, p. 403-404.

to the initial estimates, the Porte would have had to be defeated in maximum one month), the increase in human and resources cost, diplomatic complication etc. It is to be mentioned that the warnings issued by the Romanian reconnaissance units, which operated on the Bulgarian territory, were not taken into consideration by the imperial Russian command, even though they contained valuable information regarding Osman Pasha's movements. Hence, on 20 of June/2 July 1877, Prince Carol I wrote a letter to the Grand Duke Nicolae, the supreme commander of the Russian expeditionary troops in the Balkans, containing the following: "...I am duty-bound to let you have knowledge about news that we acquired from the Serbian elite, news that I here convey to you the way we received it, because nothing authorized us so far to reason upon its character of truth or lie: Osman Pasha would have left Vidin accompanied by 15 battalions and two batteries and he would have taken the path to Rahova",<sup>24</sup>.

The movement made by the Ottoman general radically changed the strategic situation of the Bulgarian front, due to the existence of a real threat for the Russian troops to be attacked on the flank and for Şiştov to be conquered. The place was essential because it harbored the most important bridge that ensured the link across the Danube between the Tsarist army and the Romanian territory; combined with the offensive led by general Gurko in the Balkans, the potential danger for the Tsarist troops to be forced retreat across the river existed, an action subsequently implying dramatic consequences for our country. Confronted with this critical situation, the imperial Russian command decided upon conquering the defensive system at Plevna.

The Ottoman garrison from Plevna occupied a special strategic position, as here there was a crossroad of important communication paths that were linking towns like Nicopol, Rusciuk, Sofia, Tirnovo or Filipopol. The natural frame was favorable for the defenders, because the terrain surrounding Plevna was mostly uneven, with successive hills of various heights that were hardening the attempts to attack the Turkish positions, with valleys and dales covered in rivers with or without water at that moment. Benefiting from the strategic errors of the Russian command, Osman Pasha, who was a very competent leader, immediately realized the fact that the location where Plevna was situated could rapidly change the course of the war – consequently, he ordered the preparation and

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<sup>24</sup> Ibidem.

fortification of this defensive system, respecting all the principles of modern engineering art, relying on 14 citadels, many of which were interconnected and had the possibility of mutually protecting themselves with artillery fire.

After the first failure of the Russian troops in front of Plevna (8/20 July 1877), even though no treaty of military collaboration had been formally sealed, the Romanian government, at the explicit request of the imperial command, agreed to take over the citadel Nicopole – which was already occupied – with the view of releasing the military units which were to participate in the second attack on Plevna.

Following the second defeat suffered at Plevna (18/30 July 1877), much heavier due to its losses and possible direct consequences, the Russian troops fled in panic, starting the chaotic retreat towards the bridge from Şiştov. The critical situation of the imperial army on the front in the Balkans determined the Sankt-Petersburg government to mobilize and send to war even the last troops it had at its disposal – the imperial guard – and to solicit the urgent participation of the Romanian army, the only one that, due to its vicinity to the front, could stop a possible Turkish attempt to surround the Russian units.

A dramatic aspect of the event is represented by the telegram sent by Grand Duke Nicolae, on 19/31 July 1877, to Prince Carol I: *“The Turks are crushing us by gathering a great mass of troops at Plevna. I entreat you to join forces, help and if possible, to cross the Danube with your army, as you wish. Between river Jiu and Corabia your intervention is urgently needed to facilitate our movements”*<sup>25</sup>.

The rest of the troops from the fourth Romanian Division were immediately sent there, because a possible defeat that Russia risked to suffer would have had dramatic consequences for Romania; the next month, following other pressing telegrams from Grand Duke Nicolae – from 9/21 and 19/31 August – and the negotiations held between the two governments and between Emperor Alexander I and Prince Carol I (16/28 and 17/29 August 1877), an important mass of Romanian soldiers crossed the river on 20 August/1 September using an improvised bridge established at Siliş toara, near Corabia, and adopted war positions in front of the fortifications at Plevna<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> *Memories of King Carol I*, volum III (1876 - 1877), Edited by Stelian Neagoe, Machiavelli Publishing, Bucharest, 1994, p. 191.

<sup>26</sup> Romanian Academy, *History of the Romanians*, vol. VII, tome I, p. 673.



At the negotiation table it was agreed that the Romanian and Russian troops dislocated at Plevna and forming the Western Army, were to be put under the command of Prince Carol I, seconded by the Russian general Zotov as the chief of the General Staff; the effective command of the Romanian army was given to general Alexandru Cernat, the Minister of War. The failures suffered obliged the Tsar to adopt a more responsible position within the relations with our country and to accept “the partnership of the Romanian army in the conditions of an allied army”, and the Romanian decision-makers were content only with the verbal statements and promises of the interlocutors, without pretending a “written” formal alliance, as it would have been normal, given the negative experience of our relations with Tsarist Russia<sup>27</sup>.

The rush with which the Russian command organized the third battle at Plevna, that took place on 30 August 1877 - also the name day of Tsar Alexander II - did not permit the Russian and Romanian military units to convey a full intelligence report upon the Ottoman defensive disposition. The insufficient information on the enemy had as a consequence the elaboration, by the operations and topography sections, of some battle strategic documents for 30 August/11 September 1877 using some imprecise data.

The third battle at Plevna clearly represented a failure, emphasizing the lack of experience of the imperial Russian command and the faulty way in which the action of the Romanian-Russian troops developed, in spite of the obvious heroism showed by the engaged units. Conquering and keeping citadel Grivița 1 was the only success of the action, definitely too insignificant compared to almost 20.000 Romanian and Russian soldiers that were hurt or died during one day of fighting<sup>28</sup>.

The important losses recorded in only a few hours convinced the supreme command that the defense system of Plevna was extremely powerful, cleverly organized, successfully using the advantages of the terrain and benefiting from artillery arms that were ensuring the execution of a dense artillery fire. Consequently, it was impossible to conquer the citadel through a general siege, but only by blocking and forcing Osman Pasha to surrender through hunger and disease; a prolonged siege started, continuing until December 1877 and representing an extremely valuable war experience that the young Romanian army gained.

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<sup>27</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>28</sup> John Henry Verrinder Crowe, *PLEVNA*, Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th Edition, vol. 21, pp. 838-840, <http://www.xenophon-mil.org/rushistory/battles/plevna2.htm>

Besides the insufficient human and material force of the Russo-Rumanian armies, in this third battle of Plevna another paramount factor of the defeat was represented by the lack of elementary information about the enemy: number, arms, fighting willingness, experience, the placement of the Ottoman citadels and fronts etc.

The incapacity to collect correct field information led the Romanian troops to a situation which endangered most of our units. Hence, following the evaluation made after the fight, General Gheorghe Anghelescu, the commander of the Infantry Division number 3, was accused of “absolute lack of initiative regarding the organization of the special reconnaissance missions”, and Major Iacob Lahovary, responsible for the field reconnaissance in front of Plevna, was severely criticized for his error, including by the national press. Major Lahovary defended himself insisting on the objective difficulties which did not permit him to identify the two citadels (Grivița 1 and Grivița 2) or the steep abyss that was lying in front of them<sup>29</sup>.

In order to make the siege of Plevna triumphant, the links of the people inside the citadel with the outside world had to be cut. This plan was accomplished through the actions developed under the command of the Russian General Gurko, who conquered on 12/24 October the Gorni Dubnic, situated in the South-West of Plevna, took 5000 prisoners and completed the surrounding plan of Plevna. During the same period, a Romanian Cavalry brigade occupied Gorni and Dolni Etropol; the conquest of Teliș, Dolni Dubnic, Crișin, Osicova, Vrața etc meant the accomplishment of the surrounding and isolation process of Plevna; any attempt to communicate with the outside was stopped. Due to a lack of external help, the fate of the surrounded army was sealed; Grand Duke Nicolae addressed an ultimatum on 31 October/12 November to Osman Pasha and asked him to surrender, but the request was rejected by the commander of the citadel under siege.

Consequently, measures were taken towards preparing the allied Russo-Romanian army (approximately 100.000 soldiers having 500 cannons) for the final battle and the conquest of Plevna. The entire perimeter of the surrounding, measuring 50 km, was divided in six sectors and the longest one was given to the Romanian units that were led by General Alexander Cernat<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>29</sup> Alin Spânu, op. cit., p.22.

<sup>30</sup> Romanian Academy, *History of the Romanians*, vol. VII, p.684.

To provide and protect the secret of its own battle action, rigorous measures were initiated in order to prevent data leaking to the enemy. The military gendarmerie and the clerks within the Minister of Interior, who were detached in the operations area, removed all the individuals suspected of espionage and living in the vicinity of Plevna, where military Romanian units were stationed, and ensured that there was no risk of information leaking in the press correspondents' telegraphic messages. Special attention was paid to the interception of Osman Pasha's agents sent on reconnaissance missions, hence many of his attempts to communicate with the Turkish commanders failed.

The interrogation of various types of people reaching the lines of the Romanian units was of extreme usefulness in the evaluation process of the capabilities held by the Ottoman army that was under siege at Plevna. Therefore, the documents elaborated on the Bulgarian front contained the interrogations of some Turkish Islamic defectors, Bulgarian peasants and small Christian traders who ran away from the Ottoman fortifications or who were taken prisoners during the battles. Next, we will follow the thread of this intelligence collection process, extremely useful due to the fact that it could also describe, of course with a dose of subjectivity, the "updated" picture of the situation of the Ottoman army led by General Osman Pasha.

In the interrogations of the Bulgarians Iordache Ghețov, Petrache Țacov and Christu Nicolof at the beginning of November 1877, they confessed they ran away from Plevna due to the harsh living conditions existing in the citadel at that moment. The General Army Headquarters established, as it was already presented, a set of standard questions that were applied to those subjected to the process of military intelligence collection. The interrogation started with the question – *What is your religion, where are you from and why did you defect from Plevna?* The Bulgarians who were interrogated answered "We are Christian inhabitants of Plevna and we ran away because if the Turks put their hands on us they make us work and they don't care we have been starving for three weeks."

*What is your knowledge about the Turkish army?* –We know the Turks were sheltering from the cannons and running from the citadels in the cities where they hid in the Bulgarians' houses; and the officers came in and beat them and threatened they would shoot them or take them on the front; at first they were boasting about having 100.000 soldiers, but now we have heard them saying they only have 20.000 able to fight, the rest being

wounded or ill; all the houses are full of injured and wounded people and the rest of us is sitting in cellars and outdoor.

*Do they have plenty of war munitions?* –For the guns there is enough, but for the cannons there is not much left; they took all the munitions out of the churches and put it outside the city, in holes dug in the ground.

*Do they have much food supply left?* –I have heard someone talk that there is enough for two weeks, but there are food stores only in some booth corners.

*Do they have much food for the cattle and how numerous are the cattle?* –They have big cattle, but they are dying of starvation as they have nothing to feed them.

*What have you heard about the Turks' intentions?* –We have heard that the officers were encouraging the troops by telling them new forces are coming from Sofia. Five Pashas from the Turkish command agree with the surrender, but Osman Pasha and two other Pashas do not want to surrender; and these Pashas never sleep together for fear not to be killed”<sup>31</sup>.

On the same line also subscribe the information delivered by other Bulgarians who fled from the authority of Osman Pasha. Subsequently, at the question “*What do you know about the Turkish army, what number is it compound of and in what condition is it?*” the Bulgarians who were subjected to the interrogations on 7 November 1877 declared: “...according to what we have seen and heard, they might be around 40-50 thousands, they are in a very bad condition, they are starving and are very ragged; before Plevna was closed, they were brought a few clothes which were taken by the most important ones”<sup>32</sup>. This number is also present in the interrogation taken to the Bulgarian Petru Nincu on 20 October 1877, who claimed having defected from Plevna due to very hard living conditions they had to suffer at that given moment. At the question concerning the size of the Turkish army in Plevna, he answered – “I have heard a rumor saying that they are around 50000 soldiers.”

The Romanian soldiers obtained very useful information by interrogating the fled Turkish defectors. In the report addressed to General Alexandru Cernat, the commander of the Operations Army, the interrogation

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<sup>31</sup>The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters*, Folder no.38/1877, Files 92-93.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, File 94.

taken on 5 November 1877 to Turkish soldier Osman Edifnizani, defector, was attached. It is mentioned that the soldier defected because of the starvation existing among the members of Osman Pasha's army; valuable data about the power of the enemy troops was also collected: "...the troops from Plevna that had around 4-500 people in a battalion at the beginning of August, now it has only 120-180 people per battalion, due to the losses suffered and the endemic diseases... The reserve troops that were to sustain the front are currently located in the bivouac, near Plevna. Only the mountain artillery has 3 horses or mules for each piece, used for transportation; the rest of the artillery does not have any horses"<sup>33</sup>.

During October-November 1877, the Romanian officers interrogated hundreds of Turkish soldiers, defectors or people caught during the battle confrontations. The corroboration of the data obtained from these people, belonging to various units, dislocated in different parts of the Ottoman defense system, created a picture very close to the reality that would come to light after the enemy's surrender, at the end of November.

The Romanian General Army Headquarters knew the defensive system from Plevna was about to collapse, due to the continuous bombardment of the hundreds of Russian and Romanian cannons – that eventually caused great damage – and due to the fact that it was defended by approximately 40-50.000 soldiers, most of whom were part of the infantry, whereas the rest of almost 1.500 troops were cavalry troops. As far as the arms are concerned, the rumors speculated a number of 80-100 cannons, having very little ammunition left – virtually 10-50 fires for each piece of artillery; on the other hand, the ammunition needed by the infantry was considered to be enough.

The same disheartening picture of the November 1877 situation is described by two Turkish officers, belonging to the encircled army and whose memories would be later published: "A circle of iron and fire was suffocating Plevna; the provisions were almost exhausted; even with reduced ratios, soldiers did not have enough food for more than 15 days. The mortality was substantially increasing. Plevna was becoming a large tomb, where, in dirt and anxiety, an army was dying, an army which has been completely separated from the rest of the world"<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Ibidem, files 98-99.

<sup>34</sup> Romanian Academy, *History of the Romanians*, op. cit., p. 683.

It was obvious that the situation could not continue that way and that the Ottoman General, lacking any external help, would try to break through the encirclement and find a path to Sofia; the number of defectors generated by starvation, diseases and cold was becoming a mass phenomena and was leading to the same result<sup>35</sup>. According to the documents from the archive, we emphasize the data delivered by the Turkish soldier Ahmet Mustafa from Battalion 1 Guard, on 20 November 1877, following his interrogation by the Romanian officers; after presenting the big picture of the situation of the army under siege, he says: **“The intention of the army is to leave towards Sofia as soon as the food provisions will be exhausted”**<sup>36</sup>.

Therefore, the Russo-Romanian command was able to timely prepare for the moment in which, due to cause despair, Osman Pasha would order the break of the encirclement regardless of the price. On 19 November/1 December 1877, the Turkish general, reaching the end of his resources, asked the allied command to allow him a free passage towards Sofia or Vidin, leaving in Plevna all the arms and munitions; the answer was that there was no possibility other than the unconditional surrender. The Turkish army tried to create for itself a path towards Sofia through fighting, but was forced to surrender on 28 November/10 December 1877, headed by its supreme commander, Osman Pasha.

The conquest of Plevna represented the end of the hardest stage of the war, the final victory being imminent after that. Further on, the mission of the Romanian army was to destroy the Ottoman troops concentrated in the North-West of Bulgaria, to ensure the back and the right flank of the Russian troops which were heading for Sofia.

The truce that was concluded on 19/31 January 1878 stipulated the occupation of several citadels and cities, our units taking over Vidin and Belogradcik; the surrender of these citadels to the Romanian army marked the end of the campaign started at the South of the Danube with the view of gaining recognition of the national independence; the campaign requested the effort of an entire society and the sacrifice of approximately 10.000 soldiers (dead, wounded or disappeared).

We cannot but remark the difficulties Romanian soldiers from the Bulgarian front had to confront, in particular the various situations that

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<sup>35</sup> The statement of another Turkish soldier, who deserted in October 1877, are also eloquent: „...if the encirclement is to last longer, almost all the soldiers will desert because they will totally lack food, and we have not received our pays for almost two years”.

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem, leaf 151.



appeared and that were requesting urgent energetic measures in order to stop their spread among the troops. From a report addressed to the Ministry of War Ion C. Brătianu (besides the position of Prime-Minister, he held this position too) by the General Direction of the Military Hospitals in Turnu-Măgurele, on 20 October 1877, the following can be extracted<sup>37</sup>: “From the last transportation of people from across the Danube, it could be observed that most of those injured, in particular those from the County of Teleorman, presented wounds with the following characteristic: injuries at the right hand showing the characteristic of a plague produced by a gun fire shot from a small distance. In the second series of injured, partial amputations of fingers made with a cutting weapon seemed to be prevalent. Our opinion is that these wounds were produced in a voluntarily manner, by people determined to end their military service.

The Medical Division from Turnu warns you, Mister Prime-Minister, about these facts, which can serve as a bad example and can be the starting point of the demoralization of the army; please convey to us what measures will you be taking regarding this matter”.

These desperate actions were caused, besides the personal motives invoked also by most of the deserters who were judged and condemned by the Courts Martial of the military units they belonged to<sup>38</sup>, by the very hard living conditions existing on the front, especially because a long and cold winter was beginning. The lack of material resources sent from the country to supply the soldiers from the active army, fighting in Bulgaria, becomes a serious problem; the higher body was sent numerous warnings regarding the reported deficiencies. In October 1877, the commander of the Active Battalion from Regiment 15 Dorobanți, through a telegram addressed to the superior structures, illustrated: “I have the honor to report we received 250 new recruits. These people are completely weak in instruction, lacking the campaign training. They did not even accomplish the shooting sessions.

We started the instruction with the processes of loading the weapons and taking aim and I will try to instruct them according to the minimum standards as soon as possible.

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<sup>37</sup> The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters*. Folder no. 11/1877, File 345.

<sup>38</sup> Regarding the proceedings instituted against the soldiers or defectors from the Romanian army during 1877-1878, more details can be obtained from the folders at the National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War, Structural part of the General Staff. The General Army Headquarters, Structural part Observation Corp etc.*



Their clothing is compound of old coats and shirts – most of which are ragged; they are wearing inappropriate shoes. The weapons are of small distance piece, which aims at most the distance of 400 meters. The battalion, as you may know, has only 2 front officers present...<sup>39</sup>

Beyond the great difficulties encountered, during this period, through considerable organizational and material efforts, a military system with an appropriate structure suitable for the situation in Romania was created. It was instructed and endowed according to the limited possibilities of the country, but, very important, it benefited from a high morale generated by the perspective of the fulfillment of the independence dream. “Only thanks to the original system – declared General Grigore Crăiniceanu in an official meeting of the Romanian Academy – the Romanian army was able in 1877 to ask the cooperation and alliance with the Russian army, instead of obedience, and then to enter the war and win those everlasting victories that offered us the independence of our country”<sup>40</sup>.

### **Conclusions**

Taking as a starting point the experience gained during the war of independence, the political and military authorities implemented major reforms concerning the leadership and management of the army, as well as the physiognomy of the military structures. Starting with the creation of the General Staff in 1882, the intelligence structure of the army acquired more coherence and stability and the intelligence activity entered a second stage of evolution based on the unity of intelligence and counter-intelligence structures. The High Royal Decree from 29 November 1882 transformed the General Staff in a permanent authority within the army, consisting of 3 principal sections: The First Section (*Staff, Mobilization and Tactical operations*), The Second Section (*Intelligence*) and the Third Section (*Communication and Transports*)<sup>41</sup>.

In 1884, on the grounds of the Decree No.158, the General Staff Regulation was approved; it also stated the internal regulatory framework of

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<sup>39</sup>The National Archives of Romania, *Fund: Ministry of War; Structural part of the General Staff. The Army General Headquarters*, Folder no.11/1877, leaf 349.

<sup>40</sup> Maria Georgescu, *Romania's Army during the reign of Carol I*, in *Military History Magazine*, no. 1-2/2008, p. 59.

<sup>41</sup> Cristian Troncotă, *Romania and the Secret Front*, ELION Publishing, Bucharest 2008, p.29.

the Second Section which, starting from 1897, changed its name into “Second Section - military statistics, study of foreign armies, intelligence, transports, telegraphy, operations and international matters” and was divided in two offices<sup>42</sup>.

Once the Superior War School was founded in 1889, there has been introduced a specialization course was introduced; in chapter VI the “Intelligence Service” was described. Analyzing the argumentations of this course, one would conclude the fact that the intelligence service had a main role in the management of war. Of significant importance was also the presentation of the means used to collect military intelligence, for instance: 1) maps and documents gathered on peace time; 2) documents found or taken from the enemy; 3) the interrogation of the local people, the prisoners or the defectors; 4) espionage on the enemy's territory in war and peace time; 5) cavalry intelligence; 6) reconnaissance missions made with the help of the military attaché; 7) topographic reconnaissance missions<sup>43</sup>.

The following decades proved to be of significant contribution for everything that future encompassed, starting from intelligence and counter intelligence activities to the conversion of the Romanian Army in a relatively modern structure that sets up accurate missions based on an effective internal infrastructure. 1883 came up with a fresh element in the military intelligence structures – the sending of the first Romanian military attaché on a mission to Berlin, Iacob Lahovari.

From a theoretical point of view, we may consider that there is a real connection to the evolution of the European intelligence structures; in reality though, the organization of a military intelligence service, suitable to the needs of the army, still encounters great difficulties due to a variety of not only objective and legal factors (the limited resources for instance), but also mental ones related to the military leaders.

The reform of the national security registered convolutions on a large scale as a result of the late nineteenth century's financial crisis. The Government's decisions were not as efficient as expected for many reasons, among which we can talk on one hand about the inefficiently assigned resources and on the other hand, about the inappropriate management of the funds together with the bad establishment of the real priorities in this area.

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<sup>42</sup> Lenuța Nicolescu, *Section II Information within the General Staff*, in “Folder” magazine, no. 2(6)/1999, p. 57, <http://www.mapn.ro/smg/SIA/document1.html>

<sup>43</sup> Cristian Troncotă, op. cit., p.29-30.

The next interwar Prime Minister, Gheorghe Tătărescu, stated that during that period “the improvement of the country's economical activity, its financial stability, seemed more important than the investments in the military field; the railway infrastructure was more necessary than the building of military barracks and the agriculture exports, more important than the arms imports.”<sup>44</sup>

In spite of all these efforts, the process of modernization proved to be too slow; as a proof stands the disastrous campaign from 1916, which was beyond the factors related to the relations between France, England and Russia. A trustful witness of those times, the future General, Radu R. Rosetti, sorrowfully stated that “most of the projects debated then remained, despite all the talks, only projects.” Moreover, even the army's chief Dumitru Iliescu admitted that “on 1 January 1914 the Romanian army lacked the most important things an army needed to start a war”<sup>45</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> Gheorghe Tătărescu, *Confessions for History*, Bucharest, 1996, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> *Romania during the First World War. Confessions from Documents*, vol. I, 1914 – 1916, Military Publishing, Bucharest, 1996, p. 217.

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