

ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE STUDIES REVIEW

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Intelligence

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Romanian territory, at the beginning of the XXth century

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Ethics of Nuclear Weapons and National Security Intelligence

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for Presentation to the International Ethics Section of the ISA,
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Introduction

From the beginning of the nuclear age there have been fears that we may have invented a weapon that will destroy us all. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who helped build the first fission bombs, commented often on this (1). Albert Einstein, whose letter to then President Franklin Roosevelt helped convince him to fund them, talked about the imperative to seek peace and new ways of thinking about everything as he neared death (2). Bertrand Russell coauthored a Manifesto with Einstein (and nine others) to warn the world that everything had changed (3). Yet thousands of thoughtful people still felt compelled by the urgencies of World War II to make nuclear weapons and to use two of them against other human beings. To end the war, they said to each other, and perhaps to show the Soviets who would be the big dog following.

But then what?

Another arms race had begun, and bigger, worse WMDs would be developed soon.

As soon as more than one nation had nuclear weapons, some strategy had to be conceived for their use. Mutual Assured Destruction was the main result, and millions learned the irony of a “MAD” strategy, where safety was to be assured by capabilities and declared will to destroy human civilization if we were frightened enough by any enemy. Those we terrified produced similar weapons and strategies. Herman Kahn and colleagues wrote books like “Thinking the Unthinkable” (4) to explain this theory to lay publics unanointed by the priesthood of nuclear physicists. Many nominally good people were hired to build thousands of nuclear warheads and delivery

systems. Thousands more were trained to use them to blow up half of the world if so ordered. Their reliability was tested relentlessly, to pull the trigger or push the button if so ordered, and our bureaucracies learned how to exclude anyone who might hesitate if their duty called. Our adversaries did the same. We shared the lethal technologies with some allies, as did they. And retired nuclear physicists started a magazine, called the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, to warn people basically not to do what they had done.

Later we invented modern biological weapons, ever so secretly, and a new community of biologists and doctors learned to sin like physicists¹. And chemical weapons were ‘improved’ by development of modern, binary nerve agents, and much more effective than old mustard gas, Zyklon B and such, despite strict prohibitions that were rationalized around. Scientists and intelligentsia pondered how we had wandered into this thicket of moral conundrums. Meanwhile we stumbled on, driven by something. One purpose of this paper is explaining that.

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the NPT of 1970

This paper assumes the reader has a general awareness of the history of nuclear weapons, of related arms control efforts and of the reasons and rationalizations associated with each. The core will be how and why national security intelligence cultures that study worst case scenarios daily almost inevitably abandon any concept of virtue ethics or deontological frameworks to arrive at utilitarian suicide scenarios like MAD implies. That occurs in the next section.

Here I will highlight two elements of the most important strategic decisions and treaties that seem essential for the educated reader to grasp how so many very intelligent, even brilliant men and some women went from deep commitments to protecting others to equally firm commitments to murder millions should the proper order be received. They still do today. It helps to recognize that weapons of mass destruction were not invented,

¹ “In some sort of crude sense, which no vulgarity, no humor, no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.” J. Robert Oppenheimer, in his Arthur D. Little Memorial lecture at MIT of November 25, 1947, “Physics in the Contemporary World.” Biologists have since learned that no matter what “mainstream” biologists proclaim in ethical manifestos, if a government wants to hire someone to work on bioweapons, they will find employees who, once in their top-secret, security cleared cocoons, will do their jobs.

perfected, built or used by people who were intrinsically evil. WMDs were invented, built and used by people who thought they were doing a good thing for their communities. One key word in this process is “bureaucracy” and another is “propaganda” especially internal propaganda.

Wikipedia tells us that “The strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction and the acronym MAD are due to John von Neumann (1902–1957), who had a taste for humorous acronyms. ... He was, among other things, the inventor of game theory, a cold war strategist, and chairman of the ICBM Committee until his death in 1957.” Game theory is a branch of mathematics fused with ideas about human behavior, and it is very useful in various areas. It also has two embedded assumptions that are the equivalents of Achilles’ heels.

The first is that people are “rational actors” and will mostly make “rational” decisions (a.k.a. rational according to the mathematician, physicist or economist positing this). This is called the “rational actor assumption.” The problem here is that the concept “rational” varies dramatically across cultures and time, and whatever your concept of rational is, it often degrades under the intense pressures of international crises (5). Besides which, no matter how nice and rational your king or commanders are today, they can go nuts over time or under pressure, both of which have occurred many times in human history. Statistics assure us that if even a tiny probability exists for general thermonuclear war and the paradigm does not change, then it will eventually occur. What is rational about wiring the world for self-destruction on that day?

The second big assumption in MAD theory is that people make all the relevant decisions in this system. Partly true, but not 100%. Many computers are involved in “decision support” during nuclear crises, because the minutes available for a life-or-death-for-the-world decision are very few. Computers make mistakes even if their programmers have been perfect which they never are. Furthermore many of those machines attached to nuclear systems, early warning, and decision support were made decades ago. More important, bureaucracies decide who sits in missile silos or has their hand on nuclear triggers in submarines and such. Bureaucracies have no morals, and national security bureaucracies in particular are afraid of people with deep objections to war, including nuclear holocaust. So they get rid of such people by forbidding their entry into the cloistered worlds of high security clearances (6). Thus isolated, the morally blind then think that they see brilliantly. Finally, corporations are involved, and they respond to one thing only.

One rational response to a world where hegemony has nuclear weapons and are almost constantly waging wars against somebody (a.k.a. the world today) is for smaller nations to get nuclear weapons of their own to avoid becoming targets. Yet today a vast majority of Americans consider Iran and especially North Korea to be literally insane for seeking nuclear weapons (the latter) or weapons capability (the former). Both have been threatened many times by nuclear powers, yet both are condemned for responding in kind by people who have nuclear weapons of their own they would not give up to get into heaven.

The architect of the policy of “containment” so essential to the ability of the Soviet Union to break up without blowing up was George Kennan of the U. S. State Department. On retirement he contemplated these dilemmas very deeply, and he wrote a forward to another deep thinker’s book called “The Pathologies of Power” (7, 1987). Kennan wrote:

“All of these men [Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, General Douglas MacArthur and President Dwight Eisenhower] perceived the suicidal quality of the nuclear weapon and the danger in allowing it to become the basis of defense postures and the object of international competition. All of them spoke with a great sense of urgency. All went to their deaths hoping, surely, that their warnings would not fall on deaf ears and that a new generation of leaders would recognize that we were all living in a world of new political-strategic realities and would draw the necessary conclusions.

Unfortunately, this has not happened. For thirty years past these warning voices have been disregarded in every conceivable respect. There has been no new mindset. There has been no recognition of the revolutionary uniqueness of the weapons of mass destruction, no recognition of their sterility as weapons, no recognition of the dangers of their unlimited development. On the contrary, the nuclear explosive has come to be treated as just another weapon, vastly superior to others, of course, in the capacity for indiscriminate destruction, but subject to the same rules and conventions that had governed conventional weaponry and its uses in past ages. The suicidal quality of these devices has been ignored.”

What Kennan knew but did not write here is that tons of money was being made by bureaucracies and companies building, storing and managing such weapons. Bureaucracies and corporations feed on money not morality. Moral people inside or outside can say whatever they like, but all that talk will have less impact on a bureaucracy or company than budget decisions.

Mindful of such dilemmas, international leaders created a Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 1970 (8). More countries have ratified this treaty (190) than any other arms limitation or disarmament agreement, a testament to its significance. On the other hand, some of the most important nuclear weapons states are not members of the NPT, and the biggest nuclear powers are in clear violation of it. The essential deal was that non-nuclear weapons states would forego building these WMDs in return for help developing nuclear power and a pledge from the nuclear weapons nations to work diligently toward a world without nuclear weapons at all. That part is called Article 6, and we are nowhere near zero nukes 43 years later, which is a big reason why countries like Iran and North Korea are saying forget you pious hypocrites; we're building weapons or capability too.

The Lens of National Security Intelligence and Worst Case Scenarios

National security intelligence organizations do many things, but job #1 is always protecting the government that sponsors them against enemies foreign and domestic, however that may be phrased. This requires sober assessments of the worst things that could happen to a country or a government. History provides many examples of governments that are not here anymore (and even a few whole peoples) because intelligence systems failed at this main task.

Focusing attention every day on the very worst things people can do to each other puts a strain on anyone. Topics can be depressing, responsibilities are great, and workloads heavy. No one wants to be surprised by a new weapon or enemy. But enemies can be masters of deception, and one thing you can count on is that they will be trying to penetrate your organization. So secrecy is the norm, and half of your security officers may be looking for the spy within (9).

Weapons of mass destruction in general and nuclear weapons in particular raise the possibility that small states, or even an individual angry or ideologically committed man, could wreck great havoc on the nations that security officers are determined to protect. So a common way of preparing or training officers is to study worst case scenarios *ad nauseum*, and to assume that anyone, anyone at all might be a spy with deadly capabilities. That dent's mental tranquility.

An example is the “ticking time bomb” category of moral dilemmas, much used in the training of intelligence officers. A common version goes like this: Assume you have caught a terrorist who has planted a nuclear weapon somewhere in your city. It is set to go off soon, but you have some time to interrogate him or her. Do you torture them to try to find out where the bomb is so that it can be defused?

Extreme cases like that often cause people to throw out rulebooks of restraints on the grounds that all those innocents who might die otherwise deserve to be protected “by any means necessary.” This is independent of the utility or disutility of torture as an interrogation technique (it is not very good). When you throw out the rulebook you have thrown out deontological ethics, and much or all of international law (10). Even the meaning of “virtue” can be transformed, as when the virtues of restraint and prudence among warriors are overcome by virtues of “courage” to face “hard choices” where the sacrifice of innocents is too often allowed to serve some allegedly greater good. In fact, all you are left with is law of the jungle or act utilitarian ethics that can be used to justify anything if your scenario is extreme enough.

Further complicating things is the verifiable fact that security clearance systems keep out people so moral they would never agree to keep any secret no matter how vile. When agencies ask you to keep secrets, they don’t say only some. Gentle folk who decline to promise to keep every secret, even evil ones will not be on any analysis team looking for enemies or operations squad waiting for targets to capture or kill. Compartmentalization enables evil especially well.

The people who remain “cleared” will focus on their positive duties to protect their own (colleagues and sponsors, mothers and children, friends and country). All are at risk to WMDs. And “terrorists” with WMDs are alleged to be extra-special scary since they don’t wear uniforms and are allegedly as single-minded about killing you as you can become about killing them.

Such environments are extremely conducive to organizational paranoia and a long list of other failures. One of the most frequent concerns I have heard in over 25 years of studying spies has been not to forget the many very good people who enter such systems and work honestly, diligently, and as ethically as they are allowed to serve real goods – like the safety of their countries and their peoples. Such sources are almost always

frustrated with dysfunctions in their systems, but remain loyal to the causes that led them to enter the world of espionage. Therefore I will spend some space here reviewing a sampler of their memoirs, both critical and nostalgic.

Because there are hundreds of intelligence agencies on earth, a comparative review is impractical in this space although we have done some for special issues of “Intelligence and National Security” among others (11). So we will focus on the CIA here. We begin with insider memoirs that are critical, followed by memoirs that are mainly supportive, followed by a few scathing critiques from outsiders who took time to really understand their topics.

“Ishmael Jones” (an alias) wrote “The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture” in 2008, updated 2010, to explain how getting around the bureaucracy was essential to him becoming one of their most productive case officers (12). “Anonymous” (now known to be Michael Scheuer from the Bin Laden desk at CIA) wrote “Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror” in 2004 (13) to explain how the bureaucracy frustrated actually getting Osama Bin Laden, their principal target. We have been assured that Bin Laden was actually killed in 2011 (without, I must note, any forensic evidence presented to external critics) but Scheuer maintains that he could have been killed or captured many years earlier. External critics point out that Bin Laden was worth many billions every year to the institutions seeking him so long as he was alive and free. 2004 also brought us “Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA from Iran-Contra to 9/11” (14) by Melissa Mahle (a career case officer focused on Middle East nations) to “highlight what is for many, the greatest political scandal of a generation: the failure of the U. S. intelligence community to combat the threat posed by Islamic extremists and prevent the 9/11 attacks.” Her book was redacted while in press by the CIA Publications Review Board, after already reviewed and approved, and Mahle was prevented from giving a speech at a conference on ethics for spies where I met her in 2006. Another career officer who became the Chief of the Moscow station, Burton Gerber, was allowed to speak and co-edited a more academic review of dysfunctions and possible fixes in 2005 with Jennifer Sims from Georgetown, “Transforming U.S. Intelligence” (15). Robert Baer, the career CIA officer whom the movie “Syriana” was modeled on, wrote “Sleeping With the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude” in 2003 (16). As noted before, none of these people are enemies of the US, of the CIA, or of espionage as a profession. They want to improve the

profession by injecting some ethics into it, and reducing the pervasive dysfunctions of the organizations they know quite well. As noted earlier (5) it turns out that the bureaucracies are at the very least allergic to genuine ethics if not outright hostile to them (17).

Long before these authors the former Chief of CIA's Angola Task Force wrote "In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story" in 1978, where he described how the CIA was tasked to destabilize Angola in preparation for the next war (18). And the "first book that the U.S. government ever went to court to censor before publication" (*The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*) may have been the most insightful. This was written in 1974 by Vincent Marchetti (who rose to be executive assistant to the Deputy Director of CIA) and John Marks from the State Department's intelligence bureau (19). Their point was simple but powerful: something in the intelligence world had cult-like qualities, and induced cult-like behaviors among people who stayed there. I will simplify that here by asserting that an obsession with secrecy and deep fears of actual ethics among the bureaucracies are the core dysfunctions that enable all the others.

Now for some more positive memoirs. As one might expect, Directors of agencies have more positive views of their decisions under difficult circumstances and of compromises they "must" make with the political leaders who ultimately are their bosses and control their budgets. George Tenet provides a good example of that genre, in "At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA" published in 2007 (20). He saw little wrong that needs fixing; maybe a tweak or two here and there, despite his most notorious failures, 9/11 and the WMD fiasco in Iraq. William Odom, former Army General and then Director of the National Security Agency saw lots to improve but was still fundamentally supportive of the U.S. intelligence community in "Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America" in 1997 (21). And two books from 2004 present views on how to improve things from two career CIA officers, William Daugherty who was held hostage in Iran for over a year in 1979-80 ("Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency," 22) and Arthur Hulnick who served the CIA as both an analyst and an operator for 40 years and before that was an Air Force intelligence officer ("Keeping us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland Security," 23). From 2012 come "The Art of Intelligence: Lessons Learned from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service" by Henry A. Crumpton (24) who organized the fantastically successful takedown of Afghanistan by CIA and U.S. Special Forces, and "Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives" by Jose A. Rodriguez Jr. (who led the agency's descent into depravity by using torture

instead of better methods of interrogation, and seducing 54 other nations on earth to help in various ways, 25).

“Politicization” of intelligence is a recurring problem that all of these authors have seen and many have rebelled against. This basically means when political leaders cause intelligence assessments to be altered to conform to their own desires or prejudices. That can lead to horrible consequences (as when top leaders want to attack someone regardless of facts, or go insane and drive their countries into disaster or destruction in other ways). So all responsible intelligence schools teach analysts to avoid such politicization ... if they can! The core problem is that leaders or their policy staff can often fire the analysts, or just ignore the ones they don’t like in favor of those who tell them what they want to hear (the sycophant problem). So I will mention here two exceptional books that try to address politicization, Joshua Rovner’s “Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence” from 2011 (26) and Robert David Steele’s 2000 work, “On Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World” (27). Steele was a persistent proponent of better use of open sources, and a critic of bureaucratic idiocies, which earned him many enemies among former Marine and CIA colleagues. As you might infer, politicization and protection of budgets is a big problem everywhere. The informal Dean of positive responses to horrible, complicated problems in this domain is probably Loch Johnson whose 2012 book “National Security Intelligence” should be required reading for all young officers-to-be (28). Johnson is a genuine world expert on oversight, and thinks it works better than I do.

Remember, all of these books cited from 11-26 were written by people with very high security clearances who spent years and usually decades working for U. S. intelligence agencies, or in Johnson’s case for the U. S. Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee (he is now an emeritus professor at the University of Georgia and senior editor of “Intelligence and National Security”). Now a word or two from critics less constrained.

“The CIA: A Forgotten History” by William Blum, 1986, listed U. S. interventions since World War II with an emphasis on covert wars and coups sponsored secretly by the CIA. It is NOT recommended to young agency officers-in-training (29). “The ‘Terrorism’ Industry” by Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan (1989, 30) lays out how the Western media were co-opted into supporting such foreign adventures, and cooperating in cover-ups regarding who was really responsible. “Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency” by James Bamford, (2001, 31) showed how the other behemoth of America’s now 17 intelligence

agencies was involved in such operations. But his book could not show how the NSA would morph after September 11, 2001 into an agency that routinely intercepts and inspects most communications coming into and out of the U.S.A. and a significant fraction of all domestic traffic also. These are split off from telecom company routers and run through supercomputers searching for people saying naughty things. But how would have to wait for a two year Washington Post investigation called “Top Secret America” by its lead author Dana Priest (32). Frank Rich’s 2006 expose, “The Greatest Story Ever SOLD: The Decline and Fall of Truth in Bush’s America” (33) proves beyond shadow of doubt that the second war against Iraq, begun March 19, 2003, was promoted by flagrantly false and sometime outright fraudulent “intelligence” (making this an international war crime). And finally, another career New York Times reporter and Pulitzer Prize Winner Tim Weiner wrote “Legacy of Ashes: the History of the CIA” in 2007 (34). Taken together, these expose’s incinerate the public relations picture of American intelligence which explains why the wall of “national security secrecy” is so essential to the continued budgets of at least the CIA if not the entire U.S. intelligence community which becomes complicit in the murder of innocents when things go really bad. But what about all those good people who enter these dysfunctional systems trying to protect their neighbors from evil abroad?

Well it is very hard on them to be blunt. Not as hard on them as on the people they help to kill, but hard nonetheless. If they retain their consciences, which is difficult if you stay inside too long and use “tradedcraft” that has other unhealthy consequences, they suffer astronomic rates of alcoholism and divorce, for example. But this is an essay on the ethics of weapons of mass destruction, so we will return to that focus having established some critical constraints on the institutions that tell U.S. Presidents who to target with nuclear or other “special” weapons.

Iran, Israel, North Korea and the U.S.A. in 2013 as illustrative cases

The hottest issues on America’s nuclear security agenda these days are what to do about North Korea (which has a few very primitive nukes, but limited means to deploy them) and Iran (which almost certainly does not have any actual nuclear weapons, and cannot for years, but does have much better missiles than North Korea, and connections with angry people who know how to smuggle things). Regardless of dysfunctions, lack of ethics or any other problems, it will be up to America’s intelligence community to

inform our national security commands what Iran and North Korea are up to in every respect, and to recommend options for action if asked.

Vastly complicated this is our very close ally Israel, which has many more and much better nuclear weapons and delivery systems than either Iran or North Korea, partly because they stole the necessary material from America back in 1968 (another story, best left untold here). Israel is also one of the nuclear nations that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, so it is harder to determine exactly what their capabilities are. Their intentions are pretty clear – they feel surrounded by enemies and are haunted by the Holocaust (Shoah) so they are determined to avoid genocide, and have worst cases on their minds all the time. Israel also has one of the highest quality human intelligence organizations in the world in the MOSSAD, which is understandably focused on declared enemies like Iran. We depend on them for much of our human intelligence in that area, which makes America vulnerable to manipulation, a common problem with liaison relationships in intelligence. Iran knows that Israel could turn it into bubbling glass if frightened enough, which probably has something to do with the desire among ‘hard liners’ in Iran for similar weapons. It is MAD squared there.

Iran’s top Ayatollah (and supreme leader) Ali Khamenei, has often said that nuclear weapons are immoral and therefore not allowed by Islamic law. But current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad foams at the mouth about Israel often enough to scare anyone who listens. Those who live in the “worst case scenario” world must assume that Iran could have nuclear weapons soon even if they don’t now, and that even if the chief preacher says it’s sinful, some generals might have other plans. Plus who knows the future? Worst case analysis assumes worst cases, and WMDs bring out the worst in everyone. We will presume here that you are familiar with the charming reputation of North Korea among its neighbors, and the legacy of dictators leading to the current Kim Jung Un. He may be a breath of fresh air compared to his grandfather and father; we shall see. But it should be noted that third generation dictators tend to be shaky and unpredictable compared with the ones who built their starving nation, perhaps the most brutal police state on earth today. As in each of the other three countries, dear leader Kim must also contend with secret powers behind his throne that can be as evil as anyone publicly visible.

What is a U.S. President to do with this conundrum?

A genuine and certified moral leader, the Nobel Peace Prize winning Rev. Desmond Tutu of South Africa says clearly “We cannot intimidate others into behaving well when we ourselves are misbehaving. Yet that is precisely what nations armed with nuclear weapons hope to do by censuring North Korea for its nuclear tests and sounding alarm bells over Iran’s pursuit of enriched uranium. According to their logic, a select few nations can ensure the security of all by having the capacity to destroy all. Until we overcome this double standard – until we accept that nuclear weapons are abhorrent and a grave danger no matter who possesses them – we are unlikely to make meaningful progress in halting the spread of these monstrous devices, let alone banishing them from national arsenals” (35).

Unfortunately, national security intelligence professionals are notoriously indifferent to what preachers say, no matter how many medals they have. They’re not “cleared” so presumably don’t know much. So we might turn to a former CIA counter-proliferation case officer Valerie Plame Wilson, who wrote on the same day: “Twenty-five years ago, President Reagan laid out a vision for a world without nuclear weapons, and in his first term President Obama boldly picked up that mantle - most famously in his 2009 speech in Prague, where he announced America’s commitment to eliminate all nuclear weapons globally. There is now a unique opportunity for President Obama, in his second term, to follow through on that commitment and set the world’s course to global zero. He can do this by pursuing further reductions to the United States’ and Russia’s massive Cold War arsenals and bringing other key countries to the table for the first multilateral nuclear arms negotiations in history.” The “Global Zero” campaign Ms. Wilson is supporting “includes a letter to the president from approximately 75 former prime ministers, foreign and defense ministers and military commanders; an official declaration recently adopted by the European Parliament in support of Global Zero’s step-by-step plan to eliminate nuclear weapons; and a grassroots petition appealing directly to the president” (36).

So their view is clear – Get rid of the evil things. But could a nation as terrified as Israel ever possibly be persuaded to “get rid of” its most powerful weapons? And what about the U.S.A. which invented them? We can’t put a leash on handguns here, much less WMDs. People love them (many people anyway). There seems to be a genuine paradox at play, where the most powerful are the most reluctant to part with weapons, even while

they insist that others around them do. In fact, the most powerful often appear to be the most paranoid as well if you read and listen to what they say. There are few consensuses in this arena, but most observers would agree that if anyone is going to “give up” nuclear weapons, it will have to be everyone, accomplished very slowly, with the most extensive oversight that people can create. The Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty would be a good case to contemplate for guidance on that.

It bears recollection that several countries actually have possessed nuclear weapons yet deliberately got rid of them when wisdom dawned. South Africa had six, or so, and Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine had hundreds each, but were persuaded to turn them over to the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union unraveled. None of those nations was subsequently destroyed.

What is true for nuclear weapons has parallels among chemical and biological weapons. Each is attractive to the worst case mind, and to those who need “enemies” for various reasons. But substantial restraints have been put on all these WMDs when larger publics that sponsored them woke up to the catastrophic consequences should they ever be used. They had to wake up, and they had to penetrate the secrecy barriers that enabled those who need enemies to create and stockpile them. Then they had to defund those projects, because one thing projects all need is money. Remember, bureaucracies and corporations respond far more to money than to any moral logic or words.

Conclusions

Bureaucracies are intrinsically immoral, seek mainly money and power, and intelligence bureaucracies are dramatically immoral because they think they are essential to their countries and governments. That hubris is only sometimes true. Bureaucracies also produce propaganda to justify both their budgets and their missions. Internal propaganda is at least as important as external, to keep employees working hard without excessive reflection. A paradox easily seen by outsiders but invisible to insiders blinded by their security rules and internal propaganda is that intelligence systems would work better if they adopted real moral codes appropriate to professionals and learned how to deal with such constraints prudently. The bureaucracies want obedience, period. Weapons of mass destruction highlight these characteristics vividly

because they are so grotesquely indiscriminate, immoral, wasteful, and some would say evil incarnate. Fear of WMDs is used to justify every other bad thing that intelligence agencies do.

All this is prelude to the key questions about nuclear weapons, and we don't want to neglect chemical and biological weapons completely. After reflection it seems the key nuclear questions are: Should anyone have them and if so when might they be morally used? How do we get from the current condition of proliferation of both weapons and fear? And how do chemical and biological conundrums compare with the nuclear dilemmas?

As George Kennan (among many others) noted, an actual, general thermonuclear war would kill billions of people and end civilization as we know it for sure. Furthermore, their destruction is so indiscriminate and unproportional to most conceivable threats that any use is likely to kill thousands of innocents along with alleged bad guys. So they are NOT just big conventional weapons. Detering use by others has a strong surface plausibility, but continued proliferation to new and crazier entities like North Korea highlights the statistical reality that if you keep such a system forever someone is going to break the taboo and use them against others.

The paranoid will cling to them obsessively, and they will have a strong retort. Why should they not cling to deterrent nuclear weapons when all the major powers do?

There is exactly one possible moral use for nuclear weapons which is to protect the whole planet from errant asteroids or other threats from off-planet, where a detonation would not risk innocents here or the rapid escalation to general war that most Pentagon war games encounter when they practice "limited" nuclear war scenarios. Is it possible for someone to maintain a modest arsenal for planetary protection without risking the planet itself to partisan feuds?

That is a difficult challenge given the realities of geopolitics and the proven tendency of governments to become corrupt and abandon their ideal functional purposes (37). Furthermore, as Lord Acton noted most eloquently, secret power is especially prone to rapid degeneration into evil forms.² Nuclear weapons bureaucracies are notoriously as secret as any due

² Most are familiar with Lord Acton's observation that power corrupts and that absolute power corrupts absolutely. At least as relevant for secret power systems like intelligence agencies and nuclear bureaucracies is: "Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice; nothing is safe that does not show how it can bear discussion and

to the obvious fear that nuclear weapons designs or materials might get into “the wrong hands” which ends up being code for “anyone’s hands but our Generals’ who are now Emperors of the Universe.”

Because of these conundrums a modest movement has arisen to urge governments to go back to the promises of the NPT and actually reduce existing nuclear weapons arsenals to ZERO excepting only a few perhaps in the hands of some new, dedicated and international entity tasked with planetary protection only. That would necessarily require actual non-proliferation to new weapons powers like North Korea, Iran or anyone else. That would necessarily require addition of Israel to the planetary WMD consensus, which would necessarily require a better resolution to the conflict with Palestinians than expulsion from the occupied territories or genocide which is the current trajectory. This is at best a long-term project, but since the alternative is civilizational suicide I suggest the relevant parties begin soon. It took decades to get here so expect decades of work ahead to walk ever so carefully out of the death ground to which we have come.

What about chemical and biological weapons, the other current WMDs, and exotic new weapons emerging like the cyber warfare crowd is working on? Here the history of arms control efforts is more encouraging. Despite many deaths and continuing chemical weapons arsenals, the long term international arms control regime appears to be working. Arsenals are declining (over 70% worldwide). By far the largest remaining are Russian and American, but both are being destroyed under careful international supervision. Dictators like Saddam Hussein who used them against neighbors at war (Iran) and even murdered ~ 5,000 of his own citizens in Halabja, Iraq on March 16, 1988 are now dead and their arsenals are really gone (38).

The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 created an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with headquarters at The Hague, Netherlands with a good track record of surveillance and eventual intervention by state parties. So their utopian goal to “eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction” using unique features like mandatory “challenge inspections” of suspect sites are worth considering in

publicity.” Found in a letter of January 23, 1861, published in *Lord Acton and his Circle*, Letter 74, edited by Abbot Gasquet, 1906. This suggests for this discussion that whatever institutions might be created to manage nuclear weapons for planetary protection should be far more transparent than bureaucracies ever want to be.

detail <http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/>. Once again, just because this group has a right under international law to inspect does not mean that countries like North Korea, Syria or Israel are actually going to allow inspector's access today, but the long term trends are positive. Meanwhile, the really big chemical weapons powers are actually destroying their arsenals as noted above, with rigorous observation by international parties that actually can look into any bunkers they want to. So an international consensus emerging after World War I in Europe, led to the Geneva Conventions, then the Chemical Weapons Convention, then to physical organizations staffed by real experts who are slowing accomplishing their goal of eradicating this class of WMD.

Biological weapons have killed far fewer people than either of the other categories, but are also more frightening than chemical weapons because in theory they could kill just about everyone. There is something about creating bugs that could kill everyone that seems to resonate more deeply with the moral core of scientists, soldiers and the people who support both, such that men who could order the deaths of million by nuclear weapons (or bombs and bullets) are often morally offended by the idea of biological weapons. It may help that the scientists required are "life scientists" who generally get their Ph.D.'s after long dedication to life affirming things.

One oddity bears reflection. Five Americans were killed by weaponized anthrax in 2001, that appeared a week after the famous events of September 11. Dozens of others were wounded but not killed. Who exactly did this why remains in dispute, but there is little doubt that the anthrax came from the US biological weapons labs at USAMRID (US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Offensive weapons research at its predecessor US Army Biological Warfare Laboratories (USBWL) was officially shut down in 1969 anticipating ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention. But it is the same base, the same buildings, the same basic equipment and many of the same people were involved in both programs. Finally, "defensive research" which is allowed by the Convention requires some "offensive" biological agents to do the defensive research. So suspicion has never ended that other things may occur in such secret laboratories, as happened when the Soviets created tons of anthrax/smallpox "cocktail" weapons that should scare anyone. And that was 30 years ago. I am a geneticist; believe me,

recombinant DNA and other methods have come a long way since then. So I say, never forget that these are all bureaucracies, ergo immoral, but that they are staffed by people who have actual consciences. Appeal to them and those so that the children may survive.

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Homology, Analogy and Cybernetics ideas could help the counter-terrorism effort

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Abstract

Much of the success in law enforcement can be attributed to data gathering and its analysis. While many a plot has been foiled by detective work using clues gathered from observations, some of the elements of this detective work can be formalized from concepts that are commonplace in Biology and in Darwin's theory of evolution. We establish these connections to Biology and introduce the reader to another principle that arose in the old Cybernetics movement, arguing their applicability to criminology, and clarifying the ideas so as to guide research in this fruitful area that might benefit crime prevention theory and practice.

Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, intelligence analysis, interdisciplinary study.

The nature of terrorism and counter-terrorism

The struggle between a terrorist attack and its counter-terrorist defenses reminds us of an example from Nature. It is the co-evolution between changes to the long bill in the oystercatcher and the flexible ligament that joins the left to the right valve in the bivalve mollusk (see Figure 1). To win its lunch, the oystercatcher must only marginally improve upon its bill overcoming a much bigger evolutionary improvement in the ligament of the mollusk.



Figure 1 – Oystercatcher opening a bivalve mollusk

The terrorist attack is like an oyster catcher's bill and its counter-terrorist defence is like the ligament of the bivalve mollusk! While a terrorist can manufacture an IED using widely available technology, it requires an enormous amount of effort, thinking, and advanced technology to design a personnel carrier capable of ensuring personnel safety against an IED explosion. Insurgents can use existing and commonplace technology: mobile phone, Internet, homemade explosives, but the defensive technology of counter-terrorism is necessarily orders of magnitude more involved and it is often leading edge technology. The defence, however, rarely stops the attack and then it often fails to sufficiently mitigate its effects. It remains extremely difficult and costly to defend against bombing campaigns, orchestrated hit and run militia activities, misinformation campaigns, and cyber attacks. At best, we can try to contain these attacks and decrease their frequency.

The value of Intelligence Analysis

Faced with this less than favourable situation, counter-terrorism activity has historically relied on the chance, induced, or coerced betrayal of the criminal organization either by its members, or by individuals in the adversary's immediate social network. Beyond tools such as the spreading of misinformation, efforts have focused on the infiltration of the criminal element by spies and undercover personnel. Through surveillance, and its reliance on the reports of informers and of the general public, counter-terrorism has been able to second guess a criminal organization to disrupt it, preventing it or delaying its operation. The value of infiltration has been to observe and to report but also to deliver advice and even to influence the conduct of the adversary from within.

Infiltration can not only be difficult, slow, and risky but sometimes impractical. For this reason, monitoring an adversary's activity over time, and the determination of patterns gathered from this activity, as input to the intelligence picture, arguably is a slow but extremely important tool of law enforcement. Such detective work holds patterns in a dual role. Patterns stimulate the construction of new theories but patterns also help to eliminate

some of the competing theories. The process of Intelligence Analysis is an active construction, an intellectual exercise which is grounded in evidence, and evidence has both a linear and a non-linear character. In a linear presentation, the frequency of a pattern and its addition to the body of evidence results in incremental progress. In a non-linear presentation, the single occurrence of a pattern may take on a defining significance.

For completion, and so as to prevent this paper from delivering an overly simplistic message, it is worth mentioning that there will always come to be instances when the availability of intelligence is judged to be detrimental. Consider the path of the Japan-US War during the Second World War. It is the considered opinion of some that the gathering and interpretation of intelligence had a detrimental effect, and that the Pacific War might have been delayed or even avoided [1]. We cannot consider in this brief paper the important psychological realities of the handling of information by the Intelligence Analysis: e.g. “warrior versus worrier” personality mix; dopamine levels; personality rivalries; and modus operandi such as “brawn versus brain”, all can influence both the development and the quality of the intelligence picture [2].

The applicability of principles and laws gathered from interdisciplinary study

It is our view that the Intelligence Analysis will benefit from a number of ideas emanating from other fields. In this section, we tread upon a few of them to motivate interested readers to explore their connection to counter-terrorism.

Consider the “old cybernetics movement” that developed during the period 1950s-1970s. During the 1960s the British specialist in cybernetics W. Ross Ashby popularized a particular concept he called “the principle of requisite variety” (page 206 of [3]). Its motto is: “only variety can destroy variety”. What does this mean? In layman terms, and for the benefit of our discussion, it is about attacks and responses to attacks. Every living creature has within its makeup a great number of in-built responses to a great number of possible attacks. Indeed, the power of imagination and problem solving of the human brain (and of the brains of other highly intelligent creatures) evolved to conjure up new responses to novel attacks. However, there will always be a certain type of attack for which there is no possible response: these attacks take the creature beyond the limits of its viability. For example, if the oxygen were to be taken out of the hermetic box, and nobody were to be around to respond to cries, then the creature that is trapped within the box would perish. As it has no response able to meet this attack, its viability would be compromised. This principle is apparent in many daily activities

including sport. Should two highly skilled football players meet on the pitch then the public would only see a minority of behaviours from the arsenal of their “attack and response” libraries. Indeed, we often see certain random moves with legs stepping over the ball because such “attacks” cannot by definition elicit a learned, and therefore a competent, response by the opponent.

Why do we suggest the Principle of Requisite Variety as useful to the counter-terrorism theory and practice? It is because it should assist both modelling and simulation. A further hypothetical example may illustrate this view. Imagine a nuclear disaster the size of Chernobyl with a very low background radiation in the area persisting for the following decades. It would be surprising to measure the incidence of cancer in the wild creatures that inhabit this area since the time of the accident as lower than normal! However, this counterintuitive notion is unsurprising if accounting for the Principle of Requisite Variety, but why? The principle leads us to reason that there must have been a time, millions of years ago, when a consistently and slightly higher level of radiation prevailed on this Earth. At such a time, Life might have evolved a defence mechanism against this persistent low level of radiation. This defence in the form of a chemical pathway might offer increased immunity against cancer. Such a theory is not implausible in light of the principle. In this hypothetical example, the investigator might use the principle to reason that the creature still has within it, such a fortunate response, and that the new environmental conditions might have triggered its genetic expression.

It suggests a technique. When modelling the dynamics of terrorist and counter-terrorist it is necessary to brainstorm and explore possible disruptive attacks and countermeasures of the criminal element. For some of these attacks it might be assumed that the criminal element possesses a response. Thus, sometimes *Gedankenexperiments* are sufficient instead of costly and risky validation through observation and experimentation, or instead of validation from painstaking data mining. Perhaps many attack-response pairs can be assumed to exist in this way owing to the Principle of Requisite Variety. This approach may attract criticism particularly with Reductionists but the approach is reasonable because, although it is important to collect data, it is arguably equally important to make reasonable assumptions guided by the principle.

Another principle that may be useful to Intelligence Analysis is to be found in Nature and also in Literature: "*Human nature is above all things—lazy. Every one confesses in the abstract that exertion which brings out all the powers of body and mind is the best thing for us all; but practically most people do all they can to get rid of it, and as a general rule nobody does much more than circumstances drive him to do.*" [4]. Consider the recent modelling efforts to combat drug crime in Amsterdam [5]. Although the

police constructed a social network which suggested to them how to disrupt organized crime, the disruption by police resulted in a more resilient drug network! This surprising and some may say paradoxical outcome, was probably because the original drug criminal network organization abided by the aforementioned principle of “laziness”. It was organized in a less than efficient manner, and upon attack, it readjusted itself more effectively to defeat the police’s interventions and attempts at its disruption [6].

Arguably, the hard sciences are not alone in establishing universal or quasi-universal principles. The Social Sciences have recently delivered a quasi-universal principle worthy of note: the “Youth Bulge Theory” [7]. It explains the conditions that lead to war, terrorism, general unrest and unstable government. For the benefit of this discussion, what can we take from the study of such a principle? Surely, it is important to understand both the causes that make a principle relevant, and to study the exceptions to the universality of a principle. Take the former for the “youth bulge”: arguably its seed is the lack of education of women because if women finish some level of education then the number of children per mother drops dramatically, thus preventing the “youth bulge”. What about the exceptions to universality? It becomes productive to studying rare cases that represent exceptions to the rule by means of comparisons, e.g., why did country x collapse into violent unrest and war whereas country y did not. We suggest that comparative exercises in the applicability of principles are most informative.

An important principle from Nature: Homology vs. Analogy

Further we propose that the intelligence community pay increased attention to yet another important principle from Nature. It is submitted that it is useful to learn to recognize the difference between a Homology and an Analogy in the Intelligence data.

It was Konrad Lorenz who in his 1973 Nobel Lecture [8] at the Karolinska Hospital in Stockholm first popularized the idea that the concept of homology also applies to culture and to technology. He illustrated this idea in a number of figures. We have reproduced his figure 5 as Figure 2 to illustrate this idea that depicts the evolution of train carriages. Even after the more technologically efficient concept of a central corridor was developed, many trains continued to be designed to resemble the old horse-drawn coach!

Similarly, the habits of a terrorist or criminal are inherited by his or her apprentice. As a trivial example of this, consider the design of a certain instrument of terror (IED, explosive package, misinformation campaign, computer virus, etc.). If it were possible to analyze its design, one would see within it solutions that are inherited (homology) and others which are re-discovered (analogy). To differentiate one from the other is to learn how to use homology to identify the criminal organization and its makeup.

Homologies can be easy to identify. For example, a certain design has something unnecessary and for no good reason, or it makes an arbitrary choice in the position of an item that could go anywhere, at no detriment to functionality. In such cases, such small details represent huge insights as to individual criminals and the nature of their association. The Intelligence Analyst must be trained to pay attention to such small details.




Figure 2 – Reproduced from Konrad Lorenz Nobel Lecture, 1973. It is an example of homology in technology that characters traceable to the ancestor, the horse-drawn coach should persist against the interests of technical progress in railway carriages.

Other times, however, the homologies are hard to discern. In contrast to a homology, an analogy is a principle that is independently rediscovered. For example, consider the re-discovery of flight in Nature by birds, bats, and insects. It is hard sometimes to learn to differentiate between a homology and an analogy. Here is something that would require a different type of training.

The application of homology to the natural sciences is as active today as in the past. In chemistry it is applied very successfully to the problem of protein folding and to the evolution of protein families [9]. Homology finds application in scientific fields beyond the sub-fields of Cladistics and Phylogenetics as it remains a popular concept in Astrophysics by shedding light on the seed of the structures in the Universe that we observe today.

Conclusions

Our proposal to the Intelligence Analysis community is to research how scientists have learned to differentiate an analogy from a homology in Nature. Learning this skill will enable the Intelligence Analyst to better grapple with the complexity that is inherent in detective work, with the ultimate objective of achieving timely and less ambiguous decision making.

We have also proposed familiarization with, and use of, some of the concepts that arose in the fruitful period of research between 1950^s-1970^s in the “old cybernetics” movement. The gain here is to use the principles to work with confidence to arrive at more complete models. Such concepts may help to deliver more reliable simulation models of criminal networks.

Top down models have been used to manage the under-determination that typifies detective work¹ and the Intelligence Analysis therefore has most probably adopted some of these concepts informally. However, a formal connection to Cybernetics and Biological ideas has not to our knowledge been made, nor has it been explored in the context of counter-terrorism.

Interdisciplinary study is an effective method to achieve innovation and invention. For this reason, it is submitted that Intelligence Analysis should explore all possible connections with established concepts from many other fields. Such efforts may deliver worthy contributions to its theory and practice.

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ⁱ Important and practical past and present field work has succeeded by such means to thwart terrorism. Reference [10] is a recent presentation of a theoretical example that illustrates use of a top down model to manage the under-determination of theories that can arise from surveillance data: although this illustrative example may be a touch over prescriptive.

Doctrine and Intelligence

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Abstract

Development, implementation and compliance with a clear and concise intelligence and national security doctrine are a sine qua non requirement of existence, functioning and achievement of strategic and tactical objectives in any organization or nation state.

Power and performance can be achieved by public and private institutions, at both organization and state level, through strategic and doctrinal linking. Specialized intelligence and security management can operate effectively only through flexible and coherent doctrinal foundation, providing decision makers with a real advantage, based on which national security geopolitical strategies are built.

International doctrinal schools, such as those in Canada, United States of America, United Kingdom or Australia as well as NATO's, have included a series of fundamental elements in building an intelligence doctrine, which is necessary to each state that wants to embrace these principles, including at organization level.

Keywords: doctrine, intelligence, organization, strategy, transformation.

Introduction

To compare argument, and make it with the quiet tone of mutual good faith is the core of any serious discussion¹.

(Mihai Eminescu)

Accelerated development of our society is based on the rapid flow of information, which has become a powerful resource in the age of speed. Moreover, by shifting from the information age to the knowledge age, the

¹ Mihai Eminescu, Works, vol. XII, PUBLICISTICĂ, January 1, 1881 – December 31, 1881, in Timpu, VI, no. 20 of January 27, 1881, including 28 reproductions of manuscripts and publications, Critical edition coordinated by Perpessicius Academy Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985, p. 46.

ratio between tangible and intangible assets has changed dramatically in favor of the intangible, reaching a score of 10 to 90. Intangible assets are built through the most important resource of the moment, knowledge, which is always based on concepts.

Within any organization operating in the knowledge era and society, everything starts from and is based on concepts. Organizations cannot progress without a clear and well-defined conceptual basis that is anchored in the conditions specific to each field and, in the case of intelligence and security organizations, in national, regional and global security framework. Today's knowledge competition is gained by those who hold supremacy in conceptual design and development of organizations. Those who design and develop new viable concepts shape the future. In this context, doctrinal construction is fundamental to any social entity's existence, survival and gaining of competitive advantage.

The intelligence doctrine is also related to the conceptual framework developed to understand and efficiently implement activities in that area (before, during and after carrying out an action) to provide military with common conduct and ideas². They must represent the arsenal of knowledge enhancing joint actions, from individual to team, that are facilitated by a common language among parties, which is understood and treated in the same manner by them.

The purpose of this approach is not to launch such an initiative, but only to highlight the importance of doctrine to an organization, state some elements of interest in developing a national and organizational intelligence doctrine, and highlight issues specific to the national framework and environment.

What The Doctrine Is?

***DOCTRINE**, doctrines, s. f. All the principles of a political, scientific, religious, etc. system – From French. **doctrine**, Latin **doctrina**.*
(Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian Language³)

Any doctrine implies connecting the fundamental elements of theory, history, and practical experience in the field. In this respect, several organizations and publications have proposed definitions of the intelligence doctrine, referring to the fact that it is designed to provide broad guidance

² Coast Guard Publication 2-0, *Intelligence*, Washington, D.C. 20593-0001, May 2010 and Till, Geoffrey, "The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order" in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

³ 2nd Edition, Author: Romanian Academy Iorgu Jordan Institute of Linguistics, Univers Enciclopedic Printing House, 1998, Type: Official, DEX '98.

on the use of judgment in the activities performed and to establish a common language of people working in the field.

Thus, according to the Canadian Army, doctrine is “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives”. Moreover, it states that intelligence is the product of a process that involves an analysis of information to be included in the decision-making process. It is authoritative and requires judgment in application. It embraces established knowledge in the areas of planning, decision making and problem solving, sometimes being simply defined as “what is taught”⁴.

Also, the Doctrine Centre of the *Australian Defense Force Warfare Centre* defines doctrine as “a description of the application of force to achieve national interests, domestically and internationally”. According to the Center, the doctrine implies a philosophical military approach to the operational environment and provides a mechanism for the analysis of key operational challenges,⁵ assisting in the delivery of professional military education and training⁵. Its elaboration is part of a dynamic process based on judgment and professional experience, and its application must be tailored to a given situation, according to specific characteristics.

On the other hand, according to Geoffrey Till, the doctrine is nothing but applying strategy in a space and time context. To highlight the relationship between strategy and doctrine – considered essential to security – he makes a culinary analogy, saying that strategy is the culinary arts and doctrine the menu⁶.

Last but not least, military theorists warn against turning doctrine into a dogma. For example, Sir Julian Corbett says that “nothing is more dangerous in the study of war than to allow sayings to substitute judgment”. Thus, the principles of the doctrine must be always questioned, and procedures tailored to circumstances⁷.

Why Do We Need A Doctrine?

“Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose and a unity of effort.”

General George H. Decker, US Army Chief of Staff (1960-1962)

⁴ Canadian Military Doctrine CFJP 01, 2009.

⁵ Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication – D (ADDP–D), 3rd edition, Defence Publishing Service, 2012.

⁶ Till, Geoffrey, “The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order” in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

⁷ Till, Geoffrey, “The Evolution of Strategy and the New World Order” in Craig Snyder (ed), *Contemporary Security Strategy*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York (2008), p. 97.

The need to elaborate a national security and intelligence doctrine is obvious, given the fact that in order to be complete, an intelligence organization must have a solid theoretical and technical support, a strong strategy and, last but not least, a clear and concise doctrine⁸. All these elements are essential for a proper conduct of activity and achieving performance by an organization.

Several arguments can be raised to explain the need for a Romanian intelligence doctrine, as follows:

- First because there is none, and without strategy, doctrine, and relevant technology, an intelligence organization is not complete and therefore it does not operate effectively and does not achieve performance;
- Also, a common language that facilitates both intra-institutional and inter-institutional communication and cooperation is established through a doctrine;
- At the same time, based on a intelligence doctrine, one can efficiently and effectively fulfill the objectives and tasks;
- Last but not least, it is necessary to apply the principles of change management within the organization for them to maintain competitiveness in a knowledge society which is permanently evolving in the century of speed.

Even since the Cold War, the concept of doctrine has been used predominantly in the military, but the intelligence activity, especially that at the national level, did not have a specific doctrine for all actors operating in the field. The military doctrine can be defined as the set of prescriptive principles guiding the use of armed forces of a state in pursuing its interests in times of peace and war⁹.

Military organizations have traditionally provided information to their forces in three ways: orders, intelligence, and doctrine. Orders are used to define a specific task. Intelligence provides information about the environment in which the task will be accomplished. Doctrine establishes the “rules of the game” or standard operating procedures. Unlike orders and intelligence, doctrine is not provided in real time, but it serves to establishing the culture and mentality of the individuals involved. The information was, until recently, inseparable from commanders, command structures, and command systems¹⁰.

As for Romania, in 2004, the Romanian Intelligence Service had the initiative to develop such a document, which was approved by the Supreme

⁸ Barger, D. G., *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division, 2005.

⁹ Russel, F. Wieigly, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, New York, Macmillan, 1973, p. 512.

¹⁰ Alberts, D. S. *The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies*. NDU Press Book, 1996.

Council of National Defense as “The National Security Information Doctrine”. Experts in the field mention the following about the respective document:

“If an academic approach to the problem of the intelligence community is wanted, then, all the same people have to accept that its necessity results from the Intelligence Doctrine. This doctrine exists and perhaps the above-mentioned people have coordinated and participated in drafting and endorsing it in the Supreme Council of National Defense, during 2001-2004. It can be accessed on the Presidency website, its full name being the National Doctrine of Security Intelligence.

Indeed, the doctrine seeks an academic approach, except for the fact that, as it is conceived, it has no power and clarity to generate the concrete framework to organize and develop a new intelligence activity needed by our country in the process of training and consolidating the democracy and the rule of law”.

“The intelligence doctrine and the intelligence community remain simple academic digressions, excuses for Bucharest-style political tensions or they are claimed as a need for reform towards democracy?”

Mihaiu Margarit, Brigadier General (r), former Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Project manager at EURISC Foundation - European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication.

The above-quoted military intelligence specialist indicates that the move is unsubstantiated, being historically inadequate to the current conditions and needs of Romania and its intelligence services. With a view to arguing this idea, he mentions the need to change the doctrine, regarded as the only way to develop the organizational culture, particularly at the level of the organizational management. The organizational culture can be changed by replacing it with another form of behavior, while in order to implement the formulated strategy, each member of an intelligence organization must know how to change the manner of performing tasks.

Alberts Davis considers that the process of drafting the doctrine tends to be slow and difficult due to the large number of people and organizations involved. Even so, it is further necessary to ensure consistency of appropriate behavior throughout the organization¹¹. Besides that, there is also the reluctance of members to changes in the organization, once a new doctrine and measures that precede it are implemented.

For an intelligence organization to maintain its flexible and adaptive nature – fundamental attributes of any social group or form of organization in the contemporary era – it needs a doctrinal construction. Once it is formulated, implemented and assumed by all group members, individuals on lower levels gain flexibility in creation and adaptation, as long as their actions

¹¹ Alberts, David S. *The Unintended Consequences of Information Age Technologies*, NDU Press Book, 1996.

are subsumed to the general framework formulated by the management, which allows them to operate more quickly and more efficient.

In this context, the interdependent relationship among *strategy*, *doctrine* and *intelligence* emerges, the reference of American strategist John Boyd's vision on the adaptability and responsiveness of individuals within the organization – “*He who best manages changes, survives*” – to the scale of dynamic capabilities enounced by Sun Tzu – known as “*the speed beats strength, speed beats surprise, surprise beats strategy*”, being worth mentioning¹².

The absence of a doctrine in the intelligence field or the existence of an unclear doctrine, with poorly defined terms and concepts, without logical and conceptual construction, hinders the development of reforms and transformations in relevant organizations. Here it is worth noting two important elements: on the one hand, the difference between reform and transformation, often misunderstood either by politicians or by some intelligence leaders of the last quarter century, and, on the other hand, the way of elaborating the legislation, regulations and instructions in the intelligence field. This is a step of the trinomial which links theory, education and practice. Therefore, the elaboration of laws, rules and instructions requires first the clear establishment of theory, strategy and doctrine of the respective field. This explains why the amendments to the legal framework or changes in the management of intelligence services have not always had the desired effect, namely that in the absence of a doctrine, each intelligence structure provided its own interpretation, as an integrated vision lacked.

In this regard, experts point out that, in a chaotic world, leaders need to rethink the organizations they lead through underlying concepts, principles and values, not by developing rules¹³. And this is possible in Romania. Let's go through them one by one.

According to Webster's dictionary, to reform means “to return to a good state”. The majority of individuals perceive the reform as an effort to improve or eliminate shortcomings of a situation, process, product, etc. A second definition attributed to reform is “the action to improve social or economic conditions without a radical or revolutionary change”. Based on this definition, we can conclude that the implementation of a reform

¹² Osinga, Frans P. B. *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd*. London: Routledge, 2007.

¹³ Pinchot, G. and E. Pinchot. *The End of Bureaucracy & the Rise of the Intelligent Organization*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1993.

requires the maintenance of the existing form, aiming just to rearrange components in order to eliminate the deficiencies.

However, on the other hand, to transform means to change the form, not just to rearrange it. In nature, transformation involves not only a change in appearance, but also in the character and life of an organism (for example, the transformation of a caterpillar to a butterfly). Unlike reforms, transformations can involve changes with negative impact: at the individual level, we can notice changes in the way of thinking that, once produced, completely change the configuration mode of the cognitive process, eliminating thus any way back.

Also, when we talk about transformation, we must realize its meaning. Thus, according to Ackoff (2004), reforms and transformations are not the same. Reforms aim at changing the means by which goals are achieved, and transformations involve changes in pre-established objectives. These changes occur in relation to the evolution of intelligence: activities of services/ intelligence communities' members come in response to internal and external factors, by replacing the objectives, and to changes that occur outside the intelligence field. Sometimes the respective changes and trends are not addressed in a timely manner by practitioners and academics, or they are addressed only partially. The major difference between reform and transformation is similar to investment in tangible versus intangible assets.

Organizations that manage to make especially long-term investments in intangible assets will be able to get a competitive advantage in the field/market/sector where it acts. To that end, the intelligence field and discipline have come of age in the last two decades, and a market of economic, competitive, technological, business, academic, etc. intelligence begins to take shape within it requiring a clear-cut and dynamic strategy, where only those organizational, state or private entities that design and implement concepts and models of action with which they can outperform competitors achieve great results.

In this context, an organization or a state without doctrinal construction or with a poor intelligence doctrine cannot operate and effectively operate, so therefore we cannot speak of a viable transformation.

What Should an Intelligence Doctrine Contain?

A first step in detecting the elements underlying the building of an intelligence doctrine is a benchmarking analysis on profile documents in various countries of the world. To this end, we can examine the constituent elements of doctrine in the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and the United States of America.

In any activity, achieving performance and obtaining success consist primarily in the correct understanding of the nature of that activity and its principles. The same reasoning applies to the intelligence field, as well. Experts stress the importance of the aims pursued, and clarify the relationships established with the decision-making factor and the operational area¹⁴. Considering our situation, the first step would be to take into account Romania's NATO membership acquired in 2004. To that end, the challenge of our mission should be diminished since we already have a fundamental North-Atlantic doctrine. Unfortunately, however, the real situation differs from reality, the topic on which we will resume later.

By analogy, the Canadian intelligence doctrine – Joint Intelligence Doctrine – represents "a guide for all those involved in the intelligence process". This material addresses topics such as: the nature of intelligence, the process of intelligence, intelligence practice, and intelligence support for planning, the operational intelligence and guidelines for joint intelligence¹⁵. To be useful and efficient, the doctrine should specify the authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders can use, provide guidance for the exercise of that military authority, provide fundamental principles and guidance for command and control, prescribe guidance for organizing and developing joint forces, and describe policy for selected joint activities¹⁶.

The US Army document – "Intelligence Field Manual No. 2-0" – represents the fundamental material for the military intelligence doctrine. It describes the bases of intelligence operations, intelligence warfighting function, the intelligence process, the roles and functions of military intelligence in the context of military operations, the intelligence in unitary action, intelligence concepts in preparing strategic and intelligence-related disciplines.

According to Brunel Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies/BCISS, a doctrine should also provide servicemen the following elements meant to guide them and help them in their work: a guide to best practice in the field, a learning platform, a document that sets out the responsibilities in carrying out their duties, a database that can be extracted from the rules and regulations and an "aide-mémoire" for officers during operations¹⁷.

Another document on intelligence doctrine of national importance is Joint Doctrine Publication 2-00 from Great Britain. It comprises the intelligence theory, practice and procedures, described in six major themes:

¹⁴ Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 2, 1997.

¹⁵ Joint Intelligence Doctrine, Canadian Forces, Publication B-GJ-005-200FP-000, 2 October 2002.

¹⁶ Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, 2013.

¹⁷ BCISS, 'BCISS Comments on JWP 2-00 Re-Write Arising from DCDC Intelligence Seminar', December 3, 2009.

understanding and influence centrality, the importance of intelligence exploitation, inter-institutional cooperation and joint cooperation procedures, command – staff relationship, intelligence in the contemporary cooperation environment.

In the French version¹⁸, an intelligence doctrine must approach the following areas: the type of intelligence and its customers (including the subject and the definition of intelligence, decision-making levels, the types of intelligence used by decision-makers), intelligence origins with "information bank" from which intelligence is extracted and intelligence production (including the fundamental principles of intelligence and intelligence cycle).

If we try to summarize the contents of the American, British, French and Canadian doctrinal schools' documents, we could highlight a few fundamental doctrinal benchmarks needed in the construction of an intelligence doctrine. They consist in understanding environmental intelligence, the nature of intelligence, bases/theory of intelligence, which includes the creation and development of an effective intelligence, an intelligence cycle, and the role and functions of intelligence.

In the case of drafting a Romanian conceptual doctrinal base, a first step could also be the observance of the above-mentioned algorithm. It is not necessary to develop it now, but some clarifications are important at this stage.

A first indication refers to the pattern we approach when conceiving and drafting an intelligence doctrine. In this case, the pattern is adjusted to architecture of the team conceiving and drafting the doctrine. This architecture must respect logical chaining of the research-education-occupation trinomial (or learning-theory-practice), so that the team conceiving and drafting the doctrine is heterogeneous, including also experts of the three elements of the trinomial and the conceiving/drafting stages are formalized in an information flow on the departments related to this formula. Therefore, the academics and research experts have to support a first draft doctrine, for a previous configuration of its content with the help of operational experts. We do not intend to elaborate now on the cooperation way and the instruments used in the actual activity.

A second indication is related to identifying and understanding the intelligence environment. Within this context, before conceiving and drafting the doctrine, it is necessary to analyze the intelligence environment, an environment included in a certain context having several components. An intelligence environment could consist of: strategic context – made up of international security environment and the national intelligence environment

¹⁸ La stratégie mondiale en matière d'information et de renseignement, 2005.

and the specific context – represented by the intelligence environment specific to the organizational entity. The projection of the elements is necessary for each of the two components.

Things seem to be very clear in the case of our country as far as the intelligence framework is concerned: there is no intelligence community in Romania. An explanation to that end is the understanding of the phase we have reached in training intelligence officers. Human capital development has not been considered important in Romania, a proof to that end being the education system. Intelligence services and community have to reconsider their position towards scientific national security-related research by projecting and setting up a national systemic intelligence. Why do we say that? Because from many reasons our efforts to build an intelligence community in Romania have failed. One of them is that the policy makers have not understood the role of intelligence in the knowledge society, and by that we mean the two executive branches – the Government and the Presidency – which both wanted to control the community or to keep it as far as possible out of the political reach. However, that's not why we have failed. The main reason of our failure is that we did not understand the processes behind creating such an organizational entity: national intelligence community. In order to succeed in setting up the community, we have to start not with legislation, legal framework and rules but with the concepts projection, definition, and elaboration, starting with intelligence in case we decide to maintain this word into Romanian language. Another reason of our failure is that we have to understand the tangible and intangible assets because we do not clearly comprehend the importance of intangible assets within an organization in Romania.

And a third reason is related to the nature of intelligence and intelligence discipline theory. Thus, intelligence represents the activity of intelligence and security services and agencies. From theoretical point of view, we talk about intelligence as a social sciences domain or what we can consider to be *academic intelligence*. It includes academics, experts in the field who became trainers and professionals who subsequently achieved academic status by developing their competencies in research or education.

Amid this context, one has to have in mind the nature of current intelligence field and discipline which is quite different of one century or ten years ago. Human society rapid development and the transformation of information era into knowledge society with steps towards intelligence era (as Dedijer and other specialists have anticipated even from 2002) produce significant changes in intelligence activity.

This leads to reconsider the specific taxonomy of the discipline by projecting new concepts related to current reconfiguration of the social organizational models. One example to that end would be the creation of

academic intelligence, a concept initiated by us few years ago to connect the academic, educational, and operational “tribes” and to fuel the development of intelligence knowledge

If we were to follow the evolution of the intelligence concept, which started with the actions and operations developed under the shadow of secrecy and undercover actions, but also to analyze its biological (Fedanzo, 1993), organizational (Lippmann, 1922, Wilensky 1967), and business side specific to the last decades, we would notice its extended translation to all people in the society and its transformation into a systemic entity that produce knowledge through models of learning and continuous adaptation to dynamic market demands, this time under the rule of "openness".

Intelligence is a knowledge process. If initially intelligence developed as an essential part of military capabilities, nowadays it has become an important part of every organizational capability, taking into account all its components from political, to social and economic ones.

While the elaboration of an organizational doctrine might be considered a simple process if we understand the nature of intelligence, but this is not the case, the extension of the doctrine to state institutions, by taking into account the two private and public elements, transcend the knowledge operational limits.

After clarifying the nature of intelligence we can strengthen the theory of this discipline. But we will discuss this complex topic later.

Conclusions

We cannot talk about a scientific paper on information on Romanian historical and ideological space due to the fact that the last century topics in the Romanian specialty literature are only information history-related and case studies. The absence of a specific Romanian intelligence theory and doctrine led to the development of contemporary intelligence systems that triggered obvious and significant differences. To conclude, this state of mind can trigger the emergence of an *agnotologic intelligence*¹⁹ rather than an *epistemological intelligence* that is useful to most of the people. The main effects are to be felt at the level of operational experts who could pay attention to research and education only from operational perspective. To that regard, a potential development of a Romanian intelligence doctrine

¹⁹ Agnotology describes and studies culturally induced ignorance or doubt, particularly the publication of inaccurate or misleading scientific data. The term was introduced in „*Agnotology: The making and unmaking of ignorance*” (2008) by professor specializing in the history of science Robert N. Proctor.

could be done by using the collaborative principles and methods for joint teams of experts from both operational and academic spectrum.

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Functional Categories in Intelligence Support*

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Abstract

Intelligence support is a communication process and the communication models, communication functions and other psychological concepts are relevant for understanding the role of both intelligence operators and decision-makers, as well as specific functions of intelligence support. Differences in these functions are supported by the amount of actionable intelligence and by the level of Clausewitzian friction involved in the security/operational situation.

Consequently, three functions of intelligence support are suggested: construction of intelligence superiority, warning, and integration into action.

Keywords: intelligence support, communication process, actionable intelligence, clausewitzian friction, intelligence superiority, warning, decision-making, risk management.

Intelligence support as communication process

As well known, the meaning of intelligence is to support with intelligence products decisions to be taken at various levels in operational planning or in the wider realm of national security. Therefore, essentially, a structure specialized in a certain domain transfers an informational content to a structure which uses this content to decide and trigger certain actions. Described this way, intelligence support is, obviously, a communication process.

According to the Explicative Dictionary of Romanian Language (DEX), the verb «to communicate», derived through French from the Latin

* This paper uses sections of Mircea Mocanu, *A Novel View on the Intelligence Cycle in Network Centric Warfare Conditions*, PhD thesis, National Defence University "Carol I", on July 6, 2013, pp. 109-135.

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verb «*communicare*», defines the action of "letting known", "informing", "conveying news", "saying".¹ The DEX definition identifies only the informational substance as object of communication. However, other definitions provide a larger scope for the contents being transferred to the recipient: "communication is a process by which persons share information, ideas, and feelings"² or "communication is a process of transmitting a sense from somebody to somebody else"³. We see that not only information is transferred during a communication, but also *feelings*, *ideas*, and *sense*, which holds water for intelligence support as well.

For all these types of transferred content, the intelligence structure has the competence to store/process/generate professional contents, thus being the *epistemic authority* of the intelligence domain. The recipient of transferred contents – the beneficiary of intelligence support – would then utilize these contents to make decisions regarding concrete actions, process which reflects the quality of *deontic authority* for the beneficiary of intelligence products.

The above mentioned positioning is relevant for researches on the functional rapport between these two parts of the communication process because it defines the limits between the entire intelligence structure – the epistemic domain – and the decisionmaker, who belongs to the deontic domain, responsible for the commands on any level of the sistem (in this case, the military system or, writ large, the national security system).

Looking at communication as *transactional process* between two parts, one can notice the signification of a basic *transactional analysis* principle, which states that the *role* of each party determines the character of communication by the adaptation of communication to serve the relation defined by the *roles of the parties*⁴. Again, this underlines clearly the limit where intelligence structure ought to stop before jeopardising its epistemic role. This is «the red line» where the intelligence product, albeit a mere verbal briefing, risks to cross into the deontic domain, where it suggests solutions, recommends a certain decision or another, asuming, this way, a deontic role.

¹ *** *Explicative Dictionary of Romanian Language* – DEX, Romanian Academy, Bucharest, 1984, p. 179.

² Sandra Hybels, Richard Weaver II, *Communicating Effectively*, Random House, New York, 1986, p. 6.

³ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *Education Psychology*, Collegium – Psychology Series, Polirom Publishers, Iași, 2004, p. 174.

⁴ Sandra Hybels, Richard Weaver II, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

The relevance of this functional rapport resides in the fact that transfer is not conducted in view of storing the communication content or with other inert aims, yet with the deliberate objective to make decisions which lead to actions, even very important actions, considering the social impact they might entail. Actually, "communication has always an end, an objective, an intentionality, which can be explicit or implicit"⁵. This is an important point in analysing communication. The destination of communication – the decision in view of an action – is well known to both parties, and the emitter cannot ignore the finality of the transfer and formulates the content in a manner coherent with the intended utilization. In other words, an important aspect of the transferred content is the substance which concretely supports the objective of the recipient's activity – the action. Thus, communication needs to include «actionable substance». In intelligence language, this requirement reflects in the necessity to transmit «actionable intelligence».

Models of the communication process

Communication is a bidirectional process and researching the transfer from the intelligence structure to the beneficiary of intelligence products – one of the transmission senses – requires the examination of both the intelligence structure role, and the decisionmaker's role. In this respect, it can be noticed that the definition in DEX reflects the vision of one of the *two classes of models of communication processes* – the *mathematic model*, informational and linear, respectively the *psycho-sociologic model*, of *interactionist* nature⁶. More exactly, the reference exclusively to information as object of the transfer corresponds, mainly, to the classic theory of information, fathered by Claude Shannon. This theory describes communication in a mathematic/cybernetic manner, only from the points of view of the mechanism, the volume/quantity of transmitted information, and of the fidelity of the transmission process, but with no reference to the content/the quality of the transmitted content.

⁵ Jean-Claude Abric, *Psychology of Communication: Theories and Methods*, Polirom Publishers, Iași, 2002, pp. 15-32.

⁶ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

John Fiske⁷ called this model the «process school», which "sees communication as transmission of messages... and is interested especially in issues like efficiency and accuracy of the message transmission". This technical feature explains the wide use of this model in information technology (IT), using the well-known graphic⁸ displayed in Figure 1. In the same time, this model sees communication as "a process by which [the emitter] acts upon the behaviour or state of mind of another individual"⁹.




Fig.1. Shannon and Weaver model for the communication process

The other model of communication, the *psycho-sociologic model*, conceptualized by the Palo Alto School¹⁰, adds to the mathematic model the social context, the interaction between the Emitter and the Beneficiary, which implies action and reaction, thus being a circular, not a linear model¹¹. In the case of intelligence product dissemination, this model implies a dynamic interaction between the intelligence structure and the beneficiary, a complex transaction and not a simple cybernetic transfer. This interaction

⁷ John Fiske – American philosopher and historian, professor at Harvard University in the second half of the XIX-th Century.

⁸ www.veghes.ro.

⁹ This paragraph includes quotations from John Fiske, *Introduction to Communication Studies*, Methuen, New York, 1982, *apud* Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *Communication Theory*, Comunicare.ro Publishing House, National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA), Department of Communication and Public Relations „David Ogilvy”, Bucharest, 2003, p. 39.

¹⁰ Group of researchers of various specialties (sociologists, linguists, psychiatrists, antropologists) united around Gregory Bateson. Palo Alto School includes Donald Jackson, Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin, Edward Hall, Ray Birdwhistell, Erving Goffman, Margaret Mead, Virginia Satir, Jay Haley, John Weakland, Richard Fish and others.

¹¹ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

implies awareness regarding the fact that the objective of intelligence support is altering the behaviour of the beneficiary, in a logic assumed by both parties and based on a common interest. Actually, as Shannon and Weaver stated, "the word communication has a wider sense, it includes all processes by which a spirit can affect another spirit"¹².

Consequently, intelligence production is influenced by specific factors called «determinants» which reflect analyst conditions such as his experience, his perception of reality, conceptions and convictions, as well as analytic errors and bias, his intentions and orientation towards an interest common with the beneficiary, but also his own creativity and professional qualities. In the same way, the decision-maker consuming the intelligence product is influenced by personal conditions such as his perceptions, expectations, conceptions and beliefs, his personality, experience, leader qualities, bias and creativity. In addition, decision-maker's intentions range wider than those common with the intelligence structure, which is the common interest expressed in commander's intent or the political project pursued by the decision-makers.

The absorption of the elements introduced by the social context, for the case of the models generated in interactionist approach, as mentioned above, as well as the approximation of the real communication channel by an ideal channel, with zero noise, allow reaching beyond Shannon's mathematic model. There, the conditionings operational both at communicator end and recipient end can be outlined according to the graphic presented in Figure 2, for the communication process adapted to reflect the intelligence support.




Fig. 2. Conditionings operational in intelligence support as communication process

¹² Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

Of course, this model works both ways, the reverse way reflecting the reaction from the decision-maker, who becomes communicator towards the intelligence structure.

John Fiske termed this model the «semiotic school», for which "performing communication means producing also an exchange of senses (significations)". For this model, "the object of interest is the study of the way the messages interact with people to produce *meanings* (or *significations*)"¹³.

The roles of participants in intelligence support

However, the encyclopaedic dictionary defines the action of communicating as "the fundamental mode of psycho-social interaction of persons through an articulate language or through other codes, in view of transmitting an information, of obtaining stability or individual or group behaviour modifications"¹⁴. In another definition, communication is "a process by which an emitter transmits information to the recipient... with the aim to produce certain effects upon the recipient"¹⁵, and "*the act of communication ends with practical implications upon the recipient*, the final stage of the information transfer"¹⁶. This underlines the natural fact that the recipient is an integral part of the functional model representing processes operating with information, intelligence included.

The same idea is expressed as representing a *power relation*: "an individual has power upon another if he can fulfil an action able to produce a change in the second individual"¹⁷. The factors which generate this influencing ability are agent properties called by the two authors «*power resources*». At the other end, the values of the target individual – in the case of intelligence support, the beneficiary of intelligence products – are termed

¹³ This paragraph includes quotations from John Fiske, *Introduction to Communication Studies*, *apud* Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, *Communication Theory*, p. 39.

¹⁴ Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁵ J.J. Cuilenburg, O. Scholten, G.W. Noomen, *Communication Science*, *apud* Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁶ Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹⁷ Dorwin *Cartwright*, Alvin *Zander*, *Group Dynamics*, *apud* Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

«*motivational bases of power*». Psychologists Cartwright and Zender argue that "an act of influence establishes a relation between the resources of an agent and the *motivational basis* of the influenced individual"¹⁸. Thus, intelligence support establishes a relation between the intelligence structure resources and the decision-maker motivational basis, which is reflected in the management conception and risk management policy.

These power relations are broken down into five power categories: *rewarding, coercive, legitimate, referential, and expert power*¹⁹. Among these, psychologists French and Raven define the expert power as "the influence based on superior knowledge attributed to the communicator and having affect upon the cognitive structure of the recipient"²⁰. Applying these concepts to intelligence support seen as a communication process, one can notice exactly the situation of intelligence structure's epistemic authority vis-à-vis the beneficiary of intelligence products. So, the production of an effect of cognitive nature is based on the acceptance of the intelligence structure expert status by the beneficiary of intelligence support in the domain where communication is performed, i. e. the intelligence domain.

The role difference in decision-maker and intelligence structure also marks the positioning of the two parties according to one of the two communication axioms, that "any communication process is either symmetric or complementary, depending on its basing on either equality or difference"²¹. In the case of intelligence support, the process is complementary, because the beneficiary holds the upper hand, according to Palo Alto School scholar Paul Watzlawick's explanation: "In a complementary relation, two different positions are possible. One of the partners holds a superior position..., primary or one-up, while the other holds the corresponding position, described as inferior, secondary or one-down"²². This role difference has clear consequences on intelligence

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ John P. French, Jr., Bertram H. Raven, *The Bases of Social Power*, 1960, *apud* Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 112.

²¹ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 180, with details about these axioms in pp. 178-181.

²² Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin, Donald Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication. A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies and Paradoxes*, *apud* Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

support, because "the complementary interaction is based on maximizing the difference, which can lead to communication blockage"²³. In intelligence, these problems can occur when the content of intelligence products is altered to please the beneficiary's vision, when the intelligence structure abuses by treading into the deontic domain – the realm of political or military decisions – or, the extreme case, when the decision is manipulated on purpose.

So, the study of intelligence support as communication process highlights the action and role of intelligence after the transfer is completed, the fact that the beneficiary of intelligence products belongs to the communication process, and the usefulness of intelligence products when the actionable intelligence is an integral component of decision and action.

Communication functions and the actionable content of intelligence products

The study of intelligence support as communication process is relevant from the point of view of functionality, because either the success or failure of intelligence can have important consequences in defence or security. This is why the best investigation path seems to lead to the communication functions. For the particular case of linguistic communication, six functions have been identified²⁴, which can be extrapolated for the communication process, in general:

- The «*conative*» function, which expresses "the capability of communication to produce effects upon the recipient", for example orders, requests, manipulation, advice, marketing messages, propaganda, recommendations. This function of linguistic communication bears no relevance for intelligence support, because the intelligence structures have to stay within the limits of its epistemic role, and to abstain from formulating recommendations. Obviously, references to any other example mentioned above are useless and alien to intelligence domain;

²³ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

²⁴ Roman Osipovici Jakobson, *Linguistic and poetry*, Moscow, 1896, *apud* Christian Baylon, Xavier Mignot, *Communication*, „Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Publishing House, Iași, 2000, pp. 83-85, and the same for the quotations in the following paragraphs referring to the communication functions.

- The «*referential*» function is centred on the transferred content and "represents the communication capability to refer to a certain *state of facts*", expressing the "orientation of the message towards reality", and speaking to the recipient's intellect, to the quantitative, mathematic side of his perception;

- The «*poetic*» function is centred on the transferred content and "expresses the capability of communication to cross beyond the sense of words and determine certain *emotional states*". This function does not limits to literature, and includes messages not stemming directly from the objective substance transmitted, but views elements of qualitative nature, non-quantifiable, which speak to the «*affective side*» of the recipient's decisional mechanism;

- The «*emotional*» or «*expressive*» function "highlights the emotional states of the emitter", being centred on it and has no relevance for intelligence domain, where the analyst's momentary emotional state have no importance;

- The «*meta-linguistic*» function refers to communications regarding the very transmitted message, its structure, and the code used for the transfer to recipient;

- Finally, the «*fatic*» function is a function of technical nature and refers to the capacity of the transmission channel to assure the transfer of the contents.

Among the above mentioned functions, the poetic and the referential functions are worth researching for the intelligence domain, because they are centred not on the emitter, the transfer mechanics or the transmission channel, but on the content transmitted to the recipient and on the effect produced by the transfer of this content to the decision-maker. So, there is great interest in analyzing the substance included in the intelligence structure's product which has relevance for understanding the effect generated by intelligence support, substance which continues its existence and produces effects after the dissemination of intelligence products.

Logically, the intelligence support aims at bringing the beneficiary to a favourable situation for making a wise decision, this way being "an instrumental or *alloplastic* communication"²⁵ (i. e. the modification

²⁵ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

of somebody else). Thus, the intelligence support reflects the communication objective to "modify the state of the beneficiary, albeit his cognitive state, affective state, his predisposition to action or the action itself"²⁶.

The role assumed by intelligence support speaks to the process of *social influencing* as "action exerted by a social entity (person or group), oriented towards the modification of another entity's actions or manifestations". This influence is based on one of the power relations mentioned above, specifically on the *expert power*, associated to the intelligence structure epistemic authority. The French sociologist Raymond Boudon argues that the mechanism of this influence as power relation is *persuadation*, which needs two conditions to work:

- the communicator should hold an acceptable degree of *competence* and *information*, which speaks to the epistemic authority of the intelligence structure;

- the influencing relation should be based on the *consensus* of the parties participating in the communication process regarding the shared values, the objective and the envisaged effects. In intelligence support, this cohesion reflects the attitude of serving the national interest, or the commander's intent, for the case of military operations, in the same risk management/operational conception.

To make sure that the epistemic role of intelligence structure is preserved, it is clear that social influencing, as a process associated to intelligence support, must be confined to persuadation about certain realities and probable evolution perspectives of the events, not at all about the concrete option the decision-maker should choose as beneficiary of intelligence products.

This rationale speaks to the «actionable» aspect of the content within the message transmitted to decision-makers by the intelligence structures. The content may refer either to simple data necessary for decisionmaking (for example numeric values, like calendaristic data or geographical coordinates), or other actionable elements able to trigger motivations or affective states which generate decisions. Contemporary psychologists specialized in communication propose²⁷ another typology

²⁶ *Idem*, p. 188.

²⁷ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

of communication functions, ignoring the engineering elements of the communication machine. This typology identifies the cognitive, affective, actional, and socialisation functions, all relevant for intelligence support.

These functions defined for the communication process generate effects which have correspondence in intelligence as follows:

- the *cognitive function*, corresponding to the Jakobson's referential function reflects the general providing of information in intelligence, which contributes to knowledge development for achieving informational superiority;

- the *affective function* triggers *motivations* related to the common interest served by the two parties for securing the opportune response to the security challenges, type of response necessary especially under pressure, i. e. under time constraint;

- the *actional function* concretely supports decisions by the sheer usefulness of the actionable intelligence and transfers the contents directly into action;

- the *social function* builds a community between the intelligence structure and the beneficiaries of intelligence products, by serving the common interest (commander's intent), and achieving an effective professional relation.

In order to complete the conceptual framework of intelligence support as communication process, it is useful to detail the form of communication the intelligence support can take along three criteria²⁸: the manner or technique of transmitting the message, the way the actors participate in the communication process, and the way communication process is performed.

From the point of view of the way intelligence products are transmitted, intelligence support can be either a *direct* communication (for example, in the case of oral briefing), or an *indirect* communication, in the case of using secondary techniques: written reports, electronic communications.

Considering the participation mode, intelligence support is either *interpersonal* or *group* communication, the latter being conducted between persons belonging to the same organisation - the case of intelligence reports disseminated inside a military structure or inside the national security system.

²⁸ Vasile Tran, Irina Stănciugelu, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Finally, by the way communication is conducted, intelligence support can be an *ascendent/upwards* communication (when the beneficiary is a decision-maker up-stream the chain-of-command), a *horizontal* communication (towards coworkers of the same level, in cooperation exchanges), or a *descendent/downwards* communication (from a higher echelon intelligence structure towards execution level organisations).

Given that intelligence support is sometimes destined for planning staff (in military operations) or politicians (for example, in the case of intelligence products provided to defence commissions of the parliament), the social/group communication, destined to groups of recipients, becomes the relevant type of communication. This is typically the situation of intelligence briefings, where psychologists identify six roles of communication²⁹, having the following connotations for intelligence domain:

- *It contributes to achieving group task*, role expressed in intelligence by the very purpose of its products – support for operational/political decision.

- *It supports group cohesion* by clarifying the context and harmonizing opinions, in the process of building the *common operational picture* (COP) – in the military – or a *shared awareness* of risks and threats – in the security domain;

- *Raises the group to a higher value* as recipient of communication, which means, in intelligence, an improvement in the cognitive domain, by absorbing the commander's intent and forming a common vision of the operational/international security situation;

- *Acts as groups' unity factor*, a role associated to those mentioned above for intelligence domain;

- *Solves group's internal problems* – role also associated to the previous;

- *"Helps the group become a reference for the individual"*³⁰, which, in intelligence, supports the relevance of mission, danger, risks, threats, and opportunities for all echelons of military or political decision.

In the logic of all examined functions, the communication element instrumental for establishing the effect of intelligence support on decision

²⁹ Dorina Sălăvăstru, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

³⁰ Adrian Neculau, *Leaders in Group Dynamics*, Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1977, pp. 82-83.

and action is the «actionable» content, which weighs differently in intelligence products and has various effects upon the beneficiaries, according to the response time it requires.

Consequently, the «actionable» substance included in intelligence products has a paramount importance in shaping the intelligence support functions from the point of view of communication usefulness and of the practical destination of intelligence products. The functions of intelligence support are discriminated by the energy of the «actionable» substance applied in decision and in the action based on this decision. The resulting functional classes also reflect the impact of the time pressure and the emergency of response measures necessary to be taken by the system in risk management activities. Both time pressure and response emergency surge when the common interest served jointly by the intelligence structure and the beneficiary of intelligence products is jeopardised.

Classes of intelligence support according to the «actionable» substance and Clausewitzian friction

Even since 1950, immediately after the foundation of the modern concept of intelligence by Sherman Kent, the American geographer Norton S. Ginsburg stated that "intelligence derives its *raison d'être* from conflict, whether in time of peace or war. Its goal at all times is not the maintenance [*sic*] of peace nor the provocation of war, but preparedness for the latter"³¹. When analysing intelligence through the perspective of confrontation, the research of intelligence support requires the consideration of Clausewitzian concepts of war friction, danger, superiority, and surprise.

In the logic of preparation for conflict, Mark Lowenthal argues³² that the *raison d'être* of intelligence services requires: *avoiding surprise* (strategic and tactical), support with expertise projected on long term, support of political decision-makers, and the protection of secret

³¹ Harold M. Greenberg, *Intelligence in the past, Intelligence in the Media*, apud Loch Johnson (coord), *Strategic Intelligence*, Praeger Security International, 2007, Westport CT, 2007, p. 173.

³² Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence from Secrets to Policy*, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington DC, 2003, pp. 2-5.

information, requirements (including financial) and methods. This approach is somewhat eclectic, including all aspects of intelligence activity, in the absence of a thorough analysis of intelligence support and ignoring the tricky issue of the intelligence cycle. Lowenthal's approach offers an unquestionable practical value inside the intelligence structures, but with little relevance for the research of intelligence life after the phase of dissemination. However, the logic of these pages requires the consideration of the first component mentioned above, i.e. avoiding surprise.

From the point of view of performing intelligence support as communication process, the functionality of intelligence activity needs to be analysed like an architecture organised in the cognitive domain, meaning knowledge, understanding, information superiority over a potential enemy. This perspective has been underlined by the French psychologist Rodolphe Ghiglione, in the concepts specific to social representation and cognitive psychology theory regarding communication: "the individual who communicates is not just a mirror reflecting the reality; he is, especially, the permanent builder of social reality. We have here the proposition of a new paradigm: communication as process of *social «co-construction»*. From this perspective, among the functions accomplished by communication one can identify the *construction of the reference univers*"³³.

In intelligence, this construction of the reference univers translates by the evaluation of the security environment, more exactly by activities such as: security phenomena monitoring; risk, threat and opportunity identification; production of assessments which approximate reality as close as possible; performing warning about dangers against interests of military or security nature; and producing prognoses about future evolutions within the military/security environment.

In all these activities, the intelligence structures exert *social influence* operating upon beneficiary's cognitive domain by alloplastic communication in order to determine the generation of effects of deontic nature, i. e. to trigger decision-making and issuing of dispositions/military orders. For the intelligence structure, the instrument of this action is the

³³ L. Iacob, *Research on Communication Today*, apud Adrian Neculau, *Social Psychology. Contemporary Aspects*, Polirom Publishers, Iași, 1996, p. 185.

intelligence product: periodic bulletins, pinpointed campaign intelligence reports (SPOTINTREP), briefings, annual national intelligence estimates, intelligence assessments, long-term prognoses and others.

Besides circumstances connected to dissemination context (peace, crisis or war), the place of intelligence product consumption (head of state cabinet, battlefield), beneficiary (brigade commander in operation or European Union programme planner) or the physical support of the intelligence dissemination, the intelligence product contains more or less «actionable» information, according to the intelligence product purpose: "the final product... needs to be disseminated to beneficiaries... to realise planning support, influence decisions and the way actions are executed, and prevent realising surprise"³⁴ by the adversary. Considering the «actionable» contents of intelligence products, the intelligence activity shells various functionalities which can be associated to the functions mentioned above for the communication process.

However, it is hard to imagine an intelligence product having zero content of «actionable» intelligence, since the intelligence structures always aim to deliver useful products in order to assure relevant support to decision-making finalised by concrete actions. Even at the highest level, "wisdom means the turning knowledge into useful action. So, knowledge becomes an abstract good"³⁵. Therefore, the destination of «actionable» intelligence is important, that is the action to be triggered by the beneficiary, considered in connection with the danger/opportunity it answers to.

Thus, for routine planning activities (for example, in the case of multi-annual governmental programmes), the «actionable» intelligence is not associated to emergency actions, wrought under time pressure, which alter the working pace specific to normality, but are transferred calmly into actions of planning adjustment.

Considering intelligence which detects the perspective of dramatic modifications of the security/operational situation, even in the absence of an armed confrontation, a pre-conflict Clausewitzian friction appears. In this

³⁴ Sergiu T. Medar, *Intelligence for commanders*, Military Technical Publishing Centre, Bucharest, 2007, p. 25.

³⁵ George Cristian Maior, *Editorial in Intelligence*, magazine of the National Intelligence Academy "Mihai Viteazul", nr. 21, Bucharest, March-May 2012.

case, intelligence products *warn* the beneficiary, meaning that they stimulate the generation of a reaction with an affective component, based on the common understanding of the fact that a common interest is jeopardised or favoured by an event which can occur in a relatively short time, i.e. under time constraint.

Finally, in the situation of a response to an acute political crisis or during a military operation, the Clausewitzian friction is intense and the intelligence products contribute directly to the editing of decisions and get directly integrated into the very actions, even up to being automatically transferred into electronic commands which trigger the action of combat equipment (in the case of electronic warfare).

Functionalities in intelligence product utilisation

If the main goal of intelligence activity is avoiding/preparing surprise by warning about dangers or opportunities, other functions of intelligence support refer to utilisations employing less or more «actionable» substance than in the case of warning, or another rapport to the time factor, and reflect lower or higher levels of Clausewitzian friction.

The communication function easiest to translate to intelligence domain is the *referential function*, which reflects the transfer of information to the beneficiary by referring to realities about which the decision-maker should be aware for a good performance according to his duties. The referential function is simple to term as information function, by which intelligence support contributes to achieving general *informational superiority* by *building intelligence superiority*, in conditions of low Clausewitzian friction. Writ large, in the wider scope of risk management, the *construction of informational superiority* is described as "the state of relative advantage in the informational domain achieved by assuring the right information to the right beneficiary at the right time and in the right form, and, in the same time, forbidding the adversary to do the same thing"³⁶. Bearing this in mind, intelligence support fulfils its meaning even when a content of «actionable» substance is destined not for an urgent

³⁶ ***, *NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP)*, C-M(2007)0118, Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk VA, US, 13.12.2007.

response to a danger jeopardising the main interests of the system, thus with no time constraint, but for a systematic elaboration of a future response, i. e. for a perspective planning or understanding a security situation with no pressing risks or threats.

Of course, informational superiority serves to achieve military superiority. Carl von Clausewitz reserves a subchapter of his masterpiece "On War" to military superiority, but he only deals with numeric superiority, which he considers "the most important factor in battle". This is quite normal in the conditions of the military art of that era, considering that the armies were "much more similar to one another regarding weaponry, organisation, and technical knowledge of all kinds"³⁷ and there was no force projection, remote strike, mass destruction capabilities, computer networks or air capabilities whatsoever.

David Omand³⁸ considers that the finalisation of intelligence support includes three areas, all pertaining to the *construction of intelligence superiority*, here identified as one of the intelligence support functions. D. Omand proposes³⁹ the conceptual organisation of the intelligence support utilisation in three domains, according to the temporal perspective of analysis. These areas/«uses» are *explanation* – oriented towards the past, *building situation awareness* – linked to the present, respectively *prediction* – projected towards future events. Obviously, between these categories of intelligence product utilisation there is no clear separation, each of the three «uses» having relevant values reflecting the other two.

The *function of warning*, already established in intelligence, implies, of course, transfer of information, but also presents a component of the *poetic/affective* function, as a communication function, because it crosses beyond the mechanical transfer of information to generate or feed motivations

³⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, p. 182.

³⁸ Sir David Omand, GCB, was Intelligence and Security Coordinator in the British Cabinet Office from 2002 to 2005. He has also been a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Permanent Secretary of the Home Office and the Cabinet Office, Director of the Governmental Communications Headquarters of (GHGC) and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence Policy. He is, in March 2014, visiting Professor in the War Studies Department of King's College London and honorary Fellow of Corpus Christi College, University of Cambridge.

³⁹ David Omand, *Securing the State*, Hurst and Co., London, 2010, pp. 24-26.

beyond the mathematic calculus, namely in the affective domain. This way, intelligence support determines employment of ambition, courage, cunning, and preservation instinct. Facing a higher level of Clausewitzian friction, this implication has the nature to trigger decisions in view of concrete and relatively quick actions meant to lead to avoid danger, secure the most appropriate response to the detected danger or to the exploitation of opportunities with the goal to accomplish the mission. All these reactions face the constraint of a limited implementation time.

For warning in the military domain, without naming intelligence, Clausewitz identifies the role of intelligence support in adapting the effort of the system's own military organism, as the crisis escalates or the fighting actions unfold: "the relative superiority, meaning the shrewd manoeuvre of superior forces in decisive points, is based on the correct judgement of these points and on the adequate orientation"⁴⁰.

The third communication function selected for the research of intelligence support as communication process is the *actional function*, which highlights the most practical destination of the transferred information, namely their *integration into action, with a short and precise temporal perspective*. In this case, the corresponding function in intelligence can be named exactly «*the actional function*», which would define, for the intelligence products, a dominant content of actionable intelligence which is transferred immediately into decisions and actions. In a Clausewitzian approach, this function defines the situation of already engaged confrontation, characterized by a maximum friction, when the forces engaged in conflict seek to diminish the friction perceived by own forces, and to transfer the conflict friction to the adversary, following the battlerhythm. This «intense» domain of intelligence support can be exemplified by the situation of fighting actions or by the case of acute political-diplomatic crises. The extreme situation is that of intelligence operations, where the action is performed intensely inside the very intelligence system, and the intelligence products are an integral part of the very core of the concrete action.

⁴⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

Conclusions

The arguments presented in these pages lead to the conclusion that the construction of intelligence superiority, the function of warning, and the actional function can be considered functional categories of intelligence support, discriminated by the pressure/urgency of «actionable» intelligence utilization, by the rapport between the intelligence operator and the effect of his activity, as well as by the intensity of Clausewitzian friction associated to the confrontation perspective.

The consideration of these functional categories does not require modifications in intelligence production or the introduction of new types of intelligence products. However, it allows a better understanding of the intelligence support effect upon the decision-makers and also opens the avenue of researching the way to optimize the integration and utilization of intelligence activity in risk management and decision-making at all levels.

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**Intelligence analysis and possible intelligence failures.
Qualitative research accomplished on a particular case: news
on the Russian military presence in the Mediterranean.**

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Abstract

Every day we are besieged with news, questions and comments on various themes. Nowadays the quantity of data is not a problem any longer. Therefore assessing priorities in the process of collecting data needs a certain “vision” upon the information which must be searched for and collected. Identifying other factors, which might influence analysis, beyond those which are accounted by the individual, is one step forward in containing errors. Although intelligence failures abound, we lack positive intelligence theories. This qualitative research tries to exhibit how intelligence analysis based on perceptions can be affected and by which factors.

Keywords: intelligence analysis, intelligence, intelligence failures, qualitative research, focus group.

■ Sources of intelligence analysis failures

▪ Richard Heuer¹ highlights both the value and the danger of mental patterns. The author states that analysts build their own version of “reality”, based on information filtered through perceptions. This input is mediated by mental complex processes and might determine what information is retained, how information is organized and what meanings are assigned to that kind of information.

¹ HEUER Jr., Richard J., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999, pp. 10-21 și pp. 116-120.

What people perceive, how readily they perceive something and how they process information upon reception are factors strongly depending on previous experiences, education, cultural values, role requirements and organizational rules as well as the peculiarity of the information/data received.

This act can be compared with the perception/cognition of the world through a lens, which directs, amasses and, therefore, can distort the image. Lenses are known under different names – mental patterns, bias/predilections or analytical assumptions².

▪ The volume *Intelligence analyst's guide, Compendium for junior analysts*³ inventories psychological limits as causes for intelligence failures, namely:

1. Memory vulnerabilities (the inability to save a great deal of information, the tendency to classify information on categories).
2. Cognitive/intellective errors (the image in a mirror, mental inertia, inability to recognize and identify misinformation).
3. Default reasoning (new information blurred by previous ones or by analyst's experiences and beliefs).
4. Inappropriate parities (false similarities between events/ new postures and older ones).
5. Overly positive thinking ("Pollyanna complex") or overly negative thinking ("Cassandra complex").

Pursuant to psychological errors, I briefly need to mention few causes, as they have been identified in *Ars Analytica*⁴: mental pattern, memory, lack of empathy, cognitive laziness, illusion of causality, confirmation bias, category classification prejudice, theory of commitment and reconfirmation.

▪ Other authors highlight failures derived from methodologies: either underdeveloped (which leave analysis rather in an experimental area)⁵

² *Ibid.*

³ MICU, Manuela; VÂLCEANU Corin, *Factori care determină/influențează procesul analitic. Limitele psihologice și erori de analiză*, în Ionel Nițu (coord.), *Ghidul analistului de intelligence, Compendiu pentru*.

⁴ MAIOR, George Cristian; NIȚU, Ionel, *Ars Analytica*, Editura RAO, București, 2013, pp. 295-297.

⁵ JOHNSTON, Rob, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, 2005.

or overly developed (which may restrict their analysis in terms of limiting the necessary perception/intuition and flair)⁶.

For example, Rob Johnston argues that “intelligence analysis errors are factual errors, resulting from insufficient information or lack thereof. Intelligence failures are due to inaccurate, outdated, inappropriate assumptions or forecasts”⁷.

▪ The fact is, that based solely on analysts’ individual/cognitive skills, intelligence analysis may fail.

“Analysts’ prejudices have repeatedly limited answers to the information needs of consumers. Thus, from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to the erroneous estimation by the CIA (2002) on the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Irak (during the Saddam Hussein regime), the lack of sufficient critical thinking over potential crises, has produced mistakes in the assessment process of information.”⁸

▪ Some authors emphasize that errors are not so often intelligence generated, but rather coming from the level of on decision making (beneficiaries, politicians).

Richard Betts believes that military disasters befall some states no matter how informed their leaders are, because their capabilities are deficient.⁹

Same author points out that errors may occur due to different perspectives held on same facts, especially when it comes to estimates/predictions.

“There is an axiom that a pessimist sees a glass of water as half empty and an optimist sees it as half full. In this sense, the estimative system is a glass half full. Mistakes can happen in any activity. Particular failures are accorded disproportionate significance if they are considered

⁶ HEUER Jr., Richards J.; PHERSON, Randolph, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*, CQPress, Washington D. C., 2011.

⁷ JOHNSTON, Rob, *Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, 2005, p. 67.

⁸ NIȚU, Ionel, *Analiza de intelligence. O abordare din perspectiva teoriilor schimbării*, Editura RAO, București, 2012, p. 101.

⁹ BETTS, Richard K., *Analysis, War and Decision. Why intelligence failures are inevitable*, în GILL, Peter; MARRIN, Stephen; PHYTIAN, Mark, *Intelligence theory: Key Questions and Debates*, Taylor and Francis, Studies in intelligence series, 2008, p. 106.

isolation rather than in terms of the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less striking because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen.”¹⁰

▪ Finally, other authors emphasize the inability to prevent all risks, due to the “black swan” phenomenon.¹¹

With this background in mind I have tried to accomplish a qualitative social research starting from Richards Heuer’s “lens theory”.¹²

■ Research

In early October 2013, I have conducted a study based on a qualitative research (focus-group), accomplished together with a company specialized in social researches (X), under the coordination of an intelligence analyst and author of several books in the analysis field (Y).

▪ **Context:** News regarding Russian Federation intention to deploy troops and naval military capabilities in the Mediterranean.

▪ **Method used for research:** Conducting focus-groups

▪ **Purpose:** To what extent and by which factors can intelligence analysis be influenced?

▪ **Hypothesis of the research**

The objective we started our research with was to find out to what extent may intelligence analysis (based on perceptions) be influenced and by which factors (beyond those related to the individual)?

We have chosen several students and MA graduates from two universities (humanities major) and we grouped them by six, in three different teams (team 1, 2 and 3).

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p.107

¹¹ TALEB, Nicolas, *Lebăda neagră. Impactul foarte puțin probabilului*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2008.

¹² HEUER Jr., Richard J., *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.

▪ **Intelligence Input**

We selected a story about the deployment of Russian military forces (permanent) in the Mediterranean basin (Hotnews, “Russia wants to relocate a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean”, signed by R.M. on 03/11/2013)¹³.

After a brief search, I identified dozens of articles on the same subject, all published in the same period of time (e. g. Karadeniz Press, 03/17/2013, Vitalie Goncearov, “Russian Navy began preparation for deployment of permanent naval forces in the Mediterranean”)¹⁴

Almost none of the various pieces of news was presented in simple, neuter tones. At a first glance, various authors used same process of building up impressions on comments, in order to support a particular hypothesis.

Most of the columns hinted at Moscow’s intention to restore its area of influence and to Russia’s need to have access to the Mediterranean, as a space of confluence and transit between Asia and the West, between North Africa and Europe. The texts drew similarities between the current state of the art and the Soviet Navy’s deployment of navy forces in the Mediterranean during the Cold War. Other comments suggested that the Western strategic advantage created by the missile shield was thus neutralized, they hinted at the Russian intention to control trade routes between the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean etc. Other comments connected events to the tense developments in Cyprus, the Arab Spring, and the conflict in Syria etc.

Obviously, such pieces of news were the result of subjective interpretations of information. When I started to make my own search on this issue regarding Russian military presence in the Mediterranean, I found out that such news was published regularly for more than a year. So, in fact, the news on Hotnews portal or Karadeniz Press were not at all new, they were resuming (by using, indeed, a recent statement) an older idea. None of the articles (neither written press, as [gandul.info](http://www.gandul.info)¹⁵, nor audio-visual media,

¹³ <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-international-14396958-rusia-vrea-reamplaseze-flota-permanenta-marea-mediterana.htm>, seen on October 2, 2013.

¹⁴ <http://karadeniz-press.ro/kara/rusia-in-permanentizeaza-misiunea-navala-in-marea-mediterana/>, seen on October 2, 2013.

¹⁵ <http://www.gandul.info/international/marina-rusa-a-inceput-sa-lucreze-la-crearea-unei-forte-de-interventie-in-mediterana-10661873>, seen on October 2, 2013.

as [realitatea.net](http://www.realitatea.net)¹⁶ and articles on news agencies such as [mediafax.ro](http://www.mediafax.ro)¹⁷ or specialized sites like [ziare.com](http://www.ziare.com)¹⁸) published during this period, did not report that, in fact, such news appear episodically for over a year. Almost every time, such news was sparked by a declaration of an “official” from Moscow.

Therefore, I wondered whether this too was a case in which one could very well apply Heuer’s theory on the analysts’ bias to interpret/filter reality through their own “lens”, marked not only by their own experiences (influenced by culture/civilization they belong to), but also by their own limitations, prejudices, stereotypes etc.

I also wondered to what extent the context (political, economic, military, etc.) can influence our analytical thinking, causing failures.

With all of the above in mind, I also wondered if – based on Stanley Milgram’s experiments (regarding obedience)¹⁹ – a person with authority/professional legitimacy can change perceptions and opinions of a group of analysts.

In March 2013, the conflict in Syria was not very noted, but disputes over oil reserves in the vicinity of Cyprus (Turkey had already deployed military forces in the area) were highly publicized, and the international context in Middle East seemed to get more and more complicated (Iran’s nuclear agenda, Turkish-Israeli tensions, etc.).

Therefore, multiple meanings can be conceded to the Russian Officer’s statement.

▪ **Intelligence analysis’ variables**

Thence, I set myself to evaluate how analysis may be influenced, presetting the subject of analysis, namely the news and context described (when, occasionally both the moderator and one of the group members took

¹⁶ http://www.realitatea.net/marina-rusa-lucreaza-la-crearea-unei-forte-de-interventie-in-mediterana_1132571.html, seen on October 2, 2013.

¹⁷ <http://www.mediafax.ro/externe/marina-rusa-a-inceput-sa-lucreze-la-crearea-unei-forte-de-interventie-in-mediterana-10661814>, seen on October 2, 2013.

¹⁸ <http://www.ziare.com/international/siria/rusia-trimite-vase-de-razboi-si-trupe-in-siria-desfasurare-de-forte-ca-pe-vremea-urss-1178374>, seen on October 2, 2013.

¹⁹ <http://www.infopsihologia.ro/2011/12/fenomenul-obedientei/>, seen on October 2, 2013.

a clear position on subject review). The favorable context was the opportunity to appoint focus groups together with specialists whose charisma helped changing the context of the news processed and analyzed.

Consequently, we had two variables (modified news and context) – and I wanted to see if, lest, we will acquire 2 or 3 different conclusions/analysis/evaluations, although the news accrued from a single (real) statement, and the context as well as the mindset are issues that should not excessively effect analysis. Proficient analysts know they have to expel noise when recovering the sound.

However, we have done just that: we embedded noise.

Doubtlessly, our subjects were not intelligence analysts, but students and MA graduates who are, however, familiar with scientific research methodology, have critical attitude and they can (though they are convinced they can) perceive the reality and are convinced they cannot be manipulated.

Therefore, the original story (the one on Hotnews.ro) has been deliberately modified, generating an exaggerative news (item no. 1, Annex 1), some attributes (especially adjectives and complements) have been, where appropriate, strengthened or added to the story.

In the initial news we have removed most of the attributes, obtaining a neuter style of presentation of news, in which adjectives and complements which might indicate a certain subjectivism were avoided as well as the author's conclusions, generating item no.2 (Annex 2).

After an analysis of all the reports published last year, I have made a selection of the stories on the same subject (item no. 3 – representing a selection of about 17 pages in Annex 3).

▪ **Course of research**

1. The team of 6 subjects was asked to interpret Item no.1, after a brief presentation of the context conducted by a moderator.

The mediator brought forward the context in specific terms of Cold War, depicting Russia as USSR successor trying to rebuild its sphere of influence. An increased attention has been attached to the MD (missile defense), suggesting to the subjects that, in fact, notice of deployment of Russian troops in the Mediterranean is meant to limit the strategic advantage created by the placement of missile shield elements in Romania.

The subjects were asked to discuss and then to extract answers to the following questions²⁰:

- a) What is Russian Federation's real purpose?
- b) Is it just a statement, or Russia would send troops to the Mediterranean?
- c) Does this statement have an effect upon Romania?

After only half an hour, subjects concluded, without major differences of opinion (except on answers hierarchy according to the degree of probability).

Answers:

a) Russia wants to recover losses anguished after Cold War; Russia wants to rebuild spheres of influence held by USSR; Russia wants to sabotage/cancel West strategic approaches (Western countries and the U. S.), namely those obtained by NATO expansion.

b) It is a statement that will be implemented.

c) This will cancel the strategic advantage obtained by Romania for hosting U. S. military troops, respectively, by hosting elements of the future missile shield.

Therefore, team no. 1 was prone to take contextual elements foreshadowed by moderator, being clearly influenced by far-fetched news (item no.1).

2. Next team was given the news no. 2 (Item no. 2), without giving prefabricated elements as context, but the events of recent months (Arab Spring, missile shield, tensions in Cyprus and Middle East).

With no context elements preset, team no. 2 – exposed to an extremely clear, but drily news – was extremely difficult to answer the three questions.

The correlation degree of responses was reduced, one of the subjects – who proved certain knowledge of the subject – to some extent, influenced the perception of the whole group.

However, most subjects exhibited their findings, undertaking their own hypothesis and assumptions – mainly pre-set – so that similar responses to team no. 1 have been answered but no implications of alleged missile defense have been evidenced.

²⁰ Same questions in same order have been asked to all 3 teams.

Team no. 2 could not assess the degree of implementation of the statement, so that equal scores have been recorded as follows: is just a statement (threat), respectively, it will be implemented in the future.

Being exposed to an intentionally altered context (as the team no.1 was as well), team no. 2 could not establish a connection between the Russian Officer's deliverance and the decision to host MD elements in Romania.

Answers were as follows:

a) Russian Federation wishes to rebuild the USSR's area of influence; Russian Officer's statement shows Moscow's concern towards NATO approach to its borders; Russia wants to control trade routes crossing the Mediterranean; Russian military troops' intention is to intervene in favor of its allies (Iran, Syria).

b) 50% concluded that is a simple statement, with a purpose to intimidate the other half, thought it would be followed by action from Russian side.

c) The impact on Romania is the same as to the other allied countries (EU/NATO).

3. The most informed team was obviously the third, as it had access to a much larger fund of data and it has not been exposed to altered news or contexts by moderator.

Discussions were the longest, allowing extraction of multiple working hypotheses. Those answers having the highest correlation have been retained and recorded after analysis and validation within the group. Answers were as follows:

a) Recent statements are the continuation of older ones; all indicate a certain fret of Russia; however, such deployment of naval military troops requires large costs; Military troops are not urgently needed, Russia already having quartered military troops in Syrian port Tartus; It might possibly expand its presence in another state area (Cyprus, Libya and Egypt were mostly indicated). Most likely the West intent to intervene in Syria caused Russian statements; Russia wanted to signal not giving up on Syria and supports Assad's regime.

[I find it interesting that Egypt was mentioned, taking into account that the first news regarding possible Russian military deployment in the area, occurred in less than 2 to 3 weeks after our research, that is early November 2013]²¹.

²¹ <http://www.enational.ro/news/rusia-isi-face-baza-navala-in-egipt-348634.html/>, seen October 2, 2013.

b) It is a simple statement; it will not be implemented that way; most likely Russia will maintain or increase number of troops in Syria (possible other countries in the region).

c) Inferences for Romania are not others than any EU or NATO member state. The statement has nothing to do with the announcement regarding hosting missile shield on national territory.

Question	Team no.1 – Answers:	Team no.2 – Answers:	Team no.3 – Answers:
What is Russian Federation's real purpose?	Russia wants to recover losses after Cold War; Russia wants to rebuild spheres of influence held by USSR; Russia wants to sabotage/cancel West strategic approaches (Western countries and the U. S.), namely those obtained by NATO expansion.	Russian Federation wishes to rebuild the USSR's area of influence; Russian Officer's statement shows Moscow's concern towards NATO approach to its borders; Russia wants to control trade routes crossing the Mediterranean; Russian military troops' intention is to intervene in favor of its allies (Iran, Syria).	Recent statements are the continuation of older ones; all indicate a certain anxiety; however, such deployment of naval military troops requires large costs; Military troops are not urgently needed, Russia already having quartered military troops in Syrian port Tartus; It might possibly expand its presence in another state area (Cyprus, Libya and Egypt were mostly indicated). Most likely the West intent to intervene in Syria caused Russian statements; Russia wanted to signal not giving up on Syria and supports Assad's regime.
Is it just a statement, or Russia would send troops to the Mediterranean?	It is a statement that will be implemented.	50% concluded that is a simple statement, with a purpose to intimidate the other half thought it would be followed by action from Russian side.	It's a simple statement; it will not be implemented that way; most likely Russia will maintain or increase number of troops in Syria (possible other countries in the region).
Does this deliverance/state ment have an effect upon Romania?	This will cancel the strategic advantage obtained by Romania for hosting U.S. military troops, respectively, by hosting elements of the future missile shield.	The impact on Romania is the same as to the other allied countries (EU/NATO).	Inferences for Romania are not other than any EU/NATO member state. The statement has nothing to do with the announcement regarding hosting missile shield on national territory.

Every day we are exposed to such (altered) news. *The way information is shared/expounded, charisma of the one who shares the information and the way data context is exposed, are parameters/ factors influencing analysis.*

Altering one of the above parameters may forge analysis. How often the way information is exposed does not matter? The more attributes (e.g. adjectives with negative emotional charge), the more tempted we are to evaluate the situation in mainly negative registry.

How often are we not influenced by the personality of the person communicating the information? *If a person is an undisputed leader or has charisma, we tend to give credence to a greater extent, and we doubt a person we do not know or has less credibility.*

How often are we amenable to a context? *A series of negative news will make us value, by contrast, a single positive information. Drawing out from the context, exaggerated presentation of certain contexts may influence analysis of a simple information/data. "Halo" effect is true in analysis as well, and the need to obtain social consensus often leads us to accept what seems to be accepted unanimously by everybody.*

Even though our students and MA graduates were not experienced intelligence analysts, they have shown us, at some level, how analysis errors may happen.

The less experienced, the higher the noise and the lower the ability to extract the clear sound from the great mass of noises – Team no. 1. A more convenient option for us (intellectually) and socially approved will also be more rapidly accepted when it comes of a straight forward news, without any interpretation, but most often we lack accuracy and correctness of analysis.

Moreover, lacking emotional characteristics or attributes, a drily news may generate completely different approaches, polarized – Team no. 2.

The higher level of acknowledgement, expertise, amount of data on a subject and degree of freedom (non-exposure to misinformation, charismatic leaders, etc.), the higher probability to produce objective analysis. Greater interaction between senior analysts tends often to function as a true task force, cooperating and acting synergistically – Team no. 3.

For team no. 3, any attempt to change assumptions or ask new questions, with the purpose to confuse the subjects, were doomed to failure, facing a greater volume of information, the subjects suddenly became experts. Increasing awareness and multiplicity of sources of information gave team no.3 guarantee of certain objectivity of their analytical approach.

Annex 1 – News/Item no. 1

Feared Russian Navy began preparing thoroughly for the deployment of permanent troops to defend Moscow's interest in the Mediterranean, according to the Admiral Viktor Chikov's announcement dated Monday, March 11, 2013, quoted by RIA Novosti. American and Europeans would soon have Russian cruiser carriers and submarines, just like in Cold War times.

We recall that the former Soviet Union maintained a fleet in the Mediterranean from 1967 to 1992. It had the purpose to counteract the U. S. 6th Fleet during Cold War and had 30-50 warships and auxiliaries.

American airbases, including the one in Mihail Kogalniceanu Airport might lose their strategic relevance as Russian ships would neutralize American planes at any time.

“The Minister of Defense has ordered us to form a force to operate permanently in the Mediterranean” said Chirkov. “We have already begun deployment” he added.

Defense Minister, Serghei Shoigu, had said earlier that it was decided to send a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean.

“I believe we have the ability to settle and maintain such a fleet” said Shoigu, who spoke about the recent success major naval maneuvers conducted by the Russians in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

Exercises – true Russian military show of force, perhaps in response to the insistence of Americans and Europeans to achieve missile defense – involved ships in the fleet of the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.

The two Russians officials did not mention a deadline for deploying new naval forces, which would require significant efforts in terms of logistics.

A senior official in the defense ministry had said in early March for RIA Novosti, the naval forces would consist of 10 warships and auxiliaries from three existing fleets.

The terrible Russian naval deployment may operate in the Mediterranean, using ports of Cyprus, Montenegro, Greece and Syria as supply points, according to sources.

Annex no. 2 – News/Item no. 2

Russian Navy began preparing for the permanent deployment of the naval forces in the Mediterranean, according to the announcement, Monday, March 11, the commander in charge, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, cited by RIA Novosti.

“The defense Ministry has ordered to put together a naval force to operate permanently in the Mediterranean “, said Chirkov. “We have already begun deployment”, he added.

Defense Minister Serghei Shoigu, said earlier that it was decided to form a permanent naval force in the Mediterranean.

“I think we have the ability to form and maintain such a force”, said Shoigu, who spoke about the recent success major naval maneuvers conducted by the Russians in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Exercises involved ships in the fleet of the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.

A senior official in the defense ministry had said in early March for RIA Novosti, the naval forces would consist of 10 warships and auxiliaries from three existing fleets.

Annex no. 3 – News/item no. 3

(For space reasons, I will show in here only the headlines presented to Team no. 3)

Russia sends warships to Syria (Monday, November 28, 2011 at 7:37 p.m)

Russian warships headed to Syria (Saturday, January 7, 2013, at 4:32 p.m.)

Russian warships arrived in Syria - local press (Sunday, January 8, 2012, at 10.02 p.m.)

Russia plays dangerous: sends special anti-terrorist troops in Syria (Tuesday, March 20, 2012, 15:02 p.m.)

Russian naval maneuvers in the coast of Syria. Russian secret service claim that the opposition in Syria is preparing a challenge for Moscow (January 11, 2013, at 07:26 p.m.)

Russian ships bound for the Mediterranean (January 19, 2013, 11.27 a.m.)

Russian navy began preparing for the permanent deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean (RIA Novosti, March 11, 2013)

Russia wants to relocate a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean (RM, March 11, 2013)

Russian navy began preparing for the permanent location of the naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea (Karadeniz Press, March 17, 2013)

Russia sends warships in the Mediterranean, amid imminent western attack on Syria (August 29, 2013)

Syria: Russia sending warship with a “special load” (Friday, September 6, 2013, at 07.14 p.m.)

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Intelligence for competitiveness and national security in the knowledge society (I)

A short benchmarking analysis on the creation of a Romanian national intelligence system

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Abstract

With the transition to the knowledge economy, the value of all social, organizational and individual entities is directly dependent on its intellectual and knowledge capital. Unfortunately, the majority of decision-makers focus too much on the tangible assets, almost to the point of ignoring the intangible ones. However, in order to successfully navigate this world, where the global is directly connected to the local it is essential, to first understand the interaction between certain key-concepts, such as politics, economy, knowledge, intelligence, strategy, competitiveness and security.

In the new evolution paradigm knowledge means value, while intelligence means power, that is why the paper analyzes the evolution of national intelligence systems in an attempt to shed some light on the interaction models employed at international level, which can then be adapted and re-configured to fit the necessities of developing countries, willing to engage in such a national endeavor.

To develop a national intelligence model applicable for Romania, the study employs benchmarking analysis to compare the structure and performance of various national intelligence systems and extract those structural elements that fit the overall approach to continuous improvement. To insure the efficiency of the results, we have selected for the comparison leading examples of national intelligence systems: the US, France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany.

The analysis resulted in a set of guidelines and best practices that, after integration can be used to elaborate a blueprint for the development of a Romanian national intelligence system by both decision-makers and representative of the academia and private sectors. This research product is by no means comprehensive, as there are many other case studies that could and should have been included in the benchmarking analysis, in order to create a full picture of the overall evolution undergone by states in the process of developing national intelligence systems.

Though the issue of national intelligence system has been debated before, both in the academia and at governmental level, as proven by the existence of the Carayon Report and the works of Robert Steele, this has always occurred in large states, with a strong tradition in the field. The originality of this paper is that it uses benchmarking to try to understand the processes taking place in all those places and then extract key elements and patterns that then can be re-adapted and replicated for a different type of state, such is the case of Romania.

Keywords: national intelligence model, competitiveness, national security, Knowledge Society, knowledge capital

Introduction

“We are a smart people, but a dumb Nation and this is something we must be aware of if we are to prosper and be secure in the 21 century”
(Steele, 2000:80)

National intelligence is produced to ensure national security, a concept defined at the political level, but having its foundations in knowledge intelligence. We can, therefore, conclude that the manner in which the concept of “national security” is defined plays an important part in the development of a national intelligence system/process.

In the last two decades the open systems and open sources field (OSINT) has known an unprecedented evolution. That is why it is important to address OSINT separately from the intelligence collected from covert sources. Such a model would support the theoretical and practical development for both areas of intelligence, enabling OSINT to integrate in the domestic informational cycle of the state. In the same time the covert intelligence becomes a client of OSINT, being unburdened by the efforts OSINT is currently making.

If we were to make an analogy between genetics and the intelligence cycle there are several interesting aspects, which draw our attention. In the case of living organisms, there are two information processing systems, one which works in the background, developing the characteristics of the species and one which works in plain sight comprising those activities, which appear as a response to or anticipation of events taking place in the external environment¹.

¹ A. Fedanzo (1993) A Genetic View of National Intelligence. *Second International Symposium: National Security & National Competitiveness: OPEN SOURCE SOLUTIONS Proceedings*. volume I. p. 6-14. [Online]. Available from <http://www.phibetaiota.net/1993/12/1993-fedanzo-a-genetic-view-of-national-intelligence/>, p. 6-14.

Redefining national intelligence systems, in a context marked by the end of the Cold War, is characterized by processes, which take into account both the national and global features, processes that are controllable and often sequential. The concepts of reform, transformation and/or revolution in intelligence or revolution in intelligence affairs² are employed most often to depict the complexity of changes taking place at the human, institutional and conceptual levels. The objective of these changes consists in the formulation and acquisition of a new ability – the adaptability to an ever changing environment. This is the only way for any social entity to gain competitive advantage. This paper uses benchmarking analysis to study the transformation that has marked the evolution of national intelligence systems, in the last decades, focusing on several significant case-studies such as the US, Canada, France and the UK.

National intelligence units

To be able to conduct a comparative analysis of the national economic intelligence units this study employs a four-tier scale analysis entitled PEKS (P – Political, E – Economic, K – Knowledge and S – Security), layers that must be general and invariant (meaning, a supplementary analysis is needed to show that these tiers are encountered in each national system from the set under analysis). In this study, however, we will limit ourselves to a global analysis, though it is important to note the invariance (in terms of time, it lasted for tens of years) of the institutional structure, mixed with the flexibility necessary for the adaptation of the entire system.

Note that none of the descriptions of national intelligence units mention a platform for the management of human capital production albeit, if we were to study more carefully the cases under analysis, we would notice that each of these units made this their main strategic goal. The moral of this discovery is that, in terms of creating human capital no out-sourcing is employed and only the final institutional product is put forward to be debated upon.

Although, the phrase “economic intelligence” seems to be rooted in a national intelligence context, it is actually built in an interdisciplinary manner. The economic is a means to ensure security understood as sustainability, a necessary means for the value system through the capacity required to gain competitive advantage, a means and not an end in itself.

² D. Barger (2005) *Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affaires*, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division. [Online]. Available from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf, p. 33-47.

It is vital to understand that through the very use of comparative analysis methods, a process of convergence takes place at the structural and functional level of various national intelligence systems, which the states that do not possess the wisdom to prepare in advance for this evolution will be unable to understand.

Besides, the reason behind the need to understand such national systems is that we must possess a good knowledge of the main trends first and then of the fluctuations (for the simple reasons that it is the trends which define the fluctuations in both statistical and cognitive terms). It would be an unforgivable error to accept that Romania is a small country and Romanians are not ready to face the future. Romania is not a small country inside the EU, and in order to have Romanians prepared tomorrow, people should have started yesterday to think about how to prepare them today.

The cases analyzed in this study are those of the US, France, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan. Mapping the level of knowledge in intelligence across the world is maybe one of the most important resources for any intelligence-related activity.

Case Study: the US

The beginning of the 90s in the US was the period of momentous transformations in the field of intelligence as a result of several facts: Robert Steele's redesign of the role of open sources and the creation of the "Smart Nation" concept – a movement that originated inside the Intelligence Community³ and was aimed at ensuring access to open information and later to education, the economic intelligence initiatives, all taking place in the context of the end of the Cold War.

Robert Steele's movement and the transformation it brought contributed to the process of redefining the Euro-Atlantic area in the new political context as the European states identified and implemented the imported conceptual mechanisms of the new paradigm

Even if it is not recognized today by the intelligence establishment the OSINT conferences taking place in both the US and then Europe provided the setting for disseminating to the American and European public information on the new field of intelligence, irrespective of the fact that the

³ An example is the creation in 1995 of COSPO (Community Open Source Program Office) inside the CIA.

audience belonged or not to the intelligence community. The first such conferences were organized by the OSS and Steele's website www.oss.net was for many of the first unrestricted contact with the intelligence field and the first step in the diffusion process of the intelligence culture.

In terms of institutional building the initiative of retired Marine Corps officer James P. Etter of creating in 1991 the American Military University, an establishment which has become a symbol of the intersection between the civil and military worlds, with the academia acting as the main catalyst, was one of the most important stages of the process.

In the new political context, intelligence-related initiatives have multiplied, ensuring a good representation of American strategic intent in non-military terms. What comes out of this is a network of interconnected institutions defending American interests in the economic and non-economic areas.

Therefore, an analysis of the transformations undergone by the American Military University between 1991 and 2004 reveals the sequencing and controllability of the entire process:

I. The research and preparation stage lasted for two years, starting with 1991.

II. The preliminary operations stage took place during a three year period, having national accreditation as the end-goal.

III. Maturation lasted for three years, 1996-1998; note that in 1996 Steele launched the "Smart Nation" concept.

IV. Growth lasted for three years, 1999-2001.

V. Expansion and Diversification lasted for three years, 2002-2004.

The American Military University is a solution fully able to solve the problem of integrating the civilian and military dimensions inside an intelligence/OSINT culture with the help of the academic intelligence concept⁴. The project is envisaged to continue until 2015 as the entire academic system is currently undergoing a transformation that would enable it to provide a nationwide integrated solution.

⁴ In U.S. political culture the civil-military relations were conceived in the democratic state framework, being a continuous research subject D. B. Bobrow (1996), *The Civic Role of the Military: Some Critical Hypotheses*, *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19(1), pp. 101-111 and O. R. Holsti (1998), *A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96*, *International Security*, 23(3), pp. 5-42. In the post-Cold War decades it became a central dimension for both NATO new membership and security affairs as seen in P. D. Feaver (2003), *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press and H. Born, M. Caparini, K.W. Haltiner, J. Kuhlmann (2006), *Civil-Military Relations in Europe Learning from crisis and institutional change*, Routledge, New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

A current example is given by a report from the Defense Science Board (2014), which found there are “gaps” in the U.S. intelligence community’s “global nuclear monitoring” capabilities. It argued that closing these gaps “should be a national priority.” The report recommended adopting “new tools for monitoring,” including looking at “open and commercial sources” with “big data analysis”.

“In some cases, this problem is partly due to a lack of careful scholarship, which requires an awareness of the limitations of the available knowledge, an understanding of how far one can go in drawing conclusions from it, and a willingness to ask tough questions about those conclusions to see how well they hold up to scrutiny. But these gaps and failures are also the product of an institutionalized deficiency in the way the U.S. government recruits and trains intelligence analysts.”⁵

The network of public institutions supporting the national intelligence system has been expanded through partnerships with the public and private sector and a process of externalization aimed at increasing capacity in key areas is underway. An example of these evolutions is the relation established between the Central Intelligence Agency and In-Q-Tel, a non-governmental non-profit organization having the mission of investing in technologies that may prove useful for the technological needs of the US Intelligence Community.

The US structure is designed around what we may call “the Vannevar Bush paradigm” comprising:

- the micro-macro relations between the P component (the white colored area) and the rest of the system; in practical terms, the White House has a representation of the system (unchanged from 1947) and also a responsibility for the political power;
- the S component (the yellow colored area) is fully integrated in the other components through information fusion and decision configuration mechanisms; it acts in practice as an interface between the first component and all the rest, being endowed with the attribute of national security;
- the C component (the green colored area) is from the start designed to integrate the defense economy and civilian economy types of knowledge. One of the institutionalization elements resides right inside the NSF (National Science Foundation, which does not appear in the figure);

⁵ G. Kulacki (2014) Defense Science Board off point open source intelligence reform, Union of Concerned Scientists. [Online]. Available from <http://allthingsnuclear.org/defense-science-board-off-point-on-open-source-intelligence-reform/> [Accessed: 10th January 2014].

- the E component (the violet colored area) has an explicit hegemonic orientation in the framework of the democratic peace theory. It is orientated towards the outside, because domestic welfare is highly dependent on external performance - the welfare at home is achieved with the help of capital imported from outside (this meaning much more than just commerce and the tangible economy);
- the portals component (the blue colored area) is the correspondent of Vannevar Bush's MEMEX idea, represented through the concept of virtualization inside the national intelligence system.



FIGURE 1 – The US National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 3)

All these elements show us that the system in question is highly flexible being designed for economic warfare conducted inside the paradigm “intelligence is knowledge and knowledge is power”. Moreover, following

a knowledge transfer, which has taken place in the last 50 years two phenomena occur: firstly, the philosophy behind this architecture provides the matrix for all other national intelligence systems and secondly, the system must be made more flexible so as to ensure competitive advantage.

The element left unexplained is the training platform, which has been reduced to universities and the “circulation of human resources”, while another key element is the positioning of the “influence” component inside the White House, influence being a fundamental factor in the functioning of the national intelligence system.

Currently, the process of making the system more flexible is undergoing a structural transformation in accordance with the “smart nation” paradigm through the:

a. extension of virtualization – the AMU project has provided the first university that integrates the skills of military and civilian systems on a 100% online platform; this achievement is not prolonged with the “knowledge democratization” process – the creation of a meta-platform fed by the main universities

b. extension of the OSINT paradigm inside the EU – the EUROSINT project for example is a replica of the AMU’s development project;

c. preparations made to develop the theoretical framework necessary for the development of the intelligence field;

d. measures aimed at setting the stage, with the help of the ideas related to the creation of national intelligence systems, for a new understanding of citizen roles – moving towards the vision of the citizen as intelligence consumer (eg. the “lifelong learning” concept fits this new type of paradigm).

Case Study: France

In the beginning of the 90s, as a domestic reaction to the global challenges and through the import in a more or less open manner of the conceptual models that have provided the theoretical basis for the transformation the American intelligence system, France started its own project of redefining its national intelligence system. The main fields of action for the French were the academic, economic and territorial levels. Consequently, a higher education institution was founded dedicated to the means and practice of “economic war”. Moreover, a national network of public and private institutions was created to manage the theoretical and

practical issues connected with the intelligence field. The French approach was openly oriented towards an intelligence culture and a realistic insight into the problems concerning the statecraft future sustainability⁶.

What distinguishes the French project is its centralized character, in agreement with the French political philosophy. Therefore, starting from this background and the existent institutional framework (developed throughout the entire country) the concept of territorial intelligence⁷ is defined as a supplement to that of economic intelligence.

Each of these three initiatives becomes a guiding axis for this study. Two additional clarifications come to strengthen the idea of a sequential and controllable process in what concerns the creation of the French national intelligence system.

Thus, an analysis of the stages undergone by the French intelligence system between 1989 and 2004 show us the sequential and controllable character of the process:

I. 1989-1991 – Identification of the problems through academic debates among experts (the studies of Bernard Naboulek, Christian Harbulot and Philippe Baumard);

II. 1992-1993 – Creation of an analysis group addressing the topic of “economic intelligence and enterprise strategy” within the General Planning Commissariat, under the presidency of Henry Martre;

⁶ e. g. “Even during the Cold War, getting intelligence in economic, technological, and industrial matters from a country with which you are allied is not incompatible with the fact of being allied. The competition in terms of technology and commerce and industry is stronger than it was during the Cold War. There should be more emphasis put on that, and on industrial espionage”, quoted in Schweizer, Peter. *Friendly Spies: How America's Allies Are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our Secrets*, New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993.

⁷ The relationship between territory and political science was initiated as a landmark of the French political culture through the contributions of André Siegfried (1875-1959), the founding father of electoral geography and the corresponding analysis methods e.g. A. Siegfried, *Le Canada et l'impérialisme britannique*, p. 3-58 in A. Siegfried, P. de Rousiers, M. de Périgny, F. Roz, A. Tardieu (1911), *Les questions actuelles de politique étrangère dans l'Amérique du Nord*, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan; A. Siegfried (1913), *Tableau politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République*, Paris: Armand Colin; A. Siegfried (1954), *Tableaux des États-Unis*, Paris: Armand Colin, etc. Some other two facts are relevant on this ground. First, it is noteworthy that this approach is highly different of geopolitics, classic or modern; this aspect was treated in a course of S.G. Sebe, *Analytical Spatial Theories in Political Science*, Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest, 1998-2000 (unpublished). Second these approaches are included in the class of research methods in political science; one example particularly relevant for Romania is Matei's PhD thesis, S. Matei, *Romania at voting age: 18 years of electoral change in post-communism*, Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012.

III. 1994 – Publication of “Martre Report” comprising several proposals, such as:

- a. assessing the potential of existent skills and information networks at national and regional level;
- b. defining the necessary structures and means to create networks;
- c. introducing common procedures.

IV. 1995 – Creation of the “Competitiveness and Economy Security Committee”: seven key figures elected based on their experience, authority and competences in the field of economic intelligence for a period of 3 years with the clear objective of providing decision support to the Government in regard to competitiveness and economic security issues and of providing advice in the elaboration and implementation of policies in the field, thus ensuring continuous coherence and coordination of all actions taken.

V. 2003 – Publication of the “Carayon Report” on economic intelligence, competitiveness and social cohesion;

VI. 2004 – Creation of the General Delegation for Economic Intelligence inside the Ministry of Economy and Finances;

VII. 2008 – The White Book of Defense and National Security launched by the French Presidency of Sarkozy that tries to integrate all previous initiatives in a national intelligence system

VIII. 2009 – The official launching for the DCRI (Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence) and the creation of the DDRI (Departmental Directorates of Interior Intelligence).

IX. September 2009 – the adoption of a decree creating an inter-ministerial delegate for economic intelligence place under the coordination of the General Secretariat of the Economy Ministry. It has the mission of elaborating and promoting public policies in the field of economic intelligence and evaluating their efficacy⁸.

The national network of public institutions supporting the national intelligence system was expanded through partnerships with private and non-governmental organizations (from lobby groups to reputation management NGOs) that act inside the European Union, most often in Brussels, having as a main goal – the defense of French interests. Such an example is represented by the relation between Compagnie Européenne d'Intelligence Stratégique (CEIS) and EUROSINT Forum.

⁸ C. Countenceau, F. Barbara, W. Everett, A. Gilliéron, X. Jacquin, M. Poullain, C. Valle and E. De Vigouroux D'Arvieu, (2010), *Guide Pratique de l'Intelligence Économique*, Paris: Eyrolles, p. 4.

The main successive stages undergone by France in the process of defining a matrix for its national intelligence system, covering the period between 1994 and 2008 have already been mentioned in the beginning of the paper. There are, however, several important accomplishments of the Carayon Report, from which a lot can be learned when implementing a Romanian model. First, the design of the French system employs a state-centric approach, which brings it closer to Romanian traditions in the field. Second, the mentality of the French elite is of a Socialist orientation (following the European Socialist tradition and not the Russian one), which makes a radical transformation impossible. For the abovementioned reasons we will now proceed to show, which elements of the US design lack from the French model, thus indicating the distinct mark of Henri Martre.

The missing institutional components could not be included inside the already existent institutions due to the mentality problems already mentioned, therefore after being identified they were institutionalized separately (this was the case of the “École de guerre économique” and other similar institutions).




FIGURE 2 – French National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 6)

The integrating link between the defense and civilian economies is preserved (the green colored area), acting as in the American case as the originating factor for the OSINT community. The orientation towards hegemony is preserved (the violet colored area). Furthermore, the decision support dimension was ensured through the creation of the French economic rating agency COFACE – Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extérieur.

The traditional French approach on territoriality was re-conceptualized because of the fact that the nearest region is the European Union. Thus, the entire concept was extended through a system similar to territorial and informational early warning. Key positions to place the drivers of change were identified inside the newly created institutions (ADIT – Agence pour la Diffusion de l'Information Technologique, INIST – Institut de l'Information Scientifique et Technique and UbiFrance), designed to flexibilize the system without changing it radically structurally. For example, the great schools, which have provided France its elite for over 200 years (École de Mines, École Normale Supérieure, École Polytechnique și École des Affaires) have remained in place.

Case Study: Canada

The case of Canada is the most important for our analysis because the Canadian national intelligence system was not designed and implemented for hegemony, Canada not being in the position to claim such a status. Furthermore, Canada has a partnership with the US and the EU in the field of intelligence, being one of the most important contributors to the debates on how to make the system more flexible (through the development of intelligence education systems and building a theoretical framework for intelligence).

Canada's behavior is one of discreet intervention in all fields of activity, being oriented mainly towards the external environment and knowing not only how to strengthen its reputation, but also the best ways to capitalize on it.

The Canadian national intelligence system is an offensive one, designed not only for economic competition but also for “knowledge wars”.

In what concerns the design of the Canadian intelligence system the following elements bear notice:

The component dedicated to traditional security (the yellow colored area) is part of the intelligence community and provides decision support solely to the federal government.

The research-development component is distributed between the conquest of markets module (the violet colored areas) for the Applied Research and Commercial Research tasks and the civil society organized as a forum of NGOs for the Fundamental Research and Applied Research tasks.

Although the figure does not include a knowledge production system, we must take into consideration that Canada has a certain particularity, which consists in the integration of think-tanks in the decision-making processes, be it governmental or private. The early warning component is explicitly connected to the concept of opportunity and integrated into the conquest of markets module (in violet).

Another particularity of the Canadian system is the fact that it reunites all professional organizations in a mixed module, which combines market conquering activities with intelligence-related ones (one of the first systems in the world in which the economic sector is conceived as the analogue of a unit engaged in war)

The Canadian intelligence system is practically designed for discretion and integrated action.




FIGURE 3 – Canadian National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

Case Study: Germany

The German case also provides a good study model. The intelligence and influence activities (the yellow colored modules) are conducted by a system explicitly designed for such a purpose as well as by labor syndicates (the OSINT analysis leads to such a conclusion) and through the German intelligence service – the BND. Moreover, these categories of activities are distributed in all the other societal components, from NGOs to the press, large private conglomerates, diplomats etc.

A distinct feature of the German system is its mixed character, which is much more striking than in the case of Canada. In addition to the above mentioned the first referral information are distributed both through the corporate component and through the professional organizations.

Germany's federal structure is transformed in this figure in a criterion for the segmentation of the other modules. For example, the support for research activities is given directly by the lands through universities that integrate fundamental, applied, practical and commercial research activities. Strategies have been initiated at national level to increase the integration of universities, research centers and corporations. For example, in Karlsruhe a technological institute was founded in 2009, which brings together the skills portfolio of the Universität Karlsruhe and the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe.

The orientation towards the conquest of markets is driven by the intelligence activity conducted by the banking system combined with the financial consulting and corporate sector.

The model does not include the analog of the French COFACE, namely HERMES, Germany's rating agency (a project conducted by the University of Ilmenau during 1993-2000 and then transferred to federal level).

The German intelligence community is one of the most advanced in Europe and one of the most relevant indicator of its success is the activity of the Springer Publishing House in Berlin, which in the last 10 years has coordinated several book collections dedicated to intelligence, the majority of which are not translations works written by foreign authors, but are books by German authors; therefore though the German intelligence community is not as vocal or as visible as other intelligence communities in Europe and in the world, the skills it possesses make it a very competitive European actor.




FIGURE 4 – German National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

Case Study: Great Britain

The national intelligence system from Great Britain is the only intelligence system with the corresponding community directly inserted on the external market, which is perfectly understandable given the colonial past of the country. It is the system, which is the most connected to the US intelligence, having enjoyed for the past 50 a symbiotic relation with it.

The intelligence activity functions in the global network through 3 modules: that of intelligence services, the BI compartments (their tradition comes from William Petty in 1660 and the maritime insurance companies) and the Commonwealth's Foreign Ministry and its system embassies.

The financial-banking systems are basically mixes between the intelligence activity, the conquest of markets and the intelligence community.

The NGO systems are sensors and analyzers (according to Waltz's model of informational warfare) for first referral information and decision support for the rest of the system.

The influence systems are distributed through the central concepts of club and lobby, which generate an incredible variety of institutions present in all social segments both inside the country and in the old Commonwealth.

Traditional think-tanks have always filtered the fundamental and applied research, produced by universities and institutes in a format useful for the process of decision-making in the government, corporations or military institutions. This should draw attention to the psychological profile of those trained in these institutions.

Several British institutions have training and selection criteria for professions which demand first and foremost professionalism and as this was applied as a state policy for long periods of time it statistically lead to remarkable results, which become indisputably reputation bearers.




FIGURE 5 – British National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

Japan

The case of Japan deserves special consideration because of several factors:

It is the only national intelligence system organized dynamically, not in a sequential network, but in a static one, so that it allows adaptable virtualization.

This characteristic is the result of two factors. The first is the PDCA cycle (Plan, Do, Check, Act), a cycle defined by Deming for industrial production processes from the 50s and the second is the management principles formulated by Drucker (in the same period, during their time in Japan). Their synthesis in terms of political marketing intelligence combined with the Japanese value system has led to this outcome. As the PDCA⁹ and OODA¹⁰ cycle are symbiotic, the conceptual structure of management places the architecture of such a system on a special position giving it a level of flexibility, which allows dynamic adaptation to take place.

Therefore, the Japanese designed extended the PDCA cycle from one of industrial production as component of the tangible economy to an organizational intelligence cycle¹¹. As we can notice the diagram includes all fundamental elements of the Japanese system. These elements are placed on an information platform (represented by the star-shaped pentagon in the center) which ensures the dynamic update of the information. The micro/macro characteristic confers informational cohesion and interoperability to the system. Furthermore, Japan has the only national intelligence system with a micro/macro accumulation, meaning that knowledge accumulation at the level of the company's functions by the same logic as knowledge accumulation at state level. The added value consists in the transformation of information in intelligence at the level of each organization.

Similarly to the British case, JETRO (Japan's External Trade Organization) integrates together with the professional federations the intelligence and conquest of markets functions, the two acting as the dynamic components which organically tie the two functions.

Another fundamental characteristic is the fact that the first referral information are often to be found in the scientific field, especially as a result

⁹ PDCA – Plan, Do, Check, Act – model elaborated by Dr. Edwards Deming, the father of modern quality check and Walter Andrew Shewhart.

¹⁰ OODA – Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action – the OODA cycle elaborated by John Boyd.

¹¹ In accordance with Wilensky's theory (1967), where the main feature is the integration of the governmental and corporate components to acquire competitive advantage for the nation-state.

of the fundamental and applied research processes in their early stages. This gives the system good prediction capabilities.

As mentioned before, the orientation toward hegemony manifests itself in the Japanese case not only in the economic field, but also in what concerns the universities and research institutes focused on the study of foreign markets (as each entity from the domestic markets has a clearly established position due to the dynamic accumulation mechanisms).

The syndicates are integrated into this cycle, being given decision-making powers. Through this the designer of the Japanese system wishes to acquire a certain dynamic social cohesion inside the system. The banks are conceived as integrating factors for the first referral information and conquest of new markets-related processes. The SMEs are in touch with the think-tanks through a separate regulatory channel, profiting with their help by the activities conducted by JETRO.

The state is, in reality, given a coordinator role for all scientific information, differentiating between the intelligence cycles of the corporations and the intelligence resources of the system. The analysis of this system is important not only because of its similarities with the OODA cycle¹², but also because of its dynamic nature.

Initially, the Japanese experts active in the field of marketing intelligence designed the intelligence capabilities of the large Japanese corporations and the solutions they provided led to the genesis of the Japanese national intelligence system.

¹² That in the meantime has become a research topic in the Euro-Atlantic area.




FIGURE 6 – Japanese National Intelligence System
(Carayon, 2003, Annex 7)

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Terrorist press – Inspire magazine

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"Terorism is a product of freedom , particularly freedom of the press"
Brian Jenkins

Abstract

Mass media and terrorism are two intertwined phenomena which inevitably gave birth to a "marriage" from which both sides benefit. For several decades terrorist networks have learned to use media to induce fear or to attract new supporters and adherents. Innovative and open to change, terrorist groups have shifted part of their media in the virtual and online environment.

This paper is a qualitative and subjective analysis of the most successful terrorist publications in the Inspire magazine. Inspire magazine is a current online publication issued by the Al Malahen media foundation in 2010.

The main aim of this paper is to analyze how the objectives proposed by the editors are found throughout the content of the magazine. From the methodological point of view, this work is based on a content analysis tool through which we analyzed the ten issues of the magazine. In our analysis we took in consideration four indicators: the magazine sections, the authors, the images and the overall tone of the articles.

Keywords: terrorism, mass media, Inspire magazine, qualitative analysis.

The evolution and progress generated by the media and the advent and popularization of the Internet has led to changes in the way in which terrorist groups regard the media. Terrorists have observed that the mass media and the internet are fields of influence for every XXIst century individual so that they began to see it as a vehicle for achieving their

objectives. The importance of the media in this process is confirmed by the current leader of the terrorist network Al-Qaeda, Al Zawahiri, who estimated that more than half of the battle between believers and nonbelievers is taking place in a "battlefield" created by the media¹.

Glimpsing the interdependent and symbiotic relationship between them, terrorist organizations have learned to use the media to spread fear among a target group to attract and mobilize supporters or to undermine the ability of governments to ensure the safety of their citizens. "The marriage" between the two is translated in terms of advertising and audience: terrorists need publicity and the media needs viewers and, therefore, audience. The effects of this marriage are significantly positive. Through countless news articles about them, terrorist groups succeed to spread fear or sympathy in the audience.

The means by which terrorist organizations use the media are different. Whether they use newspapers, television or virtual environment interventions they reinforce once again the conclusion of the researcher Brian Jenkins who at a certain point said that "terrorism is a product of freedom, freedom of the press particularly".²

Based on these aspects, the present approach represents an analysis of one of the most successful publications promoted by terrorist networks- *Inspire magazine*. *Inspire magazine* is promoted under the auspices of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and since 2010 arrives in the hands of English readers from all over the world through the internet.

This paper is an analysis of how the objectives of the editors are found in the content. Through this approach we try to demonstrate once again that freedom of the press and the globalized world in which the Internet is a natural part of every individual's life, leads to the spread of radical ideas and also to the attraction of new supporters and followers for that group.

¹ The original quote is "more than a half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of media." Fawz GERGES, *The war enemy, why jihad went global*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 194 *apud* Transnational Terrorism Security & the Rule of Law: *Terrorism and the Media*, available at <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP4%20Del%206.pdf>, p 4.

² William BIERNATZK, "Terrorism and Mass Media" in *Communications Research Trends*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2002, p. 5. available http://csc.scu.edu/trends/v21/v21_1.pdf, accessed in 28.08.2013.

Methodologically, our approach is built on a qualitative and subjective analysis based on the content analysis instrument. The ideas and findings that will be presented below are the result of the analysis of the ten numbers of the jihadist magazine, through four indicators. The magazine was analyzed considering the *magazine sections*, the *contributors/authors* that sign articles in the magazine, in terms of *the overall tone* of the article but also the *images* presented in the journal. We will track the frequency of certain sections, the origin of the authors (political leaders/religious leaders/supporters) to determine the legitimacy of the magazine in conjunction with the objectives it sets them. Assessment records (religious/motivational instigator/objective) in which the articles are written and the analysis of images (portrait/violent images/peaceful pictures), will be an important aspect of the analysis because it will show how the editors use everything they have in their hands to generate emotions and radical behaviours.

Inspire-and inspire the believers³

Through Al Malahen Media foundation, the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula succeeded since 2010, to spread online no more and no less than ten editions of Inspire magazine, turning it into a real success for the terrorist group and a veritable propaganda device for the ideals and goals of the group.

The purpose of this magazine is contained in the first page of the first editorial. The journal editors say that Inspire will be *a mean by which Muslims around the world will be brought together in the right path of Allah*; it will be an engine for *creating a more positive image for Salafi Islam* which is increasingly polluted by western media. Inspire magazine also aims to be *a platform for the most important events of the area* and an *environment of clear presentation of Islam*. By far, the most important goal proposed by the editors of the magazine is that it is meant to be a *source of inspiration for the warriors of Allah*, a catalyst for believers who have to fight in the name of Allah⁴.The editors of the magazine are encouraging

³ *Inspire-and inspires the Believers* is the motto that opens each issue of the magazine.

⁴ "Letter form the editor" in *Inspire* , Issue 1 1431, 2010, p.1.

the readers to contribute with articles to this approach, offering, at the end of each edition, a series of tips and addresses where anyone can submit a contribution.

A brief analysis of the ten issues of the magazine clearly reveals the attractiveness and complexity driven not only from the interactive template but also from its interesting topics. The magazine is unquestionably an anti-American, anti-Israeli magazine and a genuine device of propaganda, indoctrination and radicalization.

The objectives of this magazine are easily identifiable in the sections and the topics that it hosts. The most common and important sections will be discussed shortly below.

As a platform for events marking the Muslim world, Inspire magazine devotes one page of each edition to the section *Hear the World ... a collection of quotes from a friend and a foe*. People that are cited in this section are divided into two categories as the title states: the "friends" and "enemies" or heroes and antiheroes. In the enemies category the most common appearances are those of the U.S. President Barack Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Vice President Joe Biden. Along with this, journalists and other officials of the United States security department are considered enemies. The heroes of the Muslim world are people more or less known who devote their lives to the spreading of the message of Allah. The great leaders of Al Qaeda are the most cited along with other fighters and clerics of Islam. Through this section, the magazine aims to accordingly inform the reader about major events that occurred in the Middle East region showing, in the same time, the real picture of Islam.

Another section of the magazine is the *Question we all should be asking!*. Within that section the readers have the opportunity to reflect on some questions that only have an anti American or anti-Israeli answer. The most frequently mentioned topics are related to the American presence in Iraq and Israel's position towards the Palestine situation. This section is a means by which those who stand behind it shall ensure that their perspective on important issues concerning the Muslim world is acquired in accordance with their vision.

Readers of the magazine have the chance to come in contact with the leading representatives of the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula group. Using a

shaker register the great political and religious leaders are calling Muslims from all over the world to join and fight for jihad. The same speech is maintained in other sections of the magazine like *A Call to Islam* or *The call of the Quran* in which the clerics and some religious leaders explain the basic principles of Islam. Another interesting item that is present in almost every issue of the magazine is titled *Why do I Chose Al Qaeda*. It is based on the work of Sheikh Abu Musab al Awake, a work that deals extensively with no more than 46 reasons for choosing to be part of this famous organization. During several numbers of the magazine the author discussed several reasons why you should join te Al Qaeda. Some of those reasons are:

- Because it follows the path of Jihad
- Because the organization is strong enough to survive
- Because the religion of Abraham is directed against the infidels
- Is based on universal ways to achieve victory
- Jews and Christians hate Muslims

Other sections like *My Life in Jihad*, discuss some terrorists experiences and a great source of inspiration for every reader. Almost every issue of the magazine is having a series of reflections, poems or motivational quotes.

Besides the religious, the motivational and inspirational section the magazine has a practical component that aims to prepare its readers, future Jihadist fighters, in actual fighting techniques. In this regard, *Open Source Jihad*⁵ section includes a series of practical lessons, ideal for everyone who plans a terrorist attack. Open Source Jihad is designed as a handbook for those fighting against tyrants and it's considered to be "the American greatest nightmare." The Open Source Jihad section provides information about how to build a bomb (*Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mother*) about the security measures that a fighter must take, or a series of guerrilla tactics etc. The first lesson explains systematically what is the easiest way to

⁵ Notice the ironic similarity with the already known Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The editors assign the concept of open to issues concerning educating readers in the direction of acquiring skills and competencies that can be used in physical combat against the enemy. It can be seen as the magazine opened its pages not only to theoretical, ideological and motivational issues but it also has a pragmatic part where, through the technical lessons the readers can apply what they learn.

manufacture a bomb⁶. In the same section, another issue of the magazine offers a number of tips for members who live in the U. S.⁷ or those who seek to destroy or burn buildings⁸. Another issue provides the leaders with the knowledge of how to produce Acetone Peroxide⁹, how to wield an AK¹⁰ or an ordinary pistol or what are the ways in which you can produce road accidents and then disappear quickly¹¹.

After evaluating how the content of the magazine is structured we can say that the goals proposed in the first editorial are achieved: the Jihad fighters stories are aimed to inspire and bring Muslims on the right path of Allah, the clerics' teachings promote the desired image of Islam, and the readers are provided with an x-ray accompanied by a range of perspectives on the most important events in the area.

Another indicator of the scale of analysis that we used refers to the authors of the materials present in the magazine. Based on the analysis, we have come to the conclusion that the contributors have the role to strengthen and give legitimacy to the magazine. The great leaders are not missing from the contributors list. Voices of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri are heard in the first pages of the magazine. In *The way to save the earth*, Osama bin Laden, the former leader of the network, draws attention not on things that should be taken to preserve the planet, but rather the causes that gave rise to these concerns. Highly researched, the article condemns the luxury and extravagance of western countries and accuses American industry and their corporations for damaging the environment. This article opens the first edition of *Inspire*. Another article signed by Osama Bin Laden encourages readers to punish Americans who have done so much harm to the Muslims¹². The interventions of the current leader of the network are also relevant.

⁶ "Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom-a detailed yet short easy to read manual on how to make a bomb using kitchen ingredients" in *Inspire*, Issue 1, Summer 1431, 2010, p. 33

⁷ Tips for our brothers from United Snakes of America-from experience Yahya Ibrahim explains how to protect oneself from the enemy when conducting operation" in *Inspire*, Issue 2, Fall 1431, 2010, p. 55.

⁸ Destroying buildings" in *Inspire*, Issue 3, Winter 1431, 2010, p. 39.

⁹ "Makin Acetone Peroxide – Dr. Kateer has cooked up a fatal formula with ingredients widely available" in *Inspire*, Issue 6, Summer1432,2011, p. 39

¹⁰ "Training with an AK" in *Inspire*, Issue 5, Spring 1431, 2011, p. 24.

¹¹ "Causing road accidents" in *Inspire*, Issue 10, Spring1432, 2013, p. 52.

¹² "In order that they taste some of what we tasted" in *Inspire*, Issue 4, winter 1431, 2010, p. 18.

Immediately after the onset of the phenomenon known as the Arab Spring, Ayman Al Zawahiri comments on the situation and encourages the continued fight against the infidels¹³. Along with this, the magazine often hosts articles by Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan and other political and religious leaders of the network. The weight they give to the magazine is undeniable. Their presence not only proves the legitimacy of the magazine but also the fact that the terrorist groups are aware that the fight against infidels can be taken not only on the battlefields.

Regarding the overall tone of the magazine articles, we found that almost none of the articles can be placed in an objective register, which again demonstrates the propagandistic character of the publication. Magazine articles can be separated in two categories: motivational-instigator and religious. Below we have selected some quotes that you can easily fit in a motivational/instigator register:

"And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief) and the religion will all be for Allah alone"
*"Jihad today! Jannah tomorrow!"*¹⁴

In this way the readers are urged to take part in Jihad, a fight that will eliminate all unbelievers and will guarantee them a place in Paradise. All ten issues of the magazine contain messages that inspire the desire to take part in combat and otherwise bring Muslims together in this direction. These messages are subtle, hidden in the stories of the martyrs, political and religious speeches or explicit as poetry.

Deeply religious references and a language that praises Allah are also embedded into the overall tone of the articles. As a true jihadist magazine, Inspire treats the issue of death in the name of Allah gloriously and great. Each issue of the magazine treats those who resort to terrorism as heroes. Name of Allah or the Prophet Mohammed are very often invoked.

*"Nobody who enters Paradise likes to go back to the world even if he got everything on the earth, except a Mujahid who whises to return to the world so that he may be martyred again because of the dignity he receives from Allah!"*¹⁵

¹³ "The short and long-term plans after the protests" in *Inspire*, Issue 5, Spring 1431, 2011, p. 34.

¹⁴ *Inspire*, Issue 4, Winter 1431, 2010, p. 60.

¹⁵ "O Martyr, you have iluminated" in *Inspire*, Issue 1, Summer 1431, 2010, p. 30.

The quote presented above shows how readers are encouraged to take actions that can bring them death, death which is the passport to Paradise. True martyrs are therefore those who would choose to leave paradise to return to earth to perform new works worthy of a martyr.

Such motivational, instigator messages motivated by deep religious reasons can convince readers to join the line of martyrs but can also generate a negative image of Islam. Even if editors do not realize the negative, violent image that they created to Islam, they promote a distorted image of Salafist Islam.


Leaving aside the content of the articles, Inspire manages to meet its objectives through the graphics and images presented in every issues of the magazine.



Portraits of leaders, clerics and enemies are present in almost every issue. The praised jihadist heroes are surprised in various poses.

The most common characters whose images appear in the magazine are Osama bin Laden, the current leader of Al Zawahiri Ayman network, the U. S. President Barack Obama and other leaders of the Muslim world (Anwar al-Awlaki etc.). Pictures of leaders like Osama bin Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri are a catalyst and an impulse for all the Allah fighters. Put in contrast with American and Israeli enemies, portraits of Muslim leaders and clerics give legitimacy and substance to the journal content.

Violent images are also an important part of the media strategy to inspire readers to support jihadist ideals. The ten issues of the Inspire magazine are loaded with pictures of attacked places or soldiers ready to fight in a battle.



Beyond the images of brave jihadists or the damages caused by them, the editors resorted to a series of images that incite to violence.



Messages like "Yes we can"¹⁶ to "A bullet a day keeps the infidel away"¹⁷ encourages violent impulses while images titled "Your blood won't be wasted" ensure readers and potential martyrs that their deaths will not be in vain and that the blood which they will shed will benefit the community.

In addition to this category of images, in the magazine can be found an excellent set of explicit pictures for Open Source Jihad section. Technical

¹⁶ Those who made this poster certainly had in mind the famous campaign slogan of President Barack Obama.

¹⁷ *Inspire*, Issue 3, Winter 1431, 2010, p. 9.

guidance is accompanied by images that help the reader to better understand the way to build a bomb or the techniques to fight to survive.

An interesting edition of Inspire magazine is the issue of 2011 summer, issue which commemorates the death of the famous leader of the network. Killed by a Navy Seal team soldiers, Osama Bin Laden is praised and described with the most glorifying words. The day he died is considered a historic day, a day when he joined the caravan of the wise people. After a lifetime of effort, determination, patience, jihad, generosity, nobility, honesty, wisdom and tact the great leader died but his blood, his words, his spirit will stand out over generations.

The importance of the ninth issue of the magazine, for our research lies in the editorial that opens the magazine. The editors are explaining very clearly that the death of the great leader does not mean the death of the magazine and that's because Allah will continue to manifest, to enlighten and inspire the lives of many members of the organization.

Through articles and the authors that the magazine hosts, the tone of the letter and the images they promote, *Inspire* is a true 'soldier' in the fight against the so-called infidels. The attractiveness of the articles and the messages that they send cannot be challenged, which is why it can be a magnet for all those who sympathize with the terrorist network. Undoubtedly Inspire can be a contributing factor in the radicalization of individuals. Beyond all this, the magazine is a success of a fundamentalist Arab media, an anti American and anti Israeli flag and a reliable partner of the Al Qaeda and terrorism of any invoice.

Aware of the potential of the magazine, the Western world has more than once taken a strong position against the terrorist magazine. A U. S. official goes so far as he recognizes the quality and success of the magazine: *it is an unfortunately well done magazine and a virtual guide for becoming a terrorist*¹⁸. David Gomez, an FBI counterterrorism agent from Seattle, believes the following: *we understand the absolute seriousness of the threat from an Al Qaeda inspired magazine* and promises a number of measures to minimize or reduce the maximum possible negative effects: *assist the*

¹⁸ "Inspire reactions" in *Inspire*, Issue 4, winter 1431, 2010, p. 11.

*individuals and protect themselves from changing their behavior and making them less of a target*¹⁹.

Conclusions

Returning to the idea of Brian Jerkins, throughout the article, we have seen how the terrorist magazine of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula strengthens the idea that the media can mobilize and inspire members and also attract new supporters for the network. Starting from the goal we set earlier we conclude by stating that the editors of Inspire magazine achieve, at least partially, objectives set forth: guidance of Muslims around the world on – what they call - the right path of Allah, building what they consider to be a real and positive image for Salafi Islam, inspiring and informing readers about important events in the area etc.

Sections of the magazine as: *My Life in Jihad*, *The Call of the Quran*, *Hear the World* and *Open Source Jihad*, sprinkled with articles signed by political or clerical leaders with a large load of legitimacy (Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahiri and others), discussed in glorifying, inflammatory and anti-American registers, outlines the profile of an attractive, anti-American and anti-Israeli magazine.

Considering these issues and others that were detailed in the pages above, we consider that the journal is a genuine terrorist propaganda device that can be a perfect tool in any radicalization process. As a conclusion we can say that Inspire represents a success in the context of marriage between terrorism and the media. Using the freedom of the press and the immensity of the virtual environment, Al Qaeda in Arab Peninsula is acting in its benefit. *Inspire* magazine is undoubtedly a "soldier" in the war against the "infidels".

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The backstage of the Russian espionage activities on the Romanian territory, at the beginning of the XXth century

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Abstract

Unlike the successor Soviet regime, imperial Russia's expansionist ambitions were not global, as the Empire's only aim was to occupy the Balkans and the nearby Straits. Since 1878, Romania represented a serious obstacle in achieving these goals, which is why Russian authorities „sought to cause domestic problems” through influence, espionage and corruption of Romanian citizens.

At the beginning of the XXth century, foreign espionage represented a great challenge for the Romanian military and civilian intelligence organizations. In an attempt to implement preventive security measures in Romania, in 1908, the Department for General State Security is established within the Ministry of Interior. During Romania's neutrality period (1914-1916), this secret police force counteracted various espionage and betrayal cases.

Although most of the cases were focused on the activity of German and Austro-Hungarian intelligence services, the Department for General State Security also pursued and annihilated Czarist espionage networks.

Keywords: espionage, Russian Empire, Department for General State Security, intelligence cooperation, Ministry of Interior, Romanian Army.

Introduction

The old Kingdom becomes, through the neutrality adopted in the fall of 1914, a turning point of all the belligerents' espionage. Radu Rosetti suggestively conveys the atmosphere of an apparent eye of the storm, in the midst of a global torment, as Bucharest was perceived at the time „...the air of corruption and scheming maintained by both groups of adversaries in Bucharest, where the so called social life followed its course and the nightlife had a huge development. Beside the interlopers and usual low lives

of the capitals, as well as the more or less honest businessmen, Bucharest, and especially its hotels, cafes, restaurants were overwhelmed by an utter invasion of news correspondents, commissioners, actresses and others of the kind, some in service of one or the other power groups, others adventurers in search of financial gain”¹.

The German and Austro-Hungarian intelligence services were spending, during those years, huge amounts of money to influence the public opinion in favour of the Central Powers, having on their payrolls Romanian citizens belonging to all social strata.

While there are numerous accounts and studies regarding the economic and military espionage as well as the propaganda carried out by the Germans and Austrians, this is not the case for the espionage activity carried out on the national territory by our future ally in the first world conflagration, Czarist Russia.

The Romanian state, independent after 1878 and undertaking a strong process of modernization in the following decades represented a major impediment both in ensuring a terrestrial corridor linking the Russian Empire and the „Slav brothers” from the Balkans, and in reaching the main objective of the Empire’s foreign policy – the occupation and control of the Straits. Since an open military conflict against our country was out of the question, various entities tried, through a multitude of means (the greatest majority of them coming from the arsenal of the espionage services), to create trouble for the country’s governments. That happened in the context in which the Czarist Empire had superior capabilities and resources and undertook, contrary to the largely circulated opinion in the epoch, an ample process of modernization and development.

Even from its very beginnings, the Russian secret police had paid undivided attention to the espionage activities conducted in the states which presented interest for the Czarist Empire. Nevertheless, for various reasons, the results didn’t live up to the expectations, the mistaken informative notes from the time of the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905) being an edifying example in that sense. However, the intelligence and counterintelligence structures of the Russian imperial army achieved remarkable results in the first decade of the XXth century (a notable exception being the defeat in front of Japan).

¹ Radu R. Rosetti, *Mărturisiri (1914-1919)*, Editura Modelism, București, 1997, p. 62.

The military attachés accredited with the diplomatic missions, whose attributions included informative activities, proved to be extremely efficient. The Russian military attaché in Vienna, colonel Matschenko, took advantage of favourable circumstances, and was able to use to his advantage, at the beginning of the XXth century, the atmosphere and general state amongst the Austrian officers to recruit agents. Amidst many armies there are elements who will betray for any number of advantages, but the Austro-Hungarian army „excelled” in this. The list of agents recruited by the Russian officer contained intelligence officers, from the military justice, or detached in different military branches both in Vienna and the imperial provinces².

These, as well as others recruited by the Russian military espionage (a structure which was extremely active in Romania, too), have offered the decision makers at Petrograd the complete picture of the Austro-Hungarian adversary’s capabilities, with direct effects on the unfolding of the military operations in the first year of war.

According to general Gheorghe Dabija, Romania’s military attaché in Sofia during 1910-1913³, the Russian military espionage was coordinated from Sankt Petersburg by general-major Yuri N. Danilov⁴ around the onset of the world conflagration. The Empire was divided into 13 military districts, each disposing of its own agents network; the most powerful district espionage centres were, taking into account the „objectives” they had in sight, Warsaw (lead by colonel Nikolai Batiushin, the one who had managed to recruit the head of the Austro-Hungarian military counterespionage, colonel Alfred Redl), Odessa (from where, as we will see along the study, the espionage directed against Romania was conducted) and Kiev.

From his official stance, general Dabija wrote, referring to the collaboration he had in Sofia with the Russian military attaché: „colonel Romanowski, intelligent, with a moderate and sensible spirit, with very distinguished manners, a gentleman. An excellent Major State officer, I have had the best rapport with him, working close together, which was notable, *since he had extensive informative means and possibilities, which I completely lacked*. Nevertheless, thanks to the friendship that bound us, both I and my country have benefited.”⁵

² Alexandru Popescu, *Agenții mărturisiți. Diplomații și spionajul*, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, București, 2009, p. 72.

³ Gheorghe Dabija, *Amintirile unui atașat militar român în Bulgaria. 1910-1913*, Editura Ziarului „Universul”, București, 1936.

⁴ Leonard Raymond, *Secret Soldiers of the Revolution*, Greenwoodpress, 1999.

⁵ Gheorghe Dabija, *op. cit.*, p.54.

Although it is still not a fully elucidated subject, we can also talk about a certain foreign involvement where the onset and unfolding of the peasant revolt from 1907 is concerned, an event with major reverberations on the national public opinion.

In connection with this issue, the first report addressed to the state leadership at the beginning of the uprising by Jules Văsescu, the prefect of Botosani county, demands, on the 10th of March 1907, that the troops sent as reinforcement be cavalry, as the instigators do not come from the revolted villages, but are rapidly moving from village to village: „*they are emissaries who roam the villages and promise, in the name of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to distribute the land to peasants, and encourages them to revolt, so that Russia will come to power in this country, since only they will be able to distribute the land*”⁶.

In the second report of the prefect, dated 11 March 1907, the army's help request is renewed, because the situation was rapidly worsening: „The revolution phase has changed, the inhabitants, thanks to the instigators – *believed to be Russians by nationality* – who roam the villages, seeing that they were able to determine the landlords to fulfil their demands, ask for more: to divide the lands among themselves... There is an absolute necessity for cavalry, in order to successfully pursue the gangs that roam the villages in order to determine the uprising of the peasants. The infantry cannot carry out this mission.”⁷

Although during the following decades the existence of these Russian, instigators or paid by the Russians, was denied, it is obvious that Petrograd was trying to take full advantage of any internal problem Romania might have had, fact which was all too well known by the Romanian governors. This is why, starting with the 7th of March, the Romanian authorities ordered that the borders close „from Suceava to Mihăileni” so as to prevent the infiltration of agents dressed up as peasants from Bucovina and not to provide a pretext for military intervention on the part of Czarist Russia and Austro-Hungary⁸.

⁶ *Răscoala din 1907*, vol. I, Editura de Stat, București, 1948, p. 49, *apud* Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *Istoria loviturilor de stat în România*, vol. 2, Editura RAO, București, 2001, p. 134.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 54 (Raportul nr. 1933 din 11 martie 1907), *apud* Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

⁸ Alex Mihai Stoenescu, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

Unfortunately, the files of the Police Department and the Department of General State Security that can be found at the Romanian National Archives (RNA) do not shed any light with regard to this matter, so that a definite conclusion might be reached. The researchers have yet to complete, in different archives from Bucharest or the rest of the territory, a laborious work of clarification concerning several aspects of Romania's modern history.

Nevertheless, the documentary basis at the RNA allows us to reconstitute one of the Russian espionage networks from Romania, at the beginning of the XXth century, painstakingly structured over many years. Since many of the files belonging to the huge operative archive of the State Security have disappeared, or have been destroyed during the past century, we don't have a complete image of the phenomenon, but "pieces of the puzzle". Because of this, we cannot make a definite statement in connection with the undoubted and obvious guilt of all the persons mentioned in the documents which were written by the agents and informants of the Police and State Security.

The espionage of the Czarist Empire on the national territory up to Romania's entrance in the First World War

The law reorganizing the Ministry of Interior adopted during the mandate of Secretary Vasile Lascăr, April 1903, was intended to be the answer to the evolution of society at the beginning of that century; but the events that followed showed that this was appropriate for the institution of Police only as „administrative police”, lacking the intelligence component, the one which meant collecting the information⁹.

The peasant uprising from March 1907 played the role of a real „cold shower” for the Romanian political elite, who were totally taken aback because they lacked pertinent information on the explosive situation registered at that point in the rural world. This is why, in March 1908 a law is adopted, by which the Department of Police and General Security (DPGS) is established, consisting of two sections: the General State Security and the Police. To ensure an increased efficiency, all the structures having state security attributions were organized and functioned separately from the General State Police, being much less exposed to the pressures coming on the part of the local authorities, like the prefect or the political parties¹⁰.

⁹ Adrian Pohrib, *Din istoria Poliției Române. Poliția orașului Galați între anii 1832 și 1949. Istoric și documente*, Editura AGATON, Galați, 2013, p. 63.

¹⁰ Alin Spănu, *Serviciul de informații al României în războiul de întregire națională (1916-1920)*, Editura Militară, București, 2012, p. 27.

Looking to create a strong state institution with special assignments, the leadership of the state saw in the General State Security the „nerve of Police which is duly tensed by the environment, conducting to the general measures in matters of public order and state security, registering at the same time all the seismic activity occurring in domestic population as well as in the neighbouring countries, so that it may prevent, in due time, those subversive moves against the security of the state”¹¹.

A significant amount of attention was also paid to the Police from the border crossing points and harbours, which was under the direct leadership of the Secretary of Interior and was exercised by the director of DPGS, who had the right of complete control over the entire activity¹².

In conclusion, the State Security, as the main institution with attributions in collecting information both internally and externally, had the duty to ensure constitutional order, the country’s internal security and to counter the actions carried out by hostile states, which would have attempted to endanger Romania’s independence and territorial integrity.

Due to the close collaboration between the different structures of the power institutions belonging to the state (especially the Ministry of Interior and the Army) many of the attempts by different foreign powers to find out about Romania’s strengths and vulnerabilities were discovered and annihilated. Some successful examples are presented in the following lines.

One of the intensely mediated espionage cases in the epoch, in which the Czarist espionage was definitely involved, is that of the artillery captain Rodrig Goliescu. A talented inventor in the field of aviation at the beginning of the XXth century, as well as a person with doubtful morals, eager to become rich and living over the means offered by his military condition, he enters a dangerous game of national treason¹³.

Sent with substantial financing from the Romanian state to Paris, in order to perfect his invention (the „avioplane” – a hybrid airplane), he returns in the autumn of 1910 with unpaid debts. In Bucharest, taking advantage of the fictitious company that he had registered in France – „The society of aviation Goliescu et comp”, he tries, without too much success, to scam people who were willing to invest in a flourishing business. On the occasion of his visit to Russia, made in order to get the approval for

¹¹ Vasile Bobocescu, *Istoria Poliției Române*, Editura Ministerului de Interne, București, 2000, p. 141.

¹² Adrian Pohrib, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

¹³ See C. Neagu, D. Marinescu, R. Georgescu, *Fapte din umbră*, vol. II, Editura Politică, București, 1977, pp. 49-57.

his avioplane inventor's certificate, from the Ministry of Industry, he enters the attention of the Russian espionage. In June 1912 he is contacted by the Russian agent Piotr Altinovici, interpreter at the Russian Legation, who recruits him as informer.

In a note discovered when searching his house, Rodrig Goliescu assumed, in writing, the obligation to transmit the Russian intelligence service a number of documents with regard to the national security: the mobilization plan of an infantry regiment, with all the necessary data; the last edition of the Mobilization regulation and the concentration plan of the Romanian army in case of war with the Czarist Empire or Austro-Hungary; the Major State's plan of military transports on the railroads in case of mobilization, etc.¹⁴.

The need to procure the necessary military information makes him look for help, which is fatal. His former subordinate, M. Predescu, whom he had contacted in order to steal the documents from the Great Major State, presented the case to his superiors, which meant that Goliescu was taken over by the General State Security, which had the required competencies and resources to monitor him. He will be arrested on the 13th of February 1913, with the news spreading like wildfire all over the capital.

Because of the given situation, Piotr Altinovici clandestinely leaves the country, avoiding the monitoring performed by the Romanian agents; in the document issued as a consequence of searching his house, the police officer appointed to execute the mandate of bringing him states that „he is out of the country and there is no information related to his whereabouts”¹⁵.

In the spring of 1913, the War Council of the II Army Echelon started the instrumentation of the process. The sentence from the 22nd of June 1913 condemned captain Goliescu to twenty years of hard labour and military degradation for „high treason and forgery of signatures and seals”¹⁶. He outlives the war, being set free in 1925, but all his latter attempts to officially rehabilitate himself were doomed (he dies in 1942).

The Russian-Bulgarian collaboration aimed at spying the Romanian military apparatus

In a very important Report dated November 12th 1907, submitted to the Home Secretary and to the War Secretary also, the DPGS Director draws attention upon a dangerous case of espionage in which Bulgaria was involved and most likely Czarist Russia, too. Thanks to the efficient collaboration

¹⁴ Paul Ștefănescu, *Istoria serviciilor secrete române*, Editura ANTET, Prahova, 2007, p. 36.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 56.

between institutions in matters concerning national security, the Postal Office from Odobesti sends the Department of Post and Telegraph a parcel considered suspicious, which is then sent to the General State Security. Here it is opened and closely examined, only to conclude that it is a case which can seriously affect Romania's security. The parcel was addressed to a Bulgarian artillery officer who lived in Sofia, lieutenant G. Hesapcieff and contained maps and detailed military plans of a part of Moldova.

Director Panaitescu highlights, among other things, the existing cooperation between the Russian and Bulgarian institutions, having as a joint objective the espionage of our country. This was vital for the Czarist army and espionage service because any arrival in our country of a Russian employee, civilian or military, was rigorously registered and monitored both by the Police and Security or County Police. However, the movement freedom of the Bulgarian citizens was much greater on Romanian territory.

„The logical conclusion would be that this espionage was carried out in the best interest of the Bulgarian army. Nevertheless, since the area represented by the afore mentioned maps is situated beyond the fortified line Focșani Nămolosa, (Putna-Bacău), a region which falls outside the Bulgarian interest zone, it is not excluded that this espionage activity is performed by the Bulgarians to serve Russian interests. It is possible that Russians use Bulgarian undercover officers, since it is much easier for them to enter the country without being noticed, mingling with Bulgarian workers and merchants who can be found at the gates of all our military establishments.

There is not one troop who starts its march without being followed by the Bulgarian merchants everywhere, only God knows how many of them are undercover officers. It would have been very difficult for Russian officers to enter the country and mix with the population, they would have been immediately discovered, since they could have only dressed up as icon painters, which are always suspects for the authorities and even if they had not been discovered, they would still not have been able to do a very good job, not having the possibility to stay around military units and travel along with the troops in marches, exercises and manoeuvres...¹⁷.

In conclusion, the report of the General Director of DPGS draws attention on the necessity that „The Grand Major State of the Army establishes a counter-espionage service, which should be well organized in order to easily reveal the spies who roam the country”. All the more since „the Bulgarians are up to date with everything that our marine and army

¹⁷ Romanian National Archives (RNA), The *General Police Department* Fund, File no. 94/1907, sheets 19-20.

do and plan, and they arrive on time to spy on them and get information on the matters that are of interest to them”¹⁸.

Due to this we must also show the ability of the DPGS to carry out external espionage actions. Due to the special importance given to the case, an experimented agent of the General Security, Grigore Radulescu, is sent to Sofia, in Bulgaria, in order to obtain more details related to the receiver of the parcel, the Bulgarian artillery lieutenant Hesapcieff. On this occasion Iancu Panaitescu assigns Radulescu to also obtain information on „a certain Mincoff, merchant and cards player, who sometimes comes to Romania and carries out espionage missions, as far as I am informed”¹⁹. In order not to look suspicious to the Bulgarian counter-espionage, he will be accompanied by his wife, who will contribute to the informative monitoring of the Bulgarian officer.

The Romanian agent-couple permanently monitors the lieutenant, establishing that he works at the „Army arsenal in Sofia, in the chemistry laboratory which prepared the explosive material for cannonballs”. They characterized him as being an especially scrupulous person, serious and very well seen by the Bulgarian officers with whom he had interacted, on different occasions, in town”²⁰.

Of great importance for the prevention of actions which could have affected the national security and internal order proved to be, on the 31st of March 1904, the adoption of the Regulation of the police and frontier, railways and harbours activities, through which the Frontier, Railways and Harbours Police is organized. It had the main mission of preventing the entrance of anarchist activists on national territory and annihilating the foreign services’ actions against Romania, by signalling to the General Security any possibly dangerous foreigner.

Mention must be made of the fact that the document made an exception for the arrivals/departures of the Romanian citizens from Austro-Hungarian and Czarist Russia. With this action Romanian refugees, who were pursued by the repressive Austro-Hungarian and Russian organs for participating in the national emancipation movement, were protected²¹.

From the notes and reports of the security or police agents up to the onset of the First World War, found in the archives, it can be seen that there was good collaboration between this frontier police with large prerogatives

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, sheet 21.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, sheet 30.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, sheets 22-24.

²¹ Vasile Bobocescu, *Momente din istoria Ministerului de Interne*, Editura MI, București, 2000, vol. I, pp. 82-84.

and the Department of Police and General State Security, a structure which officially came to life in March 1908.

**Actions of the Czarist military espionage on the national territory
Case study – Vladimir Nicolaevici**

A unique document, found in the Central National History Archives, shows an important part of the Russian military espionage network in Romania, presented by the very person who was considered a trustworthy spy, the lawyer Vasile Alexandrescu, from Iași. He had denounced to the General State Security the Czarist service's secret operation, presenting the Romanian citizens who were willing to procure, in exchange of particular amount of money, the information solicited by the Russian party.

With regard to this subject, the central „character” is the Russian citizen Vladimir Nicolaevici, considered a well-versed spy by the security, a specialist in the east European space, who often travelled to Bulgaria and Serbia. Practically, during 1914, due to the onset of the world war, the intelligence necessities grow exponentially, for all the belligerents who need information related to their declared enemies as well as neuter states like Italy or Romania.

In the Paper written by the deputy director Stan N. Emanuel and presented to the board of the DPGS on March the 2nd 1914²², it is shown that: „A part of the Russian military espionage in Romania is the espionage service organized especially for Moldova, with its central headquarters in Odessa, at the Russian Major Sate, the Odessa military circumscription ...The connection between Odessa and Iași is made by a certain Vladimir Nicolaevici, of Russian origin, a fake merchant, who was traveling to Romania very often and has been suspected of espionage for a long time.

From the examination of File no. 227, from the secret archive of the Department, it appears that this Vladimir Nicolaevici addressed lawyer Alexandrescu from Iași, suggesting that in exchange of a sum of money which he will receive monthly, he should take interest in the activity of these agents, and their Reports should be sent to Odessa.

Lawyer Alexandrescu denounced everything to the Department and since we were interested in knowing the military interest points of the

²² Romanian National Archives (RNA), The *General Police Department* Fund, File no. 1/1914, sheets 30-33.

Russians, as well as knowing who the persons doing this type of services to the Russians were, we requested that lawyer Alexandrescu accept the proposition.

Accepting he was immediately acquainted with the agents from all over the country, respectively: Vasile Gavrilesco, belt-maker established in Roman; Mihai Pălimaru, singer, retired sergeant in Bat. 8 Hunters, established in Husi; Mihail Christescu, the representative of the village federal cooperatives from Bucharest, living in Brăila.

The correspondence which is circulated between the recruited agents with lawyer Alexandrescu and between the latter and Vladimir Nicolaevici from Odessa is written by the known Russian procedure, namely by using chemical substances and revealing the writing with other substances.”

The urgency of the military information required by the imperial army and the (premeditated or contextual) delays with which Alexandrescu answered the requests of the Odessa headquarters, determine Vladimir Nicolaevici to enter the national territory on July 3rd 1913, accompanied by another „Russian subject”, Zeilich Champanier. Nicolaevici started a tour through Romania, starting in Iași, followed by Galați, Bucharest, Constanța, heading back to Russia on the 2nd of August 1913.

Important information for the DPGS board is transmitted by the same lawyer, who became a very valuable agent for the Romanian counterintelligence structures and was, ironically enough, appreciated by our adversaries as well. As a proof of confidence which he had gained with the Russian spy, Nicolaevici presents him with all the novelties, after returning from Iași and before going back to Russia: in Galați he had „four civilian informants with good material situations and extended military knowledge”, in Constanța he had hired yet another agent (from which we deduce that here he had already established an active espionage network). Although he did not communicate the name of these new „acquisitions” to the Romanian lawyer, he drops a very important detail for the Security, particularly that „the transmission of the written information from the counties neighboring Russia is made through some of our customs officers (Romanians)”²³.

²³ *Ibidem*, sheet 31. It could not be precisely established if this information transfer was possible due to our officers' corruption or the inventiveness of the Russian couriers.

Here is the type of information requested by the Russian military espionage, as it appears from the letters sent throughout September 1913 by Vladimir Nicolaevici to Alexandrescu:

„1. How the infantry, artillery, reserve units were organized during the mobilization.

2. How the troops transport was made on the railroads: in how many trains an infantry, artillery, cavalry regiment was transported.

3. How many reserve regiments were mobilized and their registration number.

4. Idem for artillery.

5. If it was possible for the Division no. 11 to be created at Dobrici and Division no. 12 at Mangalia”²⁴.

The urgency to collect military information determines Nicolaevici to return to Romania on the 25th of November 1913 (he will stay until the 23rd of December 1913) and then on the 12th of January 1914; practically, during 1914 he stays on our national territory for long periods of time, being constantly monitored by Security agents. The surveillance is carried out constantly, being registered on hundreds of report pages, each meeting, each move of the Russian citizen being supervised, to its most minute details.

One aspect becomes obvious from the surveillance of Nicolaevici, as well as the other „Russian subjects” suspected of being spies, and that is, the complex network created on Romanian territory throughout the past decades. In the capital, the Russian Consulate and the Russian Church were headquarters of these activities, for the Romanian agents mention that Nicolaevici frequently visited the Russian Consulate, and the Bailiff of this Consulate, Petre Terzici, had the mission of sending to Nicolaevici the correspondence sent by the Russian Major State from Odessa (according to a note that entered the Security’s possession).

„He almost permanently contacted many of those who were suspected by the Department for espionage, namely: Alexe Drosdov and Vorocilov from the Russian Chapel, priest Politoff from the Russian Church, merchant Teodor Godezlinschi, Russian captain Anatol Troitzki, the Russian military attaché etc...”²⁵.

Security’s agents register each of his journeys, including the states of mind through which the Russian spy goes through, as follows: „mention should be made of him awaiting with nervous gestures in different parts of the capital, as well as his stationing twice in front of the Artillery school, where he seemed to have been waiting for someone.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, sheets 31-31v.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, sheet 35v.

Among meetings which take place in the street and particular places, involving women of Russian nationality, a certain Nadia could be identified, who is also under surveillance and on which information is received.”²⁶. His activity is prolific, taking part almost daily in diverse meetings which are more or less conspired.

The thoroughness with which he promotes his legal status denotes a character with experience in espionage activities, the Security having observed that he is very careful that his official cover of Russian businessman remains credible. Therefore, he makes sure that he is always in possession of some catalogues with the industrial products of several Russian companies, as well as „papers with the visa of the Romanian consulate from Odessa, according to which he is a voyaging interpreter”.

In the end, as a conclusion, the Paper suggests that „this dangerous Russian military spy” be banished from Romania through a decision taken by DPGS. However, because of the interest shown by the intelligence structures in knowing about his connections in Romania, the decision was postponed indefinitely. Therefore his stay is allowed, but only under careful surveillance. His meeting with the already mentioned characters continue in Bucharest, especially with the Russian captain Anatol Troitzky and the priest Politoff from the Russian church (whom he also visits at home).

The importance given by the State Security to this espionage network also derives from the order given by the DPGS Director, Iancu Panaitescu, to receive personal reports containing the information resulting from Mihail Christescu’s surveillance, the representative of the village cooperatives’ federal from Bucharest.

A very interesting aspect, known by the national intelligence structures, was the exchange of secret letters between the Russian spy and lawyer Alexandrescu from Iasi, in May 1914. The Russian soldiers from Odessa were very upset by the lack of valuable information delivered by the Romanians (these were elaborated under the supervision of the General State Security); Nicolaevici was very explicit on this aspect: ”Your latest letters only contain general political information...which we cannot make use of.....What we do need is military intelligence...You have to urgently make the acquaintance of soldiers from troops established in Iasi, so that you can find out about the regiment’s lifestyle and write all about it to us.....You must provide us with all the information on the Romanian army...on the change of the army’s organization and on the formation of new units.....on the navy, cannons’ orders, clothing, guns, projectiles²⁷.”

²⁶ *Ibidem*, sheet 32.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, sheets 97-97v.

It was asked of him that this information be as detailed as possible, the Russian espionage being interested even by the possible financial offences registered at Romanian units, names of the officers who had received disciplinary penalties, incidents among officers, etc. It should be reminded that this type of „sensitive” information (focused on the officer’s daily life) led to the recruitment of the Austrian colonel Alfred Redl in the beginning of the XXth century (a particular success of the Russian intelligence officers) with catastrophic aftermaths for the Austro-Hungarian monarchy during the world conflagration.

In the second letter sent during the same month, lawyer Alexandrescu receives an ultimatum from the Russian military espionage: „You communicated to us that there is nothing new with regard to the army. That is a lie, now there is talk in Romania of establishing new units, orders have been made for the navy. A new 11th division will be established and you haven’t written anything about it. Very bad. If you intend to write in invisible ink, write on the new address instead of the old one: Russia – Odessa – Piskenovskaia No.19 loc. 4 Palaghee Dumitrieve Volodinoi.....If you should sent information without military content, we shall spare your services”²⁸.

It is obvious that the Russian spies disposed of functional networks in Romania, since they knew about the changes which had come up in the national military apparatus and they could not be fooled too easily. We can get an image of the relations the Russian „businessmen” in the Romanian society by tracking Vladimir Nicolaevici’s acquaintances in Bucharest, which contained militaries and civilians with particular social statuses.

He is seen in the company of many Romanian citizens, on some of whom there is further information. The surveillance team reports that on the 25th of May 1914, Nicolaevici meets two Romanian citizens at Café Bristol, one of them was an artillery lieutenant, identified as Vintilă Popescu, belonging to the Pitești garrison.

The supervision of Vladimir Nicolaevici’s activity in Bucharest between May and August 1914 meant an important logistical effort on the part of the institution’s employees, because of the fact that the persons he interacted with, had to be, in turn, supervised.

We will take, for example, Ludvig Copici, the hairdresser and administrator of a hair salon on Calea Victoriei, who was already suspected by the General Security of carrying out espionage actions for Petersburg. His behaviour had attracted the attention of the agents because „in the morning, at 7, when he exits the courtyard he takes a few minutes to observe

²⁸ *Ibidem*, sheets 105-105v.

the street, and only then does he leave for work, then at every crossroad he stops and checks whether he is being followed....”²⁹.

Agent no. 8 from the 1st Brigade of the State Security, which had the building (where the salon was) under surveillance, reports on the 10th of July 1914 that during the previous day, around 18 o'clock, Copici's wife went out of the beauty parlor and entered the Russian Imperial Consulate on Calea Victoriei, going up the stairs „to the right side apartment, where the Consul's Chancellery was, as I found out, and she remained there until 7 o'clock when her husband also went up, only to come back to the parlour fifteen minutes later.....

From the conversations I had with Mr. Costescu, a hatter who lives next to the Russian Legation, I found out by indirect and discrete questions that the Copicis were at the reception organized on the occasion of Mr. Fasanov's visit (the Russian Secretary), in June, this year. *The couple are known as devotees of the Russian Consul, often visiting him in his very apartments, not only in the Chancellery*”³⁰.

Taking into account the social and diplomatic status of the Consul his friendship to a hairdresser and his wife is suspicious (even if they manage the respective location). This aspect was also suggested by the Security's agents during the monitoring. Unfortunately, the notes and reports presented in the pages of the files from the Central Historical National Archives do not shed further light on this issue.

His „work” relations also extend to the army, as he frequently contacted an artillery officer during July 1914. The officer is lieutenant Ionescu, the son of a Romanian general in the army, according to an informant of the Security. The information will be transmitted to the leadership of the army, in particular general Dumitru Iliescu, the actual leader of the Great Major State.

The meetings take place at café Boulevard, in the centre of the capital, in the evenings, where the lieutenant goes to the table which is already occupied by the Russian. After having a couple of beers, the Romanian officer would accompany him home, where he would stay for at most an hour, heading back to his house afterwards. The close supervision of the Russian citizen was not able to provide details based on which we could draw a conclusion referring to a possible delivery of the Romanian army's secret documents or information to the Czarist espionage³¹.

Where Vladimr Nicolaevici is concerned, by the Galați Security Brigade's note, from the 6th of August 1914, the DPGS board is informed that he had left the country: „.....Today, the 6th of August, 8 a.m. he left the hotel,

²⁹ *Ibidem*, sheets 166-166v.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, sheets 171-171 v.

³¹ *Ibidem*, sheets 172-198v.

went to the Russian Agency and embarked on the Russian ship to Odessa. He was accompanied by the Russian journalist Ilios Gorelik...Nothing suspicious could be noticed as a result of V. Nicolaevici's monitoring"³².

Although the name of the Russian spy is not found in the reports of other GSS agents, there are many Russian citizens suspected of collecting both civilian and military information, which was necessary to the Czarist military to create a realistic picture of what Romania represented at that time, especially in the perspective of our engagement in the world war.

Conclusions

After being close to fulfilling their geopolitical goal of controlling the Straits³³, in 1878, Czarist Russia's politics towards Romania was constant and categorical during the next few decades; its objectives were to undermine and create, as much as possible, social and political unrest, to show „the civilized world” that the Romanian state was not viable and, consequently, did not deserve to exist inside the borders which the European powers had acknowledged.

Czarist Russia's espionage activity on Romanian territory was complex and focused on obtaining detailed knowledge concerning key political and economical aspects, as well as on the „informative control” of important political figures, organizing attempts on the lives of those who were uncomfortable for the imperial politics in the region.

A notable fact is that the secret agents' network was heavily supported by elements belonging to the strong Slav minority, which had already been established on our territory for generations. Moreover, after Romania was consolidated as a state, a large number of „Russian subjects” were registered in our country, looking for a better life.

As an example of direct intervention on the part of the Empire's representatives in the Romanian socio-political life during the latter decades of the XIXth century, we shall present the United Opposition's moment, which intended to overthrow, after violent upheaval, the liberal government lead by Ion C. Bratianu (March 1888).

The reputed journalist and politician, Constantin Bacalbasa, an eyewitness to the events, has left an eloquent testimony to this effect: „The Russians were not even worried about being discovered; the Russian legation's agents were present everywhere on the occasion of the street

³² *Ibidem*, sheet 199.

³³ The Russian troops had reached the capital of the Ottoman Empire, it was only the categorical opposition of England and the new European power, Germany, that prevented the Czarist Empire from breaking the balance of power at a continental level.

protests of the past few days. On the 15th of March the entire Russian legation, except the Secretary, was on Dealul Mitropoliei. The legation secretary, Lermontoff, stood so close to the fighters that he felt cartridge dust on his cheek”³⁴.

Beyond the expected confrontation between the Romanian and Czarist intelligence structures, we should take into account the existence of a certain degree of cooperation, during 1915-1916, given the public opinion's preference for Antanta. Subsequently, certain German-Austrian attempts to disrupt, on Romania's territory, the Serbian ammunition supply from its ally, Russia are annihilated³⁵.

Romania's entrance into the World War, in August 1916, transformed the Czarist Empire into an official ally, with whom we were supposed to have, at least officially, a close military and political cooperation. Nevertheless, this was not put into practice as it should have been, being one of the causes of the military disasters suffered by the Romanian army in the 1916 campaign. The modernization and transformation process undergone by the Romanian army in the winter of 1916/1917 materialized in a solid collaboration with the equivalent Russian intelligence structures.

The onset of the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 is followed by a period of restlessness which puts the relationships between the two allies on strain. Russia's exit from the war in December 1917 and the attempts to implement communism in Moldova, which was left under the control of the Romanian government (the winter of 1917) culminate with the breach of the diplomatic relations (January 1918) and the establishment of a very dangerous conflict for the new Romanian state, as Basarabia represented the great inter-state issue in the period between the two World Wars.

During the next few years the espionage structures of the Soviets (CEKA and later NKVD, as well as the military espionage – GRU) will try, using all the available means, to create social unrest and convulsions in Romania, which was considered an „imperialist state”. The confrontation will become a bloody and brutal one, the Secret Intelligence Service – SIS and 2nd Department of the Great Major State of the Romanian Army will stand out through their professionalism and the sacrifice spirit of the agents, civilians and militaries involved, many of whom paid with their lives for the intelligence collected from the Soviet Union. Moreover, after 1945 a heinous repression commanded by Kremlin unleashes over all of those who had handled the „communist issue” as functionaries of the intelligence structures.

³⁴ Constantin Bacalbaşa, *Bucureştii de altădată*, vol. III, Editura Albatros, Bucureşti, 2000, p. 124.

³⁵ Romanian National Archives (RNA), *The Department for General State Security Fund*, File nr. 177/1914, sheets 1-10.

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